Abstract
Reputasi dan Kredibilitas sebagai Upaya untuk Mengatasi Masalah Koordinasi dan Reformasi yang Berkelanjutan
Bahasa Abstract
Reputasi dan Kredibilitas sebagai Upaya untuk Mengatasi Masalah Koordinasi dan Reformasi yang Berkelanjutan
References
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Recommended Citation
Indrawati, Sri Mulyani; Kuncoro, Ari; and Ikhsan, Mohamad
(2019)
"Reputasi dan Kredibilitas sebagai Upaya untuk Mengatasi Masalah Koordinasi dan Reformasi yang Berkelanjutan,"
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Pembangunan Indonesia: Vol. 19:
No.
2, Article 8.
DOI: 10.21002/jepi.2019.16
Available at:
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/jepi/vol19/iss2/8
