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From Bali to Copenhagen: Indonesia's Position and Role in International Negotiation to Establish a Post-Kyoto Protocol Agreement on Climate Change

Syamsul Hadi¹

In the light of upcoming end of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, international society is in the urgent need to arrange a new international agreement to cope more with the issue that has been threatening both today and the future generation. In this context, Indonesia has attempted to contribute a positive role to seek international consensus on the climate change negotiations, including by becoming the host of Un Conference on Climate Change in Bali (2007), which resulted in the Bali Roadmap and Bali Action Plan, both of which has become important stepping stone for the Post-Kyoto Protocol international regime. However, the Copenhagen Conference (2009), which was designed to finish the Post-Kyoto Protocol Agreement had notably failed to provide such international consensus, due to the various different views, interests and perspectives amongst developed and developing countries that caused to failure to reach a new binding agreement on the issue of climate change.

Keywords: *climate change, negotiation, Kyoto Protocol, developed countries, developing countries, Indonesian role*

I. Background

Climate change is certainly a unique issue in international relations, as its very condition could not be solved without an intensive coordination

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and cooperation from countries all around the world. Of the most important international agreement in this issue was the Kyoto Protocol (1997), which was designed to quantitatively and timely-scheduled reduce carbon emission, especially for the developed countries. The protocol brings foundation for those industrialized countries to reduce their cumulative green house gases (GHG) emission of at least 5 percent from 1990 level prior to 2008-2012.²

The Kyoto Protocol has been implemented since February 2005, after the Russia Federation ratified it in 2004. Unfortunately, such protocol has been undergoing without any participation from the United States (US), which despite become the biggest GHG emitter in the world, decided to turn it down. In the light of upcoming end of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, international society is in the urgent need to arrange a new international agreement to cope more with the issue that has been threatening both today and the future generation.

As a part of internasional society, Indonesia has attempted to contribute a positive role to seek international consensus on the climate change negotiations, including by becoming the host of United Nations (UN) Conference on Climate Change (the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties or COP-13) in Bali, December 2007. The conference has resulted in the *Bali Roadmap* and *Bali Action Plan*, both of which has become important stepping stone for the Post-Kyoto Protocol international regime. However, the Copenhagen Conference (December 2009), which was designed to finish the Post-Kyoto Protocol Agreement had notably failed to provide such international consensus, due to the various different views and persepctives that caused to failure to reach a new binding agreement on the issue of climate change.

This article will discuss Indonesia's position on this international negotiation, focusing mostly on description and analysis of the process and how Indonesia involved and contributed to such negotiations. I would firstly describe the theoretical perspective which is important as a kind of theretical guide for this discussain, which would be followed by a narration on the difference between developed countries and developing countries in seeing the issue of climate change and how to resolve it. Than I would describe Indonesia's general position and interest in climate change negotiation, by trying to locate it in the context of the dynamics of climate change ne-

2 Daniel Murdiyarso, *Protokol Kyoto: Implikasinya Bagi Negara Berkembang*, Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2003, p. 4.

gotiations, especially in relation with different views between developed and developing countries in Bali and Copenhagen Climate Change Conferences. Finally, I would make some concluding remarks as well as notes for the future of Indonesian role in this 'climate diplomacy'.

II. Theoretical Perspectives

A. Climate Change and International Regime

The dynamics of international relations in the 21st century has been coloured by various processes and issues that need global-based collective actions. The direction of globalization also determines by the capacity of international community to collectively provide public goods, not only by a single nation.³ Peace and security, financial stability, and prevention of infectious diseases are among the global public goods that can not be achieved without high degree of international coordination. Nowadays, one of the most highlighted global public goods is prevention as well as mitigation of climate change, especially related to the global warming.

The issue of public goods and collective actions have been widely discussed since the 1970s, especially after the introduction of international regime theory. The theory basically examines the existence of states within the anarchical international system, as the absence of world government contributes to the vision of world governance.

Stephen Krasner (2009) defines regime as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. In Krasner's definition, international agreement can be seen as 'explicit regime'. Meanwhile, K.J. Holsti (1992) defines regime as rules, regulations, norms, and principles that guide and govern transactions and the solutions of problems or issue areas that affect two or more states. Some regimes are institutionalized in the sense that they include special multinational monitoring and enforcement agencies, but many are embodied only in treaties and even in less formal undertakings⁵.

3 Ernesto Zedillo, "Introduction", in Ernesto Zedillo (ed), *Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto*, Washington, DC: Center for Study of Globalization & Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p. 1

4 Stephen D. Krasner, *Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Eassays on International Relations*, London and New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 113

5 K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis*, Sixth Edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992, p. 383

According to the Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy⁶, regime should be understood as something more than just a temporary or short-run matter, residing merely on short-term interest calculation. Regime is different from ad-hoc agreement or one-shut arrangements like armistice during a war. Thus, a regime should include the principle of general obligation and reciprocity. The latter enables a state to give up its short-term interest in order to anticipate others' counter-measures.

Regime has two-hand aspects: (1) principles and norms; (2) rules and procedures. Regime change is fundamental if there are changes in the principles and norms, which means the regime change itself. Changes in rules and procedures is also a 'change' within the regime, although it is not a fundamental one.

B. International Regime, Diplomacy, and National Interest

Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy has also put forward three schools of thought in regards to regime:⁷

1. Stressing on the aspect of power. It states that regime formed as the dominant actor (the hegemon) chooses to extend its influence to existing actors through constitutional contract, which is a characteristic of a regime;
2. Stressing on interest. It emphasizes on bargaining process to gain consensus resulting in the reduction of transaction cost. It is in this group there are those who stress on the knowledge aspects and epistemic community;
3. Seeing regime as a 'self-generating' phenomenon. Among its proponent is Friedrich von Hayek and other ultra-liberalist.

This paper will adopt the first two school of thought to see regime formation. In other words, we will see the importance of power and interest in the bargaining processes and negotiations in issues related to climate change. In the context of regime as a result of bargaining process between actors, its very existence can not be separated from inter-state diplomacy. According to Daniel S. Papp, diplomacy is the implementation of an international actor's policies, wishes, and interests toward other actors. Consequently, this action establishes a set of expectations about what an interna-

⁶ Barry Jones (ed), *Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 1321-1325

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1321-1322

tional actor will and will not do.⁸ Diplomacy has various objectives:⁹ (1) to exchange views, to show wishes, and to convince others that the proposal they bring suits all actors' interests; (2) in the bilateral and multilateral context, to show as if a state wishes to bargain although in fact they don't feel attracted to conclude anything; (3) as a propaganda tool; and (4) to achieve agreement.

Diplomacy is an important instrument of a state's foreign policy. It has been a general and underlying assumption that a state's foreign policy is derived from national interest, which in the word of David E. Nuchterlein, is needs and wishes of a state on its relations to external environment, namely other state.¹⁰ In this sense, national interest could be a subjective concept, depending on elite's point of views and tendencies.

III. Analysis

A. The Kyoto Protocol and Different Standing between Developed and Developing Countries

In the last few decades, international community has been continually discussing on how to effectively respond to climate change issue. Back into 1992, there has been United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), mostly known as the Earth Summit, which enunciated an important convention on climate change (the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change/ UNFCCC), designed to stabilize green house gases (GHG) concentration in the atmosphere.

Focusing on stabilization issue, the convention implicitly takes the stance that climate change obliges emission reduction at all cost.¹¹ The convention, which has been signed by 189 countries including the USA, has triggered a series of negotiation aiming to reduce GHG emission to the 1990 level. Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), formed by the UN, has conducted some conferences, including the one in Kyoto, De-

⁸ Daniel S. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations: Framework for Understanding*, New York: Allyn and Bacon, 1997, p. 437.

⁹ K.J. Holsti, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

¹⁰ Donald E. Nuchterlein, "The Concept of National Interest: a Time for a New Approach", in *Orbis*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1979, p. 75.

¹¹ Warwick J. McKibbin, "Indonesia in a Changing Global Environment", in Budy P. Resosudarmo (ed), *The Politics and Economics of Indonesia's Natural Resources*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005, p. 62.

cember 1997, producing the 'Kyoto Protocol', which clearly set the GHG emission reduction target to as much as 5.12 percent until 2012.

Although the Kyoto Protocol provides detailed mechanism regarding responsibilities to reduce global emission, even in the very beginning it is clear that such an international cooperation is hard to achieve. Since the first Conference of Parties (COP-1) in Berlin 1995, developing countries have made their position to be clear, not to tie themselves in such a legally binding commitment that will hamper their economic growth. They claim that global warming nowadays could not be separated from historical factors where developed countries have been committing themselves to every economic and industrial activities causing increasing concentration of GHG in the atmosphere. Then in such situation, it is of their view that developed countries must reduce the global emission as in the same time let developing countries to continue their economic development in order to chase growth and counter various economic and social problems. The obligation to reduce emission to developed countries included in the Annex I of Kyoto Protocol has showed consensus not to disregard this historical factor, resulting on differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing countries.

The Kyoto Protocol has enunciated 38 developed countries to cut their emission to 5 percent below the 1990 level, set to achieve in 2012.¹² To regulate quantitative emission and its timeline, the Kyoto Protocol provides three flexible instruments: (1) Joint Implementation (JI); (2) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); and (3) Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). All those scheme set to be valid until 2012, the last year of Kyoto Protocol comes into force.

After adopted in 11 December 1997, the Protocol Kyoto has been opened to sign since 16 March 1998. As stated in Article 25, the protocol will be applied 90 days after ratification of at least 55 signatories, including the developed countries (Annex I) with total emission of at least 55 percent from total emission in 1990.¹³ Although with the absense of the USA and several delays, the Kyoto Protocol was finally applied in March 2005, after the Russian Federation ratified it in the end of 2004.

¹² Budiono Kartohadiprodjo, "Gotong Royong Melawan Perubahan Iklim", in Gatra, 28 November 2007.

¹³ Daniel Murdiyarso, op. cit., p. 8. As seen from the last table of Kyoto Protocol's appendix, which is used to determine the effectiveness of the protocol, the biggest emitter is the USA (36.1 percent), Russia (17.4 percent), Japan (8.5 percent), Great Britain (4.2 percent), Canada (3.3 percent), Italy (3.1 percent), Poland (3 percent), France (2.7 percent), Australia (2.1 percent), four countries between 1-2 percent, 17 countries below 1 percent, and the remaining 3 countries 0 percent.

One basic problem during international negotiations, both before and after the introduction of Kyoto Protocol, is different standing between developed and developing countries.¹⁴ Although in several point differing from one to another, developed countries in general want to apply universal principle, where legally binding commitment should be inevitably attached to both developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, it is also true that some developed countries seem reluctant to give a clear commitment, including on the agreed points of the Kyoto Protocol.

US objection to ratify the protocol has gained international attention due to its position as the biggest emitter as well as the most influential economic and political power in the world today. The US and Australia (the latter of which then ratified it in the end of 2007) derive their objection to the exclusion of developing states to legally binding commitment to reduce emission. As the world's biggest emitter also comes from developing countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, the US sees such exclusion will put the protocol's effectiveness in doubt.

Developed countries' rejection, especially the US, is mostly related to the strong influential lobbies from oil and coal industries, along with various companies depending on fossil fuels. They claim that economic cost needed to apply Kyoto Protocol will reach US\$ 300 billion, mostly contributed by energy-related cost. In the other hand, the proponent of the protocol believes that such measures will only cost US\$ 88 billion or less and it will return as soon as the US converts equipments, vehicles, and industrial process more efficiently.¹⁵

In regards to the debates on emission reduction responsibilities, some developed countries, including the US, has used uncooperative behavior of China and India, which both are enjoying high economic growth lately, as an excuse for them not to launch any legally binding commitment. Facing this, China and India challenge developed countries to reduce their carbon emission up to 40 percent from 1990 level before 2020, if they expect poor countries to participate in the long-term emission reduction measures.¹⁶

Developing countries, which in general has undergone relatively late industrialization if compared to developed countries, see commonality in term of emission reduction is unfair. They argue that developed countri-

¹⁴ "Setelah Pesta Usai: Bagaimana Rencana Aksi Perubahan Iklim?", retrieved from http://sydvoicehome.multiply.com/journal/item/13/Setelah_Pesta_Usai_Bagaimana_Rencana_Aksi_Peubahan_Iklim

¹⁵ Budiono Kartohadiprodjo, op. cit.

¹⁶ Syamsul Hadi, "Pemanasan Global", in *Kompas*, 1 December 2009.

es have surpassed such industrial steps that enable them to apply a more environment-oriented development. Therefore, they urge their developed counterparts to do technology transfers, financial supports, and capacity building to developing countries.¹⁷ However, the biggest dilemma for developing countries is, in certain level, they still need to be binded on commitment to reduce emission for their own sake, as many said that it will be developing countries themselves that will face the worst impact of climate change.

As the awareness to strengthen their standing grows, developing countries try to build a common position in the G-77, a group of developing countries in the UN. China, which has historical relations with this group, tries to use it to reinforce its position. Along with the G-77, China emphasizes the importance of historical responsibilities of developed countries, per capita emission gap between developed and developing countries, and also reject all commitment to reduce their GHG emission.¹⁸

However, it is fair to note that during negotiation processes there are at least three different sub-groups within developing countries.¹⁹ The first sub-group is the majority of G-77 member and China, with the position and roles that has been mentioned above. The second sub-groups is the OPEC countries, which see emission reduction would contribute to obligation to cut down fossil fuel usage that will hamper their economy. Although they fail to attract significant support, this countries continuously struggle for compensation fund to cover their economic losses. The third is developing countries coalesced into the Alliance of Small Island States (OASIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), both of which are not only highly vulnerable but also have low capacity to adapt the climate change. Therefore, they have the very interest that the developed countries would aggressively cut down their emission. Moreover, they also need financial support. It is this OASIS countries which firstly introduced clear target on emission reduction: 20 percent from 1990 level and must be achieved prior to 2005. OASIS countries also urge developing countries to voluntarily cut down their carbon emission in order to accelerate the ratification process and implementation of Kyoto Protocol.²⁰

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Joanna I. Lewis, "China's Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations", in *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2007-08, p. 102.

¹⁹ Daniel Murdiyarso, op. cit., pp. 98-102.

²⁰ Ibid.

B. Indonesia and the Climate Change Negotiation

1. Indonesia's Position and Interest

In 2007, the Indonesian government officially launched a document entitling "Climate Variability and Climate Changes and Their Implication", which describes the impact of climate change to various sectors in Indonesia.²¹ In this sufficiently-detailed report, it is mentioned that the El Niño events have become more frequent as the global temperature anomalies associated with each El Niño continue to increase. El Niño has reduced the rainfall significantly, especially in 1982 and 1997 (the two of which were among the strongest El Niño in the last 25 years). Sumatera, Java, and Celebes have consistently performed decrease of seasonal rainfall, particularly in the dry season.²² The report also mentions that Indonesia's capacity to counter such process has been unfortunately low, whereas in the future the intensity and frequency of climate change symptoms will predictably increase. If Indonesia doesn't upgrade its adaptation capacity immediately, the higher the chance it will not be able to actualize sustainable development.²³

According to the World Bank,²⁴ Indonesia ranked 16th as the world biggest contributor of GHG in 2003, with total emission of 347 MTCO₂e (million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent), covering 1.34 percent of world total emission that year. If all non-CO₂ GHG were included, with total amount of 505 Mt CO₂ per year, Indonesia would be ranked 15th in 2000. Moreover, if emission from land use, land-use change, and forestry were taken into account, Indonesia's rank would jump to be the world 3rd biggest emitter, with total amount 3.068 Mt CO₂ per year.

Nevertheless commenting on those high emissions contribution, Head of the National Council on Climate Change (*Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim* or DNPI), Rachmat Witoelar stated²⁵ that the above data were based on old-fashioned measurement. According to him, there is a more updated one in UNFCCC, where 50 percent emission are calculated from emission per capita, 30 percent from industry, and 20 percent from historical emission. With this new measurement, among the world biggest emitters are the United Arab Emirates, Australia, the US, the Netherlands,

21 Lihat Government of Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia Country Report: Climate Variability and Climate Changes, and Their Implication*, Jakarta: Government of Republic of Indonesia, 2007.

22 Ibid., p. 16.

23 Ibid., p. 44.

24 Government of Republic of Indonesia, p. 9.

25 Interview with Rachmat Witoelar in Jakarta, 30 November 2010.

Canada, Russia Federation, and Singapore. Indonesia itself is not among the top 20.

Land use, land-use change, and forestry alone account to as high as 83 percent of Indonesia's total emission.²⁶ Indonesia has vast forest area, covering 70 percent or 132.4 million hectare of total mainland (187.8 million hectare).²⁷ Forestry has become important source to fund the country's development. In 1993, revenue from this sector alone was estimated to reach 26.9 percent higher than revenue coming from oil exports.²⁸ Along with higher population growth and its resulting faster development pace, pressures on Indonesia's forests are far higher than countries with comparatively less forest possession. Moreover, the country's decentralization policy has also resulted in more deforestation, as seen from 1997-2000 data which amounted to 2.8 million hectare per year.²⁹ In this regard, the Indonesian government needs to find out the best solutions, which locally, nationally, and internationally reflect balances between economic and ecological values.

Indonesia has indeed tremendous interests to cope with such complex and multidimensional issue as climate change. Since the very beginning, the Indonesia government has actively involved on every international negotiations, especially on the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) and has signed the climate change convention consequently in June 1992. On 1 August 1994, Indonesia ratified this convention by Law Number 6/2004 on the Ratification of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.³⁰ Indonesia has also ratified the Kyoto Protocol in June 2004 by enacting the Law Number 17/2004.³¹

Indonesia's position as a developing country becomes the general stance taken by the country in every international negotiations. Although it can be seen that not all developing countries share common position, they at least share common perception that climate change has impacted them pretty heavily.³² In this context Indonesia supports every international decision to reduce global emission.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Nur Masripatin, "Hutan Indonesia: Penyerap atau Penyumbang Emisi Dunia?", in *Prisma*, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 62-63.

²⁸ Aga Sugandhy, "Instrumentasi dan Standarisasi Kebijakan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup", Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Trisakti, 2008, p. 42.

²⁹ Nur Masripatin, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Andreas Pramudianto, *Diplomasi Lingkungan: Teori dan Fakta*, Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 2008, p. 261.

³¹ Ibid., p. 263.

³² Interview with Rachmat Witoelar, *op.cit.*

Indonesia also takes proactive role on global warming negotiation, for example by becoming the host of International Conference on Climate Change in December 2007, resulting in the Bali Roadmap (therein, the Bali Action Plan) which become important references for Post-Kyoto Protocol international agreement. Indonesia's passion to be part of solution has also been showed by the government's commitment to reduce emission by 26 percent (or 41 percent with international assistance) from the 2005 level.

It is no doubt Indonesia's commitment to counter climate change has placed the country as one of the most reckoning one in the international negotiations. Although Indonesia belongs to developing countries (the Groups of 77 or G-77), in the advance Indonesia positions itself as a middle ground country, which tries to provide consensus and win-win situation to all parties at stakes in order to pursue collective efforts.³³ As admitted by Head of DNPI Rachmat Witoelar,³⁴ this position is expected to bring leverages for Indonesia to gain supporting fund for domestic mitigation and adaptation programs.

2. The Significance of UN Conference on Climate Change in Bali 2007

One of the most important contribution of Indonesia to deal with the climate change issue is by becoming the host of The UN Conference on Climate Change (COP-13) in Bali, December 2007. Here, Indonesia's role is very salient in the issue's diplomatic and political economic constellation.³⁵ Beside being host and successfully facilitating more than 10,000 participants from 189 countries, Indonesia which become the Head of COP-13 had also gained ground in narrowing big differences between developed and developing countries.

There are four key topics in Bali: (1) climate change mitigation; (2) adaptation on climate change impacts; (3) financial assistance; and (4) transfer of technology. During the meeting, it can be seen that it was very hard to achieve such a legally binding commitment, due to big differences in terms of each countries' condition and capabilities. It was no wonder that during the meeting conflicts and opposition were prevalently striking, making the conference to be extended for another day but finally resulted in the 'Bali Action Plan'³⁶.

³³ According to Andreas Pramudianto, Indonesia's position among the developing G-77 countries is very salient. Indonesia had even become the Chairman of G-77. See Andreas Pramudianto, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Ismid Hadad, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁶ Susan R. Fletcher & Larry Parker, "The Kyoto Protocol, Bali "Action Plan", and International

Intense debates during the Bali meeting can not be separated from the complex background of climate change negotiations. Generally, all parties tend to expect that post-2012 action will include measurements both from developed and developing countries. All parties also agreed on the danger of climate change and the need to take adaptation and mitigation measures. After the issuance of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the biggest problem hampering negotiation is still the US (as the biggest emitter) and developing countries' reluctance on legally binding commitment after 2012. Even Protocol Kyoto's participants themselves are actually reluctant to discuss this commitment if it doesn't involve world biggest emitter such as the US, China, and India³⁷.

During the Bali meeting, there were three blocks came in front:³⁸ (1) the European Union; (2) the US, which was supported by Japan and Canada; and (3) G-77 and China. The last block included more than 100 developing countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Their agenda tended to be driven by the Advanced Developing Countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia which all worry of the consequence to their economic growth by implementing emission reduction commitment.

It can be said that the Bali conference has been figured by political friction regarding commitments to be taken by developed and developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol perhaps includes the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", but such principle has been used by the Advanced Developing Countries to avoid legally binding commitment. In contrary, the US wishes the Advanced Developing Countries to bear on a legally-binding ones.³⁹ The US which is not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, tends to wait until there are sufficient scientific evidences on climate change's causes and the availability of cheaper technology in the midst of the current global economic crisis.

The Bali conference has finally concluded in two important results:⁴⁰ (1) the Bali Roadmap; and (2) the Bali Action Plan. Bali Roadmap is commitment between developed and developing countries regarding two year

Actions", CRS Report for Congress, 30 May 2008.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁸ Md Shamsuddoha and Rezaul Karim Chowdury, "Political Economy of Bali Climate Change Conference: A Roadmap of Climate Commercialization", Dhaka: Equity and Justice Working Group, Participatory Research and Development Initiative (PRDI) Post-Bali Position Paper, January 2008.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁰ Ismid Hadad, op.cit., p. 13.

processes (2008-2009) on how to deal with differences in approach and negotiational arena. Between developed countries, there is an important country such as the US which is registered as a member of the convention but is outside the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, it is agreed to establish two track negotiation. *First*, by using the UN Convention on Climate Change (the UNFCCC) to discuss and negotiate post-2012 and long-term issue, which will be conducted through Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperation Action (AWG-LCA). *Second*, using the Kyoto Protocol to discuss and negotiate on the further commitment by the developed countries included in the Annex I. It will be conducted through the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitment for Annex I Parties (AWG-KP). These two tracks go hand-in-hand for two years and are expected to conclude its result in the COP-15 and the Fifth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP-5) in Copenhagen, Denmark, December 2009.

If Bali Road Map determines the process and negotiational tracks, then the Bali Action Plan is commitment between parties regarding substances and direction on climate change negotiation. Bali Action Plan involves plan to establish long-term cooperation assigned to deal with climate change not only in terms of mitigation and adaptation, but also to the four key elements of long-term global partnership. These four elements – mitigation, adaptation, funding, and technology transfer – are directed to be one package of global action plan in the future.

The inclusion of two new elements – funding and technology transfer (including capacity development) – as a kind of ‘collective vision’ of both developed and developing countries was a progress achieved by developing countries during the Bali Meeting.⁴¹ Funding is certainly a difficult issue. The UN predicted that the world needs adaptation fund as much as US\$ 100 billion per year in order to cope with natural disaster such as flood and droughts. Adding that to mitigation fund of US\$ 200 billion, then the world needs fund as much as US\$ 300 billion per year.⁴² Moreover, technology transfer which is also correlated with funding issue, is also complicated one. Without any technology transfer or capacity development from developed to developing countries, it is unlikely to expect any environmentally friendly development model in the latter.

In this Bali Meeting, Indonesia has also successfully included deforestation agenda called the REDD-plus (Reducing Emissions from Defo-

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴² Syamsul Hadi, *op. cit.*

restation and Forest Degradation) as one important instrument to reduce GHG emission in the developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol has made it possible for developing countries to promote reforestation measures in order to gain financial incentive from the carbon trade. Along with another 10 tropical countries, namely Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Columbia, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and Peru, Indonesia gained success in making coalition to promote REDD in the Bali meeting. They asked developed countries to provide financial incentive for this tropical countries in order to avoid deforestation and degradation.⁴³

As mentioned before, Indonesia's GHG emission mostly comes from forestry sector, so the effort to include REDD agenda is indeed along with the country's national interest. Forestry produces a quarter of world's total GHG emission, as the result of deforestation, forest fires, illegal logging, and other forest disaster. At the same time, forest also becomes the lung of the Earth to absorb GHG emission, which 75 percent of them has been produced by developed countries alone.⁴⁴ It is in this context that the issue of tropical rainforest becomes much more important because 80 percent of world forest lies in the tropical area, which is between 10° N and 10°S Latitude. Indonesia's tropical rainforest itself covers 10 percent of world's total rainforest.⁴⁵ Then, Indonesia's alliance with fellow tropical countries is a clever strategy in order to include REDD instrument in the climate change negotiation.

Moreover, issues to measure countries progress in implementing its emission reduction commitment, or generally referred as MRV (Measurable, Reportable, and Verifiable) Criteria, is also one hottest issue to debate. The MRV Criteria was finally concluded as obligatory for developed countries's commitment and mitigation efforts but only voluntary for developing ones. On the latter, there existed the NAMAS (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) concept, which is a nationally mitigation effort to achieve sustainable development. Developed countries could help them by providing funds, technology, and capacity development if it is finely measured, reported, and verified.⁴⁶

The climate change negotiation in Bali has indeed showed Indonesia's capacity to direct international negotiation to achieve concrete results, then

⁴³ Md Shamsuddoha and Rezaul Karim Chowdury, *op. cit.*.

⁴⁴ "Diplomasi Hutan dan Laut", in *Gatra*, 26 November 2007

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Ismid Hadad, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

brought the world closer to the Post-Kyoto international regime in 2012. Commitments made in Bali such as mitigation, adaptation, funding, technology transfer, and capacity building are among issues that could become starting points for the next negotiation.⁴⁷ It was targeted that two years after Bali conference the world would achieve a new and universally accepted international regime by taking the momentum of climate change conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, December 2009.

3. The UN Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen 2009 and Indonesia's Position

UNFCCC's Fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP-15) in Copenhagen, Denmark, 7-19 December 2009, was originally set up to become the biggest momentum for to produce the post-2012 climate change agreement amongst nations in the world. The presence of more than 100 Head of States and 40,000 guest lists have made this Copenhagen meeting to be the biggest environmental meeting ever.

It can not be denied that the success of such conference, including the Copenhagen meeting, relies to the stance taken by biggest powers amongst countries in the world, namely the US and China. China has become the world biggest GHG emitter, but according to UNFCCC regulations, the country does not classify into countries obliged to take specific measures to counter climate change.⁴⁸ Together with the US, China contributes to nearly 40 percent of world's total emission.⁴⁹ This 'China Factor' becomes the main US objection to involve more in the Kyoto Protocol's commitment. The US, along with other developed countries, reject every international agreement that doesn't include legally-binding emission reduction for China.

It is interesting to note that while other climate change negotiations are only attended by respective ministers and ambassadors, the Copenhagen conference provides an event where 115 Head of States directly involves in the negotiation process. Even The Prime Minister of Denmark himself became the Head of COP-15 until the end of the meeting, a position that is always filled in by Minister of Environment or other relevant agencies pre-

⁴⁷ Interview with Director WWF Indonesia, Ari Muhammad, in Jakarta, 1 December 2010.

⁴⁸ Florian Weiler Sb Stefanie Bailer, "Climate Change Negotiations, Negotiation Positions and Domestic Structures", paper for annual meeting The American Political Science Association, 2-5 September 2010, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Morentalisa Hutapea, *Diplomasi China dalam Ad Hoc Group untuk Menghindari Raget Pengurangan Emisi dalam Perundingan Perubahan Iklim Periode 2005-2009*, Skripsi, Department of International Relations FISIP-UI, 2010, p. 6.

viously.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, those situations didn't result in consensus among parties, instead opposition widened even more. 26 state representatives were 'included' in a 'commitment circle' in order to solve opposing issues. Nevertheless, some of the most difficult decision was made as the result of frequent US meeting with BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) leader.⁵¹

The most dissapointing part from Copenhagen forum was that it did not result in a legally-binding agreement. It only produced a political commitment called the Copenhagen Accord, consisting of:⁵² (1) atmosphere GHG stabilization target. It was agreed to hold temperature increases below 2°C above pre-industrial levels prior to 2050. The target will be reviewed in 2015, including to change the GHG stabilization by 1,5°C as requested by the Small Islands States (OASIS); (2) in relation with Annex I obligation, it was agreed that developed countries (Annex I) must register their emission reduction pledges for 2020 by 31 January 2010. These countries, including the US, were also agreed on monitoring and reporting system to assess this target emission progress as well as providing fund and technology for developing countries; (3) in relation with non-Annex I obligation, it was agreed that non-Annex emission reduction efforts need to be measured, reported, and verified (MRV) by each state and to communicate it to the UNFCCC Secretariat through the National Communication report. Format and action plan of this emission reduction become the absolute right of each respective countries. It was also agreed that emission reduction from developing countries (National Appropriate Mitigation Actions/ NAMAs) would be assisted by funding and technology transfer from developed countries and to be measured, reported, and verified in accordance with UNFCCC guidelines; (4) on funding, developed countries agreed to provide US\$ 30 billion for 2010-2012 for mitigation and adaptation measure in the developing countries under the supervision of Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. Aside of this fast-track funds to 2012, developed countries also committed to provide US\$ 100 billion per year starting from the year of 2020 to fund, inter alia, mitigation in forestry sector (REDD), capacity development and technology transfer mechanism.

As stated before, the Copenhagen conference failed to bear on the Bali Roadmap's mandate to produce Post-2012 international agreement.

⁵⁰ Ismid Hadad, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁵¹ Navroz K. Dubash, "Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust", in *Commentary*, Vol. XLIV, No. 52, December 26, 2009, p. 8.

⁵² Ismid Hadad, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

Copenhagen Accord is only a mere political commitment, not a stronger legally binding ones. The original high expectation was suddenly turned down by political commitment involving the US, China, and several other considered-important developing countries. Some developing countries such as Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Sudan criticized it harshly by saying that such a situation was 'unacceptable'. Reasons for those high rejections were mostly based on consideration that it didn't involve both legally binding commitment as well as specific target on GHG emission reduction.⁵³ Thus, the Copenhagen forum has failed to pursue a new Post-Kyoto Protocol international regime on climate change.

It was also clearly could be seen that Indonesia's effort to achieve this, by promoting the Bali Action Plan and Bali Roadmap in 2007, didn't result in optimal achievement in Copenhagen. In fact, as stated by Presiden SBY, Indonesia's stance was quite clear: the Copenhagen Conference must find consensus. There were five suggestions expressed by President SBY during Copenhagen conference to break the deadlock: (1) not to give tolerance for global increasing temperature of more than 2°C; (2) developed countries must contribute significantly to emission reduction efforts; (3) developing countries need to have clear target and plan of action, although in voluntary basis; (4) developed countries must encounter the climate change by providing funds and other resources for mitigation, technology transfer, and capacity building; and (5) target and direction must be all agreed, as well as commitment from developed countries must be implemented appropriately.⁵⁴

Based on these five suggestion, it is clear that Indonesia's positions are in many ways identical with developing countries' stances in the G-77, which still demand for responsibilities, commitment, and concrete actions from developed countries. Nevertheless, Indonesia also needs to be more balanced in the sense that it needs to, along with its fellow developing countries, put clear target and action plan on its national development program. In this regards, Indonesia has publicly announced commitment to voluntarily reduce its emission by 26 percent from 2005 level prior to 2020 or 41 percent if it receives international funding assistance.

⁵³ Muhamad Takdir, "Ambigu Akhir Konferensi Kopenhagen", in *Koran Jakarta*, 28 December 2009.

⁵⁴ Arfi Bambani Amri, "Lima Agenda SBY di Konferensi Kopenhagen", retrieved from http://dunia.vivanews.com/news/read/114547-lima_agenda_sby_di_konferensi_kopenhagen

IV. Conclusion

As an archipelagic state and possessing vast tropical rain forests, the condition of which provide both threats and potentials to global recovery, Indonesia has played active roles in the the negotiation to resolve the international problems related to climate change. The country is a member of UNFCCC as well as signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, as a Non-Annex I country, Indonesia doesn't bear any obligatory mandate to reduce its carbon emission.

Indonesia's role in this issue has founded momentum during the climate change conference in Bali, December 2007, resulting in the launching of the Bali Roadmap and Bali Action Plan, both of which provided important foundation for the next steps of climate change negotiations. The Bali conference has boosted negotiational tracks as well as clear schedule to pursue a new Post-Kyoto Protocol international agreement. In the Bali forum Indonesia has also succeed to include the REDD instrument as one of official tools designed to counter the climate change.

Unfortunately, Indonesia's efforts to achieve the new international agreement was not followed up by a positive development in negotiations as expected. The climate change conference in Copenhagen, which gained international attention due to high expectation to be resulted in the long-desired new international agreement, was only concluded in a mere political commitment named the Copenhagen Accord, the content of which didn't mention any quantitative and legally binding emission reduction commitment. Opposition between the US and several other developed countries in the one hand, with China and the majority developing countries in the other hand, can not be settled in the forum. The roots of the problem stays the same; it is mainly about sharing of responsibility to reduce emission between developed and developing countries.

As a last remark, it is likely that international negotiation on climate change would still be a long way to go, without any clear prospects. It is very hard to formulate a new Post-Kyoto Protocol international agreement which can meet demands from both developed and developing countries. The US and China factors seem to constantly play crucial role in this process. It is the challenge for Indonesia which tries to position itself as a 'middle ground country' to continuously provide constructive proposals in order to break the deadlock, without neglecting its obligation to implement sustainable development domestically.

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