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Constraining Citizenship: Presidential Threshold in Indonesia’s Judicial Framework

Abstract

This research critically evaluates the constitutionality of Indonesia's Presidential Threshold as regulated by Article 222 of Law No. 7/2017, requiring political parties or coalitions to secure 20% of DPR seats or 25% of national valid votes for presidential nominations. The term “Presidential Threshold” follows Constitutional Court jurisprudence, distinguishing it from the election threshold in Article 6A(3) requiring 50%+1 votes to win the presidency and the parliamentary threshold in Article 414 requiring 4% of votes for legislative seat allocation. Through normative legal analysis of Constitutional Court decisions No. 51-52-59/PUU-VI/2008, 53/PUU-XV/2017, and 62/PUU-XXII/2024, this study examines 33 judicial reviews from 2017 to 2025. Findings reveal that the Presidential Threshold restricts political participation by marginalizing small parties and independent candidates, fostering elite-driven coalitions, and undermining electoral justice. This contravenes the 1945 Constitution's principles of people's sovereignty in Article 1(2) and equal nomination rights in Article 6A. Comparative analysis with Brazil's runoff election system, which avoids nomination thresholds, highlights Indonesia's exclusionary framework that exacerbates polarization and weakens democratic legitimacy. The study concludes the Presidential Threshold perpetuates oligarchic dominance and recommends its abolition alongside reforming Constitutional Court standing rules to enhance inclusivity, strengthen judicial accountability, and align Indonesia's electoral system with substantive democratic principles.

Bahasa Abstract

Penelitian ini mengevaluasi secara kritis konstitusionalitas Presidential Threshold berdasarkan Pasal 222 Undang-Undang No. 7/2017, yang mensyaratkan partai politik atau koalisi memperoleh 20% kursi DPR atau 25% suara sah nasional untuk pencalonan presiden. Istilah “Presidential Threshold” mengikuti terminologi Mahkamah Konstitusi, membedakannya dari ambang batas terpilih dalam Pasal 6A ayat (3) yang mensyaratkan 50%+1 suara untuk memenangkan kepresidenan dan ambang batas parlemen dalam Pasal 414 yang mensyaratkan 4% suara untuk alokasi kursi legislatif. Melalui analisis hukum normatif terhadap putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 51-52-59/PUU-VI/2008, 53/PUU-XV/2017, dan 62/PUU-XXII/2024, penelitian menelaah 33 uji materiil periode 2017–2025. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa Presidential Threshold membatasi partisipasi politik dengan meminggirkan partai kecil dan kandidat independen, mendorong koalisi yang didominasi elit, dan merusak keadilan elektoral. Hal ini bertentangan dengan prinsip kedaulatan rakyat dalam Pasal 1 ayat (2) dan hak pencalonan setara dalam Pasal 6A UUD 1945. Analisis komparatif dengan sistem pemilu putaran kedua Brasil yang tidak menerapkan ambang batas pencalonan menyoroti kerangka eksklusif Indonesia yang memperparah polarisasi dan melemahkan legitimasi demokrasi. Penelitian menyimpulkan Presidential Threshold memperkuat dominasi oligarkis dan merekomendasikan penghapusannya serta reformasi kriteria kedudukan hukum Mahkamah Konstitusi untuk meningkatkan inklusivitas, memperkuat akuntabilitas yudisial, dan menyelaraskan sistem pemilu Indonesia dengan prinsip demokrasi substantif.

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Indonesia, Undang-Undang tentang Pemilihan Umum, UU No. 7 Tahun 2017, LN No. 182 Tahun 2017, TLN No. 6109, Pasal 222.

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