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**COLLABORATIVE POLICING FOR HANDLING COMMUNAL
CONFLICTS (CASE STUDY: CONFLICTS BETWEEN
PAPUANS AND YOGYAKARTAANS)**

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ABSTRACT

In this study, there are 2 (two) groups of conflicting citizens, namely the Papuans living in Yogyakarta which consist of students and working residents, and Yogyakartaans, that is several ethnic groups other than ethnic Papuan. This study uses a qualitative approach and the paradigm of constructivism. The root of the conflicts is the Papuans' perception of their historical past as well as cultural elements such as poverty, lack of education, and lifestyle. The triggers of conflict is the Papuans' negative lifestyles, namely frequently get drunk, eating without paying the bill, breaking traffic rules, and always shouting "merdeka" (meaning independence) when making protesting rallies. On the other side, the people of Yogyakarta have negative prejudices against Papuans and discriminate them accordingly, which could even be perceived as a racial attitude. The Yogyakarta police seem not to have a good understanding about the root and causes of conflicts, because they tend to handle conflicts by repressive measures only after the violence had occurred. They clearly believe Papuan case is politically sensitive and full of outsiders' influences. They also fail to have an open communication with the Papuans because the Papuans do not trust the police. For those reasons, the police often let Papuans who broke the law left unpunished, which produces suspicion among the people of Yogyakarta that the police might be afraid of the Papuans.

KEYWORDS: Communal Conflict, Policing, Papuans, Yogyakartaans

INTRODUCTION

Communal conflict consists of two concepts, namely conflict and communal. Conflict is a situation in which two or more people involved in dispute due to differences in purposes or interests (Wolff, 2004, p. 58). The term "communal" is originated from the word *commune*, meaning a group of people who live together, and this group is called community. Sociologists defined a community as "a group whose members have similar characteristics that are usually compiled by a sense of belonging, or certain social bonds and interactions that make the group a specific social entity. Examples of a community are ethnic groups, religious groups, academics, or professional communities (Adam & Jessica Kuper, 2000). Thus, "communal conflict" is a situation in which two or more communities involved in conflicts or disputes because of their differences

in goals or interests.


Communal conflict does not just happen, because specific issues, such as the fight over natural resources, or differences in ethnicity, religion, culture, politics (Thung Ju Lan, 2013, p. 1), as well as lifestyle, may cause the conflict. Communal conflicts based on ethnicity or socio-cultural aspects are often perceived as a disease of emerging or third world countries (Kim, 2006, p. 91). Communal conflicts in Indonesia reached its peak in 1993-1994 (Wimmer, 2004, p. 1).

The handling of communal conflicts in each country differs from one another. Ways of handling conflict have various and different implications. A country that has been considered as being highly capable of handling communal conflicts, even though the seeds of conflict continue to exist, is the United States of America (Stacey, 2015). The Soviet Union is an example of unsuccessful case that caused his breakup into several small countries, while conflict persists (Commercio, 2016).

Communal conflicts in Indonesia mostly occurred after the fall of President Soeharto's New Order in May 1998 (Buchanan, 2011). Violent conflict at Maluku in 1999 was the most significant communal conflict with an estimated victim of around 5,000 dead and more than 700,000 displaced (Siddiq, 2005). This conflict has led to a conflict between religions, namely Islam and Christianity.

Communal conflict of concern lately is the communal conflict between the Papuan community who live in various cities in Java and non-Papuan communities consisting of multiple ethnicities. This study focuses on communal conflicts that occur between the Yogyakarta community and the Papuans living in that area. The so-called Yogyakarta community comprised of 2 (two) groups; firstly, a group of residents who live in the Kamasan area, where the Papuan dormitory is located, and secondly, local mass organizations.

Picture 1.
 Statistics on violence in Yogyakarta



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As a city that always portrays itself as a "tolerant city," Yogyakarta today certainly does not reflect it. This contradictory fact came from the increasing violence that occurred in this particular area. According to the editor of Tirto.id, there have been 76 violent cases in Yogyakarta within a period of a decade (2008-2018).

The above graphics shows that violence in Yogyakarta occurred 17 times in 2014, 14 times in 2015, 22 times in 2016, 3 times in 2017, and 4 times in 2018. The violence was motivated by problems of religion, identity or race, and politics. In 2016, for example, violence with an identity (racial) motive in Yogyakarta reached its peak. This phenomenon was marked by the police siege of the Kamasan hostel on Kusumanegara street, owned by Papuan students. The arrest of Obby Kagoya, a Papuan student who did not wear a helmet when entering the dormitory on his motorcycle, had caused violent clashes between the police and Papuan students (Kresna, 2019). Universally, most governments handle conflicts by prioritizing police institutions as street-level bureaucrats who represent the government in dealing directly with citizens (Lipsky, 1970, p. 1). However, in some countries, the political situation could make the police as an instrument of power in overcoming communal conflicts. The autocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, who ruled in Serbia from 1989 to 2000, used the police not to protect the people or prevent crime but to oppress the people for protecting the throne (Barker & David L. Carter, 1999).

As a representative of the government in the area, the Yogyakarta Police has the responsibility to resolve all conflicts that occur in Yogyakarta. Article 13 of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police describes the main tasks of the National Police should include the maintaining of public security and order, enforcing the law, as well as providing protection and services to the community.

The Yogyakarta Police's discriminative action against the Papuans indicated the failure of the Indonesian National Police in protecting minorities, similar to that of the British police who tended to pay more attention to the security of the majority (white) than the minority groups (Asia and Africa) (Bowling, Philips, & Parmer, 2003). The repressive approach taken by the Yogyakarta Police confirmed the lack of the police's general understanding in dealing with social conflict. Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), in collaboration with Current Asia and the center for humanitarian dialogue, has stressed how little experience the Indonesian government and the police have in handling social conflict. Besides, the unwillingness of the government to strongly enforce the law on the participation in conflict as a criminal act that must and will be punished, has resulted in public ignorance of the existence of such a law. Obviously, the central government must make an example (Buchanan, 2011).

METHODOLOGY

Qualitative approach is used in this study because the approach could holistically describe and analyze the conflict phenomenon as intact. With the previous involvement in policing conflicts, this researcher might be able to find and capture the significant meaning given by reality

and social phenomenon of communal conflict for the act of policing in conflict prevention (Somantri, 2005).

In different words, qualitative research is used to uncover or understand a phenomenon that is not yet understood, which in this case, is a communal conflict (Strauss & Corbin, 2003). In this study, the method employed was interviews and observations as a form of hermeneutic and dialectical analysis of all respondents who were considered to be able to explain the policing practices carried out by the Yogyakarta Regional Police in dealing with communal conflicts. The results of interviews and observations were processed through a data processing system using steps compiled by Creswell, (Strauss & Corbin, 2003) to obtain a mature and valid consensus of meaning (Guba & Lincoln, 2009).


The study explores related concepts and theories of communal conflict and policing in dealing with communal conflicts, while the case under investigation is the policing in handling communal conflict in Yogyakarta to support the operationalization of those concepts and theories.

Analysis - Conflict Mapping

Conflict mapping is a conflict analysis to understand the situation as well as the relationship between the conflicting parties (Simon Fisher, 2001, p. 6). Conflicts between the Papuans and the people of Yogyakarta could be illustrated as follows.

Picture 2.

Mapping Communal Conflict in Yogyakarta



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The picture above shows that the Papuans of Yogyakarta (WPJ) are in conflict with the residents of Yogyakarta (WJ), mass organizations, and the police. Conflicts between Papuans and Yogyakarta residents occur in the social environment of Papuan boarding house. Conflicts between Papuans and mass organizations become common when the WPJ rallied a political demonstration, that is when WPJ is supported by Papuans living outside Yogyakarta (abbreviated as WPLJ), such as in Salatiga, Surabaya, Solo, Semarang, and other nearby areas. When WPJ conducts demonstration at particular times, Papuans from the surrounding area will always come to the Kamasan I dormitory to join the protest.

Conflicts between the Papuans and the surrounding environment have occurred since the Kamasan I dormitory is bought and inhabited by the Papuans, and it persisted until today. Wiwik Widiayati, the general chairman of the LPMK (Muja Muju Village Community Empowerment Institute), recalled that the Papuans arrived at Kamasan Dormitory I in 1977. Not long after, the Papuans had made a lot of commotion, either drinking excessively until they drunk, not paying for the food they eat, extorting citizens' money, riding motorcycle without wearing helmet, or even blockading roads, and so forth.


Almost all mass organizations in Yogyakarta are in conflict with the Papuans living in Yogyakarta (WPJ). However, in this study, the mass organizations discussed would be limited to the Katon Paksi and the Jogja Rembug Forum (FJR). Both are large-scale organizations that have many members and actively oppose to the activities of the Papuans. Especially during Papuan demonstrations, those two mass organizations would be readily found at every location of those protests.

WJ, together with mass organizations, have a conflicting view with the police because of the police's inconsistency in taking action against the Papuans who violated the law. As an informant stated, the police seem to have fear in cracking down the Papuans who were conducting protests. On the other hand, the police consider mass organizations as their coalition in controlling Papuans' demonstrations for independence which often follow with anarchy. Ipda Sudiro, for example, said that police intelligence in most cases asked local mass organizations to assist them in making counter rallies against the Papuans. As Salmon indicated, the Papuans are also aware of this police's tactics.

Causes and Roots of Conflict

Conflicts between the Papuans and the people of Yogyakarta are recurring periodically due to the influence of several factors, namely: attitude, behavior, and situation (a term used by Mitchell) (Swanstorm & Wissmann, 2005, p. 9), or context (a term used by Fisher et al.) (Simon Fisher, 2001), as well as conflict (a term used by Johan Galtung) (Galtung, 1973, p. 105). These factors are often referred to as a conflict triangle, described by Mitchell. The operation of this conflict triangle is illustrated in the following chart:

Picture 3.
 Conflict triangle chart



The Papuans in Yogyakarta came from the provinces of Papua and West Papua. As it is commonly known, that Papua was integrated into Indonesia on May 1, 1963. The inclusion process of Papua as part of the Republic of Indonesia is a hot topic among Papuans, including those who live in Yogyakarta, because they believe it was not a legal one. In their opinion, Indonesia has illegally annexed Papua (Yambeyapdi, 2018), therefore the Papuans always commemorate May 1 as the annexation day and demand for the Papuan independence (Taum, 2015).

In addition to the pros and cons concerning the history of integration, there are several violent actions by the security forces, army (TNI - Indonesian National Army) and police (Polri – Republic of Indonesia Police) that have left a negative impression on the hearts of the Papuans, such as the cases of Bloody Wamena, Bloody Wasior, Bloody Biak, Wamena Sinapuk, and Theys Hiyo Eluay's death that most Papuans always commemorate in the form of demonstrations. They blame Indonesian people on the occurrence of those tragic incidents ¹

The development gap of Papua in comparison to other areas of Indonesia, in which Papua has the lowest level of education and the highest level of poverty (Statistik, 2019), on one hand, has exacerbates the historical issue of Indonesia's illegal annexation of Papua. Indonesia is seen as another colonial power that does not care about the people of Papua. On the other hand, it has also brought up cultural differences in their lifestyles. Even when they have been staying in Yogyakarta for a few years, the Papuans still hold on their ethnic culture, such as stone-burning, eating areca nut, non-footwear, and so on, which are looked by Yogyakartans with dislike and contempt. This situation is almost the same for all Papuans living anywhere outside Papua. The attitude of Yogyakartans also reflects a prejudice the non-Papuans outside Papua have toward the Papuans. The Papuans are characterized as trouble makers because of their different lifestyles. The Papuans are then treated discriminately through refusing to provide boarding house, transportation,

¹ Intel dasar Kepolisian Daerah Papua Tahun 2017

etc, for them, as well as through public rejection, such as to attack Papuan dormitories, to prevent Papuans from making protests, and so on. Both sides persistently maintain their negative attitudes toward each other which after a certain period becomes “a context” for the relationship between the two communities as well as for the police. It leads to a perpetual non-conductive situation with conflicting opinions, mutual threatening, and a growing desire to attack each other.

Collaborative Policing as an Effective Way to Handle Communal Conflicts

This study offers a collaborative policing for dealing with communal conflicts between Papuans and Yogyakarta citizens. This concept is formulated based on Donatella’s model and Rizal Panggabean’s modification. In the collaborative policing, the writer combines the concepts of community policing, democratic policing as well as collaborative policing into “collaborative policing” to highlight the term “collaborative” itself. The reason for proposing such an idea, is due to the weakness of community policing in the context of Indonesian plural society. It is quite difficult to identify the so-called community particularly in the urban area. As could be seen, the police could only form *Bhabinkamtibmas* (*Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat* or Community Police Officer), without any clear boundaries for what is considered as “community”. With the collaborative policing, the first thing to do is to find those people in the community who will collaborate with the police, and at the same time the police might find the existing latent conflict in the society when identifying the nature of community actors with their different goals and interests.

There are 3 (three) steps in this model. The first step is to strengthen the police institution in managing variables that may affect policing; the second step is to prioritize conflict prevention strategies; the third step is to make collaborative policing work effectively in conflict prevention strategies.

To Strengthen Police Institutions in Managing Variables that May Affect Policing.

Rizal Panggabean (2014), in adapting Donatella’s policing model, suggested that in dealing with communal conflicts, policing is influenced by several important variables, namely police actions, police culture, legal & procedural framework of policing, police institutional characteristics, politics, public opinion, police's knowledge, and police interaction with conflicting actors (Porta, 2007).

The routine police actions have endorsed the Yogyakarta Regional Police to use the same handling methods on all cases, namely law enforcement actions. In that way, the police tend to prioritize repressive measures, and consequently they rarely carry out preemptive and preventive actions.² This phenomenon has an impact on the increasing number of complaints against the

² See Police Regulation Number 9 of 2011 concerning Management of Police Operations. Article 7 paragraph (2).

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police, especially from the Papuans who feel discriminated against, or as the subject of discriminatory treatment from the police. A stronger objection to the police came from the National Commission of Human Rights who gave a strict reprimand to the police's ways of handling 2016 conflict between the Papuans and the Yogyakartaans.³ Following the objection, the Yogyakarta Regional Police must evaluate all their actions in dealing with conflicts between Papuans and Yogyakartaans. The police was insisted to prioritize preemptive and preventive measures to prevent latent conflicts escalating into violent conflicts.

Yogyakarta police actions could also be said as behave defiantly from the ideal police culture (Suparlan, 2008, p. 144), by omitting violations, making discriminatory treatments, unable to solve cases, and so forth. This deviant acts created negative views among Yogyakartaans who then suspect the police as being afraid of the Papuans, while the Papuans themselves consider the police to act very discriminatively against them. Such deviations must be eliminated, especially on the front line police such as *Bhabinkamtibmas* (*Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat* - Community Police Officer)

There should be a legal framework for policing communal conflicts that occur in Yogyakarta, that is as part of the Law on Prevention of Social Violence of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2012 concerning the Handling of Social Conflicts. One aspect that must be included in the framework is how all local stakeholders, namely the Provincial Government of Yogyakarta, Military Resort Commands, and community leaders could follow the directive mandate of the Law on Social Conflict Management in handling social conflicts such in the case of Papuans and Yogyakartaans' confrontation. In addition, the police institution should also use police regulations and permanent procedures as a procedural framework for policing in the field. This legal framework is not working properly when police personnel do not even know communal conflict related policing regulations and procedures. The National Police must supervise the implementation of that legal and procedural framework by Yogyakarta Regional Police.

Ideally, politics should not affect police activities. However, the police and politicians have a close relationship (Jackson, 2001, p. 232), because both regional and central politics could make the police very careful in carrying out their police actions. For example, the Governor of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, often instructs the police to protect Papuans. Similarly, the Central Government, through the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security (*Kemenpolhukam – Kementerian Koordinasi Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan*) always reminds the police to be careful in handling Papuans-related conflicts, because even the smallest mistake may have big implications to Indonesia's international relations. Such conditions place a lot of pressure on the police in handling Papuans-related "local" conflicts. The important question here is that how should Yogyakarta Regional Police and its staff manage all those political influences in order not act as a barrier for the police force in conducting their task of preventing violent conflicts?

Public opinion is defined as the views or attitudes of community leaders and media

³In a Press Release No. 021 / Humas-KH / VI / 2016, dated July 22, 2016, it was explained that the National Human Rights Commission has found 8 (eight) allegations that could be related to Human Rights violations.

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coverage toward the conflict and police actions in dealing with it. The distrust the Yogyakartaans and/or the Papuans have toward the police in relation to the ways the police handle their conflicts, have given a bad image to the Yogyakarta Regional Police. Therefore, the Yogyakarta Regional Police must take proper actions such as having dialogue with conflict actors and community leaders, providing good results for public and media, and so forth.

Police officers' knowledge concerns the police's perception of their own role and of the external realities they are facing. This police knowledge is closely related to the authority for 'discretion' (Bayley, 2005)⁴ which is actually possessed by each police personnel (Porta, 2007). Police personnel's knowledge of various variables that may affect conflicts is a very important factor for the success of conflict prevention. At the present, it seems that the Yogyakarta Regional Police officers are lacking the necessary knowledge which is required for handling communal conflict. This condition has made the police officers very doubtful of their own judgment, and thus choose not to act at all. Since this knowledge is essential, the Yogyakarta Regional Police must train all their police officers, particularly members of *Bhayangkara* the Trustees of Public Security and Order (*Bhabinkamtibmas-Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat* or Community Police Officer) to have a good understanding of the variables that may affect their policing of communal conflicts.

The police have a good and intensive interaction with the Yogyakartaans, but they are not able to openly approach the Papuans. Perhaps it is due to the fact that the Yogyakarta police consider the Papuans as the source of local commotion. Without communication, the relationship between the police and Papuans would turn from poor to bad and into mutual distrust. In the long run, the police should consider recruiting several Papuans to become members of the police force, aiming them to become a negotiator to cultivate and foster the confidence of Papuans as an equal citizen of Indonesia.


To Prioritize Conflict Prevention Strategies

As explained about, the Yogyakarta Regional Police and their staff have treated conflicts between Papuans and Yogyakartaans as ordinary conflicts. Therefore, they deal with the cases only after the violence occurs (Simon Fisher, 2001)⁵, similarly to taking care a crime after it took place. This approach which could be described as a conflict-handling approach (Simon Fisher, 2001), in the context of conflict management should be changed and replaced with conflict prevention strategies, as being illustrated in the following figure.

⁴ Police discretion is defined as the capacity of police officers to choose between a number of legal or illegal actions, or even not to take any action at all, when they carry out their duties. See Michael Feldberg. *Discretion*. In William G. Bayley (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Police Science*. Translator: Rahayu and Team. Jakarta: YPKIK, 2005, pp. 245-250

⁵ Violent conflict refers to the fact that both conflicting parties use violence to gain control over some of the issues in dispute and are considered as indivisible resources, such as parcels of land or local political forces.

Picture 4. Prioritizing conflict prevention



Fisher et al. described four types of conflict, namely, without conflict,⁶ latent conflict,⁷ open conflict,⁸ and on the surface conflict.⁹ Conflict resolution is carried out only for conflict at the surface level or open stage. Conflict prevention should be applied to latent conflict, and if possible, should be maintained it at that stage. According to Fisher, conflict prevention is carried out when the conflict is still in the latent conflict stage, for a sole purpose that the conflict would not escalate into violence (Simon Fisher, 2001, p. 3). Since conflicts between the Papuans and the Yogyakartaans are latent conflicts, the Yogyakarta Regional Police had maltreated the conflict as it happened on July 15, 2016 (Kusumadewi, 2016). At that time, the police, who work closely with the Yogyakartaans and mass organizations, attacked the Papuan dormitory in Kamasan I and arrests a number of Papuan students, and led the conflict into an immature violent stage.

Conflict prevention methods could be divided into direct prevention and structural prevention. Direct prevention refers to conflict prevention that aims at preventing conflict which has a strong potential for conflict escalation in a short-term period. The structural prevention focuses on long-term actions to overcome potential causes of conflict along with other factors that may trigger conflict escalation (Brosche & Elfversson, 2012). Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson have explained several factors that may influence the success of conflict prevention. These factors include the nature of actors who could intervene conflict, interactional factors, structural factors, as well as time in conducting preventive interventions.

To be able to prevent conflicts between Papuans and Yogyakartaans, the National Police, as well as the Yogyakarta Regional Police must take direct prevention and structural prevention measures to overcome the causes and the root of conflicts. For examples, at the local level, the Yogyakarta Regional Police should work harder to get close to both, the warring parties. At the structural level, the Indonesian Police Headquarters and the Yogyakarta Regional Police should enact policies that make direct implications on conflict prevention, such as special recruitment

⁶ A society without conflict looks safe, but in order to survive, the people have to live vibrantly and/or have a dynamic life. Conflict is one aspect of those dynamics and vibrancy. People could and should take advantage of conflicting behavior and goals to fulfill their dreams, or in other words to manage conflict creatively for their own benefits.

⁷ Latent conflict is hidden, thus it needs to be brought up to the surface so that the conflict could be dealt with effectively.

⁸ Open conflict is deeply rooted and very real, therefore it requires various actions to overcome the root causes and their multiple effects.

⁹ Conflicts on the surface have shallow roots or even having no roots, and it arises only due to temporary misunderstanding about each target; which could easily be overcome by improving communication.

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policy for Papuans police force which is equipped with sufficient budgeting mechanism, as well as policies for creating sustainable conflict prevention system to manage communal and latent conflicts (Brosche & Elfversson, 2012).

To Make Collaborative Policing Work Effectively in Conflict Prevention Strategies

Direct prevention actions that must be carried out by the Yogyakarta Regional Police might refer to the opinions of Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, which include early warning and response system, as well as building trust and diplomatic missions (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2012, p. 89). Early warning and response system should be carried out with a close coordination with stakeholders in the context of conflict prevention – as the application of collaborative policing. It could also be done by forming task force members which involve institutions and parties other than the police, and regularly patrolling neighborhoods to establish an early warning system for effective conflict prevention. Building trust, among others, should be carried out by periodically holding meetings with potential conflicting parties, strengthening FKPM (*Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat* – Police and Society Partnership Forum) by involving conflicting parties as members, and by making efforts to resolving conflict-related cases. In this case, problem-solving become the core principle of collaborative policing. Finally, diplomatic missions should be carried out by mobilizing a third party who could mediate the conflicting parties, namely the Papuans and the Yogyakartaans. This local level policing should be backed up by structural prevention measures at the national level. Otherwise, it would not last.

Structural prevention measures carried out by the National Police Headquarters is to overcome the roots of conflict, such as the historical perception of illegal annexation, poverty, differences in educational level and lifestyles. The National Police should also involve other responsible institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, *Kemenkopolhukam* (Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security), and so forth. The responsibility of the National Police Headquarters is to ensure that all relevant ministries will carry out their duties as well as the evaluation of its implementation process.

In addition, the National Police Headquarters must internalize structural prevention measures within the internal police organization, in three steps of conflict prevention discussed above, namely early warning and response system, building trust, and diplomatic missions. For early warning and response system, the National Police Headquarters should make a guideline which serves as a reference for all territorial units, prepare budgets for conflict prevention activities, and conduct an evaluation of each action taken. In building trust, the National Police should appoint the head of the regional unit (*Kasatwil*), who understands the root of conflict or the people from related area (Papua), as well as to assign (Papuan) community leaders, in the peace-making mission team. For diplomatic missions, certain officers should regularly be appointed to analyze and evaluate the completion stage of conflict prevention.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

The National Police Headquarters and the Yogyakarta Regional Police must carry out a conflict prevention strategy with two actions, namely direct prevention measures for the short term and structural prevention for the long term. Direct prevention is mostly carried out by the Yogyakarta Regional Police by overcoming the causes of conflict, such as coordinating with stakeholder holders (collaborative policing). Furthermore, they may also form special task forces dealing with conflict, build the trust of Papuans by bringing together conflicting parties and making agreements, and mobilize parties who can approach Papuans.

The National Police Headquarters carries out structural prevention by coordinating actions to overcome the roots of the conflict with relevant ministries. As for the National Police organization, the Headquarters must conduct regular evaluations of the Yogyakarta Regional Police, make a policy to recruit Papuans as members of the National Police stationed in the Yogyakarta Regional Police. Moreover, the Indonesian Police Headquarters must also mobilize Papuan leaders to appease Papuans in Yogyakarta.

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