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The Role of Access Capacity of Business Actors in the “New Normal” Policy Congruence in Indonesia

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Abstract. In reducing the number of COVID-19 transmissions, the Government of Indonesia implemented a three-month social restriction policy. The social restriction caused shocks in the economic sector. This article analyzes the motivational factors that enable business people in Indonesia who are members of business organizations to use political party access and congruence to accelerate the "new normal" policy. The access capacity is related to business people's ability to reach political parties, while congruence can be seen from the level of their acceptance of policy outputs. This study develops a variable of access capacity consisting of political party membership, company scales, and the type of business organization. Data was gathered through an online survey using Google Forms to 147 business actors who are members of the national business group. By using logistic regression analysis at the individual level, we find that the scale of the company owned by a businessperson significantly influences her/his ability to access political party rather than passively following organizational policies. The company scale variable also considerably affects the acceptance of the "new normal" policy. Businessman membership in political parties only affects access capacity, but not policy congruence. In the context of COVID-19 in Indonesia, the increasing losses have an impact on accepting the "new normal" policy. This finding indicates that in general: only large companies owners can directly lobby their political representatives; pandemic, as a crisis situation, is an exception to produce congruent policies; capital is still the most powerful modality in the policy; and COVID-19 has had a significant impact on business people's incongruence with the "new normal" policy.

Keywords: new normal policy, policy congruence, business interest groups, COVID-19

INTRODUCTION

One characteristic of democratic countries is the involvement of influential interest groups during the policymaking process (Rönnbäck 2015; Sloof 2000; Spiller 1990). Therefore, interest groups are considered successful when they are able to influence the substance of the regulations. At the same time, they get the least amount of loss during the implementation of the policy.

Realizing that the business interest group is the strongest because it holds large capital (Paster, 2018), this article analyzes business actors' motivational factors in influencing the government and legislators to issue or improve policies according to their preferences. Although individuals or companies can design lobbying activities, usually business people join associations representing the company's interests. In general, their influence increases after building coalitions and collecting shared resources (Massaro 2019).

This research's context is the business people's response to Government Regulation Number 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) or the "new normal" policy. The regulation instructs companies to enforce the requirements of a health protocol. The social restriction policy during the COVID-19 period is the response of every government in reducing transmission of the virus (Setiati and Azwar 2020). Three

reasons can explain business actors in Indonesia accept or support the "new normal" policy. First, this policy became a catalyst for reopening economic activity as the strict social restriction policies pressured more business actors. Second, although the "new normal" is not an optimal choice for business actors, its function is urgent to initiate economic activity. Third, for some business actors, the "new normal" can be an economic stimulus to support the government in reducing the impact of a pandemic such as unemployment and a decrease in people's purchasing power (Pramudita 2020).

However, some assumptions explain that business actors in Indonesia cannot fully accept the "new normal" policy. First, several "new normal" policy requirements increase the additional costs that business actors charge. Second, business actors are burdened with concerns that their employees may open new clusters of infection. This article examines whether business people in Indonesia fully accept this regulation or not. This article also attempts to analyze the relationship between business actors' modalities in encouraging the "new normal" policy.

Companies are in a productivity crisis during a time of social restriction in pandemic condition (Ozili 2020). From this dilemma of interest that has swept the world, several countries have delayed their plans to accelerate their national economy (Asian Development Bank 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is changing the way people interact, including political lobbying (Dodds et al. 2020). This research is

necessary because businesses and governments face asymmetrical interests: the importance of reducing virus transmission and the importance of re-opening economic activity. This article offers experimental research with an individual focus on influencing policy.

Low productivity due to the crisis impacts the sustainability of small companies, which has spread to increase unemployment. The government recognizes these problems as a dilemma. The end of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is the cessation of business activities, especially for small companies, which cannot survive to return their capital because social restriction policies have limited economic transactions. For large investment-oriented companies, they will rely on lobbying channels to produce good policies (Fairlie 2020).

This article tries to measure the level of relationship between business people and policymakers. First, whether they use business association's channels or directly influence the person involved in policymaking or political parties, it is well known that political parties are the most influential institutions in democracy in Indonesia. The winning coalition political party spreads its members in government, representatives, and other specialized positions (Budiatri 2018; Noor 2016).

The choice of these two options may be less enlightening because the alternative lobbying options are varied and allow them to do both simultaneously. However, for the initial step, these dependent variables can describe preferences that define the level of strength of their influence. This experiment assumes what Olson says that the highest interest groups are always dominant (Olson 1965). This experiment also assumes that individuals in interest groups act as articulators in influencing decisions (Francisco 2010)

Second, this study proposes congruence in the psychological domain of the level of acceptance of the policy. This concept is the extent to which the policies produced by the government match their expectations. It is assumed that the new typical policy that will make citizens leave their homes is contrary to efforts to reduce the transmission of COVID-19. On the other hand, the business people group is the most influential because the interdependence between economic growth is inevitable. Lindblom (1982) calls this relationship the interdependence of business people and government as a structural dependence that imposes boundaries and is often imperfect congruence.

Recent studies of business relationships and policies have produced two significant responses: confrontation and adaptation. The group of businesspeople may be considered the most powerful, but in an economic crisis, they usually lose influence and submit to the government's priority agenda. In this situation, the business group is also more interested in adopting adaptation methods (Paster 2018).

In this experiment, this research sought an individual level of analysis because the political economy literature places exchanges on a personal level. This

study's data is a limited survey of indigenous business actors who are members of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). This organization has considerable experience in national-level policy hearings.

This research provides variables, such as political party membership, types of interest groups, and company scale. It also offers psychological variables, such as concern about COVID-19 and the level of company losses under social restriction policies. Business people who are members of political parties are allowed to take advantage of this access through colleagues and shared ideology to generate policies. Exchange information is the most difficult to explain in interest group studies, although experts in this field have cited numerous exchanges between senate members and lobbyists (de Figueiredo and Richter 2014).

Political party membership is a variable that indicates the closest access modality in lobbying (Yadav 2008). As with political party membership, this article assumes that the type of interest group describes access and the amount of capital (Dür and Mateo González 2012). A businessman belonging to a national level interest group has a higher chance than those in the local sphere of gaining access to political party representatives. A businessman who has a larger company scale is predicted to have a better access capacity than those who are smaller one (Kılıç 2017). Because of the characteristics that indicate modality, this article assumes these three variables can motivate perfect congruence between business people and "new normal" policies.

In a competitive democracy, business participation in policymaking is reasonable (Berger, Hertog, and Park 2002). Most studies of interest groups generally emphasize the resistance of changing ecosystems in a state's structure. The existence of interest groups is often based on demands for uncertainty. As the number of interest groups increases, it will even increase heightened uncertainty (Richardson 2000). Therefore, policymaking in the context of granting the demands of interest groups often causes conflicts between interest groups.

The access capacity is an essential part of the modality of businesspeople in the policy area. The ability to influence is largely determined by the assumption that interest groups behave with personal interests (Potters and Winden 1996). This point of view in the context of the relationship of influence in policy reminds that political parties are the only means by which businesses can get closer to access.

Groll & Prummer (2016b) emphasize competitive advantage and reward in the lobbying process as an essential part of policy-making considerations even though interest groups with the same power of influence can create bias in decision making. Therefore, membership of political parties that support the government is one of the essential accesses. As Yadav (2008) said, the party that the structure of the legislative body gives political parties extraordinary control over the policy process. This situation leads

the interest groups to lobby political parties and ignore individual politicians unless they are essential party gatekeepers.

Business groups as a specific subtype use their political members or state actors to implement the policy-making process. Meanwhile, interest groups that absorb more aspirations tend to be underestimated than those closer to policymakers in lobbying competition. Actors outside the structure make it challenging to influence policy. What distinguishes membership of political parties and business organizations is that, although they combine interests and preferences, party membership can accelerate in a more closed manner. For those within the structure, there is a hierarchy in the policy-making process rather than outside organizations (Fraussen and Halpin 2018).

H1: Business actors who are members of political parties provide an opportunity to utilize political parties in influencing "new normal" policies.

Some research on resource and policy lobbying shows diverse strategies, such as who targets effective lobbying. In addition to the ideology that can be translated into political party membership, spending in the form of donations is also a part that influences success. De Figueiredo and Cameron (2014) emphasize that business people with high levels of resources target the pros and cons of unifying objectives. Therefore, even though business people are in political party membership, the final determination is not ideological similarity, but resources that can be easily shared. Lindblom (1993) also has emphasized the striking difference between business people and other interests in the process of influencing policy. Regardless of the significant capital, which may appear on the scale of the company, business people do not only appear as special interests before the government. They also appear to be an essential function of government. The power of businesspeople almost creates actions that are almost akin to public officials in several ways. They can create demands they can count on the interests of all (Marsh 1983). In this context, the ITC survey shows that small and medium-sized companies have the potential to go bankrupt within three months in a pandemic situation, especially facing social restriction policies (International Trade Centre 2020). Meanwhile, the impact of COVID-19 on large-scale companies is related to reducing production volumes and updating the shift model for their workers, which gradually reduces company income every month (Zuniawan et al. 2020). Since large companies have the advantage of interfering with the government, it can be argued that their preference for lockdowns is to seek policies to reduce losses (Marsh 1983).

H2: The higher the scale of companies owned by business people, giving them a great opportunity to utilize political parties to influence "new normal" policies.

Although Lindblom stated that groups of

businesspeople have different strengths in access to policies, Paster defies his theory a little by providing hints that business people do not always get the policies they expect. At least business people face challenges in two ways: confrontation and adaptation (Paster 2018). He called it a challenge to democracy in policy that causes congruence between parties not to reach an equilibrium point because too many parties are fighting over interests in the policy, including competition among businesses as well.

The literature on political congruence emphasizes psychological similarities between representative institutions and citizens' preferences that can be operationalized in a variety of ways (Huber and Powell 1994; Schakel and Hakhverdian 2018). In the context of the "new normal" policy in Indonesia where business activities are re-operated, businesspeople face the challenges of strict health protocols, especially regarding the limitation of the number of workers, the provision of personal protective equipment, and the lack of attention in other aspects of the business.

The "new normal" policies may not be entirely accepted by business people because, during the process, the government is faced with critical social conditions, namely health issues and broader citizen demands. Although this policy arises from proposals that might involve business people, the government must also consider policies that generate public trust. What is clear from this dilemma is that paramedics are demanding strict policies regarding restrictions.

Although there is hope for businesses to resume economic activity, it is crucial to map congruence to get information about business dissatisfaction or to get business configurations in the "new normal". Therefore, we stipulate that congruence in the "new normal" policy is that a businessperson fully accepts (congruence) or does not fully accept (incongruence).

Some literature on the ability to influence policy has clearly explained that interest groups that have proper funding, lobbying and information capacity, and transactions are critical to their success (Berger, Hertog, and Park 2002). Beard (1913) has long argued that elites who have business wealth can influence political decisions and suggest policies to be designed. Therefore, the hypothesis, we emphasize business configuration in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we emphasize that large-scale companies may result in higher bargaining power to the Government or policymakers due to the long-term favourable economic and tax interventions. Second, there are losses due to restriction and panic policies of citizens towards COVID-19, which allows businesses to accept the full policy because it does not incur lobbying costs.

Several political economy studies have examined the considerations of large-scale companies and their ability to lobby the government to influence policy. For example, Bauer et al. have found that large-scale companies are more active in exchanging information on foreign policy than small firms. Small companies are more concerned with their own company. The

competitive nature of large companies has prompted their leaders to lobby the government to produce operational policies that are less constrained (Aizenberg and Hanegraaff 2020). In a situation where the political institutions are more potent than the economy, it will result in the domination of destructive policies to the company. In the opposite situation, where economic actors control political institutions, it will create high pressure in making policies that support business. In the Indonesian context, this study tries to relate the nature of large companies to emergencies, for example, in the COVID-19 disaster. We assume that large firms perceive a "new normal" policy as a better option than none at all. In the COVID-19 situation, large-scale investment-oriented companies are likely to be in a "new normal" policy. Therefore we offer a hypothesis to explain the actual natural situation that large companies will accept the whole "new normal" policy.

H3: Businessman with a large scale of companies, allows to fully accept new normal policies.

Quoting Lindblom (1993), he argues that business lobbies are successful in part because they can claim they will suffer a financial loss and therefore possibly lead to lost jobs and tax revenue. For them, lobbying is an investment cost which can create a favourable situation financially (Olsen 2015). This study assumes that the loss for the company and the lobbying effort is a package. This thinking is supported by Aggarwal et al. (2012) findings that companies make donations to politicians and lobbyists to promote the operational interests of their companies. Since the "new normal" policy is a consequence of an opportunity that business people desire to get out of an unprecedented situation, we suggest measuring a psychological aspect to measure the impact of COVID-19 on company losses. One of the expected effects of company losses is the cessation of company activities. The COVID-19 pandemic has seen small companies shut down their activities. While large companies are still able to operate, they are forced to reduce their production intensity. The "new normal" policy in the COVID-19 crisis is beneficial for companies to reduce the "lockdown" policy to avoid more significant losses. Therefore, it is crucial to measure the relationship between losses and congruence with the "new normal" policy. This relationship provides a projected effect on the partisanship of the government in crises.

H4: The businessperson has a slight loss that makes it possible to fully accept the new normal policy.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs survey 147 local Indonesian business people using online features (Google Forms) in early April to early July 2020. This time frame illustrates the transition from a restriction policy to conditional easing, which is essential to explain

the respondents' psychology. Selected respondents are business people who are still actively running companies and are involved in various local and national business organizations. The involvement of employers in this study explains the close relationship between the objectives of the "new normal" policy and the interests of the state in reviving the declining economy due to restrictive policies to prevent transmission of the COVID-19 virus.

This study explored access capacity by asking whether businesspeople had access to political parties or policymaking representatives during times of large-scale restrictions. The first answers are directed for codes (1) = yes and (0) = no (they follow organizational policy). The question originates from the context of the concept of efficacy adapted to "new normal" and policymaking (Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, and Ardévol-Abreu 2017). The question of access capacity can explain the cascading differences in access capacity between memberships in organizations. Of course, we suspect that those who take advantage of direct access to political parties have a higher modality than those who do not. (Daugbjerg, Fraussen, and Halpin 2018)

The level of congruence between "new normal" policies and the expectations of business people is measured by coding 1 for a businessman accepting the "new normal" policy which is launched by the government and 0 for does not fully accept. We also measure condense and simplify measurements by ignoring stratification by assigning dichotomous scores: fully accept and not fully accept. The advantage of using this question is that answer (1) will give the most congruent circumstances (Ferland 2020).

Table 1 shows the frequency of respondents using less representative access to politics than those who followed organizational decisions. These findings illustrated that the political expertise and business skills of its members are two different things (Gama, Bandeira-de-Mello, and Spuldaro 2018). Political access tends to be exclusive. Second, the concept of internal conflict in interest in groups shows that within a business group consists of various interests so that influential people in internal try to narrow down their interests to reduce the weakening of the power of influence (Truijens and Hanegraaff 2020). Third, in the context of the "new normal" policy, this study assumes that congruence does not completely occur because the policy also considers external interests such as government targets to reduce virus transmission.

This study identifies the types of interest groups, where 0 is the local level, and 1 is the national level. We also identified types of membership organizations where 1 was businessmen belonging to a political party and 0 was businessmen who was not a member of a political party. To relate to a political motivation, we propose an estimate of the level of loss experienced by business people during a period of social restriction where 1 is no loss effect up to the 10 is the most significant losses.

This study expected that high losses on large companies where the owner is part of the political party can influence businesses to accelerate "new normal" policies through the role of political institutions directly. The types of company scale adopt the classification in Law no. 20 of 2008 concerning Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, in measurement is 1 is small with a total of 300 million - 2.5 billion rupiah to 4 is a large international scale with annual business results above 50 billion rupiahs This study adds one independent variable to measure business people's concerns about COVID-19. This measurement uses a Likert scale, 1 to 5. Score 1 = no concern and 5 = high level of concern. This variable is useful in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic to describe

Table 1. Frequency of business actors in the "new normal" policy.

Access Capacity	Code	Percentage of Respondents (N= 147)
Using access to political parties and representative's institution.	1	38.8%
Follow organizational decision	0	61.2%

economic interests and health interests.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Hypotheses are tested using logistic regression analysis. Access capacity variables in influencing policy (H1 and H2) are differentiated as dichotomous. This decision is useful because it considers differences in the capacity of business actors who have a dominant influence on the process of influencing policy. This distinction is also helpful to avoid biased testing. Testing the policy congruence variable, consisting of H3 and H4, which is also dichotomous, is to get a picture of congruence. This decision means that in measuring the dichotomy, business people realize the existence of "new normal" as a comprehensive policy or not.

The link between access capacity and congruence is not a linear concept. Therefore, the dependent variables are separated. Congruence concepts focus on the psychological state after the policy is implemented, while access capacity is a set of modalities for business people. Congruence can explain the final results of the policymaking process. The relationship between the two do not show significance in the Pearson correlation analysis.

Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for access capacity in influencing policy. The column display consists of logit coefficients (B), standard errors (S.E.), odds ratios (Exp. (B)) and levels of significance displayed by star codes. The odds value can be interpreted as follows: the odds are

Table 2. The congruence of businesspeople's policies to the "new normal" policy

Policy Congruence of "New Normal"	Code	Percentage of Respondents (N= 147)
Fully accept policy	1	18%
Not Fully accept policy	0	82%

smaller than one, explaining that the predictor reduces the opportunity to influence policy use directly to policymakers. Opportunities with more than one increase opportunities to fully follow the organization in making policy.

The study presents two models that separate the modality and psychology of a businessperson in the policy arena. Of the modality variables, the variable type of interest groups shows that business people who are members of national-level business organizations have no the opportunity to utilize the access of political parties or actors in government in making policies. Second, the business membership variable in political parties significantly explains the ability of business people to use political institutions to influence policy. The third variable illustrates that the larger the scale of the company is very significant in encouraging business people to use political access to influence individual policies.

The psychological model is related to the phenomenon of the COVID-19 pandemic. We divide it into two controllers. First, the variable of concern to COVID-19 in this study was not significant even though the coefficient B showed negative results. Second, the level of corporate losses is also not significant in explaining the determinants of a business person utilizing a political party.

Table 4 shows the congruence between the results of the "new normal" policy and the expectations of business people. Of the three control variables in the modality model, the company scale variable is the only significant variable. These findings indicate that the larger the company scale owned by business actors motivates congruence to the "new normal" policy. The second model, which emphasizes the psychological aspect, shows that company losses affect congruence with the "new normal" policy. In the context of this research, it indicates that business people who get high losses can motivate the level of congruence in the "new normal" policy.

From the two logistic regression results above, the company-scale variable shows the most substantial impact of significance among other variables in explaining the modalities of policy access capacity and policy congruence. The large scale of the company shows that the economic capital of a businessman is high as well as can affect his competitive advantage and rewards in the lobbying process (Groll and Prummer 2016a). The scale of the company can also create a level of interference and bargaining power between companies and the government, especially from the benefits of tax collection (Charles E. Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). This dependence might answer why the "new normal" policy was issued amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This possibility is the demand of the most influential business elite, whose numbers are far less than other business people. The thing that is most likely to be investigated further is the sub-modality that is more specific about how information exchange occurs. The larger the company can formally benefit the government through taxes

Table 3. Logistic regression binary analysis results for access capacity.

	B	Access Capacity (SE)	Exp. (B)
<i>Modality Model</i>			
Interest Group Type	4.023	1.325	55.8
Membership of Political Party	1.777**	.737	5.912
Company Scale	4.637***	.860	103.25
Nagelkerke R ²		33.2	
<i>Psychological Model</i>			
Level of Concern of COVID-19	-1.291	.534	.271
Level of Loss	.168	.101	1.183
Nagelkerke R ²		.80	
Nagelkerke R ² (All Model)		.43	

Note: logistic regression coefficient with standard errors. Significance: (*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001) Dependent variable is access capacity (1 = business people using political party or representative institution, 0 = business people followed organizational decision)

or informal through political support. The personal closeness between politicians and business people is the best access to influence policymakers' decisions. This significant result illustrates the relevance of the relationship between the presence of "new normal" as a new policy that reduces the lockdown function and the presence of businessman association leaders.

The context of this research is very much tied to COVID-19. The "New Normal" is an issue that becomes valence when business people face social restriction policies. The context of the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster that does not directly damage the means of production and marketing, but news about deaths and high panic has made the tourism, transportation, education sectors and market activities continue to stop for a moment. COVID-19 may do psychological damage and cause panic due to the implementation of the restriction policy, so the pressure for more than three months has reduced money circulation. Including companies lay off their workers for an indefinite period (Rossi et al. 2020).

Table 4. Logistic regression of businesspeople of new normal policy congruence

	B	Congruence (SE)	Exp (B)
<i>Modality Model</i>			
Interest Group Type	.894	.0656	2.444
Membership of Political Party	.725	.626	2.065
Company Scale	1.204***	3.343	3.333
Nagelkerke R ²		.311	
<i>Psychological Model</i>			
Level of Concern of COVID-19	1.688	.496	5.441
Level of Loss	1.84**	.125	1.202
Nagelkerke R ²		.316	
Nagelkerke R ² (All model)		.691	

Note: logistic regression coefficient with standard errors. Significance: (*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001) The dependent variable is policy congruence (1 = business people fully accept "new normal policy, 0 = business people not fully accept "new normal" policy)

The context of the "new normal" policy through Government Regulation Number 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has created changes in the conditions of economic policy lobbying. In this very depressing situation, demands for economic improvement accommodate some workers and business people.

This article aims to determine the access capacity of business actors in using political parties to influence the "new normal" policy. As a continuation, this article also investigates the policy congruence. Most importantly, we found that interest group studies

could be traced to individual survey investigations as well as to understand their access capacities. Second, we found that individuals have a higher capacity for lobbying access than organizations. However, we also found that although business interest groups have a powerful influence on policy, not all of the lobby they propose can be perfectly obtained.

This research claims that business people who are members of political parties cannot merely access them as successful lobbyists. They may belong to national business organizations, but the multi-layered internal party structure selects them to have significant capacity for influence. This finding is in line with the concept of differences in access capacity that the policy results not all groups (Fraussen and Halpin 2018).

Hypothesis 1 is answered with certain conditions related to the results of hypothesis 2. It is assumed that there is a relationship between these findings and the theory of business behaviour that they have two dynamics: internal to the organization and external to the organization. (Peltzman, Levine, and Noll 1989). For example, outside of a business organization, a member of a political party takes advantage of his political party network in representative institutions or parties in government, whereas when inside the organization he may have no more specific goals (Gama, Bandeira-de-Mello, and Spuldaro 2018).

However, suppose we look at the strata of political parties in Indonesia and consider the democracy of policy-making. In that case, it is crucial to investigate whether business people who are members of political parties who naturally occupy important positions both internally and in representative institutions have a strategy of creating consensus. Meanwhile, the study also assumed that business actors who are not members of parties supporting the government, take advantage of the shared mission raised by national-level business organizations instead of entering into practical lobbying. When this study shows the variable types of interest groups that have no significant effect, it argues that the key to successful lobbying is the use of political party channels rather than their organizations. Directly, influential business people have two dynamics in policymaking. First, their behaviour is within the scope of their organization and political behaviour outside the organization. (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008). Second, political party membership provides a higher chance than their organization because after all, the government comes from political parties as well.

The scale of the company in this study is a variable that can explain the interconnection between the use of political parties and policy congruence. This finding in line with Paster that business people with large-scale firms appear to enjoy sufficient relevant resources to ensure political influence. This relationship is what Paster calls an adaptation relationship, in which political parties and government face incentives to meet business demands because of the existing forces of structural and instrumental

business forces (Paster 2018). The company's adaptation to the "new normal" policy seems to need to be explored more deeply, whether the congruence created is the result they expected or is it only limited to surrender to the COVID-19.

The emergence of a "new normal" policy is very likely the result of a selective process to place various interests: health, economy, and increasing public trust. This regulation was drafted by the Minister of Health, who generally emphasizes the high standard of health protocols. In this section, we need to pay attention to the extent to which standard protocols can reduce the productivity of a company.

The regression results show that a high rate of loss can motivate congruence. These results do not reflect how rational choice theory works. The only explanation is Vogel's theory of the economic crisis as a factor that can spontaneously reduce the influence of businesspeople in policymaking (Vogel 1996). The COVID-19 situation is different from a normal situation where the business is not hampered by factors that are completely new and beyond expectations. Business people with significant losses may view the "new normal" policy as a decision that should be relatively accepted because the government has no other alternative. Policies that are expected to be appropriate may give a legitimate burden to the government, especially politicians who are in the government's political parties (Vogel 1996).

The study did not produce a significant impact between the level of concerns and the effort to influence policy (Mean = 4.15). The psychological problem of fear of the COVID-19 virus and access to political lobbying may not be linear. This result contrasts with the fear of corporate loss, which has characterized how business people must respond through adaptation or confrontation. It needs a very detailed explanation of whether the problems of businesspeople during COVID-19 cause concern which eventually motivates them to use political parties to create "new normal" policies. "The obstacle to using this variable in this study is that the worries of COVID-19 on the transmission might give contradictory results between reactivating the economy and fear of corporate losses.

Access capacity describes the configuration of a businessperson in the policy influencing process. The modality model produces an R^2 of 30%, where 70% of the variables outside the study have the potential to be discussed. The firm scale predictor is the only one that significantly motivates business people to take advantage of political parties and is congruent to the "new normal" policy. As a complement, company management also needs to consider company management variables such as accounts payable or receivable, lobbying costs, and their closeness to people in high-ranking party circles. The variables in this model also illustrate that a businessman who has large capital has opportunities in various accesses in politics. The second model is an experiment that is strongly tied to COVID-19 ($R^2 = 80\%$). Psychological variables pose the challenge of placing the reality of

concerning about COVID-19 with fear. Fear of loss has the potential to encourage businesspeople to take advantage of political parties.

This study contributes to explaining the relationship between modality and business behavior in a crisis. More specifically, these findings suggest that congruence and access capacity are relevant dependent variables and tend to answer policy questions in confusing situations quickly. The crucial relationship between business people and government cannot be generalized that every business person is always congruent with economic policies that support economic acceleration. Future research can broaden the crisis's context by measuring the variable level of individual concern more accurately. This study's variable types of interest groups are not yet an appropriate measure of congruence and access capacity. In the pandemic COVID-19 context, the weakness of this variable is that the organization leader determines the decisions of some influential groups. This variable allows it to be paired with the quality of democracy in the internal organization. Future research should also consider detailed measures of the welfare level of business actors concerning their ability to lobby directly. Future research is suggested to consider the weaknesses of this research, namely the lack of detailed research on policy congruence. The COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis is a new arena for business people and the government to organize a profitable relationship. This study adds to the repertoire of approaches to understanding the power of influence of individual business people in a democratic system.

CONCLUSION

This article analyzes two variables that are sequentially tied to the access capacity of businesspeople in political parties and new normal policy congruence. The article concludes that a businessperson with access to a political party will portray similarities to the policies they expect. This finding may have confirmed that business groups are the most powerful, but in crises, they lose their influence. The issuance of the "new normal" policy amid the COVID-19 pandemic explains the interdependence of business groups to the government, but health interests have become the concern of all citizens of the world who make business people try to adapt.

Company scale is a variable that affects two dependent variables. The larger the scale of the company, predicting a businessman can use political party access and is congruent with the "new normal" policy. The scale of the company characterizes all matters relating to the capacity and capital capabilities of a businessman in continuing interaction with policymakers. We also assume that the internal layer of policymakers is linear with the level of wealth of the businessperson: the more productive the businessman is, the more capable he is to be among influential people. However, this variable needs to be extended to a more specific nature, such as the allocation of

funds spent on lobbying fees to reflect the suggestions of the political economy discipline.

Anyone can play citizens' access to political parties in the formulation of policies in a democratic system. However, the paradox is that only business groups or business people who have linear modalities with one's position who can penetrate the layers in a political party. Likewise, with congruence, only company owners with a large scale are satisfied with the "new normal" policy. This study also confirms that capital is the most influential factor in bargaining for policy change.

From the research results, we assume that the "new normal" policy involving groups of business-people and health issues is an impartial bargaining process. COVID-19 has heightened economic and health uncertainty, while the two areas are in practice at odds with each other. Besides, the public from all walks of life is pressuring the government to solve it simultaneously.

The concept of congruence in this study does not consider the level of grading. This study entirely places respondents on the accept and not accept levels. There may be some among them who are less accepting or quite accepting. The consideration of using this measure to get a contrasting result is because we previously hoped that the policies produced by influential business people were exactly what they expected. This neglect might also be seen as a weakness.

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