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JURNAL KOMUNIKASI INDONESIA

Abstract

Intersubjective process of international communication may shape security issue which requires extraordinary policy. This article aimed to analyze how speech acts of a country leader securitize an issue and result in an extraordinary or distinct foreign policy. Donald Trump, the 45th President of the United States of America, demonstrated his blunt talkativeness through social media and formal speech acts, including on the North Korean nuclear issue during his presidency term. Despite of the regular focus placement of North Korea’s nuclear in the United States’ foreign policy since the 1990s, Trump leaves the issue during his campaign. Nevertheless, in 2017, the first year of his term, he shifted to expressing his enmity in line with the enactment of the maximum pressure strategy, which was the heaviest sanctions ever enacted on North Korea. This study applied the securitization theory by analyzing three assumptions that support Trump’s political communication style: the centrality of the audience, co-dependency of agency and context, and dispositive and structuring forces of practices. Using the qualitative-deductive method, this article found that Trump’s speech acts in 2017 securitized the North Korean nuclear threat as an unprecedented threat requiring an extraordinary policy of maximum pressure strategy.

Proses intersubyektif dari komunikasi politik di level internasional dapat membentuk suatu isu keamanan yang membutuhkan suatu kebijakan khusus. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk melakukan analisis bagaimana–tindak tutur (speech act) pemimpin suatu negara dalam melakukan sekuritisasi terhadap isu tertentu untuk menetapkan kebijakan luar negeri yang berada di luar kelaziman. Donald Trump, Presiden Amerika Serikat ke-45, seringkali melakukan komunikasi internasional secara blak-blakan melalui media sosial maupun pernyataan formal, termasuk mengenai isu nuklir Korea Utara. Meskipun isu nuklir Korea Utara sudah menjadi salah satu fokus kebijakan luar negeri Amerika Serikat sejak 1990-an, Trump tidak menjadikan isu ini sebagai salah satu fokus selama kampanyenya. Meskipun demikian, setelah menjabat pada tahun 2017, ia mulai menunjukkan permusuhan dengan Korea Utara melalui pemberlakuan strategi maximum pressure, yang merupakan sanksi terberat yang pernah diberlakukan kepada Korea Utara. Studi ini menggunakan teori sekuritisasi dengan menganalisis tiga asumsi yang mendukung tindak tutur Trump: sentralitas audiens, saling-ketergantungan antara agen dan konteks, serta dispositif dan kekuatan struktur praktik. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif-deduktif, studi ini menemukan bahwa tindak tutur Trump pada tahun 2017 berhasil mengangkat ancaman nuklir Korea Utara ke level yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya dan membutuhkan kebijakan baru di luar kelaziman selama ini, yaitu strategi maximum pressure.

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