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THE PAPUA CONFLICT: THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES- REVIEW FROM THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY

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ABSTRAK

Isu Papua Barat telah menjadi titik singgung konflik antara Indonesia dan komunitas internasional. Akan tetapi, riset-riset yang sudah ada cenderung mengabaikan akar penyebab perbedaan tersebut. Belum ada analisis teoretis mengenai isu ini dengan bingkai politik internasional. Riset-riset terdahulu cenderung mengabaikan narasi dasar yang menciptakan perbedaan pandangan antara Indonesia dan pihak-pihak pendukung kemerdekaan Papua Barat. Tulisan ini menganalisis akar penyebab perbedaan pandangan tersebut. Menggunakan pendekatan Mazhab Inggris dalam hubungan internasional, tulisan ini berpendapat bahwa Indonesia membingkai isu tersebut dalam konsep 'kedaulatan' dan norma 'non-intervensi' yang mencerminkan pandangan aliran Pluralis. Sebaliknya, komunitas internasional yang diwakili negara-negara Pasifik dan kelompok masyarakat sipil membingkai isu tersebut dalam konsep 'hak asasi manusia' dan norma 'menentukan nasib sendiri', yang mencerminkan pandangan aliran Solidaris.

Kata kunci: Papua Barat, Mazhab Inggris, Pluralis, Solidaris

ABSTRACT

The West Papuan issue has become a flashpoint of conflict between Indonesia and the international community. However, studies on this subject have never been concerned about the causal root of differences between Indonesia and the international community over the West Papuan issue. There has not been a theoretical account of how this issue is framed in international politics. Existing literature tends to overlook the fundamental narrative, that is, the contrasting view between Indonesia and those who support West Papuan freedom. This paper aims to analyse the root cause of this debate. Using the English School approach in international relations, this paper argues that Indonesia frames this issue within the concept of 'sovereignty' and norms of 'non-interference', which represent the Pluralist strand. On the contrary, the international community represented by Pacific countries and civil societies frames this issue within the concept of 'human rights' and norms of 'self-determination', representing the Solidarist strand.

Keywords: West Papua, English School, Pluralist, Solidarist

INTRODUCTION

The UN General Assembly frequently becomes a political platform for countries to show their position on the international political stage. Pacific countries often mention the issue of Indonesia's human rights violations in Papua during the debate session of the UN General Assembly. On September 26, 2020, Vanuatu accused Indonesia of committing human rights violations in Papua. In his speech, Vanuatu Prime Minister Bob Loughman stated that "In our region, the indigenous people of West Papua continue to suffer from human rights abuses" and urged the Indonesian government to allow the UN Human Rights Council (OHCHR) to conduct an investigation in Papua (UN Web TV, 2020). This is not the first time the accusation has happened. Every year Vanuatu raises this issue in UN forums. For example, at the 2017 UN General Assembly, Vanuatu Prime Minister Charlot Salwai Tabimasmamas stated that for the half-century, the Papua people had been subjected to torture, murder, exploitation, sexual violence, and arbitrary arrests by Indonesian government officials (UN General Assembly, 2017a). At the 2019 UN General Assembly, Vanuatu brought up this issue again by stating that West Papua is one of the "nations" that are still not free from colonialism while condemning human rights violations there (UN General Assembly, 2019a).

On this charge, the Indonesian government launched a strong protest as well as self-defence. For example, in 2016, Indonesia rejected the statements of Solomon and Vanuatu representatives by accusing them of using the issue of human rights violations in Papua as a political commodity to support Papuan separatism movements and violating the UN Charter by interfering in the affairs of other countries (UN Web TV, 2016). Then at the 2017 UN General Assembly, Indonesia reiterated that statement by stating that countries supporting separatism in other countries are illegal and violate the UN Charter (UN Web TV, 2017). Another example is at the 2020 UN General Assembly, where the Indonesian delegation attacked Vanuatu with the statement: "... you are no representation of the people of Papua and stop fantasizing of being one. Papuans are Indonesians" (UN General Assembly, 2020). This firm attitude shows that Indonesia is uncomfortable with the accusations that are often levelled by Pacific countries regarding the issue of human rights violations in Papua.

Allegations of human rights violations in Papua are not only carried out by Pacific countries. Non-state actors such as international institutions and international NGOs also touched on this issue at the global level. For example, in a report published by OHCHR, the UN experts urged investigations into cases of the alleged murder, unlawful arrest,

torture, and cruel treatment of the Papuans by the Indonesian police and military (OHCHR, 2019). The International Coalition for Papua (ICP) in its report, also stated that the cases of human rights violations in Papua are still relatively high (ICP, 2021). Advocacy institutions such as the Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization (UNPO) are also active in guarding the enforcement of human rights in Papua. At the 2016 UN General Assembly, for example, UNPO sent a report to OHCHR regarding the poor record of human rights violations in Aceh and Papua by the Indonesian government, one of the recommendations were to “respect the distinct rights to self-governance” of the two provinces (UNPO, 2016). Other international NGOs such as TAPOL (the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign), Forum Asia, Caritas Australia, Inside Indonesia, ICMICA, Dev-Zone & GEC, Pan-African Coalition for the Liberation of West Papua (PACLWP), The Uniting Church Australia, Indonesian House, Minority Rights Group International, OPM International Information Office, West Papua Action, The Pacific Concerns Resource Center (PCRC), the Australian West Papua Association, Cambridge Campaign and Peace (Campeace), and the West Papua Action Network (Westpan) also played an important role in voiced out the criticisms over the issue of human rights violations in Papua to the international community (Elisabeth, 2006).

However, in contrast to the response to statements by the Pacific countries, the Indonesian government remains unaffected by various statements of attitude and reports from these non-state actors. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the attitude of the Indonesian government remains consistent in maintaining the status of Papua as an integral part of the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. As stated by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is the duty of diplomats to explain the situation in Papua to an international audience. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said, “Papua and West Papua are an inseparable part of the Republic of Indonesia. If there are things related to the separation effort, there is a call for a referendum, then that is already a red line, a red line for all of us” (Kompas, 2019a). This statement implies that Indonesia will not compromise on any external intervention regarding the Papua issue.

Against this backdrop, this article attempts to answer the question: “why are there differences of opinion between Indonesia and some of the international communities on the Papua issue?” This article aims to analyse the root cause of the different opinion between Indonesia and international communities on the Papua issue. The analysis will not consider the national interests of Indonesia and/or international actors, including the Western Pacific countries in the Papua issue. Instead, this article interprets from the

perspective of International Relations theory with respect to the disagreement between Indonesia and international communities concerning Papua. It is important to note that the term “the international communities” used in this paper refers to both state and non-state actors. Our definition of the international communities thus adopts the view of the English School which views the state as the main actor in international relations, but does not exclude the existence of non-state actors such as international organizations and transnational advocacy networks, including individuals. According to the English School Grotian perspective, the international community includes the entire human community (Rosyidin, 2020, p. 113). This is different from the perspective of international law which narrows the definition of “international community” to a community of states (see for example, Rao in Buffard et al, 2008).

The existing literature on the issue of Papua in international politics, especially regarding relations between Indonesia and countries in the Pacific region, is generally classified into two broad themes. First, the issue of Papua in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Agustina, 2014; Rianda, Djemat and Rahmat, 2017; Sabir, 2018; Putra, Legionosuko, and Madjid, 2019; Siburian and Afriansyah, 2018; Roziqi, 2020). Second, the issue of Papua in the foreign policy of foreign countries (Kalidjernih, 2008; Day, 2015; Lantang and Tambunan, 2020; Temaluru, 2016, Zahidi, 2020; Daffa, 2020; Fadhilah, 2019). None of them mentions the root of contrasting standpoints between Indonesia and the international communities regarding Papua. The majority of research only focuses on the foreign policies of the countries involved. Most studies tend to be descriptive by highlighting the strategies of these countries to achieve their interests. There is no theoretical explanation of how the Papua issue is framed by countries and the international communities. The existing research overlooks the most basic of the Papuan issues, namely the different perspectives between Indonesia and countries supporting Papua’s independence. In fact, the international conflicts are created through these differences. Therefore, understanding the root cause of the problem is very important for anyone who wants to understand how the Papua issue is framed within the framework of interstate relations.

Using the English School approach in International Relations theory, this article proposes the following main arguments. The debate on the Papua issue in the international politics between Indonesia and the international community is based on the different perspectives of the two parties in framing the Papua issue. Indonesia frames the Papua issue into the concept of “sovereignty” and the norm of “non-intervention” so that it has

implications for a resistant, non-compromising attitude and even tends to be confrontational towards any kind of external interventions. Theoretically, Indonesia's position represents "pluralism" strand of the English School. On the other hand, the international community, which is represented by Pacific countries and several non-state actors, framed the Papua issue into the concept of "human rights as a universal norm" so that it implies a critical, idealistic, and interventionist attitude. Theoretically, the position of this international community represents "solidarism" strand of the English School.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This article employs the English School (hereafter abbreviated as ES) approach to interpret Indonesia's foreign policy regarding the Papua issue. The premise built by ES focuses on three features that are believed to be the main elements underpinning the international politics (Bull, 1977). The first feature is known as the "international system" which is anarchic, competitive and invasive, accommodating the views and political ideas popularized by Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli. The second feature underscores the concept of "international society" which is considered to view relations between countries as interdependent, need each other and complement each other, in line with the prescription of Hugo Grotius' idea of order and harmony built on rationality and collaboration. The last feature is the "world society" which is the ideal of the philosopher Immanuel Kant whose ambition is to realize an absolute degree of peace and pacifism on earth through the unification of the entire international communities into a single world government authority.

ES has several basic assumptions regarding the nature of international relations. First, the countries realize that they live side by side together so that the behaviour of one country will also influence the behaviour of other countries (Holsti, 1976). Second, the relations between countries that are intensely collaborating then resulting to the collaborative principles and norms that play a role in instilling new cultures and expectations in the cooperating countries regarding international issues and dimensions (Yasuaki, 2003). A country can therefore be part of the international community when she comes out of her national demarcation and carries out international relations with other countries, but not necessarily can become part of the international community when the country does not have the same views, ideas and conceptions about the international community. Finally, although the international communities are promoted by states as the actors, the main agents in the pillars of the international community are the diplomatic

corps and individuals who are officially appointed as state representatives who are responsible for the implementation and achievement of external relations and collaborations with other countries (Jackson, 2000).

The ES adherents are divided into two opposing views in understanding the nature of the relationship between universal values and states. The first group is the pluralists or those who consider the universal values to have no binding status, do not exceed state sovereignty, and therefore, cannot be imposed on states. Pluralists who promote state sovereignty above international values and regulations view that imposing the values of the international community on states will reduce their authority and sovereignty which in turn will create a climate of competition and mutual distrust as is the characteristic of the international system. On the contrary, solidarists argue that global ethics and norms concern values that guarantee human rights so that they are binding and must be enforced on individuals. Solidarists do not view the state and or other political institutions as relevant actors in upholding international norms and ethical values, considering that these values focus on the individual level and are fighting for individual rights. Therefore, in the name of humanitarian solidarity, solidarists argues that state sovereignty is a subject that has no relevance when the issue that must be upheld concerns basic rights and human values.

The debate between the pluralist and solidarist was originally raised by two international legal experts, namely Hugo Grotius and Lassa Oppenheim. There are three areas of debate between these two schools; about the role of war in international relations, the sources of law that bind states, and the status of individuals in the international communities (Bull in Butterfield and White, 2019, p. 73). Of the three areas, the issue of the role of war in international relations is the most important issue to be elaborated further. The ES's perspective on war is different from the realist school which considers war as a political instrument, which is therefore legitimate for the state. On the other hand, ES also rejects the claims of the pacifists who view war as illegitimate because it is against human norms. It sees war as a contextual phenomenon. This means that in certain situations war is allowed or legitimate, but war may be illegitimate in other situations. The pluralist school represented by Oppenheim argues that war is the prerogative rights of every country. The role of international law is to regulate the course of war. In other words, the Pluralist school assumes that war is allowed but there are limit that the state must comply with. On the other hand, for Grotius, who is a solidarist, war must be aimed at "just war" for the protection of human rights. Apart from being based on a self-defence

motive, war is permitted if it is intended to punish parties deemed to have committed gross human rights violations.

In this regard, the pluralists and solidarists differ on the issue of humanitarian intervention. The debate between the two reflects the debate between the goals of states to achieve “international order” and “international justice.” According to a pluralist perspective, a humanitarian intervention will create chaos instead of international order. This is based on the fact that many cases of humanitarian intervention are based on the political interests of the intervening countries rather than based on the international morality. Unilateral intervention, especially by big countries, tends to create a chaotic situation. In addition, countries tend to adopt a discriminatory policy of when deciding whether to intervene or not. The pluralists challenge the solidarist argument that if humanitarian intervention is truly based on the principles of universal morality and justice, it would be applied to every case of gross human rights violations. In fact, the states intervene only when there is a national interest (Wheeler, 2000, pp. 29-30).

The solidarists responded to the criticism of the pluralists by saying that human rights values are universal. It implies that if a country violates the norm, the international community (in this case countries) must take over the role and responsibility to enforce the norm. The violation of these norms demonstrates states’ failure to protect its citizens. According to the solidarists, the intervention is carried out only if there are three conditions; the existence of a humanitarian emergency on an extraordinary scale, the use of military instruments only as a last resort, and guarantees that the use of military instruments will have a positive impact on humanity (Wheeler, 2000, p. 34). In short, the solidarists hold the principle according to the statement of Edmun Burke, “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for the good men to do nothing.”

The ES approach is very appropriate to be used as a lens to understand Indonesia’s stance on the Papua issue. In contrast to the realist approach which puts more emphasis on the concept of national interest, the ES offers a more comprehensive perspective since it accommodates non-material variables such as the concept of international norms. In contrast to the liberal approach, the ES, especially the pluralist school, does not view international norms as universal as the liberals claim. International norms such as human rights and democracy, according to pluralists, are relative depending on how each country perceives and interprets it. Therefore, in the case of the Papua issue, Indonesia’s conception of human rights and democracy contradicts to the definition of liberals who are universalist.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research is a qualitative study with a descriptive-interpretive type of research that does not only describe reality but also interprets reality using a certain theoretical perspective. This study focuses on Indonesia's foreign policy and the international communities' responses to the issue of West Papua and interprets using the ES approach. More specifically, this study seeks to find the congruence between the case study and the two schools within ES, namely the pluralist and solidarist schools.

The data collection method uses desk research techniques which fully rely on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources used are the official statements of the institution, while the secondary sources are the opinions of experts, the results of related research, and news articles in the mass media. The collected data is then processed using congruent data analysis techniques and content analysis. In the first stage, data is sorted according to each school in the ES. Once categorized, the data are interpreted using content analysis. This technique uses qualitative content analysis in which the researcher interprets sentences, phrases, diction, and expressions contained in a statement. This interpretation is done to reveal the meaning behind the statement. This meaning is then matched with the theory used.

DISCUSSION

The Brief History of The Papua Conflict

Before discussing the Indonesian government policy regarding to the Papua issue from Sukarno to Joko Widodo, it is better to first understand the root of the conflict. Rahmawati (2004) argues that the Papuan conflict is caused by many factors ranging from political, economic, social and historical which are exacerbated by hateful sentiments and inequality. The many intertwined factors started when the New Order took a militaristic approach to the Papuan people. When the Suharto regime fell, the emergence of a democratic government actually opened up more space for the pro-Papua independence activism to voice their aspirations. This last point is reinforced by the findings of Viartasiwi (2018) who argues that post-New Order democratization provides an opportunity for weaker groups (in this case the Papuan people) to challenge the Indonesian government's dominant narrative about Papua. According to the 2010 LIPI study, four causal factors for the Papuan conflict were identified. First, the marginalization of indigenous Papuans as a result of discriminatory economic

development since the New Order era. Second, the failure of development programs, especially in the fields of education, health, and community empowerment. Third, the different perspectives on the history and identity of Papua between the central government and the Papua people. Fourth, there is no law enforcement regarding past state crimes against Papuans (Widjojo, 2010). Meanwhile, Padmi (2019) focuses more on how limited resources, social isolation, and poverty generate the violence of the Papua people to fight for independence from Indonesia. In essence, the Papuan conflict is a historical product imposed by the central government in the New Order era. This coercion in turn has implications for the marginalization and discrimination of Papua from the national political-economic map, thus triggering the local community's resistance against the central government.

Since its integration in 1969, Papua had become Indonesia's youngest territory and since then has been a challenge for the country to this day with respect to separatist movement. When it became independent from the Netherlands in 1945, Indonesia asked Papua to be included in the territory of the newly proclaimed state. According to Sukarno, Papua is an area that has experienced a colonial experience similar to that of Indonesia. In order to defend and protect humanity and the right to self-determination, Sukarno felt the need to embrace Papua as a "distant relative" who shared a dark past and needed care and development (Adams, 1965, p. 34). On the other hand, the Dutch regarded Papua as part of their territorial sovereignty whose future still depends on the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Sukarno's policy regarding Papua was quite clear and straightforward, namely to incorporate the territory into Indonesian territory as was the case with the adjacent former Dutch lands. Regarding to the reluctance of the Dutch to surrender their colonies including Papua, the Sukarno's responses can be grouped into two main categories, namely diplomacy through formal negotiations and military aggression. Sukarno took a diplomatic approach in resolving the conflict with the Netherlands by bringing the matter to the United Nations which then sponsored and mediated a number of rounds of negotiations aimed at resolving Indonesia's territorial disputes with the Netherlands. The rounds of negotiations were Linggarjati (1946), Renville (1948), Roem-van Roijen (1949) and the round table (Meja Bundar) (1949) all of which demanded the Dutch to hand over sovereignty to Indonesia. The Round Table Conference was specifically designed to solve the problem of future Papuan integration, but was not necessarily successful due to the reluctance of the Dutch to relinquish the territory again.

In fact, over the next decade, the Dutch have strengthened their military presence and developed social and civil instruments in Papua in the hope of winning the hearts of the Papuans and international support for Indonesia.

After failing to achieve meaningful results from the series of diplomatic negotiations and in response to the active presence of Dutch military and civilian operations, Sukarno finally decided to take the non-negotiated path and planned to seize Papua by a military operation. The Sukarno's government then sought support and weapons from the Soviet Union and domestically, socializing what was known as "Trikorā" which was a psychological and doctrinal military operation to wage war and battle against the Dutch to restore Indonesia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The military operation was carried out in 1961 and proved successful in seizing Papua from the Dutch occupation. The operation was intervened by the United Nations which mediated both parties to agree on the 1962 New York convention which regulates the transfer of Papuan sovereignty to the Indonesian government through the United Nations' ad-hoc administrative body, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and held a public referendum known as the Act of Free Choice or People's Opinion (Pepera) for the Papua people to determine their own destiny, interests and future independently.

Sukarno's successor, Suharto concentrated on securing the outcome of the referendum in which the Papuan preferred to join Indonesia. During his more than 30 years of rule, Suharto's overall policies towards Papua can be largely categorized into two distinct groups: those that involve tough military operations and those that use a soft approach that focuses on instilling and preserving Indonesian values and identity in Papuans. It also known as "the Indonesianization of Papua" (Gietzelt, 1989). Suharto's firm policy in integrating Papua has created a wave of protests from the Papuan which then prompted the formation of the Free Papua Organization (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) which undermined Jakarta's sovereignty and demanded independence from the state. To overcome the domestic resistance, in early 1963, Suharto declared Papua as a Military Operations Zone (*Daerah Operasi Militer*) which prioritized military strategy and counter-insurgency in managing the region. The imposition of martial law has led to many cases of violence against local communities. This policy resulted in a third of Papua's population being reduced or at least 100,000 to 300,000 people being killed and subjected to violence under the Suharto regime (Crocomber, 2007, p. 287).

Meanwhile, the Suharto's soft power approach focused on transforming Papua into a social and cultural environment similar to that of Indonesia. Suharto advanced this strategy by working on the language and education, perception, economy and demographics of Papuans (Gietzelt, 1989). Language and education play an important role in introducing the Indonesian curriculum and language to the Papuan people who are still familiar with the local language. Indonesian language and the Indonesian national curriculum are introduced to students in schools in order to build their awareness of the Indonesian language and academic perspective. Suharto also sought to build a more inclusive social and cultural understanding by making the region more open to Indonesia. This is mainly done by establishing a transmigration program that invites and subsidizes Javanese and other Indonesians to settle and live in Papua. It is hoped that the existence of the non-Papuans and Papuans living side by side will be a cultural diversification and socially enriching the Papuan demography which will later make Papua inclusive like other parts of Indonesia. In addition, the presence of the non-Papuans living in Papua will also provide a first-hand image of non-Papuans to Papuans which is expected to eliminate the negative perception that local people have towards Indonesians.

In the reform era (Era Reformasi), realizing the amount of violence that Papuans have had to endure over the last few decades, Gus Dur took a warm, open, and more liberal approach to dealing with the region. In his first two months in office, he visited and had direct dialogue with the Papuan tribes and their leaders where he refused to refer to the place by the abbreviation given by Sukarno, namely "Irian" or "*Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Nederland*" ("join Republic Indonesia Anti Netherland"). Gus Dur returned the name "Papua" as a new way to name the area. It was also under Gus Dur's leadership that the Papuan were able to hold their first Papuan General Conference, a large and open political meeting held and attended by the tribal leaders, figures, and elements of the Papuan communities. The meeting resulted in what is considered a bold and significant document called the West Papua Political Communiqué which articulates the strengths and weaknesses of the Papuan communities and how to turn them into more strategic opportunities and pillars (King, 2002). Although the results of the General Conference and Communiqués of his followers were strongly refuted by Gus Dur's foreign policy principles on issues of regional secession (Smith, 2000, p. 500), this did not dampen his support and even provided funding from the government. until the creation of a similar event two months later, namely the Papuan People's Congress which

also invited elements and leaders of the national Papuan communities to speak openly about the future, demands and choices of the Papua people.

The Gus Dur's friendly policies towards Papua were not well received by military leaders and even by political circles including his deputy, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Therefore, when Gus Dur's presidency ended in 2001 and was replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri, Gus Dur's harmonious policy in Papua changed significantly. Megawati's strong stance in integrating Papua reflects the approach of Sukarno, who once told her about the importance of Papua for Indonesia's territorial integrity. Megawati chose to continue her father's vision and honour the national heroes who sacrificed their lives to seize Papua from the Dutch (Chauvel and Bhakti, 2004, p. 25). Under Megawati, Indonesia reaffirmed its presence in Papua and positioned itself as the central government and ensured that the doctrine of independence and the ideas of freedom and self-determination did not emerge (Fujikawa, 2017). Under the Megawati's administration, prominent independence activist Theys Eluay was assassinated and Megawati's government also postponed the implementing regulations for the establishment of the Papuan People's Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua*), but surprisingly favoured the issuance of a presidential decree to implement Law No. 45/1999 to divide Papua into three distinct provinces (McGibbon, 2004, p. 18).

In the 2004 general election, Megawati lost to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who at that time served as Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security. As a leader with experience in several of Megawati's policies in Papua, Yudhoyono's new government marked the return of a regime that is more cooperative and open to legal, social and political issues in Papua. Yudhoyono's policies on the Papua issue are a combination of the military assertiveness and the strategic policies of experienced bureaucrats.

During his 10-year presidency, Yudhoyono focused on achieving three main dimensions that were considered the most effective solutions to the Papuan problem. First, recognizing the uniqueness of Papua and its people so as to support the birth of special regulations that provide greater space for regional autonomy for the Papuan people, for example optimizing Law No. 21/2001 on Papuan regional autonomy and issuing Presidential Decree No. 55/2004 to recognize and approve the establishment of the MRP. Second, Yudhoyono also consistently emphasized the principles of open dialogue, cooperation and mutual trust as the philosophy underlying the Papuan affairs. SBY is noted to have visited various remote places and locations in Papua to interact with

tribal leaders, religious leaders, and local villagers. Finally, the economic and welfare dimensions are also the most important dimensions in Yudhoyono's policies in Papua. SBY issued Presidential Decree No. 5/2007 concerning the "Acceleration of the Papuan Development Process" which focuses on the provision of the so-called "New Deal Policy for Papua" which revolves around food security and poverty alleviation as well as efforts to improve education, health services and infrastructure. The decree was later revised with the issuance of the Presidential Decree No. 65/2011 which established a coordinating body, namely UP4B or the "Unit for the Acceleration of Development of the Provinces of Papua and West Papua," which is tasked with providing assistance to the President in implementing and supervising cooperation and implementation of the accelerated development program. The two decrees were designed to assist and accelerate development.

The Yudhoyono's approach to economic development and multi-sectoral development resonates deeply in the hearts of the current Joko Widodo regime. Jokowi issued Presidential Regulation No. 9/2017 concerning the "Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua and West Papua." One of the most important aspects of this development narrative lies in Jokowi's interpretation of the concept of welfare which focuses on the existence of public infrastructure that can support and encourage economic activity. To that end, Jokowi has allocated massive amounts of energy and resources to ensure that infrastructure development in the provinces of Papua and West Papua can be ideal in supporting the larger and more ambitious goals of realizing prosperity from various development frameworks. To date, Jokowi has built a trans road of nearly 1,071 kilometres that connects several cities in Papua and West Papua. In addition, Jokowi also plans to complete land infrastructure with large-scale airport and port development projects.

To ensure that development runs smoothly, Jokowi has also approved and approved the latest revision of Law No. 21/2001 concerning regional autonomy which has been revised by Law No. 2/2021. The latest regulation has brought importance to several fields to provide more benefits for the Papua people, especially in the aspect of empowering indigenous peoples, strengthening the MRP, and guaranteeing the Papuan to get greater economic opportunities in their own land. To support these development goals, the Jokowi administration has also approved the extension of the regional autonomy fund which originally ended this year. Jokowi agreed to provide more funds for the next 20 years with a total of 234 trillion rupiah.

The Principle of Non-Intervention vs The Right to Self-Determination

As described earlier, each school in ES has its own standpoint regarding the role of international norms. The pluralist school assumes that international norms are important insofar as they maintain international order, and the sense that states respect each other's sovereignty even though their behaviour is dictated by national interests. Intervention in any name is not permitted because it would disturb the international order itself. On the other hand, solidarism assumes that international norms need to be fought for in order to uphold universal values. Sovereignty is considered subordinate because it represents the state's exclusivism towards the universalism of human values which should be upheld more highly. The implication is that intervention in the name of universal norms is a common thing in relations between countries. Every country must be willing to be criticized, even in the worst-case scenario, it can be invaded if it is deemed to have violated this universal norm.

The debate between the two schools of ES is relevant to understanding the issue of the conflict between Indonesia and the Pacific countries and the international communities regarding the Papua issue. The conflict occurred because of the different views of Indonesia and the Pacific countries and the international communities regarding the concept of adopted international norms. In other words, the two parties "stand in unequal shoes." On the one hand, Indonesia views the issue of Papua as a sovereignty issue that cannot be intervened by any country. The Indonesia's policy in Papua is Indonesia's exclusive right guaranteed by international law. On the other hand, the Pacific countries and the international community consider the Papua issue to be an international issue because it involves violations of international human rights norms. This norm is considered universal and goes beyond the norm of sovereignty. As a result, the Indonesia's policy in Papua is not an exclusive right but becomes an inclusive obligation of the international communities where they feel they are also responsible for correcting the policies of the Indonesian government and defending the rights of the Papuan people.

The Indonesia's pluralist view is very clear in official government statements. We will analyse one by one in order to clarify the problem using the content analysis method. At a debate session at the UN Human Rights Council in 2016, Indonesia issued a statement denying criticism from Solomon, Vanuatu, and pro-West Papuan NGOs as follows:

My delegation reject categorically the Statements made by those Delegations today. Those statements represent an unfortunate lack of understanding of the current state and development in Indonesia, including in the provinces of Papua and West Papua. Those statements lack good faith and are politically motivated that can be construed as supporting the separatist group in those provinces who have been engaged in inciting public disorder and in armed terrorist attacks toward civilians and security personnel. Such support clearly violates the purposes and objectives of the UN Charter and principles of international law on friendly relations among states and on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia in Geneva, 2016).

The above statement contains at least three meanings. First, the Indonesian government's policy in Papua is to fight separatist groups, not to commit human rights violations. Second, the policy is justified by the UN Charter and international law which authorizes states to fight separatism for the sake of upholding sovereignty and territorial integrity. Third, the actions of Solomon, Vanuatu, and pro-West Papuan NGOs violate international norms governing friendly relations between countries by respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The following year, Indonesia again released a statement addressed to Vanuatu: "We deeply regret that the Government of Vanuatu is blatantly using human rights issues to justify its dubious support for the separatist movement in Papua." The statement made by the Government of Vanuatu put in question the commitment of the Government of Vanuatu to comply with the basic principles of the UN as engine in its charter as well as its compliance to various relevant international law (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia in Geneva, 2017). This statement is similar to the previous statement which implies that Indonesia will continue to fight the separatist movement in Papua and negative comments from other countries on Indonesia's policies in Papua violate international norms, namely the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries (non-interference). This principle has been regulated in the United Nations Charter Article 2 Paragraph 7 which reads: "Nothing contained in the present Chapter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the

domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter” (UN, 2021). In addition, the 1986 Vienna Convention also states the principle of non-intervention:

Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (UN, 2005).

The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly emphasized this principle of sovereignty on many occasions. In a meeting with Commission 1 of the Indonesian House of Representatives in 2019, Retno Marsudi said: “Indonesian diplomats have the same understanding, that we will not step back one centimetre for our fencing of the Republic of Indonesia. ... Papua and West Papua are inseparable parts of the Republic of Indonesia. If there is something related to the separation effort, there is a call for a referendum, then that is already a red line, a red line for all of us” (Kompas, 2019b). The term “NKRI” or the “Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia” which was uttered twice by Retno Marsudi implies that the Papua issue is a domestic issue and more importantly, any attempt to separate West Papua from Indonesia is a violation of national integrity. The term “NKRI” is also used when it is associated with the issue of separatism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official statement regarding Benny Wenda: “Indonesia's position on separatism groups will remain firm. Indonesia will not step back an inch to uphold the NKRI” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019) and “West Papua is part of the legitimate sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and must not be claimed and interfered with by any party including Benny Wenda” (Sampit News, 2020).

This emphasis on the issue of sovereignty is part of the Indonesian government's framing strategy to frame the Papua issue as a domestic issue, not an international commodity. While speaking with the journalist for the Kumparan media, Retno Marsudi again repeated her statements about “sovereignty,” the “red line,” and the “UN Charter”:

One thing that I always say firmly is, when the issue is the issue of sovereignty, all diplomats of the Republic of Indonesia will not step back an inch, because this is a red line. ... The issue of respecting the sovereignty of other countries, this is one of the principles contained in the UN Charter that must be respected by all countries, and Indonesia is one of the countries that is very consistent in respecting this principle (Kumparan, 2019).

The Indonesian government's efforts to localize the Papua issue so that it does not become an international commodity can also be seen in the official statement by the Indonesian representative in Geneva on Vanuatu's comments in 2021. The statement essentially clarifies the criticism that as a democratic country Indonesia should guarantee the freedom of expression of the Papuan people. For Indonesia, freedom of expression is not absolute, but there are limits. If the freedom already contains elements of separatism, then the action can be categorized as a crime so that national law applies. The following is the statement of the Indonesian government: "The right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression is not absolute. Based on our national laws, the promotion of separatism, and the intention of violence are criminal acts. We therefore reiterate the position that the promotion of separatism and violence does not fall under the category of peaceful assembly" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021).

In contrast to Indonesia's steadfast position in its stance, the international community frames the issue of West Papua within the framework of international norms. The implication is that Indonesia's sovereignty over West Papua is not absolute. The international community urges the Indonesian government to be compromising by putting aside the issue of sovereignty and complying with international norms. The representative of Solomon Islands stated at the UN General Assembly debate session: "The peoples of West Papua were never allowed the proper act of self-determination guaranteed by the inalienable right to self-determination as expressed in the UN human rights Covenant" (UN, 2017). The statement repeated the word "self-determination" twice, which meant emphasizing the right of the people of West Papua to self-determination. If Indonesia interprets this right as an aspiration to separate itself from the Republic of Indonesia, Solomon sees this right as guaranteed in international law. Solomon reaffirmed this right as a universal norm that all nations must respect when delivering a statement at the 2018

UN General Assembly: “Solomon Islands reaffirms that human rights principles are universal, indivisible, interrelated and must be treated in a fair manner” (UN, 2018).

Just like his colleague Solomon, Vanuatu also has a similar view on the issue of West Papua. Vanuatu’s statement at the 2018 UN Human Rights Council meeting reflected its political position:

Vanuatu raises its concern with ongoing enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention directed at the indigenous people of West Papua, particularly against those exercising internationally protected rights to speak out about West Papua's claim to self-determination. ... Vanuatu condemns Indonesia’s continued practice of arbitrary arrest and detention of indigenous Papuans exercising their internationally protected rights to freedom of expression and assembly (Human Rights Papua, 2018).

This statement sends a message that the people of West Papua have the right to determine their own destiny. Vanuatu does not say it supports the separatist movement, but from this statement it can be interpreted that Vanuatu regards the aspirations of the pro-independence West Papuans as rights protected by international law. Thus, Vanuatu seems to have put aside aspects of Indonesian sovereignty and put more emphasis on the universalism of human rights norms, especially those that regulate the right to self-determination. In this regard, Vanuatu stated at the 2019 UN General Assembly that, “... West Papua are still struggling for self-determination. ... Vanuatu strongly condemns the human rights violations committed against the indigenous people of West Papua. We call for the United Nations system to be used to find solutions to these human rights abuses” (UN General Assembly, 2019b). For Vanuatu, self-determination is a right that cannot be revoked by the state because it is part of universal human rights norms. This universalism of human rights implies that a state’s policy that is considered to violate human rights cannot be called a domestic issue.

Apart from Vanuatu and Solomon, the international communities also tend to view the issue of West Papua as an international issue. The pro-West Papuan agency, the International Coalition for Papua (ICP) released a 2020 report in which one of its recommendations to the Indonesian government is: “Respect and protect the freedoms of association and assembly, as well as the freedom to peacefully express political opinions,

especially if these opinions differ from the unitary state ideology” (ICP, 2020). The sentence “if these opinions differ from the unitary state ideology” is a controversial sentence because it means that the ICP explicitly supports the independence of West Papua. This support almost certainly refers to international norms, especially the United Nations Charter Article 1 Paragraph 2 which states that “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” The support for the independence of West Papua under the pretext of the right to self-determination was also expressed by the Australian Green Party: “It is quite clear that the Indonesian government is concealing its human rights abuses. ... many Australians support your right to self-determination and your right to live without fear and violence” (Di Natale, 2019).

Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Council think that freedom of expression, assembly and organization are the rights guaranteed by the international law. They encourage the Indonesian government to respect these rights (UN, 2020). This statement is much softer than other statements, for example from Solomon, Vanuatu, and the pro-West Papuan civil society groups who condemn human rights violations and even openly support the West Papuan independence. Nevertheless, the statement of the UN Human Rights Council is very clearly framed by the universalism principle of human rights so it seems that it does not give too much importance to the issue of Indonesian sovereignty. The Amnesty International also made a relatively lenient statement which used the terms “unlawful detention” and “rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association” to highlight Indonesia's human rights violations in West Papua. It also stated that in such a situation, the Indonesian government was judged to have failed to distinguish between the pro-independence activists who voiced their aspirations peacefully and those who used violent ways (Amnesty International, 2020). Despite this lenient statement, it can be concluded that the Amnesty International views the Indonesian government as ignoring the international norms on human rights.

The differences in views between Indonesia and the international communities regarding to the Papua issue are difficult to bridge because each represents a different perspective. We argue that Indonesia’s pluralist stance has two shortcomings. First, this approach is counterproductive for efforts to restore Indonesia’s image as a democratic country that upholds human rights values. Although the current administration of President Jokowi has attempted to address the issue of Papua through an economic and

socio-cultural approach, the militaristic approach remains occur. This opens up opportunities for human rights violations that can provoke an international reaction. Second, this approach also shows that Indonesia does not respect other international norms, especially the human rights norms which also exist together with the non-intervention norms. Indonesia's strong position in upholding norms of non-interference and sidelining human rights norms shows that Indonesia employs a discriminatory policy in the issue of human rights enforcement. With regard to the clash between the two, human rights become a subordinate issue. This tendency clearly represents the realist view that states need not regard international norms as important if they cannot be translated into national interests.

On the other hand, the international community's solidarist approach has several shortcomings. First, it is difficult to distinguish between a normatively oriented criticism and a political one. The international communities' criticism of the Papua issue on the surface looks very normative; as if fighting for the human rights norms of the Papua people. However, no one can guarantee that the criticism is politically charged. For example, the position of Solomon and Vanuatu against the Indonesia's policy in Papua is very likely to be based on a political motive, namely the solidarity of the South Pacific nations. The academic studies tend to show that the policies of South Pacific countries are driven by political interests, namely seeking the independence of West Papua from the Republic of Indonesia (see for example Temaluru, 2016; Walela, 2018; Fadhilah, 2019; Bayuseno, 2020; Daffa, 2020; Kusuma, 2022). In short, the South Pacific countries' criticism of Indonesia's policies in Papua may not be based on a commitment to human rights but rather a national interest in attracting the Papuans into the Melanesian racial community. The same applies to international organizations campaigning for the Papuan independence. Their activism might not purely motivated by ethical motives, that is, human rights norms, but is driven by the interests of certain countries. Liberal democracies such as Australia, the US, and the UK have an interest in disseminating liberal democratic values including supporting the right to self-determination in many countries (see for example, Diesing, 1967; Lent, 1971; Calder, 1971; Ronen, 2008; Kimura, 2018).

CONCLUSION

The issue of West Papua has become a political commodity for many parties. Opinions on this issue are divided into two opposing sides. Indonesia regards its policies in West

Papua as purely domestic matter as a sovereign state. Indonesia also claims that the policy is guaranteed by the international law which regulates the norms of international relations, that is, norms of non-interference in domestic affairs. On the other hand, the international communities consider the Papua issue to be an international issue because there is an element of violation of international norms by the Indonesian government. They assume, considering the human rights are universal norms, any kind of human rights violation would trigger international response. The implication is that sovereignty needs to be put aside because human rights universalism has a higher position than sovereignty as the exclusive right of a country.

The argument between Indonesia and the international communities cannot and will not come to a common ground. This means that this conflict will continue to occur. The firmness of Indonesia's stance reflects the pluralist view in the perspective of the ES which is based on the principle that respecting sovereignty is a fundamental norm of international relations. Sovereignty is the highest priority of the national interest which will be fought for at any cost. In short, Indonesia will not negotiate on the issue of sovereignty. Meanwhile, the criticism and the international communities' criticism reflects the view of the English School solidarists which sovereignty is not more important than the universal norms. Human rights are basic norms that must be respected by every nation that claims to be civilized. Any kind of the human rights violation will be an international responsibility. However, it should be noted that the international communities' advocacy on the issue of human rights violations in West Papua may be just a cover to achieve certain strategic interests. However, this paper is not concerned with the political or economic motives behind the advocacy. A separate study is needed to investigate the interests of the pro-independence West Papuans behind the narrative of the Indonesian government's human rights violations. The realist perspective may be able to analyse this.

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