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TIPOLOGI PENGGUNAAN HUKUM TATA NEGARA DARURAT: SEBUAT STUDI LITERATUR

Abstract

This paper discusses a number of categorizations of countries in dealing with emergencies. The development of studies on this typology is classified after a comparison of the approaches of countries analyzed by a number of experts. There are at least nine models used in this paper, namely; Roman Dictatorship Model, Neo Roman Model, Constitutional Emergency Powers, Statutory Authorization, Extra-Legal Action, The Executive Dictatorship, The Legislative Dictatorship, and The War Government. Some of these types have similarities and intersections in their use. Understanding the birth of this typology will enrich alternatives in dealing with emergencies more effectively and proportionally.

Bahasa Abstract

Tulisan ini membahas mengenai sejumlah kategorisasi negara-negara dalam menghadapi kedaruratan. Perkembangan studi tentang tipologi ini diklasifikasi setelah melalui perbandingan dari pendekatan negara-negara yang dianalisis oleh sejumlah pakar. Setidaknya ada sembilan model yang digunakan dalam tulisan ini yakni; Roman Dictatorship Model, Neo Roman Model, Constitutional Emergency Powers, Statutory Authorization, Extra-Legal Action, The Executive Dictatorship, The Legislative Dictatorship, dan The War Government. Beberapa tipe ini memiliki kesamaan dan irisan dalam penggunaanya. Memahami lahirnya tipologi ini akan memperkaya alternative dalam menghadapi kedaruratan dengan lebih efektif dan proposional.

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[1] Ibid.

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[1] Ibid.

[1] Didier Fassien dan Mariella Pandolfi, Contemporary States of Emergency. The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions(New York: Zone Books, 2010), hlm. 44.

[1] John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, “The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers.” International Journal Of Constitutional Law 2 (2004), hlm. 210-239.

[1] Andrew W. Neal, “Normalization and legislative exceptionalism: Counterterrorist lawmaking and the changing times of security emergencies,” International Political Sociology 6( 2012), hlm. 260-276.

[1] Ibid.

[1] Didier Fassien dan Mariella Pandolfi, Contemporary states of emergency. The politics of military and humanitarian interventions (New York: Zone Books, 2010), hlm. 47.

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