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The Dynamics of Military-Police Relations in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia (1998-2020)

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Abstract
Among myriad significant institutional changes in post-authoritarian Indonesia (1998-present) is the split of Indonesian police (POLRI) from the armed forces (ABRI, renamed into TNI after 1999). No longer locked in a dominant-subordinate configuration, the interaction between both institutions intensified in areas where they intersect. Drawing upon the theory of Strategic Action Field (SAF), this study attempts to capture the dynamics along the newly-established trajectory. It shall be argued that far from being one-dimensional, the relationship between both institutions has been marked by conflict, competition, and cooperation; depending on the SAF. Finally, this research proposes a new framework to assess the tendency of a particular TNI-POLRI interaction within a SAF by seeing the characteristics of the SAF itself, combined with the social skills of actors involved.

Keywords military-police relation, strategic action field, TNI, POLRI

INTRODUCTION

On July 13th, 2021, 700 new TNI and POLRI officers were inaugurated in the Presidential Palace. President Joko Widodo was present on the occasion, where he delivered a momentous speech. He urged both institutions to cooperate in order to tackle national defense and security issues, having admonished the strenuous history between them and the possibility of its recurrence.

At least three recognized studies have specifically discussed the relationship between TNI and POLRI, namely LIPI (2004), Jansens (2008), and Baker (2013). Several investigations also briefly mentioned the military or political history of Indonesia, including Jenkins (1983), Said (1987), Chrisnandi (2005), McGregor (2007), Aspinall & Fealy (2010), as well as Sebastian, Syailendra, and Marzuki (2018). This study will attempt to contribute to the discussion by proving the increasing dynamism
of the relationship between both institutions in the post-authoritarian era, first by building upon the argument that such development has been fueled by the continuity of strong military influence in the reform era (Haripin, 2019) as well as the expansion of POLRI’s capacity to influence contemporary social and political landscape in Indonesia (Sebastian, Syailendra, Marzuki, 2018). Trends in military and police relations in Indonesia between 1998 to 2020 in terms of direct and indirect cooperation, conflict, and competition will be provided.

Analysis of the relationship between police and military within states commonly adopt either one of two following paradigms. The first is structural approach, which primarily focuses on two subject matters: 1. Overlapping functional structure of the military and police (Jansens, 2008; Easton & Moelker, 2010; Campbell & Campbell, 2010; Dahlberg & Stevnsborg, 2021), and; 2. The antagonism between military and police in relation to external political economy structure (Cassman, 2002; LIPI, 2004; Weiss, 2011, Baker, 2013; McMichael, 2016; Yilmaz, 2020). Meanwhile, the second paradigm leans towards cultural approach, with a similarly dual focus on: 1) Direct and indirect influences of military culture—or militarization—to the formation of the police force (Enloe, 1978; Kraska, 2007; Madsen, 2020) or other institutions with a police function (Spencer, 2001; Bloemeborg, 2011); or 2) The influence of ethnic composition within and between both institutions (Duran, 1974; Gregory, 1976; Ahmad, 1981). Both prevailing paradigms are useful, yet contain flaws due to their analytic tendency to fixate on particular dimensions while ignoring the possible plurality of relations between military and police across different contexts. Therefore, in explaining the relationship between TNI and POLRI, this research will instead use the theory of the Strategic Action Field, which may better account for a variety of relations in different strategic fields.

As such, this research attempts to go beyond pre-existing studies which have been focusing on conflict regions (LIPI 2004) or non-conflict regions (Jansens, 2008), while highlighting national-level interactions and explaining various regional-level
cases to support the main argument. Moreover, considering the position of SAF as extension of field theory focused on conflictual framework by more concrete division of role between incumbent, challenger, and the governance unit in the strategic state and non-state field. (Fleigstein & McAdam 2016), Baker’s (2013) research was explored as well to account for business interests and evaluate all actors and the social networks pertaining to TNI and POLRI.

This article argues that noteworthy interactions between TNI and POLRI have been occurring in both state and non-state strategic action fields, involving low-ranking and high-ranking actors. But more importantly, these interactions have always been shaped by post-authoritarian democratization and decentralization following the 1998 political reforms. In turn, political and institutional changes allow pre-existing patterns to continuously mutate into forms that can be found in the post-reform period: integration, cooperation, competition, and finally, bloody clashes.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: STRATEGIC ACTION FIELD

To illustrate the sphere in which the TNI-POLRI relationship is negotiated, Strategic Action Field (SAF) is employed as the central concept of this study. In its simplest definition, SAFs can be seen as the elementary units of collective action in society. It is an object of meso-level analysis, which formation is dependent on several variables: interest (Fleigstein & McAdam, 2012:6), power (Goldstone & Useem, 2012:40), and the constantly changing degree of consensus and conflict (Klutz & Fleigstein, 2016).

Categorizations of SAFs can be formulated on the basis of their stability (settled/unsettled), or their institutional identity (state/non-state). However, it must be stressed that such categorizations exist only for analytical purposes, and do not imply definite borders between SAFs. Every SAF may intersect or overlap with other SAFs, depending on their proximity and their hierarchical position relative to each other. Within the context of this study, state SAFs consist of the parliament, the presidential office, ministries, or other state institutions. Non-state SAFs, on
the other hand, consist of political parties, mass organizations, or socio-political events (which, as in the case of momentary mass protests or social conflicts, may also fit the definition of unsettled SAFs).

Individuals that operate within SAFs are termed socially skilled actors (SSA), because their role requires them to find, articulate, and disseminate the right frame of action to another actor (Fleigstein & McAdam, 2012:7). Their understanding of the goal, relation, and rule in the field determines their interaction with collective actors.

METHOD

In line with theoretical considerations above, this research employs descriptive qualitative methods. Most of the data in this research are secondary data collected from news agencies, NGOs, and official reports from TNI, POLRI, and various state institutions. In-depth interviews were also conducted to gain further insights, with key informants: TB Hasanuddin, member of the parliament, Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission of DPR-RI; Agum Gumelar, Chairman of PEPABRI (association of retired military officers); and Sisno Adiwinoto, Senior Advisor for Chief of POLRI.

STUDY RESULTS

MILITARY DOMINATION OVER POLICE: REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR AND DESIRE FOR ORDER

The complex and complicated relationship between the Indonesian military and police can be traced back to the country’s independence in 1945. This complicated relationship has manifested in several periods at many state and non-state SAF, evidenced by changes in the national political structure from post-independence until democratization in the post-authoritarian era. Jenkins (1983) utilized five periods categorization to describe the evolution of the Indonesian military doctrine from 1945 to 1965,
which Said (1987) continued by classifying the military’s role in politics with a greater emphasis on the role and impact of political events from 1945 until post-1965. However, both investigations did not adequately discuss the dynamics between the military and police. Jenkins (1983:21) only referred to the appointment of Nasution as the Indonesian Security and Defence Minister who acted as the supervisor of the military, justice, police, and veterans in 1959. Likewise, Said (1987:26) only discussed the role of the local police chief as one of the elements of Muspida (Regional Leadership Assembly), in cooperation with the local military officer, district attorneys, regional court, and regents in the New Order Era. While both studies did not frame their inquiry in terms of military-police relations, they demonstrated the dominance of the military and the subordination of police forces in the state SAF of the New Order.

Following the independence of Indonesia in 1945, the police was not viewed as an autonomous professional body. Due to the aftermath of the revolution, namely myriad regional uprisings, Soekarno’s early reign incorporated the police into the armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI). In doctrinal sense, this can be seen in Presidential Decree No. 20/1964, which dictated the Indonesian Police to participate in national defense as a tool of the revolution in addition to their primary role in law enforcement. Presidential Decree No. 155/1965 further strengthened this configuration by requiring police cadets to undergo a year of training in the military academy of Magelang. Thus, the relationship between military and police of early Indonesia can be construed as a relationship of dominance and subordination; borne from the dynamics of national politics and state administration.

During the New Order, this dominant-subordinate structure between institutions was reinforced. In response to military fragmentation following the events of 1965, President Soeharto’s administration attempted to consolidate all four elements of the armed forces (the army, navy, airforce, and police) under the control of the Department of Defense and Security (McGregor,
2007). This effectively resulted in an institutionalized dominance of the military over the police. According to the Presidential Decree No. 132/1967, the Police Force integrated with three other armed forces under direct control of Commander-in-Chief of Indonesian Armed Forces who concurrently serve as Minister of Defence and security (Menhankam/Pangab). Through presidential Decree No. 52/1969, the name of Commander of Police Forces was changed to the Indonesian Police Chief. Meliala (2001) described this as the police being the military’s wing, itself a mere political instrument of The New Order.

To conclude, it can be said that the relationship between the military and the police had been unequal for more than half of Indonesia’s history. Contestation happened mainly in state SAFs; first regarding the conceptualization of national defense and security, followed by the institutionalization of this overarching concept. The New Order cemented the asymmetrical power relations by building upon the doctrinal elements that had been established in Soekarno’s era. Substantial changes only materialized after mass unrest and dissolution of The New Order in 1998, when abolition of ABRI Dual Function became one of the chief demands of reform proponents.

FROM VERTICAL TO HORIZONTAL RELATIONS: CONFLICTS IN EARLY SEPARATION (1998-2004)

In the colloquial Indonesian narrative, the period after 1998 including present time falls under the bracket of Reform Era (Era Reformasi). The following sections presents police-military relations within the first 20 years of Reformasi into several periods. The first period, which comprised the immediate years following the dissolution of the New Order between 1998 to 2004, was crucial for laying down the foundations for more recent patterns. The second period, between 2004 and 2014, was the ten years of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, while the third period was the administration of President Joko Widodo.
Following the 1998 reform, President Habibie issued Presidential Instruction No. 2/1999, which mandated the eventual separation between police and the armed forces. This mandate was subsequently strengthened through MPR Resolution No. VI/2000 and MPR Resolution No. VII/2000, both explicitly stating that the military and the police are separate. The second amendment of the 1945 constitution also established a strict division of roles for respective institutions: Indonesian Armed Forces are responsible for state defense, while the Police are in charge of national security and order. Later on, these preliminary changes were comprehensively codified into specific bills. POLRI is subject to Law No. 2/2002 and reports directly to the president; while ABRI, renamed to TNI, operates under Law No. 34/2004, within the authority of the Ministry of Defense.

As a result, both institutions gradually found themselves as equals in state hierarchy. This newly-established horizontal arrangement consequently altered the dynamics between them in both state and non-state SAFs. Nonetheless, there were several events that managed to momentarily invoke doubts to the efficacy of this horizontal relationship as a substitute of vertical command—particularly in the wake of violent communal conflicts in various regions during the Presidency of BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), and Megawati Soekarnoputri.

In the state SAF, a notable instance of TNI-POLRI interaction can be seen in the power struggle surrounding the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. At the time, the president’s relationship with POLRI decayed to the extent that Suroyo Bimantoro, then the chief of POLRI, was discharged from office. He was replaced by Chairuddin Ismail in an act that was certainly intended to affect POLRI’s bargaining position within the domestic political constellation. Consequently, when the country’s political turbulence culminated into a proposal to impeach Abdurrahman Wahid from presidency, POLRI’s faction in the parliament took the opportunity to unanimously support it—curiously, alongside TNI’s faction (Miertzner, 2006:31). Bimantoro would later be reappointed as Chief of Polri by Wahid’s successor, Megawati.
Soekarnoputri, just a month after the former President’s fall (Barton, 2002:362).

Interestingly, long after Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by MPR-RI (Republic of Indonesia People’s Consultative Assembly), retired Gen. Agum Gumelar commended the smooth and peaceful transition. It was an obvious reference to previous threats from the former to rally supporters who would willingly die for him in retaliation of the impeachment agenda (Feillard, 2002). However, if Gumelar’s position as the Chairman of PEPABRI (Association of Retired ABRI officers) who also participated in Wahid’s cabinet as the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security is taken into account, the statement may have indicated the solidarity between TNI and POLRI in supporting MPR-RI’s resolution. This may have served as an example of TNI-POLRI’s cooperation in state SAF.

Nevertheless, their interaction was not always harmonious, especially in regions where violent conflict was present—be it between communities or between state actors and communities (Bhakti, 2004; Yantuari, 2004; Nurhasim, 2004; Bhasar, 2004). First of all, contestation over the distribution of authority in regard to internal security policy in the post-Suharto era put both institutions in a diametrical position (Anwar 2004). But more importantly, the nature of their interaction in such regions implied that the tension which originated in state SAFs also spread into non-state SAFs: local communities and conflicts within them. On-site symptoms can be observed in Papua, a region with a history of secession attempts (Bhakti, 2004). When an armed violence occurred, TNI may have viewed it as an act of insurgency by the Free Papua Movement (OPM), while POLRI may have viewed it simply as an armed crime to be dealt with by the criminal justice system.

This competitive pattern—at times involving violent altercations between personnel—is especially more apparent in cases that were interjected by the divorce of TNI and POLRI

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1 Interview in Jakarta, March, 29th 2021
through MPR Resolution No V/2000. In the conflict-ravaged region of Ambon, functional overlap between their respective functions of internal security spawned a field of tension (Yanuarti, 2004; Azca 2006). Between 1999 to 2004, TNI and POLRI utilized differing strategies to manage the conflict across different phases, including pre, during, and post-civil emergency (Yanuarti, 2004); executing their respective plans with dealings that involved networks of religious vigilante groups and youth gangs in Ambon and Jakarta (Azca, 2006). In Poso, where violent religious conflict also occurred between 1999 and 2001, competition between TNI and POLRI led to ineffective coordination in ameliorating the scale of the conflict (Bhasar, 2004). Both institutions’ capacity to respond quickly and decisively were consequently hampered, ultimately resulting in serious escalations with a high death toll.

Megawati Soekarnoputri, who took the baton of presidency from Abdurrahman Wahid from July 2001 to October 2004, encountered similar difficulties in maintaining harmonious relations between the military and police post-their institutional separation. One prominent clash during her era was the Binjai Incident in September 2002, where hundreds of soldiers from 100th Airborne Battalion/Prajurit Setia (now 100th Infantry Battalion/PS) were involved in a crossfire with Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) of POLRI. It was the largest conflict between TNI and POLRI in The Reformation Era; resulting in the death of four Brimob officers, two Binjai City Police officers, one Army Air Defence soldier, three civilians, and dozens of injuries (Rini, 2002). The trigger, allegedly, was a dispute over the arrest of a man associated with a military member. There were controversies regarding the real cause of the conflict, but an official statement from MG. Idris Gassing—Commander of TNI Regional Command I Bukit Barisan—later unveiled that the motivation was an attempt to conceal an illicit business run by unscrupulous TNI members (Manggut & Soed, 2002). The Binjai case was another significant case in the non-state SAF; not only because esprit de corps was heavily invoked by TNI-POLRI personnels involved in the case, but also because another non-state entity was
also dragged as an actor in the conflict. As narrated by Rini (2002), the day before the bloody clash occurred, members of Youth Reformers of Indonesia (AMPI, a vigilante group associated with the Golkar political party) ran amok in the neighborhood adorning the housing complex of Great Wall Binjai; severely damaging houses in the area. The arrest of the perpetrator—who had connections with Linud 100 members—was considered to be the ultimate trigger of the Binjai clash.

Competition within supposedly cooperative settings seemed to be one of the major themes in this period. Megawati’s administration re-engaged the military to join the counter-terrorism effort in the wake of September 2004 suicide bombing of the Australian Embassy. However, according to Mietzner (2006:41), this course of action was taken simply to appease TNI elites, because POLRI remained central in counter-terrorism efforts. This agenda ultimately became another state SAF where TNI and POLRI competed, echoing previous post-reform patterns.

CONFLICT AND COMPETITION REGULATION UNDER A MILITARY LEADER (2004-2014)

The colloquial “second period” of Reformasi began in 2004, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono winning the first direct presidential election in Indonesia. His administration would run for two periods, ending in 2014. In spite of his status as retired military officer, Yudhoyono made POLRI a less turbulent political arena. He was aware of their influence and standing in Indonesian society, partly accommodating their representation in the cabinet after he won his re-election in 2009.

The 2004 election was preceded by a scandal. A video of a speech by Commissar AA Mappaera, the Chief of Banyumas Regional Police, circulated shortly before the 2004 presidential election. He was recorded expressing his support for Megawati Soekarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi who ran for the office as a pair, when active TNI and POLRI members were already legally
mandated to maintain their neutrality in electoral politics. Immediate uproar that ensued the speech, dated May 29th, 2004, was exacerbated by the fact that it was delivered in a local police headquarters (Banjarnegara regency), in front of numerous individuals affiliated with the POLRI: active officers, retired officers, as well as widows of police members. As a consequence, Mapparesa was investigated by the election supervisory committee, lost his position as regional police chief, then transferred to the administrative division in POLRI headquarters. Irrespective of the aftermath, this scandal demonstrated the worth of elections as a SAF. While the abolition of Dwifunsi ABRI put an end to the direct involvement of TNI and POLRI in electoral contests, the social standing of respective institutions attracted voters and candidates alike. Yudhoyono himself—and his running mate, the businessman Jusuf Kalla—benefited from this, as proven by his victory in the election.

Yudhoyono’s first cabinet after winning the election featured representations from people and parties who supported his presidency, including professionals and academics. High-ranking retired TNI officers were also present, such as Adm (ret) Widodo AS as Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, LG (ret) M. Ma’ruf as Internal Minister, MG (ret) Mardiyanto as Internal Minister replaced Ma’ruf, LG (ret) Sudi Silalahi as Cabinet Secretary. However, there was no single minister with a police background. Cabinet reshuffles across Yudhoyono’s first and second term opened the door for more military names such as Mar (ret) Joko Suyanto as Coord Minister of Political and Security Affairs, Sudi Silalahi, LG (ret) EE Mangindaan, and Adm (ret) Freddy Numberi; but almost no retired police officers. Chief of POLRI Gen. (ret) Sutanto was the only exception, having been the Chief of State Intelligence Agency from 2009-2011 in Yudhoyono’s second term. In short, retired police elites had less strategic bargaining position than the military, especially in terms of executive office as the state SAF.

In the parliament, the relationship between TNI and POLRI in this period was reflected in the protracted discussion on the
National Security Bill. The bill was initiated by the Ministry of Defense, but came to a deadlock due to many objections from various groups. Academics, researchers, and civil society organizations were particularly concerned that the bill might reinstate military domination akin to what had been in the New Order era. Disapproval came from figures like Adrianus Meliala from the University of Indonesia, who was also the commissioner of the National Police Commission (Gusti, 2015); Hermawan Sulistyo from LIPI, who later became a political advisor to the Chief of POLRI (Rifai, 2016); and Hendardi from Setara Institute, who was appointed a human rights advisor to the Chief of POLRI (Nasrul & Muftisani, 2012). POLRI’s camp was represented through their Union of Retired POLRI members (Tempo.co, 2012), agreeing with civil society networks to instead prioritize the security sector—namely, the bill of TNI assistance to POLRI—and military court reforms. PEPABRI, on the other hand, supported the National Security bill on the basis that the bill was aimed to further integrate TNI and POLRI rather than expanding TNI’s authority (Tempo.co, 2011). Ultimately, discussions on the bill were halted. TB Hasanuddin, a member of the parliament, cited objections as the cause.

Outside the political arena, TNI and POLRI were brought together by the war on terror agenda. An instance of collaboration on the field can be seen in Poso, where Mujahidin Indonesia Timur had established a base since 2010 after declaring their allegiance to ISIS (Jones & Solahudin, 2014; Diprose & Azca; 2019, Haripin et al., 2020:282). The Indonesian government deployed TNI and POLRI members to the mountains and jungles of Central Sulawesi in response, utilizing TNI’s anti-guerilla expertise to complement POLRI’s Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88. Institution-wise, it can be seen in the configuration within the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). Since its establishment by the Yudhoyono administration in 2010, BNPT has been led by three-starred

\[2\] Interview in Jakarta, May, 17th 2021
police officers, while the Main Secretary is usually an active two-starred military officer. Lower positions also consist of TNI and POLRI members, as well as a small number of non-military and non-police officials, e.g. employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Haripin et al., 2020:283). In the process, BNPT became a settled state SAF to accommodate interactions between TNI and POLRI.

Conflicts and tensions between members of TNI and POLRI persisted throughout Yudhoyono’s tenure, though the magnitude never approached that of the Binjai Incident. According to Indonesia Police Watch, there were 3 incidents 2007, 2 in 2008, 4 in 2009, 6 in 2010, 1 each in 2011 and 2012, and 4 incidents in 2013 (Firmansyah 2014). Aggregated data from TNI, POLRI, and the Military Police of the Indonesian Air Force between 2002 to 2008, however, records 400 cases of physical altercation between members of these institutions (Herriyanto 2010). While commander credibility and troop discipline certainly played a part in these cases, the backgrounds were diverse: from trivial disputes like interpersonal offense, to more serious confrontations due to involvement in organized crime—including drugs, gambling, illegal logging, and prostitution (US Dept. of State, 2003, Herriyanto, 2010).

RISE OF POLICE INFLUENCE AND THE WAR OF WORDS UNDER A CIVILIAN LEADER (2014-2021)

The third and final periodization of the TNI-POLRI relationship in the Reformasi era is Joko Widodo’s tenure. It started from 2014 until present day, but analysis on this section will be based on data obtained until 2021. This period is marked by a boost in POLRI’s standing both in state and non-state SAF.

As with Yudhoyono, the presidential election that led to Joko Widodo’s ascendancy was streaked with controversy. In his speech to high-ranking TNI and POLRI officers at the Indonesian Ministry of Defence on June 2nd, 2014, President Yudhoyono cited a rumor that several active generals had been contacted by several parties to support one of the presidential candidates. He

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denounced what he deemed to be infidelity towards the supreme commander of TNI and POLRI, quoting part of the hearsay where his presidency was ridiculed as “a sinking ship” (Aritonang, 2014). Rizal Dharma Putra, an intelligence analyst from Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, later divulged to the Jakarta Post (2014) who Yudhoyono was referring to: it was Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, Gen. Budiman, who allegedly had an in-person meeting to discuss the election with Yudhoyono’s political rival, Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati was the chairwoman of The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a large political party that backed Joko Widodo’s nomination as presidential candidate. Yudhoyono ended the controversy by replacing Budiman with Gatot Nurmantyo on July 25th, 2014. Joko Widodo’s candidacy, however, did not seem to suffer from it. He and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, became the first pair of non-military candidates that made it to the Presidential Palace through direct elections after Indonesia’s political reform.

Widodo’s background as a businessman did not hinder him from securing mutually beneficial relationships with retired TNI and POLRI figures. Budi Gunawan, a former Deputy Chief of POLRI and former aide of Megawati, was enlisted to Widodo’s camp at the time. He played a pivotal role in Widodo’s victory; a favor that Jokowi seemed to have returned by appointing him the Head of State Intelligence Agency in place of Sutiyoso. As a result, he became a prominent political figure throughout the administration and represented the strengthening position of police elites in national politics. Gunawan became the first ever police officer to hold a position in the Presidential cabinet, and in the second term, he successfully convinced Prabowo Subianto to dismiss his longtime political rivalry with Widodo and join the cabinet as Minister of Defense. Widodo also appointed the former Deputy Chief of POLRI, Gen. Syafruddin, Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s aide during the Yudhoyono period, as the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reforms a year before his first term ended. Pertaining to the matter, former Chief of POLRI’s Public Relation Division, IG (ret) Sisno Adiwinoto,
thought that the strengthening of POLRI’s political influence after the reform was justifiable thanks to their competence in handling almost every public affair.

Significant as they were, the rise of Gunawan and Syafruddin in the national politics did not topple the domination of military figures in Widodo’s cabinet. During both administrations, the most dominant figure in Widodo’s cabinet is LG (ret) Luhut Panjaitan, who holds a key position in the government structure and is often dubbed by his political rivals as the “real president” (Siregar 2019). Others include Gen (ret) Wiranto as the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs in replacement of Adm (ret) Tedjo Edhy; Gen (ret) Moeldoko as the Presidential Chief of Staff; and LG (ret) Agus Widjojo as Governor of the National Resilience Institute.

The combination of military and police figures continued in Widodo’s second tenure, which started in October 2019. This includes old names and new faces, such as LG (ret) Terawan, who was appointed as Minister of Health during the Covid-19 pandemic and later replaced by a civilian professional. The cabinet also includes LG (ret) Prabowo Subianto and Gen (ret) Fachrul Razi as the Defense and Religion Ministers, respectively. The police were represented by Gunawan who remained the Head of State Intelligence Agency, as well as Gen (ret) Tito Karnavian, the former Chief of POLRI, appointed as Home Affairs Minister.

The presence of military and police figures in Widodo’s cabinet somehow confirmed Power’s (2018:333) suspicion that both institutions premeditated their partisan allegiances in the 2019 election. This was in contrast with the Yudhoyono regime, which Mietzner (2009:296) considered to be fairly successful in confining the military as a state apparatus instead of an autonomous power in the government. Thus, the cabinet itself has become a state SAF where TNI and POLRI interact at a very high strategic level, whether cooperatively or competitively, with the President becoming a governance unit capable of balancing out

3 Interview in Bogor, April 15th 2021

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power between these two factions. At stake are the linkages with other equally important state SAFs, along with resources and offices. The parliament becomes a strategic field as well, where one of the most major causes of discord is the budget gap. As oft-lamented by TNI personnels: POLRI’s national budget allocation significantly increased from 2014 until 2018 (allegedly due to the prevalence of domestic disturbance), in contrast to TNI’s budget which has been lagging behind.

Both offices were also often involved in several government programs that are indirectly related to security or defense issues. For example, the food security program held by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Trade involved the Army through Babinsa (non-commissioned TNI officers at the village level) to increase the productivity of paddy field management, while the Ministry of Trade included the Criminal Investigation Agency of POLRI to trace down rice-hoarding cartel networks. Regarding the matter of Illegal Unreported Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones, both institutions cooperate as mandated by Presidential Decree No. 115/2015. The IUU Fishing Task Force consisted of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries as the Leader of the Task Force, Deputy Chief of Navy as the Daily Chief Executive, and the Chief of Security Maintenance Agency of POLRI as the Deputy of Daily Chief Executive. Finally, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Indonesian government also involved both agencies to support logistic distribution, procurement of isolation shelters and emergency hospitals, assessment and vaccination process, discipline enforcement, and the mobilization of health workers. These programs effectively meant that various government programs in the ministries or state institutions function as state SAFs where TNI and POLRI interacted.

Conflicts between high-ranking officers, when occurring, can be a public exchange of remarks. Take the September 22nd 2017 speech of Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo (Commander of TNI) at TNI headquarters, which surprised the public. The speech was conveyed after TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) detained...
280 units of 40x46 mm Arsenal Stand Alone Grenade Launchers (SAGL) and its 5,932 units RLV-HEFJ ammunition in a warehouse at Soekarno-Hatta Airport. According to Defense Ministry Decree No.7/2010, ammunition above 5.56 mm caliber qualifies as standard military weapons, thus unfit for domestic security purposes. Dismayed at what he perceived to be unlawful possession of arms, Nurmantyo delivered a threatening insinuation that TNI will strike non-military parties who possess weapons that can shoot tanks, planes, and ships. Setyo Wasisto (Chief of POLRI’s Public Relation Division) and IG Murad Ismail (Chief of BRIMOB Corps) proceeded to admit that the weapons were imported by POLRI, albeit insisting that the procurement was lawful. This war of words between TNI and POLRI elites ended with a joint press conference on October 6th 2017. Among those present: Gatot Nurmantyo; Tito Karnavian (Chief of POLRI); Budi Gunawan (Head of BIN); Ryamizard Ryacudu (Minister of Defense); and Wiranto, who led the press conference as the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs. On the occasion, Wiranto stated that TNI will issue a permit to transfer the grenade launchers, but ammunition other than tear gas will be entrusted to the TNI.

On the field, conflicts and clashes between TNI and POLRI personnel occur every year. News compilations reported five incidents in 2014, leaving 1 dead and 7 injured in Cianjur, Batam, Lanny Jaya, and Ambon. In 2015, there were three incidents with 1 dead and 2 injured in Semarang, Polewali Mandar, and Muara Enim. The year 2016 recorded seven incidents with 6 people injured in Ambon, Mimika, Jakarta, Manokwari, and Bekasi. In 2017, there were three incidents with 4 people injured in Pekanbaru, Bekasi, and Banda Aceh; while 2018 documented three incidents comprising 2 deaths and 3 injuries in Jabotabek (greater Jakarta) area. Furthermore, there were three incidents without victims in Saumlaki, Bulukumba, and Jakarta in 2019, as well as an equal number of incidents in 2020, but resulted in the death of 3 personnel and 8 injured in North Tapanuli, Mamberamo Raya, and Jakarta. By April 2021,
the year recorded three incidents, with 10 injured in Mamuju, Yalimo, and Mimika. The most frequent clashes occurred between Army and BRIMOB, while Navy and Airforce-related conflicts were less frequent.

Figure 1. Clashes between TNI and POLRI members, 2014–2021

From these cases, two primary patterns can be inferred. The controversy surrounding imported armaments by BRIMOB POLRI involved socially skilled high-level actors in terms of rank, experience, training, education, and social networks. It also allowed the influence from other dominant SAFs outside TNI and POLRI (as seen in Wiranto’s involvement), preventing the contention from escalating further. On the other hand, confrontations that occurred at the grassroots level were undertaken by actors of low rank and limited social skills. Such confrontations also happened in spaces relatively distant from the reach of other dominant SAFs. This relative absence of meaningful intervention consequently resulted in more potential for violent clashes.

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DISCUSSION

TNI AND POLRI AS SAFs

Apart from their interaction in many state and non-state SAFs, TNI and POLRI themselves could be seen as SAFs as well. Adjacent state SAFs such as the presidency and the parliament have vested interests to influence TNI and POLRI in order to achieve their agenda. Political stability is especially a priority for these actors, since it is the foundation of development and political longevity. According to Fleigstein & McAdam (2012:6), in the context of TNI and POLRI relations, the presidency and parliament could be categorized as governance unit actors. Despite the supposed neutrality of governance unit actors, the interests of TNI and POLRI remain entrenched in the presidency and parliament, and both institutions ultimately possess powerful influence on society due to their extensive hierarchical structure from the national to the village level.

The presidency and parliament usually carry out a balance of power strategy to maintain their relationship with TNI or POLRI. Likewise, actors from TNI and POLRI also see the presidency and parliament as SAFs that are influential in the democratic system. Some TNI and POLRI individuals with sufficient social skills have been trying to enter this SAF, whether they are active or retired. Active personnel usually engage institutionally through tour of duty, while the retired officers become representations of individual or group interests. Interactions across different SAFs often involve the same cast of characters from TNI and POLRI who simply swapped their roles depending on the objective. Along with the absence of formal statement from each institution about their position in conflict or competition, the facts mentioned previously make analysis of interactions using the challenger-incumbent framework difficult to do.

The dialectical relationship between the TNI/POLRI SAFs and other state SAFs has proven that institutional borders are
ultimately fluid and inclusive to socially skilled actors. Military and police figures residing in some state SAFs such as the presidency and parliament can decisively affect the outcome of competitions in other SAFs. Those kinds of actors usually have broad experience from tours of duty on many state and non-state SAFs when they were still active.

CONFLICT, COMPETITION, AND COOPERATION: THE COMBINATION OF SAFs AND SOCIAL SKILLS

This study proposes a new conceptualization of the relationship between Indonesian military and police. By seeing the combination between: 1. The characteristics of SAFs, and; 2. The social skills possessed by actors from TNI and POLRI, the outcome of an interaction can be better predicted—whether it is conflict, competition, or cooperation. Within the context of police-military relations in Indonesia, characteristics of SAFs are measured by their proximity to another dominant state SAFs, in which closer social distance between a SAF with another dominant SAF within state signifies a greater degree of strategic importance and vice-versa. The social skills of individual actors, on the other hand, are influenced by experiences accumulated through tour of duty.

Table 1. Combination of SAF and Social Skills to TNI-POLRI Relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Action Field</th>
<th>Social Skills</th>
<th>TNI - POLRI Relation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The SAF related to</td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>Potentially cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>many state SAFs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less sufficient</td>
<td>Low intensity conflict; Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>intensity cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SAF related to</td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>Potentially competitive;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a few state SAFs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less sufficient</td>
<td>Potentially violent conflict</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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When combined with the high social skills of actors, a SAF that is subject to the influence of dominant state institutions (which are also SAFs) tends to produce cooperative relations between TNI and POLRI. This pattern can be observed in state-sponsored programs where TNI and POLRI cooperate: disaster relief, pandemic mitigation, or development agenda. But if actors in the same category of SAF possess less social skills, low-intensity conflict or low-intensity cooperation between TNI and POLRI could manifest. One instance of this relationship is the tension between TNI and POLRI regarding BRIMOB’s imports of arms.

In less-strategic SAFs—ones that are less-connected to dominant state SAFs—the presence of socially skilled actors may lessen the risk of violence, but rarely reduce the risk of competition. If less socially skilled actors dominate in these arguably less strategic SAFs, the risk of violence is amplified. Results can be seen in cases such as the Binjai Incident, the Ciracas Raid, or squabbles in Ambon and Poso. These set of propositions could be used to categorize the outcomes of specific interactions between Indonesian military and police forces since the Reform Era.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of military and police relations in Indonesia was strongly influenced by the development of the national political structure from independence to the Reformation era. Democratization that happened in the reformation era changed the relationship between military and police from vertical to horizontal. As the police are no longer subordinate to the dominant military, security and defense became the arena where boundaries and scopes of their authority are blurred. Political contests experienced the same development, since politicians still see the massive potential of inherited territorial structure of the military and police, in which power networks can be developed.
along these lines for purposes of resource mobilization. Occasional inability to reach consensus on regional level, however, generated many tensions that may escalate into bloody clashes. Meanwhile, the state-level arenas were dominated by stronger power structures, where encounters may lead to political competition observable in the presidential and parliamentary SAF.

While POLRI managed to leave behind their label as one of the military wings as described by Meliala (2001) in the Reformation period, they have been unable to remove the militaristic structure and culture (Yanuarti, 2016). Its hierarchical and territorial structure can be mobilized in the fashion previously done by military officials, leading to intersections of military and police networks.

Previously, the multifaceted and diverse regional conflicts between TNI and POLRI have yet to be adequately explained. This research aims to contribute to previously-developed theoretical discussions regarding the relationship of Indonesian military and police. It argues that both conflictual and consensual relations could occur concurrently across different SAFs. The distinctive characteristics of SAFs and the actors’ varying degree of social skills determine the nature of the relationship. SAFs closely related to another SAF increase the possibility of cooperative relations, while those that relate minimally will experience difficulties achieving consensus, thereby increasing the potential for violence. In addition, actors with more social skills will have greater chances of attaining consensus, while less skilled actors will experience more conflict. Therefore, further case-by-case research is needed to observe the basis of the conflict and consensus. The use of the SAF approach will enable external actors (i.e. governance units) to deliver more effective interventions aimed to suppress conflict and increase opportunities for integration, rather than solely relying on internal mechanisms of TNI and POLRI.

Finally, any further studies will need to address how the scope of national defense and security itself has widened. The Indonesian Ministry of Defense (2015) acknowledged that the assessment of national strategic interests and threats to it must
consider new dimensions: humanitarian concerns, ecology, food, water, energy, public health, and cyberspace. Bearing in mind the functional overlap between TNI and POLRI on national security issues (Easton & Moelker 2010), these shifts might give birth to new SAFs. Both in a discursive and practical sense, there will be new arenas where Indonesian military and police may cooperate, compete, or confront each other.

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