Developing Indonesian Perspectives in International Relations: The Argument For “Depok School”

This article puts forward arguments to build a “Depok School” within the field of International Relations, as the paradigm for understanding the phenomenon of international relations is generally dominated by the perspective of powerful and wealthy Western countries. Through an analysis of empirical and theoretical developments in the study of International Relations, this paper examines the need for more non-Western perspectives. The mandate from the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia provides an axiological basis for a more suitable analytical framework that captures the unique phenomena of Indonesia and other developing countries, which is rarely seen through the lens of the West. To build the “Depok School”, the 5G and 3D ideas put forward by Juwono Sudarsono are an important starting point. His perspective emphasises links between five geographical (5G) scopes—local, provincial, national, regional, and global—and three dimensions (3D) of issues—political-security, economy, and social-culture—when analysing international and global phenomena.


INTRODUCTION
In the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the newly-formed state aspired to the following ideals: (1) to protect the Indonesian people from bloodshed; (2) to promote the general welfare of the population; (3) to promote the intellectual life of the nation; and (4) to participate in realising a world order based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice. The fourth objective reflects the understanding of Indonesia's founding fathers, who were both visionary and idealistic. However, since its independence, Indonesia has had to live with a conflictual and often unfair international system.

An International System Dominated by Power Relations
Along with other newly independent countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (or the Global South), Indonesia has existed within a flawed international system which was forged by the victors of the Second World War. The two main features have characterised the international system over the past seven decades.
Firstly, the statement "the winner takes it all" seems to be true in the Westphalian state system after the Second World War; the international system is dominated by the major powers in the domains of politics, security, and economics. The dominance of these powers, therefore, undermines the bargaining position of developing countries like Indonesia, and the 'Melian Dialogue', as observed by Thucydides during the Peloponnesian War, appears to have been replicated in contemporary international relations. The essence of the 'Melian Dialogue' is realpolitik in that powerful countries can behave as they see fit, while less powerful countries have no option but to defer to these inclinations (Bagby, 1996, Thucydides, 2012. In fact, by maintaining their dominance, the political and economic interests of the major powers are intertwined. Pax Americana created the political framework for the expansionist economic activity of itself and its allies (Gilpin, 1987, xii).
This intertwined relation between security and economy is also found among major Asian countries (Yoshimatsu, 2014). The interdependence between countries in the world (Keohane and Nye, Jr., 2012) does not prevent the existence of power relations between these countries because weaker countries are more dependent on powerful countries than vice versa. Power relations in international relations are real even though instruments such as international institutions or organisations, norms, and international law have also been created. International organisations, operating within the framework of the Bretton Woods system, have demonstrated the dominance of their founding countries, which were those that prevailed during the Second World War. These include institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which later became known as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. To prevent what Guzman (2013) terms "the Frankenstein problem", these major powers have controlled the institutions they created so that they will not grow in a way that could harm their interests. In many cases, these international institutions have actually served as instruments of power from their founding countries. Furthermore, international norms and laws that are expected to regulate and constrain (powerful) state behaviours are also problematic. First, the norms that apply in the international system today were formulated by the major powers in such a way that suits their interests thus lending validity to Acharya's claim on this matter (2009,2014). Second, international norms and laws do not always apply to major countries who are often considered to be "above" international law.
Therefore, power relations in international law are also real and while, in some cases, they may become less intense they cannot be entirely abolished.
The second feature of the post-World War II international system is the competition between major powers for political influence, strategic power, and economic domination. It appears that no country wants to be the victim of realpolitik like Melos in the 'Melian Dialogue'. Therefore, all countries compete to be the wealthiest, most developed, and most powerful in the world. This urge to prioritise national interests has implications for state behaviour in international relations because these interests must be achieved through competition with other powerful countries or by domination over less powerful ones. Alternating between competition and cooperation characterises international relations, but world history shows that countries tend to abandon cooperation rather than sacrificing their national interests.
The characteristics of this international system stray far from the lasting peace that Indonesia aspired to, as inscribed in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. As Mearsheimer (2001) states, "Hopes for peace will hardly be realised because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result". Differences in political, strategic, and economic interests, especially between major countries, create competitive relationshipseven conflicts and warsin various regions of the world that sometimes significantly impact many other countries, including Indonesia. Since the beginning of Indonesia's independence, it has experienced the Cold War between the Western Bloc led by the United States (US) and the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union (USSR). Apart from ideological competition, the two blocs also competed in the domains of security and economics. The rivalry of the two blocs spread from Europe throughout the world and formed a bipolar world structure.
In Asia, the Cold War gave rise to both the Korean and Vietnam Wars as well as engendering the rivalry of communist and non-communist factions in various countries.
In Southeast Asia, the competition between major powers has also complicated regionalism due to the divisive intervention of major powers (Fitriani, 2017).
The vision and astuteness of Indonesia's founders and subsequent leaders have prevented Indonesia from becoming trapped in this competition between major powers or from being dragged to either bloc thus giving credence to their historical and significant strategy of a "free and active" foreign policy. "Freedom" does not necessarily equate to neutral but means that Indonesia is free to determine its foreign policy, including cooperating with countries that are considered the most beneficial to help Indonesia realise its own national interests. "Free" means Indonesia is unwilling to be dictated to by any major power, which compares to Melos, who resisted pressure to comply with Athens' interests in the 'Melian Dialogue'. However, the tragedy that Melos experienced should not occur to Indonesia because the "freedom" combined with "active" principles has ensured the country has room for maneuvers in international affairs. Bung Karno attempted to take advantage of this opportunity by cooperating with countries in Asia and Africa by holding the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung to build a "third force", which consisted of the new emerging forces that were institutionalised as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Agung, 1990). Many developing countries generally had high hopes for NAM, yet history shows that NAM did not significantly build the third power that could reshape the international political structure until the Cold War ended.

The Complexity of Issues in International Relations
The fall of the USSR in the late 1980s, which marked the end of the Cold War, paved the way for a hope of building a more democratic and peaceful world order that was believed to be more conducive to economic development. However, the world has not become more peaceful with the liberal world order fortified by Western countries. In fact, the world is becoming increasingly complex, insecure and unstable as countries and their societies continue to encounter both traditional and non-traditional security threats.
The traditional threat to the stateconflict or war with other countriespersists in various parts of the world between powerful and less powerful countries as exemplified by the attacks by the US and its allies on Iraq in 1991and 2003, and Afghanistan in 2001 or the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Additionally, major countries have been the architects in civil wars elsewhere such as Syria since 2011, Yemen since 2015, Ukraine in 2014, and the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1998-2003, not to mention involvement in the continual disputes between India and Pakistan. In total, fiftytwo conflicts or wars involving states (state-based conflicts) were recorded across the world during 2018, and fifty-four conflicts took place during 2019; this number was recorded as one of the highest in world history (Palik, Rustad and Methi, 2020).
Furthermore, the world must now also contend with the introduction of nontraditional security threats, which are new problems that were not previously considered to be threats. These include climate change and its devastating impacts, the decreasing quality of the environment due to economic activity and population growth, refugee and migrant crises, smuggling and human trafficking, violence against women, children and marginalised groups, the trafficking of illegal drugs, global hunger and inequality, terrorism and fundamentalism, the debt of developing countries, and epidemics and transnational diseases. These non-traditional issues have emerged as global problems because individual countries cannot resolve them, so addressing these issues requires cooperation between countries and a more democratic international system in the form of an inclusive and fair global governance.
However, international cooperation is not always easy for two main reasons.
Firstly, there are always parties who feel entitled to more benefits than others. Secondly, some countries or parties expect to benefit from the results of cooperation without investing the cost and effort required to achieve results, which is known as the 'free-rider phenomenon'. This phenomenon indicates that the end of the Cold War has not prevented further conflicts and wars in the world, and that international affairs are getting more complicated because they overlap with economic, environmental, social, and cultural issues.

The Phenomena of Contemporary International Relations
In the last three decades, the world has also witnessed the spectacular rise of China. As a country which experienced economic hardships as recently as the late 1970s, China has drawn nearer to, and even rivalled, developed countries in the liberal world order (Keller and Rawski, 2007;Zhang, 2012). Since 2010, China has become the second-largest economy in the world and continues to make considerable progress in other fields as well.
China's massive economic development is one of the most critical phenomena in contemporary world history as it has developed in line with the modernisation of China's military strength (Dooley, 2012) and technological developments, made an impact on other countries both in Asia and other parts of the world (Keller and Warski, 2007;Cho and Park, 2013;Fels, 2017), and encouraged China to augment its position in the international system (Wang, 2007;Shambough, 2013;Garcia, 2020).
Due to its huge influence on the power structure and world economy, the rise of China is an interesting phenomenon in an international system that Western powers have dominated since the end of the Second World War. China's power is an actual threat to the US and its allies since their power in shaping the world order has diminished commensurately, although they still possess the strongest military power and economic capabilities. China, and several other countries previously considered weak, have succeeded in advancing their economies and are now categorised as "emerging" countries. There is a vast literature discussing China as a threat to the international system, and a "China threat theory" has also emerged since the 1990s (Roy, 1996;Yee and Storey, 2002).
While the "China threat theory" is supported by considerable evidence, countries that have dominated the international system since the end of the Second World War (old powers) have taken advantage of the ongoing fear of China to continue to dominate the international system (Nye, 2009;Sutter, 2008). However, some scholarly works, generally from Asia, argue that the "China threat" is a misleading term used deliberately to prevent non-Western countries from becoming powerful and influential in the international system. The emergence of such countries would disturb the interests of major powers who enjoy privileges and power within the established international system (Al Rodhan, 2007;Song, 2015).
One of the interesting empirical phenomena in this context is the recognition of China and other emerging economies in international economic governance through the Group of Twenty (G20) intergovernmental forum. (Fitriani, 2020). In the G20, the global economic powers since the Second World War (old economies) recognise their role, and try to accommodate the interests of the emerging economies with an unspoken caveat that they do not interfere with their own economic interests.
It is understandable that the US and its allies are fearful of the rise of China not only due to its expansive economic power in almost all regions of the world, but also due to the confidence that China has displayed in the South China Sea in modernising its naval power and technology. However, the "Thucydides trap" in which some observers predict that war would be inevitable if a new country emerges as a "challenger" to the existing major powers in the region or the global arena (Allison, 2017) is unlikely to apply to the US and China as there is a very strong interdependence between the two economies, and the recent trade war demonstrated only a part of the empirical phenomenon between the two economically strongest countries.
Globalisation, and its widespread consequences, have also created new actors in international affairs that can shape state behaviours, including the relations among and between major powers and smaller ones (Frieden and Lake, 2000). Nowadays, globalisation is also strengthened by technological advances that have not only eliminated barriers in the interaction between states and their citizens, but also triggered competition, fraud, and digital threats. Therefore, this current period is filled with uncertainties between the US and China as well as between them and other countries in the world.
The second phenomenon that has significantly shaped world history today is the spread of the Covid-19 virus throughout the globe since early 2020, which revealed that all countries -be they strong, weak, rich, or poor -were unable to adequately contain and manage the pandemic. Global health problems that were previously considered to be a "low" political issue suddenly shocked the world, negatively affecting the lives of almost everyone, and putting enormous economic and social pressures on all countries in various parts of the world. In fact, more than a decade ago, Feldbaum et al (2010) and McInnes and Lee (2012) argued that health issues are a very important international issue in the era of globalisation. Over the past two years, the pandemic has not only resulted in health and economic crises but has also left profound impacts on the security, social and cultural realms.
The Covid-19 pandemic has not only interrupted the societies of almost every country in the world, but it has also altered several aspects of international relations. A more flexible practice of diplomacy has been limited because digital communication struggles to create a conducive atmosphere for communication and negotiation among countries. In addition, there have been pressures from various international actors and the public for world leaders to intensify cooperation in addressing the pandemic and the economic crisis it has caused, which cannot be overcome by one country alone. Despite this, it appears that power politics and strategic competition between the US and China are still shaping the practice of international relations (Christensen, 2020;Wulf, 2021).
The pandemic has also revealed that global health governance dynamics overlap with the global political economy, health diplomacy, and global security. In fact, during the pandemic, competition has also occurred within global health governance and involves its leading actor, namely the World Health Organization (WHO). During the pandemic, WHO has sought to play a more decisive role in global health governance. The US and European countries which sponsored the founding of WHO in 1948 are striving to control this institution to prevent the previously-referred to "Frankenstein problem" (Guzman, 2013) The competition between the world's major powers has now developed into a competition for greater access to medical supplies, medicines, and vaccines. This has complicated the task of WHO, and the cooperation between countries within this institution, in addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. Both the US and its allies, and China seem to be in a dilemma whereby "there is a direct trade-off between the need to give the international institution [sic] enough authority to be effective and the desire to guard against that risk that it will become a monster" (Guzman, 2013, p. 2). As a result, the level of compliance among the member countries to WHO directives and regulations is strongly influenced by the global distribution of power.
Amid the structural limitations experienced by WHO and the competing interests of the US and China within these institutions, countries cannot expect a global health governance to manage the pandemic effectively and ideally. Hence, it is not surprising that many states have demonstrated inward-looking and self-centred behaviours since every country believes that its national interests must come as a priority (Brown and Ladwig, 2020). The more economically powerful countries compete to control access to medicines and vaccines, and even demonstrate "vaccine nationalism" by stockpiling large quantities that exceed their needs. With limited vaccine supplies throughout the world, "vaccine nationalism" by powerful and wealthy countries has limited the access of poorer countries to the Covid-19 vaccines that their people need. The world has also witnessed that the countries demonstrating this immoral behaviour are the same ones which have been actively promoting normative values such as human rights and inclusivity. In this context, social norms in international relations seem only to be used as the rich and powerful countries' political (and economic) weapons.
In this non-conducive international system, Indonesia and other countries have succeeded in forging fruitful international cooperation through the COVAX Facility, which began on July 15, 2020. This cooperative initiative seeks to provide more equitable access to vaccines for all countries. The scarcity of the Covid-19 vaccine has also encouraged countries to cooperate with vaccine-producing countries regionally as was seen in the European Union, or globally, as Indonesia did. Furthermore, non-state international actors have also become increasingly important as global partners by bridging the interests of different countries and fulfilling the needs that developing countries cannot meet or which cannot be provided by powerful or wealthy countries. The various phenomena mentioned above show that countries worldwide still continue to compete and cooperate even during a pandemic.

Different Conditions between Developed and Developing Countries
The conflictual and unjust international system Indonesia has experienced since its independence indicates the size of the challenges faced by Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomatic strategies in fulfilling its national interests. According to Krasner (2004, p. 19), a country has four main aims: political power, large national income, economic growth, and social stability. Similar to other countries, Indonesia also aims to achieve these four goals. However, there are various obstacles to achieving these that can be categorised into two groups -pressures from the international system, and domestic issues.
As discussed before, Indonesia must cope with the Westphalian international system, which has been dominated and controlled by powerful countries and further complicated by conflicts between these countries. In the global power distribution, Indonesia is not situated in the top tier as a hegemonic power but nor is it in the bottom tier. Indonesia's ability to fight for its national interests is limited by its position in the global power hierarchy. As Krasner (1976) declared almost five decades ago, "How countries choose between their options depends strongly upon their position within the international system" (quoted in Frieden and Lake, 2000).
In addition to pressures from the international system, other obstacles for Indonesia in realising the ideals mandated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution also come from within. Professor Juwono Sudarsono, in his inaugural speech as the Professor of International Relations at Universitas Indonesia several decades ago, stated that the success of Indonesia's development is the key to its diplomacy. Indonesian diplomats will find it difficult to carry out their diplomatic duties effectively and confidently if the international community can witness the increase in corrupt practices, inconsistent and manipulative law enforcement, human rights violations, environmental degradation due to the expansion of irresponsible economic activities, and various other political, legal, economic, social, and cultural problems. The aspirations of Indonesia to "participate in carrying out world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice" must start from within the country itself.
A great nation, a strong state, and a developed economy do not emerge from a polarised society based on primordial ties leading to the problems of identity politics and pseudo-nationalism. National character and national morals are included in the nine elements of national power that enable a country to become a great country, according to one of the most influential scholars in international relations, Hans Morgenthau, in his book Politics Among Nations (1951). In this context, it is critical to realise the importance of the human factor, namely human capital (Helpman, 2004) and domestic political institutions (North, 2004), in building a developed country. Investment in the education sector is vital since no country can become developed without this. The education referred to here is the process which produces not only skilled workers but also inventors, both in the fields of physical engineering and socio-cultural engineering. All major countries have significant numbers of inventors whom their governments support with long-term planning.
For Indonesia, raising its bargaining position in the global political structure is not sufficient to improve the country's image in the international community. It is equally important for the country to alter its mindset about the role of the non-hegemonic state that can change or enrich the discourse in international relations. The history of Indonesia's diplomacy exhibits that this country has been able, thus far, to: (1) continue to exist within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia compared to the civil turmoil experienced by many countries in Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East in conducting their political transformations; (2) become an influential country not only in ASEAN, Southeast Asia and Asia but also outside of its region (Fitriani, 2019); (3) become a mediator in conflicts between states; and (4) offer a cognitive leadership in various international initiatives, although on some occasions this has begun by "going solo" before being recognised and followed by other countries. Moreover, Indonesia conducts international relations practices typical of other Asian countries, which are somewhat culturally different from Western ones (Fitriani, 2015). In many cases, flexibility, aligned with the "free and active" principle, and an informal and sometimes even personal approach (Fitriani, 2018) (Emmers, 2014;McRae, 2014;Gindarsih, 2016;Hellendorff, 2020).
It is uncommon to read discussions about the practices of Indonesia's international relations with a comprehensive analytical framework that can capture "typical" Indonesian and developing countries phenomena that are uncommon in the international relations between major Western countries.

The Need for a Non-Western Perspective in International Relations
The philosophy of the relations between political entities ("states") can be traced back to the fifth century BC with the thinking of Thucydides in Ancient Greece, Kautilya in India, and Sun Tzu in China. Until the 19th century, thoughts about International Relations (IR) have been developed and encompassed in various disciplines, such as philosophy, political science, legal science, and history.
The new science of IR officially became a distinctive scientific study in 1919 with the establishment of the Chair in International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom. This initiative was driven by the widespread destruction and suffering during the First World War, which ended in 1918 and was responsible for the deaths of millions. The primary purpose of establishing IR as a science was to study the causes and effects of war so that its terror and destruction could be prevented from happening again. Therefore, since its inception, IR has been the study of war and peace, specifically to explore and discuss the causes of war. The unit of analysis has been focused on the state, considering that the interaction between countries in the Westphalian international system is generally the leading cause of interstate war.
Despite this, IR has been unable to prevent crises, conflicts, and wars in many parts of the world. There was even a global financial crisis during the early 1930s and the Second World War in 1939-1945, which was estimated to have claimed the lives of 85-100 million people -considerably more than the victims of the First World War.
Analysing the causes of the Second World War, and the failure of the international community to prevent it, became the main focus of IR both during and after the conflict.
The literature that was often referenced within this period is the influential book entitled "Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939" written by E. H. Carr. This book examines the twenty years of "peace" between the world wars, and the League of Nations' (LBB) failure to maintain world peace. Utopianism and idealism become the main concepts that emerged to criticise global leaders who were believed to have failed to build a peaceful international system post-World War I.
Post-World War II, meanwhile, quickly became a momentum for the revival of the perspective of realism in the discipline of IR. The hallmark of realism is its focus on power relations characterised by interstate relations. Empirically, this perspective was "facilitated" by the Cold War between the Eastern and Western Blocs, which began only a few years after the end of the Second World War. Institutionally, the rise of realism was triggered by the development of various centres for the study of IR in the US, especially in universities located on the West Coast, and close to the centres of power and the political institutions of the country. Scholars from various universities known as "conservatives" contributed to the production of many realist theories regarding war and power, namely how to pursue, maintain, and increase power. As a hegemonic country that had led the Western Bloc during the Cold War, the US was in need of scientific theories to justify its behaviours in various parts of the world. The formalisation of theories on Balance of Power, Game Theory, Alliance, and Hegemonic Stability are a few examples of the theories produced by IR scholars during this period.
In terms of the academic literature, this period also gave birth to numerous writings about realism which later became important milestones in the development of IR as a discipline during and after the Cold War. Leading sources include Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (1948) and Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics (1981).
Different variants of realism also emerged, such as the neorealism perspective as written in Man, State and War (Waltz, 1959) and Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Mearsheimer, 2001), as well as neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998).
The world's continuous development, and the corresponding rise of global problems (both traditional and non-traditional security threats), have fostered the diversification of units of analysis in IR from the sole focus being on the state to studying other actors who have profound impacts on the international system. These non-state actors include individuals, interest groups and pressure groups within the state (e.g., political parties, business groups, NGOs, and others), regional institutions (e.g., ASEAN and the European Union), global institutions (e.g., the United Nations), functional groups (e.g., Greenpeace, Conservation International, OPEC, Red Cross), as well as international business institutions (multinational corporations), civil society advocacy networks (CSOs), among others. Thus, international actors observed as units of analysis in IR have become significantly more diverse from the individual to the global level. These evolutions have also led to more varied research agendas.
Since the establishment of IR as a scientific discipline in the early 20th century, it has continued to develop due to an increase in debates from different perspectives, even those with contradictory ontological (the nature of what is studied) and epistemological (the means to obtain the right knowledge) views. Smith (1995) identifies three central debates in IR, which are those between idealism and realism, between realism and behaviouralism, and between positivism and post-positivism. Smith also looks at the debates within the paradigm, namely between statism and transnationalism, realism and neorealism, liberalism, and neoliberalism, and within post-positivism. These debates reflect not only the complexity of issues studied by IR as a social science but also the different perspectives, interests, and creativity of scholars in this field.
Today, the discipline of IR has experienced a deepening and development both theories. An example of this is Wendt's (1992) claim against the concept of "anarchy" in the international system, which has long been considered the dominant ontology in realism.
Therefore, the science of IR, which initially focused on studying war and peace between states, has developed into a multidisciplinary science that examines the interactions (competition, conflict, and cooperation) between various international actors in the domains of politics, security, economy, society, and culture.
In Indonesia, IR began as a political science minor. As the government's awareness of, and the national community's interest in, the importance of this discipline increased, IR developed in various universities as its own distinctive department. The focus of IR in Indonesia has also developed, from strategic studies and international security to the study of international politics and economics. Nowadays, along with the rise of non-traditional security issues and the increased role of non-state international actors in Indonesia, the Southeast Asia region, and the world, the science of IR in Indonesian universities has also strengthened studies that were originally part of the English Schoolinternational societyand developed various research and teaching agendas regarding the rise of transnational networks. Therefore, the science of IR today does not only discuss war and peace but also conflict and cooperation between international actors in the issues of human security, climate change, refugee management, developing countries' debts, communicable diseases and pandemics, gender equality, the role of media in wars and conflicts, and even the K-Pop phenomenon.

Heading to "Depok School of International Relations"?
Epistemologically, the science of IR has also developed quite progressively and is now as recognised as other social science disciplines. With the growth of actors and issues within the discipline, IR scholars are required to develop tools of analysis that are appropriate and relevant to the progress of empirical issues in the field. However, based on research and teaching experiences in IR in Indonesia, there is also a need to develop an analytical framework that is more aligned with contemporary issues in Indonesia, or experienced by Indonesia as a developing country in Southeast Asia. This is driven by two factors: (1) concepts, theories, paradigms or perspectives in the discipline of IR are generally theoretical frameworks for analysing the behaviours of great powers and are not necessarily applicable to issues occurring in Indonesia; (2) the analytical frameworks developed in the discipline of IR have originated from Western countries, produced inductively and deductively from the experience of the US and European countries and are therefore Western-centric by nature. Although some scholars study IR in Asia, they generally use the Western-born analytical frameworks as seen in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations of Asia (Pekkanen, Revenhill and Foot 2014).
In fact, as a part of the social sciences that studies human behaviours bound by space and time, theories, concepts and analytical frameworks, the science of international relations cannot be homogeneous. The need to develop more heterogeneous analytical frameworks has been advocated by Acharya and Buzan (2010) and Bilgin (2014).
However, the idea has not received a significant response from Indonesian IR scholars.
For these scholars in Indonesia, this literature gap can be addressed in two ways.
Firstly, they must seek to increase and strengthen existing studies on specific issues experienced by Indonesia, Asian countries, or other developing countries which do not occur in relations between major countries and are absent in international affairs between Western countries. International peer groups have long awaited the participation of Indonesian scholars in this matter. The country's ability to produce studies on these issues can be Indonesia's contribution to the development of the discipline of IR. Secondly, scholars must develop a distinctive approach that can identify Indonesia's distinctiveness in interstate relations at the bilateral, regional, and global levels to produce a more comprehensive analysis framework. The axiology of the science of IR for Indonesia can support the country in achieving the aspirations inscribed in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.
In this context, the thoughts of Professor Juwono Sudarsono, who once sparked the idea regarding an approach that Indonesia should cultivate in the discipline of IR, are very pertinent. He emphasises two elements that should be the basis of IR analytical frameworks. First, the entanglement of local, provincial, national, regional and global phenomena that occur daily around us and in the world-this entanglement of these five geographical spaces is referred to as "5G". Second, the intertwined links between the political-security, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions in international relations -the interrelations between these issues are then called "3D".
The linkage of 5G and 3D has inspired the curriculum development for undergraduate and postgraduate courses in the Department of International Relations, FISIP, Universitas Indonesia, over the past decade. This approach is one of his most important contributions as a pioneer in the discipline of IR both at the university and within Indonesia as a whole.

CLOSING
In accordance with its axiology, it is hoped that the continued development IR as a scientific discipline in Indonesia will be able to support the country in achieving its independence goals, particularly in implementing a world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice. Hopefully, this effort to develop an Indonesian perspective will inspire a young generation of IR scholars in Indonesia. Professor Juwono's 5G and 3D concepts can be the starting point for developing Indonesia's IR perspective in the future. It is the task of me and my colleagues in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, as well as colleagues from various other universities in Indonesia, to develop Indonesian perspectives within the field of IR. Together, it is hoped that we can develop the "Depok School" of International Relations in order to help achieve these aims.