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Cover Page Footnote

The authors of this study would like to thank Litbang Kompas for providing data on the April 2021, October 2021 and January 2022 National Leadership Surveys to be processed and utilized for research purposes.

Understanding the Role of Social Media Toward Satisfaction of Government in Indonesia

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Abstract

Along with the massive internet penetration, the number of social media users in Indonesia increases significantly during this half decade. Besides being used as a medium to communicate, social media also plays a role as a source of information consumed by the public. This poses a dilemma. On the one hand, information becomes decentralized. But on the other hand, there is no verification mechanism for information in the social media space. The loss of this check and clarification process makes it easy for hoaxes, disinformation and misinformation to spread through social media, including those related to government performance as well as public policy issues. Previous studies have shown how social media impacted public's perceptions toward the government across several countries both with positive and negative effects. Thus, this study aims to answer the relationship between the use of social media as a source of information of the public and their satisfaction with the government's performance through polls that were conducted 3 times during the period of 2021-2022 across Indonesia. The polls show various results which explain the different impacts of social media consumption toward people's satisfaction with the government based on time frame and political partisanship.

Introduction

Trust in the government is a crucial indicator for understanding the dynamics of politics and government. A high level of trust can give governments more legitimacy and freedom to make policies effectively. Bauer and Fatke (2014) suggest that with high trust, governments can be more successful as they have broad freedom and space to make policies freely and effectively.

The issue of trust in government has received significant attention from both practitioners and academics. Several studies, including Dalton (1999), Klingemann (1999), Hetherington (2005), Hetherington & Rudolph (2008), Rudolph & Evans (2005), Khan (2016), and Porumbescu (2017), have observed a downward trend in public trust against government, particularly in the US, over the last two decades.

However, the study by van de Walle et al. (2008) and Rauh (2021) found that declining trust in government in several countries was only a fluctuation, not a prolonged trend. Rauh (2021) also discovered that instead of experiencing a downward trend, trust in the government in the US and OECD member countries has already

reached a fairly low point over the past two decades. Thus, it can be concluded that trust in the government is one of the political problems faced by various countries. In Indonesia, the symptoms of this decline in trust have started to emerge. Despite the slight decline in trust from 69.5 percent to 63.5 percent during the period April 2021 to June 2022, the trend of trust in the government in Indonesia is still relatively stable, ranging from 63-70 percent.

The level of public trust in the government is influenced by several factors, with media consumption being one of them. Research on the impact of media exposure on attitudes toward politics and government dates back to the 1960s, when Lang & Lang (1966) found a negative relationship between media consumption and political attitudes. This led to the development of the media malaise theory, with Robinson (1976) and Bennett et al. (1999) positing that media consumption (such as newspapers and TV) has a negative effect on audience attitudes toward politics. However, another body of theories emerged in the early 2000s arguing that the media can actually increase trust in the government, particularly in the long run.

The effect of the media on politics is increasingly relevant for a more in-depth review along with the development of communication technology and new media. Currently, technology has opened up digital space as a space that cannot be separated from people's lives. Until 2019, it is predicted that 49 percent or around 3.5 billion of the world's population will use the internet. This figure is an increase of about 9 times compared to 2000 where there were only around 400 million internet users worldwide (Our World in Data, 2015). A similar trend can also be seen in the use of social media. In 2008, the average users on each social media platform ranged from 2 – 250 million. This number has skyrocketed to over 2.3 billion users in 2019 (Our World in Data, 2015).

Such a phenomenon also appears in Indonesia, where the level of Internet penetration continues to increase. By 2021, there are around 201 million people, equivalent to 74 percent of the population, who are already connected to the internet. This figure is predicted to increase up to 239 million in 2025 (Nurhayati-Wolff, 2022). Of this number, most of the internet users in Indonesia are also social media users. By February 2022, it is estimated that there are more than 191 million people or equivalent to 68.9 percent of the population using social media in Indonesia. This figure is a significant increase compared to 2021. The previous year, the number of social media users in Indonesia was in the range of 170 million people. Thus, there was an increase in social media users in Indonesia as many as 21 million people for a year. In terms of behavior, most Indonesians use social media for the purpose of socializing with relatives and family, which is about 58 percent of the total users, and the other 57,5 percent use social media to fill their spare time.

Moreover, Indonesians also use social media to find information. Around 50.1 percent of Indonesians use social media to find information about what is currently being discussed. Meanwhile, almost 45 percent of users in Indonesia use social media to read news. Not only that, but there are also about 33 percent of users who use social media to express their opinions to the public. This means that social media in Indonesia can be a channel used by the public as a source of information (We Are Social, 2022). This can create a dilemma. On the one hand, information decentralization occurs where the flow of information is no longer controlled by a handful of elites. On the other hand, social media are filled with contents that are not moderated and can be easily exploited by dangerous people including criminals and extremist groups to launch their actions in Indonesia.

This phenomenon also occurs in several other countries. Studies from MacKinnon (2013), Rane & Salem (2012), Lee et al. (2015), Tufekci (2021), show that the internet has become a political space. In this space, the interests of the state and the public

interest compete for power. Just like in the offline world, the governments are also trying to create order in the digital world. There are efforts by the government to supervise and control the flow of information that crosses its national borders (Maréchal, 2018). The influence of the development of information and communication technology (ICT), especially social media, on political dynamics has been widely agreed (Wijermars & Lokot, 2022). However, social media is also seen as an instrument that is operationalized as a space where dissatisfaction and political participation occur (van Dijk & Poell, 2015) as well as a tool that can be used by the public to mobilize when fighting against authoritarian governments (Valenzuela 2013; Skoric et al. 2016). Research from Oates (2013) and Pearce et al. (2012) show that the development of information and communication technology plays an important role in the activism movement. Studies from Goldstein (2007) and Enikolopov et al. (2020), specifically discover how ICT plays a role in large-scale protests.

Until now, the effect of social media exposure on satisfaction with the government is still in debate. On the one hand, social media is seen as a space that can be used to increase people's political participation (Kirkpatrick, 2011) and can be used to increase government transparency (Song & Lee, 2015) which leads to increased public satisfaction with the government (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Meanwhile, on the other hand, social media can also trigger and sharpen dissatisfaction with government performance (Zhuravskaya et al., 2020). Therefore, the intensity of the use or exposure of social media in the community is proven to have a positive or negative impact. No doubt, this study agrees with the view that social media cannot be seen as something rigid nor linear. In contrast with the traditional media, social media should not be seen as something that has a certain, uniform agenda. Rather, social media is a space that can be used by various sources to bring news (Zhang & Guo, 2019).

In Indonesia, studies on the effect of social media exposure on satisfaction with the government have not received sufficient attention. Several studies try to see how social media is exploited by political elites or governments. One of the examples is a study from Susanto (2017) which uses Robert Putnam's concept of political stratification that shows how social media is used by political elites or proximate decision makers in Indonesia. Another study created by Hamdani (2020) found that social media is also used by people in Indonesia to participate in guarding and participating in major state agendas such as the State Capital (IKN) project. Although, it has minimal influence on decision-making processes at the elite level. At a more local level, several studies such as those conducted by Hikmat (2018) and Anggreani (2020) show how social media is used by local governments to increase public engagement and enhance a positive image in the eyes of the public. Even so, there has been no research that attempts to answer how the influence of the use of social media on perceptions and levels of public satisfaction on government's performance.

Thus, this study seeks to try to answer the question of how the frequency of the use of social media by the community affects their satisfaction with the performance of the governments of Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin in 2020 and 2021. To answer this question, this study will exploit the results of the Kompas National Survey (SNK) conducted by Kompas Daily's Research and Development (Litbang Kompas) for three time periods, namely April 2021, October 2021 and January 2022. In general, this periodic survey aims to measure the level of public satisfaction with the government's performance and the electability of parties as well as presidential and vice-presidential candidates' electability.

The level of satisfaction with the government's performance is measured in several areas such as satisfaction in the economic, political, social and law enforcement fields. For the purposes of this research, Litbang Kompas has given permission to utilize several data such as the frequency of social media use by citizens and the level of

satisfaction with government performance. Furthermore, this study will see the relationship or correlation between the frequency of social media use and public satisfaction with government performance. As stated, this research was not carried out at the request or pressure of any parties. This research is also not part of the Kompas Daily media news agenda. Apart from allowing the use of SNK data, Kompas Daily did not provide any form of sponsorship for this research.

Due to the lack of related studies, this research can help fill in the gaps in studies related to the influence of frequency and exposure to social media on people's perceptions and satisfaction with the government. It is hoped that this research can trigger similar studies, especially in the context of the Indonesian social and political situation. Academically, this research can contribute to the discourse related to the effects of social media on people's attitudes toward the government. Several previous studies have shown that media consumption does influence people's political attitudes (Stromback, 2010; Shen & Guo, 2013; Porembescu, 2013; Moeller & de Vresse, 2013; Im et al., 2014; Curran et al, 2014; Ceron. 2015; Chen, 2017; Coffe, 2017; Ejaz, 2018; Chang, 2018; Müller & Wüest, 2018; Klein & Robison, 2020; Erchevarria & Mani, 2020; Cheng, 2020; Akinola, 2022; Xu & Ye, 2022).

Over the past decade, various studies have examined the relationship between media consumption and people's political attitudes, particularly in terms of trust in the government. While some studies contradict the Media Malaise theory, others support it. For example, Stromback (2010), Porembescu (2013), Curran et al. (2014), Coffe (2017), Kuncoro (2018), Klein & Robison (2020), Zhuravskaya (2020), Erchevarria & Mani (2020), and Cheng (2020) found that media consumption has a positive relationship with political satisfaction, satisfaction with the government, or trust in the government, which aligns with the Virtuous Circle theory. However, studies by Shen & Guo (2013), Moeller & de Vreese (2013), Im et al. (2014), Chen (2017), Chang (2018), and Müller & Wüest (2019) support the Media Malaise theory. These conflicting results indicate that the media's effect on political attitudes, including trust in the government, is not yet conclusive, and more attention is needed in this area. It is important to note that politics is increasingly mediated by new media, which has changed the interaction and relationship between the government and society. Therefore, this research contributes to the discourse related to the effects of social media on people's attitudes toward the government. Not only that, this research is also intended for practitioners engaged in communication and public and government policies so that it can be taken into consideration in formulating political communication policies.

Literature Review

To determine the effect of social media exposure on satisfaction with the government, this study will explain several concepts. The concept that will be discussed in this section is related to social media use and how it can influence domestic political dynamics.

Social Media and Its Influence on Political Dynamic

The idea that media can have negative effects on political involvement began to surface after World War II. Lazarsfeld and Merton's article in 1948 showed that the media's constant stream of information caused political disengagement and apathy. Kurt and Lang (1959) later added to this by stating that media consumption, especially television, resulted in passive political participation. Lang and Lang (1966) conducted a study on news consumption in the US and found a link between it and disillusionment with politics and its institutions. This research was then followed up by Weaver (1972), who found that television news coverage encouraged

disengagement, cynicism, and rejection of state political institutions. These findings suggest that media can have a negative impact on political attitudes and participation, and this has been a topic of ongoing research and debate in the field.

The "videomalaise" theory was introduced by Robinson, which suggests that people are increasingly becoming politically cynical in the US, with a decline in trust in political institutions and a rise in trust in television as a source of political information. Due to the negative nature of political programming, high trust in television is believed to cause political malaise in society. Studies by Galtung & Ruge (1965) and Bennet et al. (2007) confirm the high value of negative media coverage. Furthermore, research by Keplinger (1998) and Moeller and de Vreese (2013) indicates that audiences are more interested in political news with a negative tone. Benett et al. (1999) also proposed the theory of "media malaise," which explains the negative influence of the media on political attitudes in society across all types of media, not just TV. The media's negative effect on politics is a cause for concern as it can lead to disappointment and disengagement from politics.

Despite its importance, and how it has been studied and developed for decades, studies related to media effects in the context of video malaise (or media malaise) have yet to produce definitive results. In fact, this theory of video malaise/media malaise does not yet have a single conceptualization (Saito, 2008). In other words, Norris (2000) states that video malaise/media malaise does not offer a single concept, but rather a literature containing multiple perspectives.

In recent years, the arguments offered by this body of theory have been utilized in understanding the possible political effects of new media. The thesis of the negative effects of media consumption is also found along with the development of internet technology and social media. The proof, in the last ten years, this assumption of media malaise has been confirmed by empirical data. In a broader context, Chang (2018) finds that consumption of information from traditional and digital media is negatively associated with satisfaction with democracy. This negative effect is even stronger in the consumption of information from the internet. A more specific effect of media malaise, leading to trust in the government, was also found.

One of these effects can be seen from a study conducted by Im, et al. (2014) showed that internet use has a negative relationship with the level of trust in the government. Beside Im et al., Ceron (2015) also found that information obtained from social media makes individuals tend to have lower trust in political institutions. Similar results were also obtained by Xu & Ye (2022) who found that the use of social media has a negative association with the level of trust in the government. Interestingly, the effects of this media malaise can be found at every level of government, both at the central level (Im, et al., 2014) and at the regional level (Xu & Ye, 2022).

Zhang and Guo (2019) argue that the use of the internet which provokes a critical evaluation of government performance in countries with democratic institutions will tend to increase people's satisfaction with the government. Meanwhile, the opposite occurs in countries with government institutions with weak or authoritarian democracy. Low government satisfaction and its relationship with internet use can be seen from several studies in China (Hu & Zhuang, 2017; Lu & Quan, 2015).

On the other hand, there is also a group of scientists who try to refute the building of arguments from the videomalaise/media malaise theory. Several studies, such as those issued by Norris (2000), Holtz-Bacha & Norris (2001), Aarts & Semetko (2003), and Aarts et al (2012) argued that exposure to news coverage in the media has a positive effect on people's political attitudes. The body of political mobilization theory, or what is also known as the virtuous circle theory, argues that the impact of media exposure in the form of political cynicism or alienation cannot be seen as a general effect. In his work, Norris (2000) shows that there is a mutually reinforcing

relationship between media consumption and political engagement, where media consumption drives political engagement and political engagement drives media consumption. This is why media effects on political attitudes in Norris' view (2000) are circular.

Although contradictory, the theory of video malaise/media malaise and virtuous circle both can explain how the media can influence the political attitudes of society. One argument that supports the existence of this media effect is that the media becomes an agent in the political socialization of society (Moeller & De Vreese, 2013). There is still debate over the positive or negative effects of the media, making research related to media effects, especially in the context of new media, the internet and social media, still relevant to do.

Satisfaction Toward the Government

People's attitude toward the government is one indicator that can be used to understand how successful and how legitimate a government regime is (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003). Bouckaert and Van de Walle (2003) also argue that satisfaction with the government is a more direct and objective indicator to assess how well the government is compared to other, more abstract assessment constructs. On one hand, when people view the government positively, they will be more interested in political information and will be more involved in politics (Mishler & Rose, 2005). On the other hand, a bad perception of the government will encourage indifference and will result in pressures on the government and demand for a regime change (Harmel & Robertson, 1986). The attitude of the people toward government has been evaluated through various measurement methods. This study will look at satisfaction with government performance in its most general sense, namely the extent to which government work and the results of domestic political dynamics have met people's expectations (Bailard, 2014; Warren, 1999).

Predictive factors of satisfaction with government performance can be seen from several aspects. Previous research has shown that government openness and transparency can accurately predict how satisfied people are with the government (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). At the individual level, demographics and political orientation have also been shown to affect satisfaction with government jobs (Cook & Gronke, 2005; Turiel, Cunningham, & Saich, 2019). Furthermore, the consumption of news also turns out to be one of the crucial predictors of the level of public satisfaction with the government. This is because, based on the opinion of Louw (2005), when people do not have direct political experience, second-hand information obtained from the media appears as the main source that ultimately determines their political attitude. Even so, there is a difference in the effect of media exposure with satisfaction with the government. In democratic countries, where the media hold the watchdog role, media consumption tends to have a negative impact on people's satisfaction with the government (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Robinson, 1976). The opposite happens in authoritative governments. A study by Hu and Zhuang (2017) shows that the consumption of print media, which is mostly controlled by the government, shows an increase in satisfaction with the government.

No doubt, nowadays, the use of the internet can also increase people's satisfaction and dissatisfaction toward the government. Zhang and Guo (2019) argue that the use of the internet, which provokes a critical evaluation of government performance, in countries with democratic institutions tends to increase people's satisfaction with the government. Meanwhile, the opposite happens in countries with government institutions with weak democracy or authoritarian regimes. The low level of government satisfaction and its relationship with internet use can be seen from several studies in China (Hu & Zhuang, 2017; Lu & Quan, 2015). This is also

confirmed by research from Curtice & Norris (2004) that found internet users in the UK tend to have higher levels of trust and confidence in government. Meanwhile, the opposite finding occurred in South Korea and European Union countries (Ceron, 2015; Im et al., 2014).

With regards to these literature backgrounds and the research question, this research has a hypothesis which is:

- H1: The frequency of using social media has a negative/positive correlation with the level of trust in the government.

Research Methodology

To examine the political effects of the media, several previous studies provide examples of two approaches. The first approach is to conduct a content analysis of the media and relate it to survey data containing measures of media exposure and political discontent (Miller et al., 1979; Luengo & Maurer, 2009). The second approach is to directly look at the effect of media exposure on political discontent (Luengo & Maurer, 2009). To obtain richer data, several studies have tried to see the effect of these two variables and compared the results of several countries based on journalistic culture (Cohen et al., 1996; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004) or political system (Rossler, 2004).

This study uses quantitative research methods. In short, quantitative research refers to a research strategy that focuses on quantifying the process of data collection and analysis. This research has a deductive approach with an emphasis on testing theories or concepts that previously existed (Alan, 2012). The data used in this study were taken through the collection of public opinion which was carried out by a face-to-face interview process. This study uses data from the National Leadership Survey conducted by Litbang Kompas periodically. In general, this survey was conducted by Litbang Kompas to measure people's satisfaction with the government's performance and to find out the map of domestic politics in Indonesia.

The data used is the result of the National Leadership Survey conducted by Litbang Kompas which was organized on 13-26 April 2021, 26 September – 9 October 2021 and 17-30 January 2022. For each survey, there are 1,200 respondents that are randomly selected using a stratified systematic sampling method in 34 provinces of Indonesia. Using this method, at the 95 percent confidence level, the study margin of error is ± 2.8 percent under conditions of simple random sampling. However, errors outside the sample selection are possible (RFC, 2021; RFC, 2022). This study seeks to see the relationship between the frequency of social media use and satisfaction with the government. So, this study will only use these two variables and also variables related to the identity of the respondents such as socioeconomic level, age, education, social media preferences and political preferences. Variable frequency of use of social media is taken by asking how often respondents use social media on a daily basis. Meanwhile, the level of satisfaction is the answer to how satisfied or dissatisfied respondents are with the performance of Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin's reign during 2020 and 2021.

Furthermore, the data obtained from this face-to-face survey method will be analyzed using Spearman correlation analysis. Spearman rank correlation analysis is one of the oldest and widely used methods in analyzing non-parametric data (Zar, 1972). Spearman correlation analysis was chosen because the type of data that is analyzed is ordinal data. This correlation data will then be interpreted with concepts that have been used previously in understanding the influence of social media on people's satisfaction with the government.

Table 1. Validity test result

Satisfaction Aspects	Sig.	Correlation Coefficient
Politics	.000	.511
Law Enforcement	.000	.470
Economy	.000	.580
Social Welfare	.000	.539

Table 2. Individual’s frequency in accessing/opening/reading social media¹

Frequency	April 2021	October 2021	Januari 2022
Never, very rarely, less than once in a day	24.1%	33.4%	27%
Rarely (once in a day)	23.6%	19.3%	19.5%
Often (2-5 times in a day)	30.9%	26.6%	29.8%
Always (almost every hour)	21.5%	20.7%	23.7%

Table 3. Level of satisfaction toward Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin governance²

Level of Satisfaction	April 2021	October 2021	Januari 2022
Very Not Satisfied	2.9%	4.1%	3.8%
Not Satisfied	30.2%	32.6%	28.6%
Satisfied	59.3%	58.6%	57.5%
Very Satisfied	7.6%	4.7%	10.1%

^{1,2} Source: *Survei Kepemimpinan Nasional Litbang Kompas*

Results

Firstly, to ensure the quality of the data, validity and reliability tests are conducted. The result of validity test using Spearman Rho correlation is listed in Table 1. The reliability test was conducted using Cronbach’s Alpha with 0.721 coefficient value. Based on the validity and reliability test, it can be concluded that the data that is analyzed is valid and reliable.

Next, this section of the results will show the level of frequency of social media use and the level of public satisfaction with government performance in each period of the survey. The results of the frequency of social media use and the level of satisfaction with the government are detailed in Table 2 and Table 3. In general, the results of the survey show that most Indonesians use social media (e.g. Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, Tiktok, YouTube) quite often in their daily lives. Around 26,6 percent – 30,9 percent of the respondents admitted that they use social media or use social media 2-5 times a day. In fact, about 21.5 percent to 23.7 percent of the respondents admitted to always (almost every hour) on social media.

In terms of the level of satisfaction with the performance of the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin government, most of the Indonesian people said they were satisfied. The level of satisfaction ranges from 66,9 percent to 67,6 percent with the highest level of satisfaction being in the 3rd survey period. Meanwhile, the level of dissatisfaction is at its highest point during the 2nd survey period, or in October 2021.

Table 4. Spearman rank correlation of the frequency of using social media with the level of satisfaction toward government performance

Spearman rho	April 2021	October 2021	January 2022
Correlation Coefficient	.024	-.109	.047
Sig. (2-tailed)	.509	.000	.098

Furthermore, this section of the study will show the correlation between the frequency of social media use and the level of satisfaction with the performance of the Joko Widodo – Ma'ruf Amin government. The results of the Spearman Rank Correlation from the three surveys are listed in Table 4.

From the results above, it is known that the frequency of social media use and the level of satisfaction with government performance are strongly correlated during the second survey period. Meanwhile, the opposite conclusion was found in the first and third survey periods. The strong correlation of the two variables tested during the second survey was also strengthened by a high level of significance below the .001 level.

After looking at the bivariate correlation in general, this study also seeks to see the correlation between the frequency of the use of social media and the level of satisfaction with the government's performance based on several categories of population such as age, last education, socioeconomic class, political preferences (sympathizers of Joko Widodo or non-sympathizers of Joko Widodo), and what social media are most trusted. The results of the correlation of these two variables with consideration of the various categories are listed in Table 5 to Table 10.

In terms of age category, a fairly strong correlation only appears in the age category of 24 to 40 years during the first survey period. Meanwhile, the same thing did not happen in any age category in the second and third surveys.

In terms of education level, the relatively high correlation rate is at the elementary and secondary education levels in October 2021 and at the secondary education level in January 2022. This shows that the correlation between the two variables tends to be weak for individuals who receive higher education. Those who fall into the category of having received higher education are those who have at least completed diploma or undergraduate studies.

In terms of economic clusters, the relatively high correlation figures are in the lower and lower middle economic clusters in April 2021, in the lower, upper and upper middle economic clusters in October 2021 and in the middle and upper middle economic clusters during the third measurement period in October 2021. January 2022. This shows that the correlation level is relatively higher in the upper economic cluster compared to the lower one.

In terms of political alignments, it can be seen that the correlation between the frequency of the use of social media and the level of satisfaction with the government is quite high for Prabowo sympathizers, those who chose the Prabowo Subianto - Sandiaga in the 2019 Election, sympathizers of Joko Widodo and Prabowo, or those who claim not to vote (Abstain) in the 2019 Election, during the measurement period of April 2021 and January 2022. Meanwhile, the correlation between the two variables that appears to be strong in October 2021 is only found in groups of people who identify as Prabowo's sympathizers.

Based on the level of satisfaction towards the government, this study found that the correlation between the frequency of social media use with the people's satisfaction is not necessarily strong. High correlation between the two variables only found in October 2021's survey, specifically within the group of people who are satisfied with

the government's performance.

Table 5. The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction with government performance by age category

Time	≤ 23	24–40	41–60
April 2021	-.023	.124	-.034
October 2021	-.054	-.058	-.070
January 2022	.025	.005	.022

Table 6. The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction with government performance by last education

Time	Elementary	Secondary	Higher
October 2021	-.071	-.095	-.037
January 2022	.021	.071	-.021

Table 7. The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction with government performance by socioeconomic class

Time	Lower	Lower Middle	Upper Middle	Upper
April 2021	.181	-.131	.025	-.212
October 2021	-.159	-.011	-.232	-.413
January 2022	-.020	.054	.225	-.198

Table 8. The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction with government performance by socioeconomic class

Time	Joko Widodo sympathizers	Prabowo sympathizers	Abstain
April 2021	.016	.115	-.395
October 2021	-.016	-.104	-.002
January 2022	.022	.109	-.251

Table 9. The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction with government performance by satisfaction towards the government

Time	Satisfied	Not Satisfied
April 2021	.035	-.006
October 2021	-.104	-.061
January 2022	-.052	.054

Table 10. The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient on the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction with government performance by social media preferences

Time	Facebook	WhatsApp	Instagram	Twitter	YouTube
April 2021	-.057	.023	-.059	.207	-.030
October 2021	.075	-.108	-.120	-.182	-.074
January 2022	.017	.043	-.075	.104	-.014

Lastly, this study also looks at the level of correlation between the frequency of social media use and the social media platforms that are most frequently accessed and with the most trusted quality of information. The results in Table 10 indicate that the frequency of social media use with the level of satisfaction of the government has the highest correlation in twitter. Instagram has a fairly high correlation rate in the October 2021 and January 2022 surveys. Furthermore, WhatsApp has a fairly high correlation level in the October 2021 measurement period, so does Facebook and Youtube.

Discussion

The question of how the internet, and this includes social media, influences the public's mind has been one of the biggest questions in communication studies for the past two decades (Neuman, 1996). Previous studies have shown inconsistent results on how social media exposure can affect satisfaction with government (Hu & Zhuang, 2017; Lu & Quan, 2015; Curtice & Norris, 2004). In accordance, the results of this study also show quite inconsistent results regarding the effect of the frequency of social media use on the level of satisfaction with government performance.

From the results of the Spearman rank correlation measurement, it can be concluded that the three hypotheses from this study were met at different measurement times and in different categories of respondents. H0 can be fulfilled in the age category 24-40 years in the April 2021 survey, the lower economic cluster community in the April 2021 survey, Prabowo sympathizers in the April 2021 and January 2021 survey and Twitter social media users in the April 2021 and January 2022 survey. Furthermore, H1 is fulfilled in secondary education in the October 2021 survey, the lower cluster community in the October 2021 survey, the non-voting community in the April 2021 and January 2022 survey, people who are satisfied with the government in October 2021 survey, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube users in October 2021, and Instagram users in the January 2022 measurement. Not only that, the results of the correlation between the variable intensity of social media use and the level of trust in the government in the October 2021 survey also shows a strong negative correlation.

Meanwhile, the condition of H1 is also met in the age category under 23 years in each survey, higher education in each survey, the age category 40-60 in each survey, Joko Widodo sympathizers in each survey, lower and lower-middle class people in the January survey. 2022, upper-middle class people in the April 2021 survey, Facebook users in the April 2021 and January 2022 survey, WhatsApp users in the April 2021 and January 2021 survey, Instagram users in the April 2021 and January 2022 survey and YouTube users in the April 2021 and January 2022 survey. In addition, the general level of correlation between the two variables in the April 2021 and January 2022 surveys also confirms the H1 of this study. This conclusion is obtained from the lack of a relationship between the level of use of social media and the political attitude of its users.

On the one hand, these findings might be in line with the concept of echo chamber

and filter bubble. This can be seen from respondents in the category of Joko Widodo sympathizers in the April 2021, October 2021 and January 2022 surveys. The frequency of social media exposure that does not affect the level of satisfaction with the government can be an indication that people in this group are only exposed to information or news that is in accordance with their beliefs and political alignments. Information or news that is not in line with the thoughts of these individuals either does not enter the homepage or timeline of their social media platforms or is simply ignored so that it does not have an impact on their political attitudes. Similar conclusions can also be seen from people in the higher education group. Social media exposure is in fact unable to change the political position of this group of people. This is a quite different finding from the previous study by Wollebæk et al. (2019) which shows that people who have received higher education are relatively unaffected by the echo chamber effect on social media. In addition, the algorithms of several social media may differ from one another so that their exposure has an impact on the political attitudes of different individuals. The results of this study indicate that the algorithm used by YouTube most likely has a relatively greater potential compared to other social media to trap its users in its own bubble.

On the other hand, the results of this study may also contradict the concept of echo chamber and filter bubble. First, the results of this study also confirm the findings of Dubois & Blank (2018) which saw that most previous studies could only explain the occurrence of the echo chamber phenomenon in only one social media channel. This means that this echo chamber cannot be generalized as something that must happen in every social media channel and may vary from one another. In this study, Twitter became the social media with the highest correlation rate compared to other social media. In the April 2021 and January 2022 surveys, the higher the frequency of an individual using Twitter, the more likely he is to have a positive level of satisfaction with government performance. Meanwhile, the opposite happened in the October 2021 measurement period. In a more general context, the data on October 2021's survey showed that higher frequency of social media use has a strong negative correlation towards people's satisfaction towards the government. This shows that the algorithm used on social media, especially Twitter, still allows information or news that is not in accordance with an individual's beliefs to enter his timeline so that it can bring changes to that individual's political attitude. The same can be seen on WhatsApp and Instagram in the October 2021 Survey.

The inconsistent findings of this research prove that in Indonesia, social media is not a space with a specific agenda or tendency in terms of politics, but a space where narratives compete for influence. This is in line with studies from Zhang & Guo (2019), Ceron & Memoli (2015) and Zhu et al. (2018). No doubt, the space to influence political perceptions and attitudes in Indonesia through social media is still wide and open to all parties, both opposition and pro-government groups.

In addition, this research also suspects some of the limitations that might influence the results of the analysis. One of them is the possibility of influence from external situations outside the social media realm. In a broader context, based on the results found, this study believes that the influence of social media exposure on the political attitudes of the Indonesian people is not in line with the simple law of cause and effect, but is influenced by social, political and economic situations outside the network. In the context of this research, in the October 2021 survey which showed that the intensity of social media use was negatively correlated with the level of satisfaction with the government both in general and by category of social media, it could have been influenced by the noisy political situation due to the KPK's move to dismiss 57 employees who did not qualify Tes Wawasan Kebangsaan (TWK). Thus, this study also encourages the existence of a similar study that aims to see the effect of exposure

to social media on people's political attitudes which also takes into account external factors.

Conclusion

Until now, there is still no general agreement regarding the influence of social media exposure on people's political behavior. There are two camps of conflicting thoughts. First, social media, with the effects of the echo chamber and filter bubble in it, can have a negative impact on the politics and democracy of a country because it can cause polarization, sharpen segmentation and cause divisions in society. However, the other side argues that social media can be a tool that encourages democratization, critical evaluation of the government as well as political discourse so as to increase public political participation. In addition, this camp also argues that the echo chamber effect is a sporadic finding that cannot be generalized to a general character of the social media ecosystem. In an attempt to participate in the debate, this study attempts to examine the effect of the intensity of social media use on the level of satisfaction with government performance. The results of this study tend to be inconsistent and closer to the second camp where social media is a space for narratives, both from government authorities and other sources, to compete for influence of the people's mind.

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