•  
  •  
 

Abstract

This paper discusses how fragmented perceptions of threat impact the outcome of international security cooperation. It analyses the impacts of Japan’s expanding security posture in Southeast Asia, specifically focusing on the Japan-China great power rivalry in the region. While previous research has examined Japan’s intention to intensify its security engagement with Southeast Asian countries, this paper aims to study the broader impact of Japan’s expanding security cooperation on the region's security constellation. To achieve this objective, the paper employs Japan-Indonesia security and defence cooperation as a case study. The research found that, despite strengthening bilateral relations, the increasing Japan-Indonesia security cooperation does not alter the Japan-China power balance in the region or Indonesia’s stance on China. This is primarily because Japan and Indonesia hold divergent threat perceptions regarding China. Furthermore, Indonesia maintains its strategic independence and a distinct geostrategic vision. This finding suggests that while intensified security and defence cooperation between states may enhance security capabilities and strengthen bilateral ties, the actual utilisation of those acquired capabilities depends critically on each state’s perception of threat concerning specific security challenges.

Bahasa Abstract

Artikel ini membahas bagaimana perbedaan persepsi ancaman memengaruhi hasil kerja sama keamanan internasional, dengan fokus pada ekspansi postur keamanan Jepang di Asia Tenggara dalam konteks rivalitas Jepang–Tiongkok. Berbeda dari penelitian sebelumnya yang menyoroti intensi Jepang untuk memperkuat keterlibatan keamanannya, penelitian ini menelaah dampak perluasan kerja sama tersebut terhadap konstelasi keamanan kawasan. Sebagai studi kasus, penelitian ini menyoroti kerja sama keamanan dan pertahanan Jepang–Indonesia. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa meskipun hubungan bilateral kedua negara semakin erat, peningkatan kerja sama tersebut tidak mengubah keseimbangan kekuatan Jepang–Tiongkok maupun sikap Indonesia terhadap Tiongkok. Hal ini terjadi karena Jepang dan Indonesia memiliki persepsi ancaman yang berbeda terhadap Tiongkok. Selain itu, Indonesia mempertahankan independensi strategis serta visi geostrategisnya di kawasan Indo-Pasifik. Temuan ini menunjukkan bahwa meskipun intensifikasi kerja sama keamanan dapat memperkuat kemampuan pertahanan dan hubungan antarnegara, pemanfaatan kapabilitas yang dihasilkan sangat bergantung pada persepsi masing-masing negara terhadap ancaman. Dengan demikian, fragmentasi persepsi ancaman menjadi faktor penting yang menentukan efektivitas dan arah kerja sama keamanan antarnegara di kawasan.

References

Agusman, D. D. (2023). Natuna Waters: Explaining a Flashpoint between Indonesia and China. Indonesian Journal of International Law, 20(4), 617 - 648.

Anwar, D. F. (2019, March 28). Indonesia-China Relations: To Be Handled With Care. ISEAS Perspective, 19, 1-7.

Anwar, D. F. (2020). Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. International Affairs, 96(1), 111-129.

Arif, M. (2021). Balancing with Jokowi’s Characteristics: A Neoclassical Realism Approach to Indonesia’s Foreign and Security Policies in the South China Sea. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 8(3), 370-390.

Bao, G. (2022). China–US Strategic Competition and Indonesia’s Status Anxiety. East Asian Affairs, 2(2), 1-19.

Bojiang, Y. (2021). Japan and Changes of International Order: Concepts and Countermeasures. East Asian Affairs, 1(1), 1-19.

Cahyono, F. D. (2023). Personal interview [In-person interview]. Head of the International Cooperation Centre, Indonesian National Armed Forces.

Cohen, R. (1978). Threat Perception in International Crisis. Political Science Quarterly, 93(1), 93-107.Agusman, D. D. (2023). Natuna Waters: Explaining a Flashpoint between Indonesia and China. Indonesian Journal of International Law, 20(4), 617 - 648.

Darmawan, A. R. (2023, September 6). The Fix: Explaining Indonesia’s silence in the North Natuna Sea. Retrieved from The Interpreter: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/fix-explaining-indonesia-s-silence-north-natuna-sea

Dharmaputri, A. R., & Syawfi, I. (2022). Japan in the South China Sea: Restricted yet Strategic? Intermestic: Journal of International Studies, 6(2), 478-498.

Gindarsah, I. (2017). Chapter 2 Indonesia’s Strategic Hedging and the South China Sea. NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs 2017: Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific (pp. 25-36). Tokyo: The National Institute for Defence Studies.

Guild, J. (2022, February 8). Is There an Arms Race Underway in Southeast Asia?. Retrieved from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/is-there-an-arms-race-underway-in-southeast-asia/

Haddock, G., & Maio, G. R. (2008). Attitudes: Content, Structure and Functions. In M. Hewstone, W. Stroebe, & K. Jonas, Introduction to Social Psychology, 4th edition (pp. 112-133). Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.

Hatta, M. (1953). Indonesia's Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs, 31(3), 441-452.

Hughes, C. W. (2018). Japan’s security policy in the context of the US–Japan alliance: The emergence of an “Abe Doctrine”. In J. D. Brown & J. Kingston, Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia (pp. 49-60). London and New York: Routledge.

Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (1987). How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model. The American Political Science Review, 81(4), 1099-1120.

Irsadanar, R. J. (2023, August). Japan’s Security Policy Expansion in Southeast Asia during Shinzo Abe Administration: Case of Japan-Indonesia Security Cooperation. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 10(2).

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kyodo News. (2022, December 17). China says Japan's defence shift provokes 'regional tension'. Retrieved from The Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/12/17/national/japan-defence-china-reaction/

Laksmana, E. A. (2021, December 10). Indonesia's response to China’s incursions in North Natuna Sea unsatisfactory: Indonesian academic. Retrieved from Think China: https://www.thinkchina.sg/indonesias-response-chinas-incursions-north-natuna-sea-unsatisfactory-indonesian-academic

Lamont, C., & Boduszynski, M. P. (2020). Collecting Data for Qualitative Methods. In C. Lamont & M. P. Boduszynski, Research Methods in Politics and International Relations (pp. 97-113). London: SAGE Publications.

Lande, E. (2018). Between Offensive and Defensive Realism – The Japanese Abe Government’s Security Policy toward China. Asian Security, 14(2), 172-192.

Liff, A. P. (2018). Japan’s Security Policy in the “Abe Era”: Radical Transformation or Evolutionary Shift? Texas National Security Review, 1(3), 9-34.

Liff, A. P., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2014). Racing toward Tragedy? : China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma. International Security, 39(2), 52–91.

Lowry, R. (2017, September 4). Does Indonesia Need to Rethink its Foreign Policy? Retrieved from Australian Institute of International Affairs: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/indonesia-still-free-active/

Luis, E. S., & Dwiastuti, I. (2024). Japan's Increasing Threat Perception Of China Influence Its Decision to Re-Engage the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in 2017. Sociae Polites: Majalah Ilmiah Sosial Politik, 25(2), 77-89.

Matthews, A. D. (September 7th, 2023). Personal interview and written statements [In-person interview and written statements]. Aide Officer 5 for Naval Strategy and Diplomacy, Indonesian Navy.

Ministry of Defence of Republic of Indonesia. (2015). Indonesian Defence White Paper 2015. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017, January 15). Japan-Indonesia Joint Statement on Strengthening Strategic Partnership. Retrieved from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000218457.pdf

Nakano, R. (2023). Japan and the liberal international order: rules-based, multilateral, inclusive and localised. International Affairs, 99(4), 1421–1438.

Oren, E., & Brummer, M. (2020). Threat perception, government centralization, and political instrumentality in Abe Shinzo’s Japan. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 74(6), 721-745.

Parameswaran, P. (2023, November 8). The future of Indonesia-China relations after Jokowi. Retrieved from Geopolitical Intelligence Services: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/indonesian-chinese-relations/

Prabowo, M. A. (2021). How Does Japan Perceive China as an Adversary? The Dispute in Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 4(2), 217-230.

Pribadi, Y. A. (August 31th, 2023). Personal interview [In-person interview]. Regional Coordinator of East Asia 2, Japan Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.

Rapp-Hooper, M., Chase, M. S., Kamiya, M., Kawashima, S., & Hosoya, Y. (2019, October 10). Responding to China’s Complicated Views on International Order. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/responding-to-china-s-complicated-views-on-international-order-pub-80021

Reuters. (2019, December 31). Indonesia protests to China over border intrusion near South China Sea. Retrieved from The Asahi Shimbun: https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13056077

Sakaki, A. (2025). SWP Research Paper: Japan in Southeast Asia: Countering China’s Growing Influence. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Seungyun, K. (2025). Recalibrating Aid, Reshaping Security Strategy: The Strategic Logic Behind Japan’s Official Security Assistance. The Korean Journal of International Studies, 23(2), 357-393.

Sharp, A. (2022, February 23). Asia's arms race: China spurs military spending spree. Retrieved from Nikkei Asia: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Asia-s-arms-race-China-spurs-military-spending-spree

Shiwei, S. (2022, November 14). BRI Projects & Programs: China-proposed BRI and Indonesia's GMF highly synergised. Retrieved from CGTN News: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-11-14/BRI-Projects-Programs-China-s-BRI-and-Indonesia-s-GMF-highly-synergized-1eXfXdmjFcc/index.html

Shoji, T. (2023, August 24). Japan’s Security Policy on ASEAN ― On the 50th Year of Friendship and Cooperation. Retrieved from Sasakawa Peace Foundation: https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/shoji_17.html

Singh, B. (2015). The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy. Asia Policy (19), 49-64.

Stein, J. G. (2013). Threat Perception in International Relations. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy, The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (pp. 364–394). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sulaiman, Y. (2019). What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea. Asian Politics and Policy, 11(4), 606-622.

Sulaiman, Y. (2019, January). Whither Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy? Asie.Visions(105).

Suryadinata, L. (2020, February 19). Recent Chinese Moves in the Natunas Riles Indonesia. ISEAS Perspective, 10, 1-8.

Syailendra, E. A. (2017). A Nonbalancing Act: Explaining Indonesia’s Failure to Balance Against the Chinese Threat. Asian Security, 13(3), 237-255.

The Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. (2017, December 13). Retrieved from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000323211.pdf

Umar, A. R., & Santoso, Y. N. (2023). AUKUS and Southeast Asia’s Ontological Security Dilemma. International Journal, 78(3), 435–453.

Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. New York: Cornell University Press.

Wicaksana, I. G. (2019). Indonesia in the South China Sea: Foreign Policy and Regional Order. Global Strategis, 13(2), 35-48.

Widiatmaja, A., & Albab, U. (2019). Indonesia under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Joko Widodo: Foreign Policy in the Middle of Regional Strategic Environment Dynamics. Politica, 10(1), 77-93.

Yeremia, A. E. (2022). Indonesian diplomats’ and foreign policy scholars’ perceptions and their implications on Indonesian foreign ministry bureaucratic responses to a rising China. The Pacific Review, 35(3), 529–556.

Share

COinS