•  
  •  
 

Abstract

This research was conducted because the uncertainty in the tax amnesty policy. The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of taxpayer’s expectation of future tax amnesty, tariff period system, tax penalty and audit towards tax compliance in tax amnesty policy, using experimental economics. The result shows that, a tax amnesty followed by strict audit and tax penalties will rise tax compliance. Tax amnesty policy is best applied once in a lifetime, because the expectation of the taxpayers towards future tax amnesty will result in lowering the compliance. Taxpayers prefer the lowest rate on tariff period.

Bahasa Abstract

Penelitian ini dilakukan karena ketidakpastian keberhasilan dari kebijakan pengampunan pajak. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh dari faktor ekspektasi masyarakat akan adanya pengampunan pajak di kemudian hari, sistem tarif pengampunan, denda, dan pemeriksaan pajak terhadap kepatuhan pada kebijakan pengampunan pajak dengan menggunakan metode ekonomi ekperimental. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pengampunan pajak diikuti dengan penerapan denda dan pemeriksaan yang ketat akan meningkatkan kepatuhan pajak. Kebijakan pengampunan pajak sebaiknya diterapkan satu kali saja karena jika masyarakat berekspektasi akan adanya kebijakan serupa di kemudian hari, wajib pajak akan menunggu kebijakan tersebut dan tetap tidak patuh. Wajib pajak umumnya menyukai tarif pengampunan terendah.

References

[1] Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3–4), 323–338. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2.

[2] Alm, J., McKee, M., & Beck, W. (1990). Amazing grace: Tax amnesties and compliance. National Tax Journal, 43(1), 23–37.

[3] Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Wallace, S. (2009). Do Tax Amnesties Work? The Revenue Effects of Tax Amnesties During the Transition in the Russian Federation. Economic Analysis and Policy, 39(2), 235–253. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926(09)50019-7.

[4] Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2), 818–860.

[5] Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M., & Torgler, B. (2005). Effects of tax morale on tax compliance: Experimental and survey evidence. International Studies ProgramWorking Paper 05-16. International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Diakses 25 Maret 2017 dari https://icepp. gsu.edu/files/2017/09/ispwp-0516.pdf.

[6] DJP. (2016, 23 Maret). Refleksi tingkat kepatuhan wajib pajak. Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, Kementerian Keuangan.

[7] DJPBN. (2018). Realisasi APBNP Tahun Anggaran 2017 [Tanggal 1 Januari s.d 31 Desember 2017]. Direktorat Jenderal Perbendaharaan, Kementerian Keuangan. Diakses 2 Januari 2018 dari http://www.djpbn.kemenkeu.go.id.

[8] DJBN-Kemenkeu. (2016). Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara 2011–2016. Kementrian Keuangan. http://www. kemenkeu.go.id.

[9] Feld, L. P., & Frey, B. S. (2002). Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated. Economics of Governance, 3(2), 87–99. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s101010100032.

[10] Fortin, B., Lacroix, G., & Villeval, M. C. (2007). Tax evasion and social interactions. Journal of Public Economics, 91(11–12), 2089–2112. doi: https: //doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.005.

[11] Friedman, D., & Sunder, S. (1994). Experimental methods: A primer for economists. Cambridge University Press.

[12] Gastwirth, J. L., Gel, Y. R., & Miao, W. (2009). The impact of Levene’s test of equality of variances on statistical theory and practice. Statistical Science, 24(3), 343–360. doi: 10.1214/09-STS301.

[13] Ibrahim, M. A., Myrna, R., Irawati, I., & Kristiadi, J. B. (2017). A systematic literature review on tax amnesty in 9 Asian countries. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 7(3), 220–225.

[14] Indonesia, R. (2016). Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2016 Tentang Pengampunan Pajak.

[15] Juanda, B. (2009). Metode penelitian ekonomi dan bisnis, Ed ke-2. Bogor: IPB Press.

[16] Juanda, B. (2010). Ekonomi eksperimental untuk pengembangan teori ekonomi dan pengkajian suatu kebijakan. Orasi Ilmiah Guru Besar IPB dalam rangka Diesn Natalis IPB ke-47, 25 September 2010.

[17] Juanda, B., Ridiawati, I., & Maryati. (2010). Kajian tingkat kepatuhan pajak dalam sistem self-assesment dengan metode eksperimen. Departemen Ilmu Ekonomi, Fakultas Ekonomi dan Manajemen IPB.

[18] Juanda, B., et al. (2017). Ekonomi eksperimental untuk mengkaji pengaruh kekayaan, ekspektasi, periode tarif, denda dan pemeriksaan terhadap kepatuhan wajib pajak pada kebijakan pengampunan pajak. forthcoming.

[19] Leonard, H. B., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1987). Amnesty, enforcement, and tax policy. Tax Policy and the Economy, 1, 55–85.

[20] Lerman, A. H. (1986). Tax amnesty: The federal perspective. National Tax Journal, 39(3), 325–332.

[21] Malik, A. S., & Schwab, R. M. (1991). The economics of tax amnesties. Journal of Public Economics, 46(1), 29–49. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(91)90063-8.

[22] Marchese, C. (2014). Tax amnesties. IEL paper in Comparative Analysis of Institutions, Economics and Law No. 17. Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. Diakses 25 Maret 2017 dari http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ ucaiel/iel017.pdf.

[23] Massey Jr., F. J. (1951). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of fit. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 46(253), 68–78.

[24] Mattiello, G. (2005). Multiple tax amnesties and tax compliance (forgiving seventy times seven).Working Paper 06/2005. Venezia: Universita Ca’ Foscari. Diakses 25 Maret 2017 dari https://www.unive.it/media/allegato/DIP/Economia/ Working papers/Working papers 2005/0506.pdf.

[25] Mattjik, A. A. & Sumertajaya, I. M. (2006). Perancangan percobaan dengan aplikasi SAS dan MINITAB, Ed ke-2. Bogor: IPB Press.

[26] Montgomery, D. C. (2013). Design and analysis of experiments, 8th. ed. USA: John Wiley & Sons.

[27] Nar, M. (2015). The effects of behavioral economics on tax amnesty. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 5(2), 580–589.

[28] Pommerehne, W. W., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (1996). Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland. Public Choice, 88(1–2), 161–170. doi: https: //doi.org/10.1007/BF00130416.

[29] Ragimun. (2014). Analisis implementasi pengampunan pajak (tax amnesty) di Indonesia.

[30] Rechberger, S., Hartner, M., Kirchler, E., & Hammerle, F. K. (2010). Tax amnesties, justice perceptions, and filing behavior: A simulation study. Law & Policy, 32(2), 214–225. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2009.00316.x.

[31] Ritsema, C. M., Thomas, D. W., & Ferrier, G. D. (2003). Economic and behavioral determinants of tax compliance: Evidence from the 1997 Arkansas tax penalty amnesty program. Paper Presented at the 2003 IRS Research Conference, June 2003, Washington, D.C.. Diakses 25 Maret 2017 dari https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ritsema.pdf.

[32] Saracoglu, O. F., & Caskurlu, E. (2011). Tax amnesty with effects and effecting aspects: Tax compliance, tax audits and enforcements around; The Turkish case. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(7), 95–103.

[33] Schneider, F. & Enste, D. (2002). Hiding in the shadows: The growth of the underground economy. IMF Economic Issues No. 30. International Monetary Fund. Diakses 25 Maret 2017 dari https://www.imf. org/en/Publications/Economic-Issues/Issues/2016/12/30/ Hiding-in-the-Shadows-The-Growth-of-the-Underground- Economy-15521.

[34] Slemrod, J., Blumenthal, M.,&Christian, C. (2001). Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota. Journal of Public Economics, 79(3), 455-483. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047- 2727(99)00107-3.

[35] Smith, V. L. (1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory. The American Economic Review, 66(2), 274–279.

[36] Williams, L. J., & Abdi, H. (2010). Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test. In Neil Salkind (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Research Design, 218, 840–853.

Download

Included in

Economics Commons

Share

COinS
 
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.