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Abstract

The intergovernmental transfer system currently applied in Indonesia is intended to prevent the intervention of political powers. However, there are indications of political determinants behind central government transfers to sub-national governments. In order to prove the existence of these political factors, this research utilizes empirical panel data models of Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU), Dana Dekonsentrasi and Tugas Pembantuan using political variables. Results show that while there are no significant political variables in the DAU and Dana Dekonsentrasi models, there is a political determinant behind the amount of Dana Tugas Pembantuan, where a higher seat share for the Golkar party representing a province in the national parliament will entitle the province to a relatively higher share of the Dana Tugas Pembantuan.

Bahasa Abstract

Sistem transfer antarpemerintah di Indonesia dibuat dengan tujuan mencegah campur tangan politik terhadap sistem transfer pemerintah. Namun begitu, terdapat indikasi keberadaan determinan politik dalam menentukan transfer pemerintah pusat terhadap pemerintah daerah. Untuk membuktikan keberadaan faktor-faktor politik tersebut, digunakan model data panel yang berusaha menunjukkan determinan politik pada Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) serta Dana Dekonsentrasi dan Tugas Pembantuan. Hasil studi menemukan bahwa tidak ada campur tangan politik dalam menentukan transfer DAU dan Dana Dekonsentrasi, namun ditemukan determinan politik pada Dana Tugas Pembantuan, di mana provinsi yang memiliki proporsi kursi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Partai Golkar yang lebih tinggi mendapatkan Dana Tugas Pembantuan yang lebih besar.

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