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Gilang Mahadika
Department of Anthropology, Gadjah Mada University, gilangmahadika@mail.ugm.ac.id

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MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF POPULISM IN NORWAY

Gilang Mahadika

Department of Anthropology
Gadjah Mada University

Email: gilangmahadika@mail.ugm.ac.id
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Abstract
In the European nations, there has been a lot of discussions and arguments regarding the community who have a 'migration background'. Migrants nowadays are more capable of competing against local residents in terms of looking for better employment and participating in the political activities in European countries. Consequently, it creates fear within 'mainstream' society since it is presumably able to threaten their way of life. This interesting moment can benefit the populist political parties for gaining voices from the majority population. But, in the aftermath of 22/7 terror attacks in Norway, it also created tension between locals and those who are considered having a 'migration background'. The people who have migration background, especially Muslim community, already has long history of migration to Norway. Therefore, the research question is how the Muslim community adapt to the situation of populism in Norway. By using historical literatures and research articles regarding the aftermath of 22/7 terror attack, it shows that the intersectional approach is useful to see the intermingled aspects of class, identity, religion, nationality, gender, and ethnicity of marginalised communities. These migrants now are facing multiple discriminations. Protests in the public sphere as a way of adapting to the atmosphere of populism are considered as their struggles for citizenship since the government seems to fail at managing multicultural society, especially advocating the minority groups. This kind of situation is common in the era of populism emerging in many countries targeting minority groups as political manoeuvre in order to gain voices among the 'common' society.

Keywords:
populism, Muslim community, terror attacks, citizenship, Norway
INTRODUCTION
Speaking of migration often concerns the people moving in certain regions. This attitude of migration has been inspired by the growing inequality between Global South and Global North\(^1\) (Bredeloup, 2017, p. 139; N. Kleist, 2017, p. 1). Migration is the consequence of globalisation, the expansion of trading, and deregulation that have worsened the living conditions of the countries in Global South (Kleist, 2017, p. 3). It can also be considered as the migrants’ anxiety to material deprivation and responses of their own subjectivities when living in the Global South (Haugen, 2017, p. 96). They often project their better future in new destination countries. Moving to another region seems to provide ‘hope’ for millions of people to have better employment, exciting life, and improvement.

Living in new territories, migrants will not only face certain such challenges as adapting to new environments, learning new languages, following policies enacted by the government, etc., but they also often find it difficult to integrate to a new kind of social-cultural phenomenon in the new continent. Migrants are especially subjected to different attitudes from local people (Sopranzetti, 2018, p. 18). The local population often frames them as fools and excluded from mobility circuits (Kleist, 2017, p. 1). Moreover, Europeans often perceive those coming from the Orient countries as backwards (Said, 2003, p. 7). These binaries of European hegemony over non-European create an identity of Europeans as superior compared to the people and cultures outside Europe.

In this paper, I would like to examine some of the issues of migration, especially regarding migrants coming from Eastern countries. These migrants usually bring cultural and religious backgrounds that are often considered extremely different from those living inside Europe. By using the term “racism” brought by Grosfoguel (2011), it becomes clear that there is a global hierarchy of human superiority/inferiority between the migrants coming from Global South and Europeans as the representation of the people living in Global North. Racism can also be marked by colour, language, ethnicity, culture and/or religion (Grosfoguel et al., 2014, p. 636).

Generally speaking, migration also talks about living in the post-colonial era. By using the term of “coloniality of power” from Quijano (2000), a sociologist, it is obvious that the countries in Global North are still living in post-colonial realms, which means that even after the colonial administrators are already over, the global hierarchies created by the European colonial expansion, such as the international division of labour (the division between the core and the periphery) (Mies, 2014, p. 112), Christian-centric,
patriarchal-hierarchy of gender remain with us here (Grosfoguel et al., 2014, p. 641). Therefore, it would be significant to see these migrants migrating to metropolitan spaces in certain countries considered the Global North. They are already contaminated by racial power relations with a long colonial history (Grosfoguel et al., 2014, p. 641). When these migrants arrive in certain developed countries, they consequently live in the space of power relations constituted by coloniality. Even if they are considered formal citizens, culturally, they are often put at the bottom of urban racial/ethnic hierarchy.

Southeast Asian countries are also important topics, especially when it comes to discussing Islamic practices. The difference between Muslim community in the Middle East and Southeast Asia is about the idea of being Muslim. The former is usually associated with an orthodox and fanatical Islam in general. The latter is considered as the Sufistic and syncretic idea of Islam. But, the point of which Islam is being imagined as “harmful” religious ideology is presumably because of the tragedy of 9/11 or September 11 that already constructed “harmful” image towards Islamic movement around the globe. Importantly, Muslim living in the Southeast Asian countries is considered contributors to the ‘second front’ in the global ‘war on terrorism’ (Conboy, 2006). It can not be separated from the tragedy of the Bali bombing in 2002 (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 1). Therefore, Southeast Asian countries have become an important topic of Muslim community, especially the diasporic one living in such Global North as Norway. It needs to be explored further to see the reaction of the local population against the Muslim community.

One of the reasons why Norway is such an important topic is because of the tragedy that happened on 22/7 or July 22nd, 2011. There was a terrorist attack on minority groups of Muslims. It also became headline news on the international media such as Aljazeera and The Washington Times. A report by Aljazeera (2021) entitled, “Norway marks decade since Andre Breivik killed 77 people”, reported on how the government responded to that tragedy by holding commemorations of 77 people who were killed by Andre Breivik. It is also considered to be the worst tragedy of violence after World War II. Keyton & Lewis (2021) from The Washington Times, also reported the same event of commemorations held by the government of Norway. Norway’s King Harald said that this moment is called “the dark forces” in society. That is the reason why this paper expects to reveal about the paradoxes of the welfare state; a country that is considered as a wealthy nation, but still have the complexity of issues in terms of managing diversity.
Populism is a term that suits this current topic, especially as the rise of populist parties is considered to be a global phenomenon nowadays. They often direct emotional narratives toward their citizens to gain political powers. Anger, fear, and pride could also be tools for manoeuvring politics according to parties’ interests. It can also be imagined as ‘perfect nationalism’ that creates tensions and social antagonism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Agius et al., 2020, p. 433). Consequently, it could negatively impact the (im)migrants who are considered to be ‘them’, not ‘us’. Since the populism arises, it is followed by certain political-sentimental movements based on the local citizenship, such as anti-immigrant, xenophobic, anti-Muslim, etc.

Since migrants with such negative-stereotypical religious background as Islam exist across the globe, they are often perceived as not contributing to gender equality which is always important for European, and Nordic countries in particular, to fight for. But, interestingly, this Muslim community has a long history of living in European countries such as Norway. Indeed, there have been cultural contacts and exchanges between the migrants and the local population. So, it is too naive to only the populism without looking into the history of the Muslim community living in Norway for a long time. Therefore, the research question in this paper is ‘How does the Muslim minority group adapt to the situation amid populism in Norway?’ This paper does literature studies related to this topic of Islamic community in European countries to answer it. This paper expects to reveal how migration of Muslims from the Middle East and Southeast Asia becomes such a threat toward the local population, especially in the atmosphere of populism inspired by the extreme political right-wing parties nowadays.

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

**The Politics of Fear: The Rise of Populism of Right-Wing Political Parties**

This current issue seems to be different compared to common migration studies. Migrants all over the world are commonly known as having difficult situations in terms of their living conditions. However, when it comes to talking about populism, it can be considered a reverse phenomenon of migration. It means that the local population or the local citizens have the anxiety of facing migrants who have the ability to compete with them. In Slavoj Žižek’s article entitled *Against the Populist Temptation* (2006), it becomes clear that populism is considered as a reverse phenomenon regarding issues of migration taking place in many parts of the world.
Žižek (2006, p. 553) cited Hegel’s term of _gegensätzliche Bestimmung_ or oppositional determination, which means that there are particular ‘democratic’ demands, such as better social security, healthcare, fair taxes, and so on, among its universal political subjects. In this regard, ‘People’ become a universal political subject, which means that these people bring all different particular struggles and antagonisms that separate between ‘us’ (‘people’) and ‘them’ (outside the ‘people’). In some ways, it can also be the struggles of the workers (local citizens) who feel threatened by the coming migrants that will take over their employment. In his book, _The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class_ (2011), Guy Standing showed one of the examples that the immigrants were able to take over the local’s employment. In the city of Prato, Italy, there had been a great manufacturing centre of textiles and garments. It was able to absorb many local residents of Italy. However, in 1989, this city started to recognise the migrants coming from China. From 2008 to 2010, the Chinese firms continued to grow while the Indians and Bangladeshis started to buffet local Italian firms as they were drowned into precarious jobs (Standing, 2011, p. 4). These former workers of local residents were living in fear and insecurity toward their employment. As Standing put it,

“There is much larger element living in fear and security . . . that does not make them any less part of the precariat. They are floating, rudderless, and potentially angry, capable of veering to the extreme right of extreme left politically and backing populist demagoguery that plays on their fears and phobias” (Standing, 2011, p. 4).

From the economic perspective, the local people of Italy are threatened by the coming migrants who can take over their employment in their own country. However, this moment would be a great opportunity for the political elite to take advantage of them by enacting populist policies. One of the popular political elites, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, was considered as a political elite enacting such populist policies. From the 1950s through 1980s, there were stagnating incomes, inequality, and economic crises in general (Agnew & Shin, 2017, p. 916). From that moment, Berlusconi and his party, _Forza Italia_, were constituting populism by presenting himself as a “man of providence” (Agnew & Shin, 2017, p. 921). By 2009, populist political movements and the way Berlusconi made populism by ‘taking politics to the people’ and making an opposition towards immigrants became more popular (Diadato & Niglia 2019, p. 27).
From the case above, populism negative sentiments go against ‘the outsiders’ or those who are considered as “them”, not “us” as the real representation of “the people”. It can also be the reflection of the anti-globalisation movement. However, anti-globalisation, anti-immigrants, racial movements, and so on, can not simply be dubbed populism since the populism itself requires ‘ideal struggle of the people’ (Žižek, 2006, p. 560). One thing for sure from the case of Italy, populism occurring in Europe can also be criticised that,

“. . . the reaction of “official” Europe was one of near-panic at the dangerous, “irrational”, racist, and isolationist passions that sustained the no, at a parochial rejection of openness and liberal multiculturalism” (Žižek, 2006, p. 552).

Another example of the rise of populism can also occur closer to home. We can find from the article written by Hatib Abdul Kadir entitled “Muslim-Christian Polarisation in the Post-Conflict Society-Ambon” (2013) the historical trajectories of religious polarisation by the changing government regimes from colonial to New Order period. I found it useful to see the reason behind the idea of populism that can be considered, in addition to only mobilising or accommodating certain groups, not all of the groups within society. From the case of Ambon, we can find that the Christian community as native Ambonese had better access to education, sanitation, and political system during the Dutch-colonial period compared to Muslim as migrants or non-native Ambonese (Kadir, 2013, p. 825). However, during New Order regime, the political dynamics in the city of Ambon started to change, indicated by the emergence of the Muslim middle-class who also participated in the regional political government, consequently weakening the Christian-political parties. It eventually created tension between native Christian-Ambonese and Muslim-Ambonese (Kadir, 2013, pp. 830–831).

As Muslim-Ambonese minority groups were gaining political power, it could provoke clash and dispute among different religious backgrounds in the city of Ambon. The jealousy of the Christian community could lead to political manoeuvring of those wanting to take advantage of their emotion. Indeed, it happened after decentralisation in Indonesia which provided the local wisdom and power back to Christian community as native Ambonese. But it also created a dilemma; it created conflicts and exclusion for the migrant groups. Such provocation was due to decentralisation which in fact triggered fears of Islamisation, not redressed the past injustices towards Moluccan Muslims in
general (Bertrand, 2002, p. 73). Therefore, the decentralisation not only gained back the local residents' power but also intensified tense relations between the Christian and Muslim communities.

When it comes to participation in political activities, Norway has already provided possibilities for minority groups to democratically participate in the parliament. For instance, Mariam Hussein is considered as the first Somali elected into Norwegian parliament (The Christian Science, 2021). Unlike in the United States, this phenomenon of minorities participating in political activities is relatively new in Norway. At the same time, however, anti-immigrant populist parties also still have their electoral gains. That is the reason behind political tension between diverse ‘mainstream’ political parties since politicians with ‘migration backgrounds’ who can participate in the parliament are evidence of a subtle shift in what it means to be Norwegian and challenging the notions of the multicultural society.

As depicted in both cases, the very definition of the term ‘populism’ is not specific enough if it is only to see the struggles of ‘the people’ for hegemony. Firstly, Žižek pointed out that one of Ernesto Laclau’s works on populism only explains the struggle for hegemony based on Laclau’s case of solidarnosc (a trade union in Poland established on September 17, 1980). But, the cases from Italy and the city of Ambon seem to be missed by the Laclau. Therefore, populism could also mean that the rise of populist ideas is not only class-based but also identity-based, such as local residents versus (im)migrants and/or Muslim versus Christian, and so on.

So, one crucial point of populism, according to Žižek (2006, p. 555), is that this trend can displace antagonism and construct the enemy. Populism, for Žižek, is another way to externalise the enemy in order to gain a balance and justice within society. The economy system of the enemy is then tried to be disturbed by the particular actors, usually considered as political elites, by abusing their power to gain control over them. It means that this idea of populism is based on the motive of “abusing power” by speculative groups of the ruling class. It also never considers that the economic system is flawed, but because of,

“the intruder who corrupted it (financial manipulators, not necessarily capitalists, and so on); not a fatal flaw inscribed into the structure as such but an element that doesn’t play its role within the structure properly” (Žižek, 2006, p. 555).
Therefore, it would be too complicated to solve populism by going back to deeper solidarity between Right-wing and Left-wing parties or going further into a totalitarian one (Žižek, 2006, p. 555). However, populism now and then may occur in right-wing political parties and also the left ones. The article written by Agius et al. (2020, p. 434) showed that populism can be divided into two views. For those coming from left-wing political parties, it is considered class-based, while for those coming from the right-wing, populism is considered identity-based and much more exclusive. However, for Žižek (2006, p. 554), both parties have the same ideological concern, that is, the class struggle for hegemony. The struggle can be in any form as long as it is “transubstantiated” into the manifestation of universal ideal, which means that there is particular demand representing contingent struggles for the hegemony or political-economic dynamics taking place in the current society. Therefore, this struggle also can be considered as a way of self-reconciling the society.

In Norway's case, there was terrorist attack by Anders Behring Breivik on Norwegian soil on July 22, 2011 or called 22/7. The assailant presumably was a white-right-wing extremist Norwegian that resulted from the tensions targeting minority groups based on their nationality, skin colour, ethnicities, and religion (Bangstad, 2017a). It would be interesting to see the rise of populist right-wing, namely, Progress Party, as an example of a political party that can create such local sentiments toward outsiders. Indeed, it did not happen in Norway only, but the mainstreaming of racism and Islamophobia was accompanied by Donald Trump's rise during U.S. election (Bangstad, 2017a).

Progress Party delegates called for enacting such policies targeting religious minority groups in Norway. These policies, such as restriction of wearing hijab or Islamic headscarf for girls under sixteen in public schools, have increased state control in the mosques under the pretext of preventing “radicalisation”, and the restriction of circumcision of male children (Bangstad, 2017b). It is interesting to see that political parties such as the populist right-wing party in Norway took this momentum as their political agendas toward the outsiders, that is, the Muslim minority group. Meanwhile, this far-right populist party also has the motive of the ideals of democratic consideration in secularisation by creating the politics of fear among its citizens. This kind of situation needs to be taken into consideration regarding how a far-right-wing party is coming to emerge in an age of populism.
Intersectionality is a useful concept to see the complexity of social world organised by not only single axis of social division such as gender, but also race, ethnicity, class, religion, caste, and any other social aspects (Collins & Bilge 2016, p. 2). People usually use intersectionality as an analytical tool to address a wide range of topics of social problems. However, the case in Norway is more targeting Muslim women who face multiple discrimination.

Discrimination is also associated with the problem of citizenship. It means that Muslim women face inequality of rights, especially when looking for employment in the atmosphere of populism in Norway. It is challenging for them since they face various discrimination based on their gender, race, ethnicity, and religion. Therefore, on one hand, intersectionality could mean multiple combinations of gender, race, religion, etc., that shape individual identities in this multicultural society. However, it can also be multiple suppression experienced by individuals, particularly Muslim women living in Norway. Hence, I might argue that intersectionality usually occurs in diverse societies, and it can also be a problem if there is discrimination within society. So, intersectionality can be a useful analytical tool to see the multiple or varied aspects of the social division of class, gender, race, religion, and others in order to see the reality of unequal rights taking place in a given society.

This case of populism also does not only happen in one of the Nordic countries but also in certain areas. For example, an article written by Heli Askola, entitled “Wind from the North, don’t go forth? Gender equality and the rise of the populist nationalism in Finland” (2019), showed one of the Nordic countries, Finland, also has been seeing the growing support for populist-nationalist parties and anti-immigrant movements since 1990s. These anti-immigration movements have become more prevalent nowadays, especially targeting the people who bring such cultural and religious backgrounds as Islam.

Islam as a religion is commonly perceived as not supporting gender equality, while most of the Nordic countries, conversely, have long traditions of promoting gender equality. Therefore, the discourse of gender equality may become a political manoeuvre for extreme right-wing populist parties in Nordic countries where this discourse is strongly accepted by the mainstream society (Askola, 2019, p. 56). Bringing this political discourse is to bring public debate that is driven by the fears among the majority groups and also can be threatening their way of life (Petersen & Schramm, 2017, p. 6).
RESEARCH METHOD
Using the historical approach, we can understand the historical trajectories and the early generations of migrants coming to Global North, especially Norway, as their destination to make a better living. Historical approach means involving careful study and analysis of data regarding past events. So, it can gain a clearer understanding of the impact of the past on the present. The intersectional approach is used to demonstrate the interwoven aspects of class, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and gender to get a sense of the people who have been marginalised (Crenshaw, 1989). The intersectional approach is used to understand the process of subordination experienced by women who have ‘migration background’ along with their distinct identity within multicultural society amid populism. This approach is a useful analytical tool in that every reading materials use it to analyse the complexity of social aspects, especially targeting marginal community or minority group if they experience unequal treatments within society. Therefore, some of the literature reviews would be framed by this theoretical framework of intersectionality to divide between naturalised male and female Muslims with “migration background.” Secondary data, such as historical archives and news media, were also collected, especially from the news media currently discussing the political dynamics in Norway. Explaining the historical trajectories of Muslim migrants coming to Norway is important since there has been discrimination according to socio-spatial arrangements. For instance, in the 1980-90s, there was a growing fear of terrorism, especially in Oslo, so the government shifted the migrant settlement to the valley located outside of the city (Andersen & Biseth, 2013). It shows that the problems of migrants have a long history that has never been resolved until this day. Hence, the historical approach becomes a pivotal aspect to see the chronological process of discrimination toward migrants.

DISCUSSION
Brief History of the Middle East Migration to Norway
The people from the Middle East, such as Pakistan, Morocco, and Turkey have a long history of migration to certain countries in Europe, such as Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, and Norway (Bell & Strabac 2021, p. 6). Norway, especially, becomes the primary topic of this research to observe the attitude of ‘mainstream society’ of Norway towards the Muslim minority group. This topic would be interesting to understand the cultural
dynamics between the migrants and Norwegians who often see themselves holding different worldviews.

Norway has a long history of interacting with Muslim migrants. The population of Norway has reached 4.7 million in 2007 (Oslo Kommune, 2007, p. 40). Meanwhile, immigrants in the capital of Oslo hold 23.8% of the population (Vestel, 2009, p. 469). In the 1960s, the first Muslim workers mainly came from the Middle East (Bell & Strabac 2021, p. 6). Around 1970s, Norway began indicating that the first and largest group of immigrants were from Pakistan (Vestel, 2009, p. 469). However, in the 1980s, there was a growing threat of terrorism globally and an intensified suspicion toward Islam. The editors of newspapers had chosen terrorism globally as the main topic (Chomsky, 2017, p. 29). This kind of situation has given negative stigma for Muslims living in Norway as a threat.

Then, in the 1990s, the government decided to relocate immigrants from the capital of Oslo (inner-city) to Grorud Valley or sub-urban areas (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 7). This valley used to be rural until the 1950s, Norway's industry and blue-collar workers had dominated in this area (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 7). Indeed, moving immigrants to this valley would eventually create tensions between the two that belong to the (lower) working-class. This area is then described as a *ghetto*, a term attached to a segregated area. Then, the immigrants were not part of the larger society but deviated from the dominant ways of life and values of Norway's ‘mainstream society’ (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 18). In 1993, this valley was only inhabited by around 25% of immigrants. However, in 1998, 50% of the population was immigrants (Vestel, 2009, p. 470).

The negative attitude toward Muslims was exacerbated after September 11th, 2001 (9/11) tragedy. The 9/11 tragedy changed the entire worldviews on how to treat Islam as radical belief and that the world had to fight against terrorism (Chomsky, 2017, pp. 20–22). At the same time, the U.S. foreign policy on the tragedy triggered important public discussion since it had contributed to creating the world of terrors (Butler, 2004, p. 3). This attitude has affected not only Pakistani immigrants in Norway, but also directed against Muslims in general.

The 9/11 tragedy was followed by the Israeli invasion of Gaza that triggered the demonstrations in the capital of Norway, Oslo, in 2008 (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 5). Many young people from Grorud Valley joined in these protests. The highest or climactic point of the demonstrations was situated in Oslo. There were clashes between youth and
the police, marked by the vandalisation of stores by youth with immigrant backgrounds on January 8, 2009 (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 6). After the incident, the right-wing populist Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet / FrP* or PP), made a statement that these young people were claimed as incompatible to follow “Western values” and it would be catastrophic for social integration (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 5).

The terrorist attack on July 22, 2011 by Anders Behring Breivik, who was considered a supporter of the extreme right-wing Progress Party, created tension between mainstream society/local citizens and the Muslim community. He was an anti-Muslim crusader and said that his motives were fighting against an Islamic takeover or ‘Islamisation.’ He also targeted the European governments who support multiculturalism, which he saw as a threat for Europe, ‘Western values and culture’ (Wiggen, 2012, pp. 585–586). This situation then stimulated the local sentiments toward the minority group with “migration background.” For instance, those from the Middle East were targeted with ethnic labelling by Norwegians in schools. Racism based on the migrant appearance with minority status becomes prevalent in today’s Norway; dark skin, religious symbols like wearing *hijab*², showing cultural difference within mainstream Norwegians could result in an exclusion from the mainstream group (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 49).

One of the articles written by Sindre Bangstad entitled “Norwegian Right-Wing Discourses: Extremism Post-Utøya (2016) examined the lives of the Norwegians after the terror attacks. Actually, Breivik was a member of the Progress Party. He was inspired by certain books, such as Bruce Bawer’s regarding the term of ‘Eurabia,’ which means the vision of European countries as a multicultural society with equal citizenship rights for their residents. At the same time, the Islamic communities are considered ‘quislings’ (not respecting citizenship rights) and the politicians who support an immigration policy were considered traitors (Bangstad, 2016, pp. 235–236). Breivik’s actions also gained a lot of attention and sympathies among extreme and populist political right-wing parties. His actions targeted social democrat parties instead of the Muslim community to deliver clear messages about the future threat of Muslim community invasion in Europe (Bangstad, 2016, p. 236). Therefore, Bangstad defines Progress Party and Breivik’s actions as intersections between populist/radical and extreme political right-wing because of their political methods to make great transformations for their political interests.

“populist/radical right accepts democratic rules, directly refuses the use of violence to accomplish what it considers its main political goals, and works within the parliamentary political system; on the other hand, by contrast, the extreme right or
Far Right movements and groups do not recognise the existing institutions and political system as legitimate and are willing to make use of radical and violent and means in order to accomplish political transformations” (Bangstad, 2016, p. 234).

Interestingly, news media, journalists, and politicians of Norway had reported that the tragedy was due to Muslim terrorism. As stated by Helge Lurås, a Norway politician, “though it need not be an organised group with an international agenda. It might also be a local group of [Muslim] immigrants hostile to Norwegian society” (Gardell, 2014, p. 130). However, it turned out that the terrorist was not a Muslim, but a Norwegian-Christian. The terror attack, on the contrary, was also creating fear over the local residents because of the ‘narrative discourse’ constructed by Breivik targeting Muslim groups living in the European countries in general. He intended to protect the Nordic race from Muslim groups coming from the Middle East in particular. Therefore, he is considered more a fascist (neo-Nazi movements) than attempting to counter Jihad movements or raise anti-Islam sentiments within Norway's ‘mainstream society’ (Bjørgo & Gjelvsik 2017, p. 5).

In the aftermath of 22/7, it was quite challenging for the Muslim community living in Norway, especially when participating in the public sphere or simply applying for employment. An article in The Atlantic written by Schultheis (2017) showed that Progress Party was the third-largest political party and relatively successful in 2017. This party is concerned with the immigration issues because of the growing xenophobia and the statements from many FrP’s politicians about the alleged Islamisation of Norwegian society (Jupskås, 2015, p. 68). Given this challenging situation, it would be interesting to see through the eyes of the Muslim community in order to see how they adapt to this kind of atmosphere of populism taking place in Norway.

Adapting to the Atmosphere of Populism

Niklas Jakobsson and Svein Blom (2014) examined the aftermath of terror attacks in Norway's two cities, namely, Utøya and Oslo. They argued that there is more scepticism toward migrants. In addition, there are also growing preferences for immigration policy and prejudices toward these migrants across European-Union (EU) countries. For instance, there was a smaller attack towards these Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands (Jakobsson & Blom, 2014, p. 2) that could increase the local sentiments of anti-Muslim discrimination.
This case of terrorism is not a “usual” case that often targets random citizens but instead targets the ruling elites of democratic party representation. So, it can be considered different compared to other cases of terrorism. After the terrorist attacks, it consequently had a severe impact on ethnic-religious minority groups, particularly the Muslim community. The government, especially the Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, received praises from the media on how he responded and overcame the crisis (Jakobsson & Blom, 2014, p. 3). However, this response may only provide temporary relief among people. Jakobsson and Blom’s statistical findings on the Norwegian in response to the terror attacks shows that the attitudes of Norwegians toward immigrants are posit Norwegians conduct no repressive act. However, the terror was still able to increase the conservatism and scepticism toward immigrants. In addition, even though the government’s reactions brought positive sentiments among the people, the terror attacks still left a long-term impact on attitudes and voting behaviour within the society of Norway.

Significantly, there is growing public debate in the news media regarding the Muslim community as a threat to European society. The terror attacks by Breivik successfully changes the perception in the mainstream and online media toward minority groups. The media increases anti-Islamic criticism and some of them, who are considered anti-Muslim, feel as victims for not having voices in the mainstream media. They often use online platforms to continue delivering their messages about the growing fear of ‘Islamisation’ in Norway (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014, p. 436). This anti-Islamic digital movement has also been supported by the Progress Party and other anti-Islamic movements throughout the globe talking about the similar issue regarding the crisis in Norway (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014, p. 436). Therefore, it could actually exacerbate the tension between the ‘mainstream society’ and the people with ‘migration background’.

An article written by Mette Wiggen (2012) examined the situation in two cities of Norway a year after the terror attacks. Interestingly, there was a direct response to the tragedy from national and international media and academia. The attack was assumed to be the work of Muslim terrorist. Wiggen did a quick interview with the onlookers in the streets not far from the scene, and the onlookers immediately claimed that the assailant of the mass killing was surely from the Muslim community. Wiggen (2012, p. 586) informed that two hijab-ed girls in Oslo had been attacked verbally, and a young boy of Pakistani-Norwegian descent was thrown off public transport in the same area.
I argue that Breivik’s idea is prevalent within the mainstream society of Norway and in the rest of Europe. Additionally, regardless of their differences, mainstream political parties, the Progress Party (as the representative of the right-wing party) and the Labour Party (as the representative of the left-wing party), tend to condemn immigrant’s way of life. Therefore, the term populism is not limited to certain political parties. It can be both from the right-wing and left-wing political parties. However, the former seems to be the most xenophobic and anti-immigration party, although the latter is not significantly different (Wiggen, 2012, p. 586). Therefore, the attacks by Breivik are seen as attacking mainstream Norwegian values, openness, and democracy. The Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, surprisingly refused to point the finger at any political party. He only said how Norway had handled the tragedy and urged the citizens to protect Norwegian values of openness and democracy. But, Wiggen puts it,

“Norwegian love, tolerance, and understanding did not stretch to embrace one of Europe’s most persecuted groups, and politicians from all three governing parties were busy showing their support for the Norwegian public . . . “(Wiggen, 2012, p. 588).

Figure 1 Residents took part on flower-parade for commemorating the tragedy, four days after the attacks, reclaiming in the ‘city’ s public access in Oslo

The 22/7 attacks inevitably drive ethnic stigmatisation toward young immigrants and their descendants in the educational system. Katrine Fangen and Brit Lynnebakke (2014), provided interesting insight on how the government declares official statements calling for integration and tolerance toward immigrants and the people who have a
“migration background.” According to Fangen & Lynneblake (2014, p. 48), the Norway educational system is generally built upon hierarchies, which means the disciples are divided into two categories, namely, for those who have a good performance and those who do not, and also for those who get involved in particular social circles and those who do not. These categorisations are made to focus on the experiences of stigmatisation in the aftermath of the attacks by Breivik which might be associated with minority ethnic group prejudices (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 48).

These young immigrants have some coping strategies on how to deal with the stigmatisation. Male and female minority groups with “migration background” have different coping mechanisms when interacting with ethnic Norwegians. Female minority groups tend to avoid contact or withdraw from making conversation with the Norwegians to avoid being stigmatised (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 52). The male ones also take withdrawal mechanisms and frequently make conversation only with the same background.

However, when it comes to working harder, males and females from minority groups are treated differently by their teachers. Male Muslims are also not treated equally, especially when looking for employment. The young Muslims with “migration background” can only access certain employment opportunities. When they try to open another field of employment, they would strongly be rejected by the company (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 53). The female Muslims are much worse. They tend to be working harder and requiring something extra in order to gain equal opportunities as people from majority groups (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 53). Hence, female Muslims experience multiple discriminations, such as their religious identity as Muslims, gender, and also their “migration/immigrant background.” These cultural difference endorses the process of victimisation of immigrant women since Muslim women are usually seen as “problems of culture” taken from violence and male dominance in their own culture (Wiggen, 2012, pp. 586–587). Therefore, even though the majority often discriminates Muslim men, they still have more opportunities to access resources than Muslim women. From this case, we can see that religious identity, gender, and identity of migrants (as minority groups or ethnicities) have prominent roles in contributing to the interwoven aspects of discriminations, making Muslim female migrants often difficult to participate in public sphere (such as looking for employment).

Good illustration on how the Muslim community, especially women, faces multiple discrimination in looking for employment and jobs in European countries such as
Norway, has been written by Valentina Di Stasio and Edvard N. Larsen (2020) in their article about hiring discrimination in the European labour markets. Generally speaking, gender and race are the primary issues in everyday life. Basically, people considered as whites are the dominant groups in European societies. Nevertheless, there is discrimination between white men and women, and the latter tend to be discriminated against when it comes to looking for employment. Worse yet, people considered as the skin of colour, such as non-white women, would experience multiple discrimination based on their gender, race, ethnic and religious identities when looking for jobs in European labour markets (Di Stasio & Larsen, 2020, p. 233). For instance, Middle Easterner bringing Islamic background might be perceived as more threatening than Asian men in the employment context (Di Stasio & Larsen, 2020, p. 236). Therefore, intersectional approaches become a sharp analysis to study inequality, especially in Norway as one of the Nordic and European countries amid populism.

Racism towards people from the third-world, especially Muslims, is also prevalent daily in Norway. Bjoernaas (2015) gave vivid details of his experiences facing racist statements and discrimination from her friends in school until she worked in the office. She also told the story when she experienced living under politicians of the Progress Party who used to have plans to ban the veil in the public sphere (Bjoernaas, 2015, p. 83). In post-9/11, the ostensible oppression of Muslim women wearing the veil is more obvious. Siv Jensen, a leader of Progress Party, sees Muslim women as passive victims of men and religion (Bjoernaas, 2015, p. 87). She sees that Muslim women have been oppressed and subjugated by Muslim men and their own religion. Interestingly, Bjoernaas criticised that race, religion, and gender as having roles in oppressing Muslim women. In addition, Bjoernaas also told that her friends used to call her pakkis (Pakistani), jevla Muslim (fucking Muslim), and neger (nigger). It shows that Muslim women face multiple oppressions and discriminations. They have intersectionally been discriminated by interwoven aspects of gender, race, religion, and ethnicity for coming from the third-world. This depiction also finds that Muslim women had already faced discrimination in daily life prior to the tragedy of terror attacks and any other populist agenda.

There are still few scholars who do research on Muslim migrants coming from Southeast Asia. Interestingly, Southeast Asia has been the primary region heavily influenced by the Islamic mode of life. The countries in Southeast Asia also have significant contributions when it comes to discussing the Muslim community.
two nations considered Muslim majority nations in Southeast Asia, namely, Indonesia and Malaysia (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 1). In this era of globalisation, there is a term of ‘transnational’ Islamic movements meaning that the Islamic community at the transnational level incorporates with the local Muslim community in certain regions (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 254). Sometimes, it also brings about tension between the local Muslim community and the transnational movement. Even though, this kind of phenomenon can also be considered the process of democratisation of Islamic politics (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 255). This process is also the reason behind the emergence of fear among European countries, such as Norway, when looking at the expansion of Islamic movements in political activities.

Approximately 87.2 per cent of the Indonesian population are Muslims (Hefner, 2017, p. 91). Around thousands of them are emigrants and live in Norway, mainly in urban areas such as Oslo (Armenia, 2020). Few social researchers discuss the topic of immigrants coming from Asia, especially Southeast Asia where the Muslim community continues to bloom exponentially. Southeast Asian countries have a lot of Muslim communities with varied historical backgrounds, especially Indonesia, which is considered a country with a long history of dealing with diverse communities. However, there are countries with the Muslim community as a minority group, such as the Philippines, Myanmar, and Thailand (Miichi & Farouk 2015, pp. 1, 145), but generally, Muslim communities spread evenly in the Southeast Asia region.

The difference between Muslims from the Middle East and Southeast Asian countries is on their understanding of Islamic teachings. The first is usually considered ‘radical’ as they adhere to their religion strictly. The latter is considered syncretic since Islamic teachings in the region have blended with various ideas of beliefs surrounding it. Muslims of Southeast Asia can also be considered as ‘moderate’ in which the word ‘moderate’ is usually a label in opposition to terrorism or ‘radical’ (Van Es, 2021, p. 174). Therefore, Muslims of Southeast Asia are more adaptable to the current situation. Nevertheless, migrants coming from Southeast Asia still face discrimination like those from the Middle East.

One of the articles written by Levi Geir Eidhamar (2018) about comparison between Muslim-majority Indonesia and minority group of Muslim living in Norway showed that there is a difference in how Muslim men treat their own wives. Interestingly, when it comes to wife-beating attitudes, Indonesia and Norway have a similar term of barada, which means doing ‘physical discipline’ to women/wives (Eidhamar, 2018, p.
This term seems common among mainstream Muslims whether in Indonesia or Norway. In dealing with the authority and the patriarchal structures, most of the Indonesian women interviewed by him said that they opposed the idea of patriarchal Islamic structure. However, they considered themselves as cultural Muslims without following several principles of patriarchal doctrines. From this article, I argue that the Muslims in the two different countries still hold the same meaning of patriarchal structure. However, the difference is that in Norway, the Islamic norms frequently promote gender equality and fight against wife-beating. Nevertheless, it still shows that Muslims in both countries is deeply grounded in male dominance.

Di Stasio et al. (2021) examined the discrimination towards minority group of Muslims when looking for employment in the aftermath of 22/7 tragedy. Muslim community is considered to be in the marginal position in the mainstream society of Norway. In their study, (Di Stasio et al., 2021, p. 1306, 1318) tested the economic aspect of Muslim migrants coming from diverse countries, including Indonesia, in which these migrants try to apply for jobs in Norway. Their paper expected to reveal religious, racial, and gender discrimination experienced by the Muslim migrants when applying for jobs. For instance, the people considered as White-Muslim have a bigger chance in employment than Muslim women from Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and Africa. They mostly have a severe impact of unemployment (Di Stasio et al., 2021, p. 1308). In short, these Muslim migrants have multiple discrimination (Muslim, skin of colour, and gender). Therefore, Indonesian Muslim migrants with the rest of the Muslim communities from other countries living in Norway are now facing the same severe discrimination when applying for jobs in this situation of populism in Norway.

Adapting to this situation of populism often voiced by Progress Party (Bjoernaas, 2015), Muslims did not just stay silent. They held a public protest on August 25th, 2014 regarding the Norwegian history against the acts of terrorism and human rights violations committed on behalf of Islam (Van Es, 2021, p. 170). Van Es showed how Norwegian Muslims, regardless of their ‘migration background’ or assimilation, want to express their feelings of being marginalised by the authority. Van Es (2021, p. 171) focused on both protests, namely, the protest march against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and the ‘Ring of Peace’ around the synagogue of Oslo. Interestingly, the protests involved both Muslims and non-Muslims. As a Dutch Muslim, van Es also participated in the protests fighting for ‘good citizenship’ for Muslims in European countries. Muslim community
needs to be ‘moderate’ when it comes to Islam practices, so they can be accepted by ‘Norwegian’ values, such as gender equality, democracy, and respect for fundamental human rights (Van Es, 2021, p. 174)

In the aftermath of 22/7 terror attack, the protests would certainly empower the minority groups to have courage in expressing their feelings toward unequal treatments when generally living in European countries. They have to show their identity of Islam as a religion, putting humanity first above everything. By protesting against extremist Muslims, it is clear that not all Muslims support such violence (Van Es, 2021, p. 170). Besides, protests could also be seen as their limited participation in the public sphere. In addition, an article from The Guardian written by Bangstad (2019) entitled, “Norway is in denial about the threat of far-right violence”, showed the institutional failure associated with the atrocity, and also the director of far-right Oslo-based Human Rights Service (HRS), Hege Storhaug, allegedly pushed analogies between Islam and Nazism and the spread of conspiracy theories of “Eurabia.” In 2019, there was also the following attack by Phillip Manshaus (inspired by Breivik) targeting mosque in Bærum (Brandvold, 2019; U. S. Department of State, 2021). It made Islamic community feel even more disappointed toward the government. Hence, adapting to this situation is more likely to be challenging for Muslims to have a better bargaining position of power to gain equal treatment as citizens. However, after these subsequent tragedies targeting Islamic groups, orchestrating hatred for years, it could also open up the possibility of the Norwegian government getting the message for the voters in the future.

**CONCLUSION**

Migration concerns people who move to other places and all the problems that come with it as well. Migrants from the Global South migrate to developed countries such as Norway to find better living conditions. They used to be seen as ‘second class citizen’. However, now, they seem to be able to compete with local people or natives in terms of participating in the public space (employment) and political activities. It makes the locals feel threatened when their life has to change with the migrants. Political elites exploit the state of affairs with their populist agenda to gain votes. Discrimination against the migrants by the right-wing political parties of Norway is considered successful.

Moreover, the discrimination has been exacerbated in the aftermath of the terror attacks. Those who are considered minority groups of Muslim face multiple discrimination in public schools and apply for employment in Norway. The intersectional
approach is useful to see the interwoven aspects of class, identity, religion, nationality, gender, and ethnicity of marginalised communities. In the aftermath of the terror attacks, migrants from Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, also face multiple discrimination, certainly when they apply for jobs or employment. Carrying out protests in the public sphere to adapt to the atmosphere of populism can also mean that they fight for ‘good citizenship’ in Norway. They also seem to be neglected by the government since the government has to manage its own political interest in the multicultural society. This kind of situation happens quite commonly in the era of populism emerging in many countries targeting minority groups as political manoeuvres in order to gain support among mainstream society.

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**Note:**

1 Global North is the area or region that includes around North America, West Europe, and East Asia. Conversely, the Global South is considered to be the area of many developing countries or post-colonial countries.

2 Headscarf or veil worn by Muslim women.