

November 2022

Between the Regional and the National Level: East Asian Security Dynamics and Abe's Legacy on Japan's Civil-Military Relations

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Recommended Citation

Pratama, Januar Aditya and Sudirman, Arfin (2022) "Between the Regional and the National Level: East Asian Security Dynamics and Abe's Legacy on Japan's Civil-Military Relations," *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*: Vol. 24: No. 2, Pp. 227-251.

DOI: [10.7454/global.v24i2.1240](https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v24i2.1240)

Available at: <https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global/vol24/iss2/3>

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Cover Page Footnote

This scientific article could not have been completed without the support of various parties. First are Prof. Arry Bainus and Dr. Satriya Wibawa, who also provided important input into the flow of this research. Then, we also thank Dr. Bhubhindar Singh and Simon Schwenke who have been the primary sources for this research.

BETWEEN THE REGIONAL AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL: EAST ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND ABE'S LEGACY ON JAPAN'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Submitted: 1 August 2022; accepted: 15 November 2022

ABSTRAK

Sejak Perdana Menteri Shinzo Abe memulai periode kedua kepemimpinannya pada tahun 2012, telah terjadi perubahan yang cukup signifikan dalam posisi militer Jepang dalam hierarki negara. Perubahan yang terjadi hampir bersamaan dengan peningkatan ancaman di kawasan Asia Timur sejak Perang Dingin berakhir tersebut, dijadikan dalih oleh PM Abe untuk mereformasi struktur pertahanan Jepang. Berdasarkan dua hal tersebut, penelitian ini berupaya untuk mencari bagaimana pengaruh dari pola hubungan antarnegara dalam kompleks keamanan Asia Timur dapat memengaruhi pola hubungan sipil-militer Jepang. Upaya itu dilakukan melalui kerangka pemikiran hubungan sipil-militer Huntingtonian, yang hirau terhadap ideologi sipil, pengaruh formal dan informal, serta bentuk kontrol sipil yang ada di dalam negara, didukung dengan konsep kompleks keamanan dari Mazhab Kopenhagen yang hirau terhadap pola hubungan serta balance of power. Ditemukan bahwa peningkatan instabilitas kompleks keamanan Asia Timur telah mendorong para pengambil keputusan Jepang era PM Abe untuk mengubah hubungan sipil-militernya, baik secara langsung dari persepsi elit-elit politik itu sendiri, maupun tidak langsung melalui dorongan dari Amerika Serikat. Peningkatan instabilitas kawasan sendiri akan mendorong negara untuk turut meningkatkan kekuatan militer, termasuk dengan melakukan perubahan pada hubungan sipil-militernya agar kebijakan pertahanan lebih tepat sasaran demi menjamin kedaulatan dan integritas teritorialnya.

Kata kunci: Hubungan Sipil-Militer, JSDF, Kompleks Keamanan Asia Timur, Pasal 9, PM Shinzo Abe

ABSTRACT

Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began his second term in office in 2012, there have been significant changes in the position of the Japanese military in the country's hierarchy. The change that was occurred almost simultaneously with the increasing threat in the East Asian region since the end of the Cold War, made as a pretext by PM Abe to reform Japan's defence structure. Based on the two factors, this study seeks to find out how the influence of the pattern of relations between countries in the East Asian security complex can affect the pattern of Japanese civil-military relations. This effort was carried out through the framework of the Huntingtonian civil-military relationship, which was concerned with civil ideology, formal and informal influences, and forms of civil control within the state, supported by the complex concept of security from the Copenhagen School which was concerned with patterns of relations and balance of power. It was found that the increasing instability of the East Asian security complex had prompted PM Abe's Japanese decision-makers to change their civil-military relations, either directly from the perception of the political elites themselves, or indirectly through encouragement from the United States. An increase in regional instability itself will encourage the state to participate in increasing military power, including by making changes to its civil-military relations so that defence policies are more targeted in order to ensure their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Keywords: Article 9, Civil-Military Relations, East Asia Security Complex, JSDF, PM Shinzo Abe

INTRODUCTION

In the early days after the end of the Cold War, the international system had almost become a unipolar system under the *de facto* leadership of the United States (US). However, after the 2008 Financial Crisis, the People's Republic of China became a rival to the US in terms of hegemony in various regions, including the East Asia region, where the US projects its influence through one of its allies: Japan. With a competition between the world's two most enormous economic and military powers, the region cannot avoid the destabilization of regional security after it becomes an arena of competition.

Apart from the US and Japan, at least two other countries are currently increasing their military strength. The first is China. With China's rising status to become one of the world's great powers (Pramudia, 2022), the push for dominance in East Asia is also getting more significant. China's domination efforts often use its military power to handle various issues, such as the military build-up in the South China Sea and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) establishment in the East China Sea. Second is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which started developing nuclear weapons in 2006 (BBC, 2017a). In 2016, North Korea produced a working atomic bomb to ward off potential US aggression (McCurry & Safi, 2016). With the increasingly unfavourable regional security in East Asia due to the growing strength of neighbouring countries, the situation has become quite urgent for Japan. In addition, Japan is facing challenges to become more independent in security matters because, so far, the country has relied on the protection of its superpower ally. Thus, it becomes an obligation for Japan as a rational state actor to increase its defence capabilities to anticipate regional insecurity in the East Asia region.

One of the methods taken by Japan to anticipate this is to make changes in terms of civil-military relations in their country. Since Japan's defeat in World War II, the country has begun to implement policies that resemble pacifism, as stated in Article 9 of its post-war constitution to abandon the use of force in resolving international disputes" (PM and Cabinet of Japan, n.d.) and resulted in the demilitarization of the Japanese military to a mere instrument of self-defence. Apart from legal or constitutional constraints that external parties—victors of World War II—influenced, some restrictions emerged from the view of the Japanese people themselves. Generally, post-war Japanese society has inherited a "heritage of shame" for Japan's aggressions in World War II (Han, 2017; BBC, 2017b). A survey by Pew reflects such shame of Japan's past militarism,

which shows that more than two-thirds of Japanese people want restrictions on Japanese military activity (Stokes, 2015).

In 2014, Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe passed a reinterpretation of Article 9, which allows Japan to protect its allies (Smith, 2014). The reinterpretation was a "continuation" of Japan's policy in 1998, where the lawmakers passed a regulation that allowed participation in international peacekeeping missions (McElwain, 2015, p. 255); the realization was Japan's involvement in the War on Terror, despite playing a non-combatant role (Wortzel, 2001). The ambition to revise Article 9 and make the JSDF a "complete military" continued even after Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida replaced Abe consecutively (Zhang, 2020). In case of a realization of the revision efforts, there will undoubtedly be greater power in the military realm. Such a revision can cause a shift in the balance of Japan's civil-military relations, as a complete military will have a more potent lobbying ability and, therefore, more influence (Rukashnikov & Pugh, 2006, p. 139). Thus, the issue of national security is Japan's priority in the contemporary era, as seen through the efforts to revise Article 9, at least under the leadership of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians. However, there are still opposing opinions from other parties and some of the Japanese public itself (Liff & Maeda, 2008).

From these phenomena, the authors consider that the influence of the regional security complex on the balance of Japan's internal civil-military relations is an important topic to study. As previously mentioned, one of the main driving forces behind the balance of civil-military relations is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, efforts to amend the article also can cause a shift in the balance of Japanese civil-military relations. One is the potential for the military to gain greater power to carry out its defence duties more flexibly without excessive restrictions from the existing constitution (Tatsumi, 2017, p. 26). The authors chose Shinzo Abe's leadership period based on several considerations: (1) Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida had not led long enough, and (2) in Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida's reigns, there has been no significant change from the direction of the policy during Abe's reign. A research on regional security dynamics and civil-military relations might be quite interesting, considering Japan's significance in the East Asian security complex dynamics. Such a significance is described by Saltzman (2015, p. 498-499) as amplifying the standard of security dilemma among the neighbours due to Japan's history with the practice of imperialism. Therefore, the main question in this research will be how the relationship pattern between countries in the East Asian

security complex shaped the civil-military relations of Japan under the late Shinzo Abe's reign from 2012-2020.

In addition, this research seeks to complement previous studies, mainly due to the absence of research linking a security complex's dynamics with the state of a country's civil-military relations; most of the previous research emphasizes only one of the two variables. Izumikawa's (2010) research provides the initial basis for a discourse on contemporary Japanese civil-military relations. It explains how the Japanese Constitution constrains its security policy and provides an overview of the pre-power conditions of the LDP today. Then, Muhammad and Sudirman (2015) described how Abe's leadership's first three years (in the context of him being a member of the LDP) attempted to relax these restraints. Furthermore, Madison (2018) explains how there is support for elitist efforts (especially the LDP) to remilitarize the JSDF, one of which is through reinterpretation and amendments to Article 9. Al Syahrin (2018) and Shoji (2021) provide an explanation of how the murky dynamics of the East Asian security complex have hindered cooperation between countries and have the potential to increase the severity of existing conflicts further. Therefore, this study attempts to bridge the discourse on civil-military relations (including the research of Izumikawa (2010), Muhammad and Sudirman (2015), and Madison (2018)) with the discourse on security complexes (Al Syahrin (2018) and Shoji (2021)). This article also serves as a situational update and continuation of Anindya's (2016) writing on the antimilitarism strategic culture of Japan concerning the regional security milieu.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Regional Security Complex Theory

Through *Regions and Powers* (2003), Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argue that the post-Cold War international system is more appropriate to analyse at the regional level. According to him, there is a decline in the quality of the global penetrative interests of the world's superpowers and the withdrawal of the attention of the superpowers into domestic affairs, resulting in a focus on the regional level (Buzan & Waever, 2003, pp. 10-11). Then, a region is often defined only from certain geographical boundaries. From these boundaries, interactions often emerge from countries within a region, forming what the Copenhagen School calls a "security complex."

Previously, in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, p. 201) defined a security complex as "a set of units in which processes of

securitization, desecuritization, or both are closely related to each other; thus, the respective security issues cannot be analysed or solved in isolation from one another.” Through this understanding, we can see that the national security issue of a country is not entirely separated from the security issue of the neighbouring countries.

Thus, in contrast to the neorealist view that emphasizes security interactions at the systemic level, the Copenhagen School, through its understanding of the security complex, argues that security interactions or dynamics between countries will occur more significantly at the regional level than at the global level. A country will become concerned about its geographical neighbours’ actions, which also incentivizes it to cooperate with other regional actors (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 41). In addition, Buzan and Waever also provide four variables that define a security complex:

- (1) boundaries that distinguish one security complex from neighbouring security complexes;
- (2) anarchic structure;
- (3) the presence of polarity; and
- (4) social construction, which allows for patterns of relationships.

At least two main indicators mentioned in Buzan and Waever (2003) are helpful in analysing the dynamics of a security complex, due to their regional nature. The first is the relationship patterns in the security complex, which includes the amity pattern and the enmity pattern, which shows the influence of constructivist thought in the conception of the security complex in the Copenhagen School. Meanwhile, the second is the power relation of countries in a region through a balance of power.

Civil-Military Relations

According to Brooks (2019), civil-military relations as a concept can be defined as the study of the relationships between the military institution and civil society, including civil government. However, the main emphasis is on the power dynamics between political elites and military officials at the highest stage of the state. These dynamics are also inseparable from external conditions, such as the existence of physical threats to the state (Feaver, 2003, pp. 1-2); so, if there is a significant physical threat, then it can be considered reasonable if the civilian side "gives up" some of their freedom so that the military can more freely carry out their duties in defending state sovereignty (Diamond

& Plattner, 1996, p. 30). Thus, the concept of civil-military relations concerns the relative power of civilians represented by the civilian government and the military over each other. In Huntington's (2000) view, the military should ideally be under the control of a civilian government; it describes the liberal democratic ideas that exist in the US. The military must act professionally to serve the government and civil society (Huntington, 2000, p. 15). Therefore, the military cannot determine and influence decision-making or defence policies (in ideal Huntingtonian conditions) but can only have limited freedom to realize the policies initiated by the civilian government.

Although the military is primarily an instrument of the state to defend its existence from external threats, in Huntington's view, the military must have certain limitations. These limitations are presented to maintain the integrity of civil society democracy, as the military is the only party with lethal weapons and could threaten democracy; in other words, monopolizing violence. The military also has a culture of command, which is contrary to democracy. In the end, the civilian government and the military must reach an agreement regarding the limits of military power, influenced by several factors.

The first factor is civic ideology. According to Huntington (2000, p. 86), the compatibility of the ideology of civil society with the ideology of the military command can significantly affect the balance of civil-military relations in a country. Huntington argues that the ideological compatibility of the two can facilitate the expansion of power and power of the military itself. He also divided the various types of ideologies into two categories: those of civil society that were pro-military and antimilitaristic. In the first category, namely pro-military ideology, Huntington (2000, pp. 90-93) explains that fascism and conservatism are two examples of ideologies that support military development more aggressively. Meanwhile, in the category of antimilitaristic ideology, Huntington (2000, pp. 90-93) gives examples of two major ideologies, namely liberalism and marxism. Antimilitaristic ideologies are the ideologies that aim to reduce civilian or political power from the military and ultimately avoid wars between countries as a means of conflict resolution (Miller, 2002, p. 8); In addition, an ideology that is opposed to military power in the civilian realm can also be considered as antimilitaristic (Cockburn, 2012, p. 2).

The second factor is the influence of the civilians and the military. Huntington divides influence into two categories, namely formal and informal influences; they can impact each other. They are also interrelated with the ideological factors previously described. Thus, the existing factors cannot be separated from each other. Formal

influence refers to formal authority, usually confirmed constitutionally or legally, that can take the form of authority granted by a civilian government or the form of authority achieved by the military, such as a military junta. Huntington's (2000, pp. 86-87) criteria regarding this authority are the relative hierarchy, relative unity, and relative scale of military authority and civilian government. Meanwhile, informal influence refers to the political power and influence exerted by the military in everyday life.

The third factor is the form of civil control. In the civilian control concept, there are two types of effective civilian government control over the military as an instrument of state defence, distinguished by the degree of authority the civilian government grants to the military. There is objective civilian control which gives limited freedom to the military and vice versa, namely subjective civilian control by curbing the military purely under the political will of the ruling civilian government. The two types of civil control illustrate the shifting trend from the previous indicators, namely changes in civil ideology and formal and informal influences.

RESEARCH METHOD


The research uses the qualitative method. According to Yin (2016, p. 6), qualitative research methods offer flexibility in choosing topics due to several things, including (1) the inability to conduct experiments, (2) the lack of sufficient quantitative data, (3) the difficulty of drawing sample limits in large numbers, and (4) the possibility to research ongoing events (not only historical). This case study has similar characteristics to what was described by Yin.

The data collected by the authors are primary and secondary, where interviews generate primary data, literature studies and official documents bring about secondary data. These data are not analysed by following any logic (either inductive or deductive) rigidly. In the discussion section, the authors will use deductive logic because it provides a sense of certainty more scientifically than deductively to be the primary basis for conclusions (Yin, 2016, p. 101). Meanwhile, in the conclusion section, the authors will use inductive logic. Inductive logic is useful in explaining how a security complex's dynamics can affect a country's civil-military relations in order to provide an overview that the authors feel is a novelty in International Relations. Thus, the authors are hopeful that the conclusion of this study can be a new beginning for further research to examine the correlation between the two variables.

DISCUSSION

Development of the East Asian Security Complex Dynamics

Figure 1. Northeast Asian Regional Security Complex



Source: Buzan & Waever (2003).

Based on the map provided by Buzan and Waever (2003), some countries that are quite significant in the dynamics of the East Asian security complex include China, North Korea, and Japan, with the considerable presence of South Korea and Taiwan. All the countries mentioned above have various affinities, ranging from geographical, historical, to cultural proximity. In addition, there are also state actors in this region who penetrate from the opposite continent, namely the US. The US shows its presence in the East Asian security complex, with military bases in Japan numbering around 56,000 military personnel and South Korea numbering around 28,500 military personnel (Asahina, 2022; Shin & Lee, 2021). The US also frequently conducts joint military exercises with its allies in the region, which countries such as China and the North Korea see as acts of provocation.

Thus, the interactions between these countries will undoubtedly have quite a deep meaning because of the proximities contained in the pattern of relationships in the form of amity or enmity. Relationship patterns that can be amity or enmity are specific patterns of who frightens or like who are generally drawn from internal interactions within the region, with a combined consideration of historical, political, and material conditions (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 47). When talking about positive relations or amity between the countries of the East Asian security complex, the majority of what happened also reflected the existence of bipolarity in the region.

The democracies in the East Asia region, namely Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, cooperate more both (?) bilaterally and multilaterally. Meanwhile, North Korea has almost only good relations with China in the region due to the similarities in ideology and history, in which China had supported the establishment of the North Korea, which had a communist regime since the previous Korean War. Such a good relationship is reflected in statistics that 94 percent of North Korea's international trade is carried out solely with China (Statista, 2022a). In addition, China needs North Korea as a counterweight in the balance of power in the East Asia region (Xiaohe, 2018). Then the two countries also have a similar history, where imperial Japan once occupied them, and they are still demanding retribution from Japan for their actions in the past. Apart from all these issues, one significant cooperation in the economic field involves China and Japan, namely the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the RCEP. However, such cooperation is still limited to the economic side and occurs at the multilateral level.

That way, the dominant relationship pattern is that of enmity, especially from the perspective of Japan itself. Japan has relatively poor relations with China as well as with North Korea. Said poor relations are also due to the historical background where Japan, during the imperial period, occupied parts of China and North Korea with various accusations of war crimes allegedly committed during the Japanese occupation. To this day, these historical issues are still echoed by the two countries (Kwon, 2021; Xinhua, 2021).

Then, there are also significant ideological differences where Japan is a liberal democracy, while China and North Korea are countries controlled by a single communist party. Stemming from such a difference, China and North Korea have taken several military provocations against Japan and vice versa. Some of the most recent are North Korean missile tests aimed at the Sea of Japan (Kyodo News, 2022) and the increased activity of Chinese warships in straits near Japanese territory (Liu, 2022). Likewise, Japan responded with provocative actions in the form of joint military exercises with the US and South Korea in May 2022 (Mahshie, 2022). Therefore, this enmity pattern is quite dominant, coupled with negative diplomatic antics and an actual arms race in the region (Gatopoulos, 2020).

Thus, with the dominant pattern of enmity in international relations in the East Asian security complex, this region has relatively high instability compared to other regions such as Southeast Asia. When referring to the stages of the security complex, the East Asia region is still in the early stages, namely the stage of conflict formation. Buzan

and Waeber (2003, p. 173) state that the East Asian security complex will not be able to reach the security regime or even the security community soon.

Important to discuss also is the development of the balance of power in the East Asia region. The balance of power itself becomes an important discussion in the issue of security interdependence between countries in a region because it becomes a guide for policymaking of each country (Haas, 1953). As a security complex, East Asia has a regional system that tends to be bipolar, with two major regional powers competing with each other, namely Japan and China (Buzan & Waeber, 2003, p. 173). Such bipolarity is almost absolute if we consider the factor of economic strength as part of hard power. However, if purely considering military strength alone, North Korea must also be taken into consideration because of its nuclear capabilities, which are now worrying even Japan. Coupled with the perception of threats from the wider Asia-Pacific region, East Asian countries have also been involving themselves in an arms race which affects the regional balance of power (Gatopoulos, 2020).

One country that relies heavily on the balance of power as a method of state defence is China. In the period towards the end of the Cold War until the early decades after, China was determined to increase its power peacefully, or what they called "peaceful rise," by accumulating economic and military power without creating meaningful conflicts with its rivals (Zhao, 2014, p. 379); one of them being the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Jaknanihan, 2022). This statement shows China's aspiration to become a superpower, just like the US, which is now considered its hegemonic rival. Apart from these reasons, Garcia (2016, p. 550) also states that China has considered Japan's "normalization" as an existential threat. Normalization here refers to the existence of Japan's remilitarization efforts, with the addition of the capabilities and capacities of the JSDF itself. These concerns also arise due to the history between the two countries. In the end, for these two reasons, China also managed to develop its military into one of the strongest in the world, with the second largest number of active personnel in the world (World Bank, 2022), and become one of the countries with the most active aircraft carriers (Armed Forces, 2022).

Unlike China, North Korea relies more on nuclear power as a deterrence to leverage its country's significance in the regional balance of power. Gaertner (2014) calls it an "insurance policy" that can ensure that there will be no full-scale invasion of North Korean territory from any party as long as the Kim regime can demonstrate its nuclear weapons launch capability. The nuclear proliferation development began in 2003 when

North Korea officially left the Non-Proliferation Treaty (CNN, 2003). To this day, it is suspected that North Korea has a functional nuclear missile capability, although its nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile is still quite doubtful (Associated Press, 2022). North Korea's missile tests (including intercontinental missiles) also alert Japan due to missile tests leading to the sea of Japanese territory (Davies, Sugiura, & Sevastopulo, 2022). Even so, the non-nuclear military capabilities of North Korea are doubted. Although it has a larger number than South Korea's military, the quality of its defence equipment is not as good as its neighbouring countries—reflecting North Korea's relatively low economic strength (Min-Seok, 2020).

Against/in responding to the security threats from China and North Korea, Japan is slowly starting to modernize and expand the capacity and capability of the JSDF. Japan became the country with the seventh largest defence expenditure in the world, with a percentage of defence spending to the gross domestic product similar to China (Isakson, 2022). Of the total expenditure, Japan's expenditure is only about one-fifth of China's (Statista, 2022b), but we should be mindful that Japan's population is only one-tenth of China's population and Japan's territory is far smaller in size compared to China's. The military development that worries Japan's rival countries the most is the conversion of Izumo-class ships to carrier-equivalent capabilities starting in 2018 during the administration of PM Shinzo Abe.

Therefore, the balance of power in East Asia tends to be bipolar, with Japan and China acting as two polar countries in the security complex. Both countries have a military with high capabilities, supported by modern defence equipment and nuclear deterrence protection (with Japan under the nuclear umbrella of the US). Although China has far more military personnel than Japan, two factors make it relatively equal: (1) China's territory is much larger and also has to deal with threats outside the East Asia region, and (2) Japan has also hosted a military base of the US. Although North Korea also has nuclear deterrence, its non-nuclear military capabilities tend to be weak compared to the two previous countries.

Development of Japan's Civil-Military Relations

After World War II, Japan became a pacifist country, cemented with the Article 9 of the co-formulated Japanese Constitution. The consequence of the existence of Article 9 is that Japan has abandoned its right to use war as a means of conflict resolution, unlike other countries in general. Thus, Japan has no offensive military capability to carry out

aggression outside its territory. The culture of shame and regret in Japanese society plays an indirect part in creating such a condition. The JSDF as an institution is also referred to by Singh (2022) as quasi-military because of the many existing constraints. Therefore, to this day, the JSDF does not have the flexibility of the former Japanese imperialist military, with constitutional and bureaucratic constraints; on the other hand, there was encouragement both internally and externally for the JSDF to act professionally, following the ideal military context of a liberal democratic society. Therefore, the military name has the name JSDF, which stands for Japan Self-Defense Forces, which means it is a purely defensive military force; the JSDF is different from most military institutions in the world, which has both defensive and offensive capabilities. This uniqueness arises because of the previously mentioned Article 9 and the pressure from both internal and external. This section will discuss the internal dynamics that shape the balance of Japanese civil-military relations, with Huntington's (2000) civil-military framework as the basis of discussion.

In the civilian ideology factor, the majority of the Japanese public has held an antimilitaristic ideology in the form of democratic liberalism since World War II, translated into the practice of the Japanese government through Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The liberal democratic agenda is also supported by educational reforms by the Japanese civilian government, emphasizing the fondness for peace and eliminating military subjects in education (Ong, 2020, p. 86). The result is a civil society dominated by antimilitaristic ideologies, such as liberalism in general, following the liberal democratic ideals of the US during the Japanese occupation. In addition, some minorities adhere to the ideology of communism, which also opposes military rule in the civilian realm. This antimilitaristic attitude also continued even after the establishment of the JSDF, with public opinion wanting to minimize the use of the JSDF (Miyashita, 2006, p. 100). Therefore, the government's policy of not deploying the JSDF other than pure self-defence until the late 20th century reflects the Japanese public's ideologies, which antimilitaristic ones dominate.

The dominant civilian ideology of antimilitarism continued well into the post-Cold War era with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, during the leadership of PM Shinzo Abe, there have been some significant, but not fundamental, changes in which some Japanese civil society now supports efforts to expand the capacity and capability of the Japanese military, namely the JSDF. Even so, the public's desire or support for the JSDF is minimal, only wanting the JSDF to become a solid defensive military force, not

offensively. Madison's (2018, p. 3) findings also support this statement, where the political elite and PM Abe's government failed to persuade the public to support the JSDF's remilitarization agenda and normalization of Japan. However, the public also had concerns over the increasing military power of China and North Korea. Kennedy (2018, p. 74) also mentions that there has been a change in public opinion that is more positive towards the Abe regime's remilitarization efforts, but that it has been gradual and limited; the existence of a crisis originating from external actors can accelerate these changes.

Next are the formal and informal influence factors. In the last two decades, there has been an increase in the formal influence of the military over civilians. PM Shinzo Abe's government granted some powers to the military, one of which was in 2015 in conjunction with Japan's defence ministry reform. Since then, Japanese military officials have been able to appear directly to parliament (Muhammad & Sudirman, 2015, p. 42). The position of military officials in the defence ministry is getting more equal, with bureaucrats continuing to ask for inputs from JSDF military officials on Japanese defence matters, and politicians starting to respond to input from military officials as equal to input from the defence ministry bureaucrats themselves. Previously, military officials could not provide input directly but had to go through bureaucrats (Schwenke, 2020, p. 4). Thus, there has been an increase in the power or formal influence of the military in Japan with the permission of the civilian government, which was quite significant in the era of PM Shinzo Abe. However, outside the defence and security sector, the JSDF has almost no formal influence, especially for final national decision-making, which is still entirely in the hands of Japanese politicians.


There is not much can be found regarding the informal influence of Japanese military institutions on civilians. Japanese civil society, which generally has an antimilitaristic attitude after World War II, causes this informal influence to be minimal. In contrast to the pro-military society of the Meiji era to the early Showa, modern Japanese society does not even consider the JSDF as a complete military. However, they consider the JSDF a mere self-defence force (as its official name suggests); most positive public perception of military operations outside Japanese territory came from their non-combat operations, such as providing medical assistance (Traphagan, 2012). In addition, positive public perceptions of the JSDF also emerged because of operations to deal with natural disasters in Japan, in which Kennedy (2018, p. 75) stated that military competence is directly proportional to public perception. As a result, the Japanese military is more prevalent in the eyes of the people in the non-military aid sectors than in the military

sector itself (Schwenke, 2022). Even so, it is undeniable that the informal influence of the JSDF is minimal, partly because military headquarters are far from urban areas, causing the low presence or direct presence of uniformed military personnel in the daily life of civilians (Hikotani, 2014, p. 169). As a result, military prestige, as in the samurai era or the former shogunate, is no longer visible in modern Japanese civil society.

The last is the factor of civilian control over the military. From the early post-World War II period of Japan until the beginning of the 21st century, Japan had such a civilian control that made the military entirely subordinate to the civilian government. Likewise, the earliest form of the JSDF is a police force that also serves a national security function (Kuzuhara, 2006, p. 97). From the 20th century until the early 21st century, the JSDF was under the total control of the bureaucracy, leaving the military institutions no direct access to formal communication to politicians unless with the supervision of the defence bureaucrats. The Japanese military at that time was very restrained, where bureaucrats closely monitored strategy and tactics; thus, there has been bureaucratization in military institutions as well (Schwenke, 2020, p. 3). Therefore, in a Huntingtonian perspective, the government of Japan demonstrated a subjective civilian control upon the Japanese military.

However, there have been significant changes in the second decade of the 21st century. Since the establishment of the Japanese Ministry of Defense from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), the JSDF has been under the ministry's auspices. The most significant change to the form of civilian control over the Japanese military coincided with the reform of the defence ministry in 2015 under PM Shinzo Abe's regime. Previously, there was no direct input from the military to defence decision-makers—the defense minister and prime minister—without the intermediary role of bureaucrats; after the reform, the bureaucrats and the military were on an equal footing (Pollmann, 2015). These changes can be seen in the latest Japanese Ministry of Defense organizational chart:

Figure 2. Ministry of Defense Organizational Structure



Source: Ministry of Defense (2022). Accessed 12 May 2022, from <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/about/index.html>

In the chart, the positions of Extraordinary Organs filled by military officials, starting from the Joint Staff as headquarters to each JSDF force, are equivalent to internal bureaus. Therefore, in the Japanese Ministry of Defense, since the reign of PM Shinzo Abe, the military element has been in a hierarchical equal position with bureaucrats to provide input to decision-makers.

Thus, the reorganization is a form of diversion from subjective civilian control, as before, to objective civilian control. Based on the writings of Huntington (2000, pp. 83-84), objective civilian control can be said to be a distribution of power to respect the military's expertise in the field of defence and encourage military professionalism. Under this definition, the civilian government has distributed defence-related powers to the JSDF, a division of labour. Even so, the government and the parliament still handle the final decision-making regarding the defence and security policy. Meanwhile, the JSDF has the flexibility to execute policies or orders from the civil government as a client. This flexibility also reflects the professionalism in the Japanese military, where the JSDF carries out client requests (namely the civilian government) without being directly involved in the Japanese national political stage. Therefore, the LDP coalition government led by PM Shinzo Abe has given more faith in the JSDF to be more involved.

The Influence of the Dynamics of the East Asian Security Complex on Japanese Civil-Military Relations under PM Abe

Based on previous findings using the lens of the regional security complex concept, there has been a decline in stability or an increase in regional security tensions, which even started before PM Shinzo Abe took office. The argument arose based on two indicators, namely the patterns of relations (whether amity or enmity) and the balance of power between countries within the security complex of the East Asia region. The relationship pattern between Japan, China, and North Korea is increasingly leading to an enmity or negative relationship, which can also spiral into a feedback loop or self-fulfilling prophecy of threat perceptions (Arif, 2016, p. 126). Increased tension between countries caused such a condition, which the balance of power influences. The balance of power in the East Asia region has undergone a significant change due to a significant increase in China's military capabilities and the existence of North Korea's nuclear proliferation program since the early 21st century in order to match the US presence in the region (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 101). The changes also pushed Japan towards increasing the JSDF's capacity to carry out operations outside Japanese territory and procuring aircraft carrier carriers initiated by PM Shinzo Abe's regime. Therefore, Japan has been reactive to its security environment by strengthening the JSDF.

PM Shinzo Abe's government has also significantly changed the relationship between civilian and military institutions. Driven by changes in the perception of the Japanese political elite in the LDP coalition, these changes both influenced and were influenced by shifts in Japanese civil ideology. Japanese civilian ideology is now more tolerant of its military presence, with some supporting the expansion of the JSDF's capacities and capacities. In addition, Japan's political elites, through the government of PM Shinzo Abe and the civilian parliament, have also given more formal power or influence to military institutions, which are now on an equal footing with bureaucrats and can communicate directly with policymakers since 2015. The Japanese government also encourages the professionalism of the Japanese military by giving the JSDF power in terms of strategy and tactics to execute government policies; now, the government is more aware of the particular expertise of the military to provide input to the decision-making process. Such awareness can also be seen as a shift from Japan's civil control form to an objective form of civilian control, almost in tandem with changes in the East Asian security complex that show greater instability:

Table 1. Comparison Before and During Abe's Premiership 2012-2020

	The Cold War until pre-Abe's Reign 2012-2020	Abe's Reign 2012-2020
Pattern of Interstate Relations	Enmity	Enmity, with higher intensity than before
Regional Balance of Power	Japan-dominant	More balanced towards China and North Korea
Dominant Civil Ideology	Liberal democracy, antimilitaristic	Liberal democracy, antimilitaristic
Civil Formal Influence	Bureaucracy superiority	Equality between the bureaucracy and the military
Military Informal Influence		
Informal Influence of the Military	Ignorant towards the military	More positive views towards the military, with appreciations dominant in the nonmilitary operations sector
Form of Civilian Control	Subjective civilian control through government institutions	Objective civilian control

Source: Author

However, based on the relationship patterns presented by Huntington (2000, pp. 96-97), so far, there has been no shift in the pattern of Japanese civil-military relations, which still shows the characteristics of (1) antimilitaristic ideology of society, with (2) low military political power and (3) high military professionalism. The changes that occurred, namely the decrease in antimilitarism of the Japanese people and the increase in the political power of the Japanese military, were not significant, so they changed the pattern of existing relations like countries during a war.

PM Shinzo Abe and elites within the LDP have driven changes to civil-military relations, but the regional instability factor also became a catalyst for the attitude of these political elites. Singh (2022) stated that PM Shinzo Abe is a leader who is reactive to changes in the East Asia region by recognizing the threat from China and North Korea. However, there are differences in attitudes towards the two countries. China is considered an existential threat to Japan, especially after the second decade of the 21st century, in which China has demonstrated military power by increasing assertiveness towards areas in dispute with Japan (Schwenke, 2022). So, as already mentioned, North Korea is more of a scapegoat because of its position of being easy to blame, with almost all countries viewing it negatively. PM Shinzo Abe used North Korea's nuclear capabilities as a pretext to advance Japan's normalization agenda, which has changed the balance of its civil-military relations. Such an agenda can also be seen from the previous sections of the

discussion, where gradual changes to Japan's civil-military relations occurred at the end of the Cold War, along with China's massive militarization and North Korea's nuclear proliferation further clouded the region in the 21st century. As a result, along with the encouragement of nationalism and ideology, PM Shinzo Abe also used the threats from the two countries in the East Asian security complex as legitimacy to make changes to civil-military relations. The changes, in turn, gave more flexibility to the military with hopes of enabling more precise defence and security decision-making with professionalism in mind.

The changes made by the government of PM Shinzo Abe are also inseparable from the encouragement of the US as one of Japan's strategic partners. Schwenke (2022) explains that since Japan's defeat in World War II, Japan's national security decision-making cannot be separated from the inputs of the US; the difference, in the era of PM Junichiro Koizumi and PM Shinzo Abe, they have internalized values that are in harmony with the US' interests. As a result, in the era of PM Shinzo Abe, regional and international security policies became more proactive per the US, which wanted more participation from Japan in regional and international security. What is also unique is that although Shinzo Abe wants a more autonomous and independent Japan, he has realized the importance of an alliance with the US and its role in Japan's security so far (Singh, 2022). The alliance has greatly benefited Japan's security because the only carrier strike group (CSG) based outside the US is located in Japan (US Navy, 2022). Japan was also selected to be one of six countries that could purchase the F-35 fighter from the US, which also received technology transfers to develop its own stealth fighter (Lockheed Martin, 2022).

Therefore, there may be a change in the balance of Japan's civil-military relations, which will increasingly give power to its military. Said change can happen if the intensity of the relationship pattern continues to increase in the East Asian security complex, which will undoubtedly result in regional instability. The region's instability will also increase the perception of threat to the civilian government, political elites, and the Japanese public, as has happened over the last two decades. According to the previous sections' findings, in the era of PM Shinzo Abe's leadership, the perception of threat was more pronounced on the side of political elites and the government than the Japanese public. Even so, political elites who are members of the LDP coalition (including PM Shinzo Abe) have successfully gained support for military-related policies, albeit on a limited scale. The limitation is the inability of PM Shinzo Abe's government to revise or amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution until the end of his tenure as head of the Japanese

government. However, the following two prime ministers from the LDP, namely PM Yoshihide Suga and PM Fumio Kishida, continue PM Abe's ambition to revise and amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Asahi Shimbun, 2021; Global Times, 2022).


CONCLUSION

So far, interstate relations in the East Asian security complex have succeeded in influencing and even shaping the balance of Japanese civil-military relations as one of the significant state actors in the region. Although the Cold War had ended, the instability in the security complex increased, especially in the 21st century. From this instability, Japan perceives two other state actors in the region as existential threats, namely China and North Korea.

Thus, the increasing threat after the Cold War was used as momentum by the LDP, which has dominated the Japanese political scene since its defeat in World War II. The LDP is a right-wing nationalist party that also desires to normalize Japan like other countries by having a military that is not only limited to minimum defensive capabilities. Such a desire was also encouraged by the advancement of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister of Japan. In the second to fourth period, 2012 to 2020, Abe has shown a robust ideological drive to make Japan be able to match the military power of its regional rivals, namely China and North Korea. Coupled with the external encouragement from the US, Japan wants to be more proactive in maintaining regional and international security. PM Shinzo Abe is also said to have internalized policy inputs from the US, reflected in his security and foreign policy legacies, that the successive PMs continue to this day.

Therefore, it has been found that there is an influence from interstate relations in the East Asian security complex, which has also changed Japan's civil-military relations. The changes resulted from an increase in the perception of threats from China and North Korea directly and the encouragement of the US as a state actor to penetrate the East Asian security complex indirectly; all of this was made possible by PM Shinzo Abe's strong ideological drive. Hence, it could be visualized as such:

Figure 3. Visualization of How East Asian Security Complex Dynamics Affects Japan's Civil-Military Relations



Source: Author

However, the changes that occurred were not as significant as the PM Abe government had hoped due to the reluctance of the Japanese public to revise or add to Article 9 of the Japan's Constitution. Therefore, there has been no significant change in the Japanese civilian ideology, which is still anti-military, which means that they do not view the threat in the region as critical enough to change the political mindset of the people to become more pro-military. Meanwhile, in terms of formal and informal influence, there has been an increase on the military side; civil control has also changed from subjective civilian control through government institutions or bureaucracy to objective civilian control. Changes in objective civilian control are considered more capable of improving traditional Japanese national security because the military has become more flexible in executing orders from its clients, namely the civilian government.

Thus, Japan as a country also changed its attitude. It used to be a pacifist country that tended to be passive and has now become a more active pacifist, with support for increasing military power and expanding the reach of defence and security policies. In the end, the relations between countries in a security complex can affect the civil-military relations of a country, although it is not the only factor.

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