Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional China's Strategic Ambiguity on the Issue of Autonomous China's Strategic Ambiguity on the Issue of Autonomous Weapons Systems Weapons Systems

This paper discusses the factors behind China's ambiguous stance on the issue of autonomous weapons and its relationship with China's rise. In 2016 at the United Nations on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN-CCW), China was the only Permanent Five (P5) country to call for the prohibition and importance of a binding protocol on autonomous weapons. Through its position paper, China stated that the characteristics of autonomous weapons are not in accordance with the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), fears of an arms race, to the threat of war. However, in 2017 China issued the New Generation of AI Development Plan (AIDP), which became the basis for China's development of autonomous weapons. This action violates their commitment at the UN-CCW because, through AIDP, China has planned the use, development, and production of autonomous weapons. Using the framework of the technologically innovative imperative and the conception of strategic ambiguity, this paper argues that China's ambiguous stance is a strategic intention resulting from a response to technological lag and systemic barriers that China is currently facing. This paper concludes that China's ambiguous stance is; (1) aimed to maintain the consistency of China's Peaceful Rise; (2) dealing with technologically innovative imperatives dynamic; (3) helping China in achieving China's Dream to achieve a Great Power status.


INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) 1 has become one of the essential features for a country in this contemporary era. The development of new autonomous technologies, AI, and robotics has an extensive application in society, bringing risks and opportunities. Concerning technological sophistication and increased automation, many countries have begun to develop military weapons that no longer require humans to operationalise. Autonomous systems in weapons formed through AI's sophistication are also called Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) (UNODA 2017, p.2). According to the ICRC (in UNODA 2017, p.2), autonomous weapons are any weapons systems with autonomous capabilities that can select (search, detect, identify, track) and attack (use force to fight, neutralise, damage, or destroy) targets without meaningful interference from humans. This definition of AWS includes all weapons systems and vehicles that can select and attack targets independently, including existing weapons and potential future systems (UNODA 2017, p.6). According to Stop Killer Robots (in HRW n.d, p.1), countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, Australia, South Korea, and Israel are already developing and starting to compete in AWS. The U.S. was the first country to include AI in its military, followed by China and Russia, which have also made efforts to prevent lags in the development of AWS (Arif 2019, p.1). Sander and Meldon projected that global military spending on AWS will reach $16 billion by 2025 (Sander and Meldon 2014, p.5). The importance of developing AI, especially in the military, has been expressed by President Vladimir Putin. Putin highlighted that "AI is the future, not only for Russia but also for all of humanity. It comes with colossal opportunities and threats that are hard to predict. Whoever becomes a leader in this field will become the ruler of the world" (Arif 2019, p.1).
AI as a dual use technology can bring significant security risks to individuals, state entities, organisations, industries, and the future of humanity. Any new development or innovation in AI can be used for beneficial and destructive purposes. Pandya stated that any single algorithm capable of providing critical economic applications could also lead to producing an unprecedented mass destruction on a scale that is difficult to comprehend (Pandya 2019, p.1). As a result, concerns about AI-based automation of weapon systems are increasing. Various regulatory options have been proposed to overcome the challenges that arise from this weaponry, ranging from international negotiations on preemptive international treaties to strengthening existing international laws. However, until now, there is still no international consensus that can regulate the issue of AWS. The U.S. and Russia are the two prominent actors preventing negotiations on the ban on AWS (Busby 2018, p.1). The U.S. and Russia, and other major military powers, including South Korea, Israel, and Australia, also blocked progress towards an international agreement on the ban on AWS at the 2018 conference in Geneva, which also involved the United Nations (UN) (Busby 2018, p.1). The blocking was based on the application of AI in the military in the contemporary era, which can provide various advantages. The aforementioned states believed that AWS, which was being developed and designed by the world's major powers, would; (1) have a much higher degree of autonomy with the ability to detect targets, operate independently to make their own decisions to shoot or kill without human intervention; (2) has a much greater ability than humans to collect and process complex information at an extraordinary speed; (3) be able to operate more precisely, quickly and flexibly; (4) not be affected by physical or emotional limitations like humans, who can carry out tiring, protracted and dangerous routine tasks because this system lacks emotions to cloud their judgment, such as fear, anger, selfishness, hysteria, revenge, frustration, exhaustion or hunger (Geneva Academy 2014, p.1).
On the other hand, the development of AWS has been rejected by various parties because AWS can pose a significant risk and has the potential to violate international law, especially the law regarding armed conflict, due to the lack of meaningful human control over these weapons (Sharkey 2012, p.1). Countries that have a position against and disagree with the development and use of AWS, such as countries in parts of Africa and Asia, state that the issue of AWS is very closely related to ethical issues, where human life is said to have no value when machines are used to make the decision to kill (Sharkey 2012, p.1). In addition, AWS is believed to be able to change the pattern of war to be unfair, disproportionate, and brutal (Sharkey 2012, p.1). Not only the majority of developing countries reject the use or development of AWS, but more than 100 nongovernmental organisations, especially in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law, have also joined in voicing their criticisms of AWS, including concerns about operational risks, accountability, and compliance with the requirements of proportionality and the law of armed conflict (Sharkey 2012, p.1).
The interesting thing about this issue is that China is showing an ambiguous stance. 2  that called for establishing a new international protocol that specifically regulates AWS (Mohanty 2017, p.46). In its position paper, China stated that: "As a hi-tech product, the use of AWS will lower the threshold and cost of war, thus making the outbreak of wars easier and more frequent. Such systems cannot effectively distinguish between soldiers and civilians and can easily cause indiscriminate killing or wounding of the innocent" (China. Delegation to CCW 2016, p.1).
In its position paper, China committed to support the implementation of the prohibition, restriction, and control of AWS in the military revolution (China. Delegation to CCW 2016, p.1). However, this commitment did not last long because, in 2017, China issued the 'New Generation of AI Development Plan' (AIDP) released by the Chinese Parliament, which became the basis for China's development of AWS (Webster et al. 2017, p.1). 5 According to the AIDP, China will develop various levels of technology, especially the use of AI in the military. It will develop the so-called Hybrid New Intelligent Architecture and New Technologies, which are innovations that combine AI technology and weapons to become fully autonomous. China's action to issue AIDP has violated their commitment to the UN-CCW because by issuing AIDP, China has planned the development and production of AWS. This action has given rise to ambiguity in the international community.
In response to this, in 2018, China supported the negotiation on the creation of a new CCW protocol on AWS. However, different from the 2016 meeting, China this time confirmed and further explained that the prohibition on AWS would be limited to their "use" and not their development or production (Stop Killer Robot 2018, p.1). Table 1 shows countries' position on the development of AWS protocol: definitely present the most promising profile of a potential superpower and the one whose degree of alienation from the dominant international society makes it the most obvious political challenger" (Buzan 2004, p.70 (Yu 2018, p.1). This practice has proven the extent to which China has succeeded in creating strategic ambiguity to obscure its motives to militarily challenge the U.S., the only country that can militarily stop China's growing ambition. The policy of strategic ambiguity that China uses is aimed at maximising profit potential and avoiding conflicts and tensions that trigger losses (Yu 2018, p.1).
The author of this article aligns with Baliga and Sjostrom's (2008) and Yu's (2018) explanations. They concluded that an ambiguous stance is an intentional act aimed at maximising potential interests and avoiding tensions that trigger losses for the state. Third, China wants to ensure that its innovation efforts will not hinder its rise. Therefore, along with its rising and the emergence of complexity in AWS development, China faces several constraints and pressures, and the ambiguous stance finds its justification.

Rising Power and Innovative Imperative
The Rising powers will change the dynamics of power in the international system by seeking voice, exerting significant influence in international institutions, and building political ties through regional organisations (Tank 2012, p.1). Rising power can exist to challenge the status-quo power to reach the top of the hierarchy.
International Relations scholars have long recognised that technological innovation plays a crucial role in the transition of power and, more broadly, international politics (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). Starting from the 1970s, Robert Gilpin emphasised that significant advances in technology enable new states to achieve political prominence (Gilpin 1981, p.182). Gilpin (1975, p.182) also added that the emerging powers became dominant countries because they succeeded in developing innovations in new industries or leading sectors that could sustain the dominant state's economic vitality and military power (Gilpin 1981, p.182). The theory of the Technologically Innovative Imperative means that rising power faces the need to acquire and develop new technologies to overcome the structural challenges it faces and continue its international ascent to become a dominant state (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.556). The power transition theory recognises that economic resources are the foundation of military power and many other forms of power (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.556). When it emerged, technological innovation was believed to be the saviour and driver of economic enhancement for rising power (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). This implies that rising power must be able to face the challenge of catching up and not only relying on technology created by the dominant state but also must be able to become more efficient in innovating new technologies, including in production, industrial processes, and transactions (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555).
Economic theory explains that innovation is essential to sustain sustainable economic growth to achieve excellence. Therefore, rising states must pursue innovation as a primary national interest (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). IR scholars view the critical role of technological advances in explaining the transition of power but have so far ignored the challenges it poses to a rising power. Recognising these challenges would allow us to consider how the need for technology and pursuing technology can limit rising power in sustaining its rise. In addition, it would also allow us to consider the domains of technology and innovation as a unique locus of great powers interaction, to the extent that rising power's innovation activities can directly affect the strategic interests of the dominant country. Kennedy and Lim (2018, p.556) saw that new technological innovations by rising power can be carried out in three stages, namely; (1) "create" in which the rising power will support domestic manufacturers to develop new technologies; (2) "transacting" in which the rising power will conduct commercial transactions with foreign entities that result in technology transfer, due to the limitations of the rising power in mastering the technology; (3) "take" which requires the acquisition of existing technology from the outside world through non-transactional means. This includes actions aimed at accelerating the general diffusion process, in which knowledge naturally spreads from high-tech countries to low-tech countries over time (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555).

Great Powers Interaction in the Realm of Innovation
The dominant country might welcome the rising power's desire for technology innovation. In this case, firstly, a dominant country which is also a world technology leader will be in the best position to take advantage of technology sales to a rising power.
Secondly, the dominant country can also increase opportunities for cross-border collaboration in R&D with the rising power. However, at the same time, the innovation activities of rising power can challenge the strategic interests of the dominant country.
These two characteristics of shape the relationship between technology and strategic competition. Kennedy and Lim (2018, p.558) identify external effects closely related to the strategic relationship between a rising power and the dominant country, namely security externalities. Security externalities are defined as security implications that arise as a by-product of economic interactions and can take various forms (William 2016, p.12).
It is stated that various trades with potential adversaries will result in negative security In addressing security externalities, the dominant country is likely to act directly to cut off the supply of relevant technology to the rising power. This will involve market intervention to limit or prohibit certain transactions that cause concern, at least when the technology is unavailable from other countries (Mastanduno 2017, p.289

The Conception of Strategic Ambiguity
Utilising ambiguity provides a way out by placing the actor in a safe middle ground position. Eisenberg (1984, p.35) also explained that when a country faces a conflict and systemic obstacles, clarity is not always the best solution. On the other hand, an ambiguous stance will allow the international community to defend their interpretations while believing that collective action can be achieved.
Looking at China's empirical behaviour, it can be seen that there is a clear relevance between the dynamics of the innovative imperative, the interaction of great powers in the realm of innovation, and the ambiguous stance regarding the issue of AWS.
China as a rising power attaches great importance to the technologically innovative imperative aimed at acquiring and creating new technologies to meet short-term and longterm growth goals in both the economic and military sectors. As Kennedy and Lim (2018, p.558) described, transactions are essential when a rising power tries to obtain new technological innovations. While it innovates, especially in AWS, China conducts commercial transactions with foreign entities because its ability to master certain technology components is still limited. This point will be elaborated in the discussion.
This situation causes China to rely on technology transactions, mostly dependent on imported technology originating from the U.S. (Fedasiuk 2020, p.20). Amid this situation and the debate between the two major groups in the UN-CCW (countries that reject and support AWS), China has instead taken the middle path. Being in a hazy middle ground, China stated that it prohibits the use of AWS but not its development. This position shows a contradiction. On the one hand, China firmly supports the development of AWS, but on the other hand, China strongly prohibits its use. This strategic ambiguity is carried out to trigger protection objectives, minimise the impact of uncertain situations, and maximise interests.
This paper argues that China's strategic ambiguity is not a mere coincidence.
However, it is a rational choice that China has calculated to meet its interests of the innovative imperative, especially as a rising power. At the same time, its position that rejects the use of AWS is because China still has a technological lag in a situation of innovation. Therefore, China tends to take peaceful and compromised ways to ensure a stable environment while trying to catch up. China's stance is relevant to the explain the rising power's interest in the dynamics of the technologically innovative imperative and the interaction of great powers in the realm of innovation.

RESEARCH METHOD
To elaborate Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as the concept of multiculturalism in Indonesia, and to explain how it is unique and different from the existing concepts of multiculturalism, this research follows the qualitative research approach. The aim is to identify the particularity of the characteristic of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika specifically when compared to liberal multiculturalism, multicultural nationalism, and accommodative multiculturalism.
Some official documents are used as the primary data for this research. Secondary data, information, opinion, and debate we found in books, journal articles, as well as some grey literature from online media were analysed in such a way to develop and justify the arguments proposed in this study.

China's Rising Power Strategy and Strategic Ambiguity in Practice
Along with the emergence of China as a rising power came the perception of the 'China threat,' which has been commonly debated since the 1990s (Wang 2009, p.1). China understands that without effectively addressing the issue of the "China threat," its rising will be hampered and would not be well received by the international community (Wang 2009, p.2). Intending to allay these concerns and suspicions, the Chinese political elite created the idea of Peaceful Rise, which means that the rise of China will be peaceful and beneficial not only for the Chinese but also for the whole world (Wang 2009, p.2 China usually adopts two approaches to achieving strategic ambiguity, both inherited from China's strategic ruse and are currently studied in many Chinese military and defence universities (Yu 2018, p.1). The first is "Hide a dagger in a smile" as one of The Thirty-Six Strategies, which means "reassure the enemy to make him slack, work in secret to subdue it" (Yu 2018, p.1). This is a method of hiding China is still catching up with the gap or lag, it will tend to choose peaceful or compromise way rather than controversial ways. China's Peaceful Rise is actually in line with the stance of strategic ambiguity, which often shows a contradiction between China's narratives in international forums and the actual activities.

China's Ambiguous Stance on Autonomous Weapon
Contemporary warfare innovation should lead to intelligent operations and focus on new types of combat forces, including AI and AWS. At the same time, China has expressed concern about AWS in several international fora, like UN-CCW and UNGA. However, China's normative response is in stark contrast to its empirical behaviour. This section will elaborate on China's ambiguous position on issues related to AWS.
First, at the UN-CCW meeting, China stated that it was essential to uphold "human involvement, judgment, control and responsibility" in war (Hynek and Solovyeva 2020, p.89). In the 2016 UN-CCW meeting, according to its position paper, China supported the development of a legally binding protocol on the prohibition of AWS. It appeared that China was the only P5 country that did not support the development and presence of AWS
In line with the three strategic areas where AI can make a substantial difference in China, this paper highlights two significant drivers for China to develop AWS; (1) China's concern towards Intelegentised Warfare; and (2) AWS as a new promising industry which can booster China's economy. First, China views that Intelligentized Warfare in the future is considered a stage beyond informatisation that will require a significant change in its approach to force development and modernisation (Wang 2015, p.76). China's 'information revolution' has progressed through three stages; (1) digitisation, (2) network, and (3) intelligence (Wang 2015, p.76). The PLA has actively pursued AI-enabled systems and autonomous capabilities in its military modernisation efforts. The PLA has fielded more advanced unmanned robotic and missile systems (Kania 2020, p.3). China's defence industry is building a visible force of armed drones and missiles to introduce greater autonomy in operations and exploration. China also utilises the application of AWS in its defence industry, where China has built ballistic missiles through automation (Kania 2020, p.5 Zeng Yi, a senior executive at a Chinese defence company, described China's hopes for AWS on a futuristic battlefield. Zeng stated that, "In future battlegrounds, there will be no people fighting" (Zeng in Allen 2019, p.8). Zeng predicts that by 2025 AWS will become very common and believes that the increasing use of AI in the military is inevitable. In the future intelligentised wars, the AI system will function as a warrior (Allen 2019, p.6). The supremacy of intelligence will be at the core of future warfare. AI can completely transform the current command structure, which humans dominate, into one dominated by 'AI clusters' (Allen 2019, p.6). Ziyan, a Chinese military armed drone manufacturer, has sold the A2 Blowfish model to the UAE. In November 2019, Ziyan was reported to be negotiating with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for a contract to sell the A2 Blowfish (Zeng in Allen 2019, p.10). Equipped with missiles, AK-47 automatic machine guns, or mortar-sized ammunition, the Blowfish A2 is able to autonomously conducts combat on complex missions, including time detection, fixed range reconnaissance, and precision-targeted strikes (Allen 2019, p.10). Blowfish A2 has been operating and exported in various Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa (Xuanzun 2019, p.1).    actively contributing to several international forums. These peaceful measures are essential to avoid a position that could potentially trigger counter-productive tensions to

Strategic Constraints and Great Powers Interaction in the Realm of Autonomous
China's innovation activities. Third, China wants to ensure that its innovation efforts will not hinder its rise. Therefore, amidst its interest as a rising power and the emergence of complexity in AWS innovation, as well as the obstacles and pressures China faces, the ambiguous stance finds its justification. Thus, through this strategic ambiguity, China can maximise its interests in the realm of AWS innovation and be prepared for future warfare.
This paper shows how China contradicts its positionespecially when China is aggressively developing AWS and actively contributing at the UN-CCW or other international forums to voicing the threat of AI arms race. However, paying attention to the arms race dynamics while aggressively participating in it is a common story in the history of international relations. This ambiguous and rhetorical move allowed China to receive positive media attention for its support to global restrictions while masking the hypocrisy of China's development of military autonomy and more advanced industries.
The Chinese regime has successfully projected strengths while hiding weaknesses by controlling information leaving their borders. As a researcher, it is essential to distinguish between the image that China seeks to present and the reality it faces.

CONCLUSION
This study has elaborated the arguments regarding the reasons behind China's ambiguous stance on the issue of AWS. It has explained that China's ambiguous stance is a form of strategy in dealing with the innovative imperative dynamics, especially AI-based AWS that are in line with the China's fast-growing status as a rising power. AI-based weapon innovation, especially AWS, has been essential in this situation. With these innovations,