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Abstract

This article offers a reinterpretation of the concurrent election practice in a multiparty presidential system. Traditionally, concurrent elections were designed as a constitutional mechanism to prevent political deadlock by aligning executive power with legislative support. However, the dynamics of contemporary presidentialism have raised a new problem: the threat to democracy now often comes from a president who is too powerful because he or she has succeeded in drawing nearly all political forces into an oversized coalition. This massive coalition ultimately becomes a tool of executive domination that legally narrows the space for opposition and undermines the oversight function of parliament. Considering that correcting the balance of power is extremely difficult midway through a term, since both the president and parliament possess direct democratic legitimacy, prevention must be implemented from the outset through the strategic design of the election schedule. Based on a doctrinal research method, this article proposes a solution in the form of "functional  concurrency", meaning the separation of elections based on their respective functions of power. This design divides the election schedule into two parts. The "Executive Day" is for electing the president and regional heads to consolidate the government's mandate, while the "Legislative Day" is for electing members of parliament midway through the president's term to create a mechanism for periodic evaluation (a midterm electoral check). Through this model, the purpose of elections is no longer merely to pursue maximum alignment, but rather to maintain a balance between a strong executive branch that governs and an independent legislative branch that oversees.

Bahasa Abstract

Artikel ini menawarkan pembacaan ulang terhadap praktik pemilu serentak dalam sistem presidensial multipartai. Secara klasik, pemilu serentak dirancang sebagai rekayasa konstitusional untuk mencegah kebuntuan politik dengan cara menyelaraskan kekuatan eksekutif dan dukungan legislatif. Namun, dinamika presidensialisme kontemporer memunculkan persoalan baru: ancaman demokrasi kini justru kerap datang dari presiden yang terlalu kuat karena berhasil menarik hampir seluruh kekuatan politik ke dalam koalisi super gemuk (oversized coalition). Koalisi raksasa ini pada akhirnya berubah menjadi alat dominasi eksekutif yang secara legal mempersempit ruang oposisi dan mengebiri fungsi pengawasan parlemen. Mengingat koreksi kekuasaan sangat sulit dilakukan di tengah jalan karena presiden dan parlemen sama-sama memiliki legitimasi demokratis secara langsung, pencegahan harus dilakukan sejak awal melalui rekayasa desain waktu pemilu. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian doktrinal, artikel ini  merumuskan solusi berupa "keserentakan fungsional" (functional simultaneity), yakni pemisahan pemilu berdasarkan fungsi kekuasaannya. Desain ini membagi waktu pemilu menjadi dua yaitu Hari Eksekutif untuk memilih presiden dan kepala daerah guna mengonsolidasikan mandat pemerintahan dan Hari Legislatif untuk memilih anggota parlemen di pertengahan masa jabatan presiden guna menciptakan mekanisme evaluasi berkala (midterm electoral check). Melalui model ini, tujuan pemilu tidak lagi sekadar mengejar keselarasan maksimal, melainkan menjaga keseimbangan antara eksekutif yang kuat memerintah dan legislatif yang mandiri dalam mengawasi.

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