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Abstract

Sustainability of System of Rice Intensification (SRI) requires rural institution role. The study was conducted in Karawang and uses institutional economics approach and logit regression. The analysis shows potential problems of SRI related with principal-agent/institutional relation and economics transaction costs. Strengthening the activities within farmer groups will reduce economics transaction costs in beginning of application. Farmer will choose "bagi hasil/revenue sharing" as land management cooperation with moderate risks and transaction costs. Monitoring and incentive mechanism will reduce problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Some factors which determine the sustainability of SRI are production, principal position, off farm work and ex ante transaction costs.

Bahasa Abstract

Keberlanjutan penerapan metode System of Rice Intensification (SRI) membutuhkan peran kelembagaan perdesaan. Studi dilakukan di Kabupaten Karawang dan menggunakan pendekatan kelembagaan ekonomi dan regresi logit. Hasil analisis menunjukkan potensi problem metode SRI terkait hubungan kelembagaan principal-agent dan biaya transaksi ekonomi. Penguatan kinerja kelembagaan perdesaan melalui kegiatan bersama dalam kelompok tani mengurangi biaya transaksi ekonomi pada awal aplikasi SRI. Pilihan kerja sama pengelolaan lahan pola bagi hasil banyak dipilih terkait risiko dan biaya transaksi yang moderat. Potensi masalah berupa moral hazard dan adverse selection dapat dikurangi dengan pemantauan dan mekanisme insentif. Faktor determinan keberlanjutan penerapan metode SRI adalah peningkatan produksi padi, posisi sebagai pemilik lahan, pekerjaan di luar usaha tani, dan biaya transaksi sebelum pelaksanaan.

References

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