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Abstract

The volatility of expenditures sub-local derived from central government transparency in transfers to local governments may aggravate sublocal economy. This study aims to analyze the effect of fiscal decentralization to the level of volatility of local government spending in 230 sub-local in Indonesia. We use two periods, before and after the implementation of Law No. 28 Year 2009. The regression results indicate that the volatility of local government spending may decrease if the degree of fiscal decentralization increases, especially at the time when districts implement that law. As responsive taxation can provide incentives for smooth spending for sub-local government.

Bahasa Abstract

Volatilitas belanja pemerintah kabupaten/kota yang berasal dari ketidakpastian transfer pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah dapat memperburuk perekonomian kabupaten/kota. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh desentralisasi fiskal terhadap tingkat volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah pada 230 kabupaten/kota di Indonesia serta membandingkan data sebelum dan sesudah implementasi UU No. 28 Tahun 2009. Hasil menunjukkan semakin tinggi derajat desentralisasi fiskal, cenderung menurunkan volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah kabupaten/kota karena kemampuan fiskal kabupaten/kota cenderung meningkat setelah implementasi UU tersebut. Pajak properti merupakan sumber penerimaan daerah yang dapat diprediksi sehingga pemerintah kabupaten/kota dapat mengelola belanja daerahnya dengan lebih pasti dan terukur.

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