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IDEOLOGICAL PARAMETERS FOR DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS TO MEASURE CHANGES IN TERRORIST IDEOLOGY IN INDONESIA

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The paper analyzes the inefficiency of the Deradicalization strategy implemented by The National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), causing the issue of recidivist terrorism in Indonesia. Although the occurrence of recidivism is common in various crimes, it poses unique challenges in terrorism cases, given that the government has allocated a specific budget and established a special agency, BNPT, to tackle terrorism-related issues. The high recidivism rate in terrorism cases has prompted public concern and criticism regarding the effectiveness of Deradicalization programs. Despite the ongoing debate, this paper argues that the success or failure of Deradicalization programs cannot be measured simply by the high recidivism rates. This is because the rehabilitation of terrorists is a dynamic and progressive process that requires continuous evaluation. The authors suggest that the main problem with the program lies in the absence of clear parameters to assess the process of changing terrorist ideology, leading to biased assessments. Therefore, this paper attempts to reconceptualize appropriate Deradicalization strategies to measure and ensure the ideological changes of terrorists. The study begins with redefining the meaning of terrorism, identifying terrorist groups in Indonesia, mapping the ideology of terrorist groups, establishing ideological parameters of terrorism, and devising appropriate Deradicalization strategies to rehabilitate terrorists in Indonesia.

Keywords: Terrorism, Counter Terrorism, Deradicalization, Terrorist Ideology, Ideological Parameters
the latest terror incident on November 7, 2022, which involved a bomb explosion at the Astana Anyar Polsek, Bandung City, West Java. The perpetrator, Agus Sujatno, was previously arrested and sentenced to 4 years in prison for his involvement in the Cicendo Bombing case in 2017 and then released in September 2021 (Tribun News, 2022).

From the various recidivist terrorism cases in Indonesia, it is also intriguing to consider the case of Ismarwan, a former terrorist convict from Aceh who was involved in terrorist acts in 2019 after being released from prison in 2015. Ismarwan had been involved in terrorism cases in the past. Banda Aceh City was the site of a series of terrorist attacks, including the throwing of grenades at UNICEF offices on March 16, 2009, facilitating the shooting of German citizens on November 5, 2009, and shooting an American house on November 23, 2009 (Tempo.co, 2010). In the second arrest case, which occurred in 2019, he was again involved in terrorism in Gunung Salak, North Aceh, where he participated in military training with the JAD network.

Ismarwan's case presents a fascinating scenario, given his involvement in terrorism activities despite always participating in various deradicalization programs and receiving financial support from the BNPT Deradicalization Directorate. According to Andre Marlan, Director of the Aceh Jalin Peace Foundation Network, Ismarwan has actively participated in all deradicalization activities held by the BNPT since his release from the penitentiary in early January 2015. Ismarwan participated in a gathering with the BNPT Deradicalization Directorate in Banda Aceh in 2015. Further, in 2018, the BNPT Deradicalization Directorate collaborated with the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs, and Ismarwan again received financial assistance from Rp. 15,000,000, which was continued again in 2019 for Rp. 5,000,000. In addition, Ismarwan always attended various deradicalization activities held by BNPT in Jakarta, including a "Gemar NKRI" event in December 2017 that gathered over 100 former terrorism prisoners to be given entrepreneurial training and nationalism insight seminars, as well as a gathering between perpetrators and victims of terrorism and a nationalism insight seminar in February 2018 at the Borobudur Hotel, Jakarta (Zulfahri, 2019).

The critical question that arises from Ismarwan's case is why Ismarwan still engaged in terrorism activities despite participating in various deradicalization programs and receiving continuous financial assistance and nationalism insight seminars. Is this purely due to Ismarwan's lack of goodwill, or does it point to the inefficacy of the deradicalization program? This is a multifaceted concern that necessitates thorough consideration. If the problem is in the deradicalization program, there will likely be other recidivist cases in the future.

Against this backdrop, Ismarwan's case reminds us of the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) group led by Kartosoewirjo. At that time, the Indonesian government succeeded in suppressing the NII movement and providing amnesty and financial assistance to its members. However, some NII members regrouped ten years later to continue their
violent struggle. This context highlights the temporary nature of deradicalization efforts and the need for a more effective approach.

This paper argues that the key problem of the deradicalization program is the absence of parameters to measure the ideological change of terrorists, which causes their assessment to be biased. Therefore, this paper attempts to develop ideological parameters for the deradicalization program in order to measure the ideological changes of the terrorists and reconstruct the concept of an appropriate deradicalization strategy.

**METHODS OF RESEARCH**

This research uses qualitative methods by relying on primary data from in-depth interviews and also uses secondary data to map the ideology of terrorist groups in Indonesia and develop ideological parameters based on the mapping results then reconceptualize appropriate deradicalization strategies that can measure changes in terrorist ideology in Indonesia.

The discussion begins by redefining the meaning of terrorism, identifying the terrorist groups in Indonesia, mapping the ideology of terrorist groups, creating the ideological parameters, and then reconceptualizing appropriate deradicalization strategies to be able to measure the ideological changes of terrorists.

**RESULT AND ANALYSES**

**What is Terrorism?**

Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon (Antwi-Boasiako et al., 2022). Frightening, threatening, shocking violence, or killing to spread fear are tactics inherent in power struggles before being labeled as "terror" or "terrorism" (Rausch 2015).

To counter terrorism, particularly in rehabilitating terrorists through deradicalization programs, creating an appropriate concept of deradicalization is highly dependent on how we determine the causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, determining the causes of terrorism depends on how we define terrorism. (Schmid, 2004). The concern is, defining terrorism is challenging.

Walter Laqueur, who devoted his life to investigating this phenomenon, remarked on the difficulty of precisely defining terrorism. Terrorism is unlike other forms of warfare, including conventional warfare, guerrilla war, revolutionary war, or insurgency, and cannot be categorized as such (Laqueur, 1986).

According to Laqueur (1986), conventional warfare pursues complete annihilation, encompassing human and material components. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare constitutes a revolutionary form of war that typically results in partial physical damage. Meanwhile, terrorism strives to inflict psychological harm. It consistently disregards all forms of war rules and procedures. Victims in an act of terrorism are mostly civilians who, at the time of the incident, were close to or together with the victims who were targeted. This renders terrorism hard to define because its form and character vary considerably, depending on the specific circumstances and times.

Conceptualizing the definition of terrorism has proven to be challenging. It can be
observed in the United Nations’ efforts, which saw the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism in 1972. The committee convened for six years, during which different groups of countries submitted seven draft proposals. However, no consensus was reached on the definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2004).

The phenomenon of terrorism has long been a fascinating subject of study. Debates and discussions among policymakers and experts regarding the definition of terrorism have resulted in diverse interpretations. The lack of a universal definition of terrorism has resulted in injustice, given that anti-terrorism actions are sometimes used to excuse unjustifiable acts.

Although reaching an agreed definition of terrorism is problematic, suggestions proposed by Alex Schmid for defining terrorism can be fruitful in identifying the root causes of terrorism. Schmid (2023) outlined five distinct approaches to defining terrorism in his report. These approaches include examining the history of terrorism, exploring the psychology of terror, differentiating terrorism from other crimes, analyzing terrorist actions, and focusing on terrorists.

Historically, the term ‘terror’ was first used in 1793, when the French revolutionary government was threatened by aristocrats and upper-class immigrants conspiring with foreign governments to restore the old regime to power. In response, the revolutionary government held a national convention on August 30, 1793, and determined that terror was the only way to counteract the threat of revolution. Consequently, at least 300,000 people were arrested between September 5, 1793, and July 27, 1794. About 17,000 of them were formally executed, while many others died without trial. This regime became known as the Terror Regime (Schmid, 2023).

From its early history, terrorism has been used to intimidate, coerce, frighten, threaten, to create a psychological effect that can affect one or more parties beyond the immediate target. The ultimate goal of terrorism is not the production of fear but rather the means to an end, where the primary intention is to elicit a particular response from the target audience (Schmid, 2023). This is what distinguishes terrorism from the unlawful violence of a psychopath or the casual murder of a criminal. A psychopath or criminal has achieved his main goal when successfully killing his victim. Terrorism, on the other hand, initiates a killing process aimed at creating a psychological response from the other party in the form of threats and fear (Savelkoul, 2022).

Terrorism is an extraordinary crime that often defies comprehension. Terrorists not only target indiscriminate victims but are also willing to commit suicide. Even in the most extreme case, such as the May 2019 church bombings in Surabaya, Indonesia, the perpetrators, a married couple, involved all of their minor children in the suicide bombings.

How do we determine the causal factors of this puzzling phenomenon? Simply labeling terrorists as ‘evil’ or ‘psychopathic’ is not only an oversimplification but also hinders intervention against terrorism itself (Ruby, 2002). Various studies profiling terrorists...
have also found no evidence of a relationship between psychopathology, lack of intelligence, poverty, and pathological personality factors and the decision to commit acts of terrorism (Ruby, 2002; Atran, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005; Ehrlich & Liu, 2002).

To determine the causal factor of a phenomenon or event, Schmid quotes Boesjes-Hommes, who states that causality is never visible in reality but is established by the scientist's construct that certain factors, in reality, have influenced the existence of certain phenomena. In this case, the actual causal workings of these factors are not open to perception but can only be approached through theory (Schmid, 2004).

According to Drake (1998), when an individual or group decides to engage in terrorism, they are motivated by an ideology or belief. In this case, ideology plays a vital role in providing the motive and framework for acting and committing acts of violence and justifying the violent acts committed. A similar view was expressed by Savelkoul (2022), who stated that terrorists need an ideology to define overarching goals and targets, to provide internal justification for attacks, and to attract resources and recruits.

Before committing an act of terrorism, the perpetrator must determine the target, and the target of terrorist attacks does not include people who have a direct relationship with the perpetrator. Therefore, who becomes the target of the attack depends on the perpetrator's ideology. In addition, to carry out senseless acts such as involving young children in suicide bombings, the perpetrator must believe that it is the right thing to do, and this justification is obtained through ideology.

In another example of terrorism committed by followers of white supremacist ideology, Brenton Tarrant, who opened fire on two mosques in New Zealand in March 2019, killing 51 people, not only expressed no remorse for the mass murder he committed in a manifesto he wrote titled "The Great Replacement," but also claimed the right to the Nobel Peace Prize (Kulsum, 2019).

It can be said that without ideological factors, we might not find brutal, heinous, and senseless acts of terrorism in the form of a global phenomenon. In other words, ideology is an absolutely necessary factor in terrorism.

Therefore, this paper argues that ideology is a causal factor of terrorism since it is the most reliable factor to explain why terrorists constantly feel righteous in their acts of terrorism, why the targets of terrorist attacks can change, and how terrorism can be distinguished from sporadic crimes committed by psychopaths or ordinary crimes committed by criminals.

Solahudin, a terrorism expert from the Center for Terrorism and Social Conflict Studies at the University of Indonesia, stated in an interview that two crucial elements of a crime can be categorized as terrorism: ideology and violence. Thus, this paper concludes that terrorism is ideology-driven violence.

**Terrorist Groups in Indonesia**

Since terrorism is ideology-driven violence, the rehabilitation of terrorists through
deradicalization programs must be able to measure the change in their ideology. Ideological parameters are absolutely necessary and, in this case, can be created by mapping the ideology of terrorism. Furthermore, the first step needed to map the ideology of terrorism lies in identifying the existing terrorist groups in Indonesia.

According to a report by the International Crisis Group, it is impossible to understand the problem of terrorism in Indonesia without understanding the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by S.M. Kartosoewirjo and his efforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia. The DI movement has produced various fragments and splinters, where each time the old generation is about to disappear, a new generation of militants emerges who are inspired by the history of DI to renew the continuity of the movement (ICG, 2005).

The emergence of the DI movement began with a dispute between the Islamic nationalist group and the secular nationalist group to determine the direction and form of the Republic of Indonesia before Indonesia's independence. At that time, the Islamic nationalists wanted to make Indonesia an Islamic state because Muslims must live under the application of Islamic Sharia law. Meanwhile, the secular nationalists opposed this idea because they believed that an Islamic state would be unable to respond to the challenges of the times. However, in the end, the Islamic nationalists and the secular nationalists reached an agreement contained in the Jakarta Charter. One of the main points of agreement is that the Indonesian state is based on "a belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic Sharia for its adherents." With this agreement, Soekarno-Hatta read out the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, on Friday at 10 a.m. (Chaidar, 1999: 57-58; Rizieq, 2012: 63-67).

However, the problem resurfaced shortly after the declaration of Indonesian independence. The afternoon after the proclamation, according to Hatta, he was visited by a Japanese naval officer who demanded that the phrase "with the obligation to implement Islamic Sharia for its adherents" be deleted from the Jakarta Charter. The reason given at the time was objections from Christians in eastern Indonesia. Notwithstanding the request to remove the seven words, Soekarno and Hatta immediately held an emergency meeting the next day, attended by only three people from secular groups. In the end, this meeting decided to remove the phrase "the obligation to implement Islamic Sharia for its adherents" and replace it with the phrase "God Almighty" (Rizieq, 2012: 67-72). With this change, the implementation of Islamic Sharia specifically for Muslims was not enforced in Indonesia.

In response to this situation, the Islamic nationalist group led by Muhammad Natsir, K.H. Wahid Hasyim, and Kartosoewirjo formed the Masyumi political party as a forum to fight for the application of Islamic Sharia for Indonesian Muslims (Chaidar, 1999: 62). Until then, no one had taken the path of violence in the struggle for the implementation of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia. The situation began to change when there was Dutch military aggression after Indonesian independence, which led to
the Renville Agreement between the Indonesian government and the Dutch. In the Renville Agreement, the Dutch recognized only Central Java, Yogyakarta, and Sumatra as part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. A demarcation line was then drawn to separate the Indonesian and Dutch-occupied territories. Meanwhile, the Indonesian national army had to be withdrawn from its enclaves in the Dutch-occupied areas of West Java and East Java (Riziek, 2012: 76).

Kartosoewirjo, who had led the armed resistance against the Dutch military aggression in West Java, strongly opposed the Renville Agreement (Solahudin, 2011: 65). Together with the leaders of the Masyumi Party in West Java, Kartosoewirjo froze the Masyumi Party and formed the Darul Islam (DI) movement to continue the armed resistance against the Dutch. The DI movement viewed the Renville Agreement as a form of recognition of Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia. By recognizing the Renville Agreement, the Indonesian government was considered to have fallen. Therefore, in order to continue the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, they proclaimed a new Indonesian state based on Islamic Sharia law, which was called the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) (Chaidar, 1999: 72-75; Solahudin, 2011: 65).

When the situation in the Republic of Indonesia stabilized, Kartosoewirjo and the DI/TII movement continued to defend the establishment of the NII. They then engaged in a long war with the Indonesian government until it was finally suppressed in 1962, and Kartosoewirjo was sentenced to death (Chaidar, 1999: 113-116; Solahudin, 2011: 69-76). After Kartosoewirjo's death, the DI movement went into a hiatus and did not demonstrate its existence due to the loss of its leader. Twelve years later, however, DI members regrouped to continue their struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia. In this new movement, the DI went further and no longer used a guerrilla warfare strategy but was involved in a series of terrorist acts in different regions (Solahudin, 2011: 82-92; ICG, 2005: 5; Mbai, 2014: 75).

Among the DI members who continued Kartosoewirjo's ideas were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who later defected and formed a new group called Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI). Sungkar, with the help of Ba'asyir, succeeded in developing JI into a transnational Islamic organization covering Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and Singapore. Along the way, the JI group split into the Indonesian al-Qaeda group under the leadership of Noordin M. Top. The Indonesian Al-Qaeda group carried out a series of bombings targeting various interests of America and its allies in Indonesia until it finally evolved, and the ISIS group was born in Indonesia in the form of the Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) organization (Mbai, 2014: 72-88; Said, 2014; Riziek, 2012: 79-80; Solahudin, 2011; ICG, 2005; Chaidar, 1999; Zulfahri, 2020).

The phenomenon of terrorism in Indonesia has become a destructive shadow that has always accompanied the course of Indonesian history. A decades-long story that has existed since the beginning of Indonesia's
independence and continues to this day, with the perpetrators of each era intertwined. Terrorism in Indonesia was born as a response to the blocked political aspirations of Muslims and the desire to implement Islamic Sharia as a whole. This blocked political aspiration eventually gave birth to various derivative ideologies, which then became the frame of reference for some groups to carry out various acts of terror and violence in the name of religion. To date, terrorism in Indonesia has produced four main groups in the form of DI, JI, Al-Qaeda Indonesia, and JAD.

The history and genealogy of terrorism in Indonesia can be summarized in the following figure 1 below:

Figure 1. The Genealogy of Terrorism in Indonesia
ideology serves as a causal factor of terrorism in Indonesia.

However, Ideology is a highly complex concept within social science (Savelkoul, 2022). The debate on ideology has evolved over time, and Heywood summarized the discourse on ideology and defined it as a set of ideas that form the basis of organized political action. Specifically, Heywood identifies three characteristics of ideology: a) as a society's worldview; b) as a set of ideas, models, and vision for achieving future social structure; and c) as a guideline for political changes that ought to be implemented (Heywood, 1998).

The DI group's worldview was inspired by the thoughts of its founder, Kartosoewirjo, who argued that every Muslim had a duty to make a hijrah from the conditions of an un-Islamic society to an Islamic society, as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad when he hijrah from Mecca to Medina. This view of life eventually gave birth to the vision and aspiration to build a state based on Islamic law so that Muslims could live in divine light (Chaidar, 1999). Entis Sutisna, a former NII governor in West Java, explained in an interview that DI's concept of hijrah from Mecca to Medina was to move from the Republic of Indonesia to the Indonesian Islamic State (NII). Therefore, when he found the right momentum, Kartosoewirjo immediately proclaimed the establishment of the NII and fought to defend it.

Meanwhile, the JI group's outlook on life is reflected in the life story of its founder, Abdullah Sungkar, who, from a young age, had been actively preaching and calling for Muslims to live under laws derived from divine provisions. The JI group's Nidhom Asasi document states: "Man is a creature of Allah Ta'ala who is obliged to serve Him alone with the guidance of the Shari’a and the manhaj and sunnah of His Prophet." This belief then gave birth to the vision and aspirations of the JI group to establish a state based on Islamic Sharia to create a better social order, not only in Indonesia but also throughout the world, in the form of an Islamic Caliphate. This is mentioned in Chapter II Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Nidhom Asasi document: "The goal of the struggle of this Jama’ah is to realize the establishment of Daulah Islamiyyah as a basis for the re-establishment of the Khilafah ‘Alaa Minhajin Nubuwwah." (PUPJI, 1996). As a result of this ideology, in its journey, the JI group carried out an underground movement strategy, focusing on finding base areas to conduct open warfare with the Indonesian government. Although, in the end, there were unscrupulous JI members who carried out various bombings, this was outside of the ideology and general policies of the organization (Zulfahri, 2020: 167).

As for the worldview of the Indonesian Al-Qaeda group, there is not much literature that can explain the thinking of the group led by Noordin M. Top. However, if the Taujihat Manhajiyah document by Osama bin Laden as the central leader of Al-Qaeda is examined further, differences in views will be visible, causing some JI members to deviate and eventually join Al-Qaeda. In the Taujihat Manhajiyah document, which contains messages and wills from Osama bin Laden,
he explains his views on the condition of Muslim life as follows: "When we talk about the conditions experienced by Muslims today, along with the colonization, injustice, and hostility that befalls them on the part of the Israeli and American powers, not to mention the decline of the shade of Islam on earth, then it is appropriate to look back to the guidance of Muhammad (peace be upon him) in establishing this religion when Islam was still foreign at its inception" (Bin Laden, 2004).

The point that needs to be scrutinized in Osama bin Laden's view is that there are two main problems afflicting Muslims today: first, the Israeli and American occupation of Palestine, and second, the collapse of the refuge for Muslim communities in the form of a state under the rules of Islamic Sharia. Between these two problems, Osama Bin Laden prioritizes resistance to Israeli and American occupations. This is predicated on the belief that the United States is the dominant power in the world. Therefore, the decline of the United States will have a substantial negative impact on all nations relying on it. Thus, as we have seen so far, the Indonesian Al-Qaeda group has carried out bombings against various facilities and citizens of foreign countries, especially the United States and its allies in Indonesia.

Finally, the worldview of the Indonesian ISIS group, which takes the form of the Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) organization, can be understood by referring to the Tawhid Material Series guidebook written by its leader, Oman Abdurrahman. In the book, it is explained that the purpose of human beings created on Earth is only to worship Allah; to guide humans whose minds are weak, Allah sent the Prophets and Messengers to teach humans how to worship Allah (Abdurrahman, 2015).

Abdurrahman (2015) further explains the core of the da'wah of the Prophets and Messengers as follows: What is the essence of the da'wah of the Messengers? Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala says: "And indeed we have sent a Messenger to every nation (to say): Worship Allah (alone), and avoid the Taghut" (QS. An Nahl: 36). This verse clearly and unequivocally explains that all the Messengers were sent by Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala, and the first thing they said to their people and this was said by the Messengers to their people including the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon Him) was "Worship Allah and avoid the taghut." Therefore, Abdurrahman (2015) insists a Muslim is only valid if he has fulfilled the two things that have followed the core of the da'wah of the Prophets and Messengers as he explained: "The key to entering Islam is Laa ilaaha illallaah as the key to entering heaven is Laa ilaaha illallaah. The meaning is not just saying it, but a commitment to the meaning of its content, namely disbelief in Taghut or avoiding Taghut and faith or worship only to Allah, meaning that if people do not realize Laa ilaaha illallaah, then that person does not yet have the key to Islam, namely the practice of Laa ilaaha illallaah".

In Islamic terminology, Taghut is ‘Idols’ or ‘Gods’ other than Allah. Meanwhile, Oman Abdurrahman included the Indonesian state or government in the form of Taghut. In the book Tawhid Material Series, Oman
Abdurrahman explains: "Allah will only accept the good deeds that a person does on condition that the person realizes Laa ilaaha illallaah (disbelief in taghut and faith in Allah) because people are not said to be Muslims and are not said to be believers unless they disbelieve in taghut and faith in Allah or realize Laa ilaaha illallaah."

In sum, Oman Abdurrahman not only has the vision to establish an Islamic state but also makes the purification of Tawheed by disbelieving the Indonesian government a valid condition for one's Islam. The meaning is not just to disbelieve, but the disbelief must also be accompanied by hatred and hostility, as explained: "The one who abandons the shirk but does not hate it, then he has not disbelieved in the Taghut. This is because Allah requires hatred of the shirk to realize monotheism towards Him. One who is not hostile towards the perpetrators of shirk is not one who kufr the Taghut. Because of this enmity, Allah says in Surah At-Taubah: "So kill the polytheists wherever you find them, arrest them, besiege them, and keep them on the lookout" (Abdurrahman, 2015). Hence, as we have seen thus far, the JAD group does not hesitate to carry out various acts of violence and kill government officials, especially police officers, with sadistic and cruel actions as a result of being filled with a deep sense of hatred and hostility.

In summary, the worldview and vision of terrorist groups in Indonesia can be explained in the following Figure 2, showing that terrorist groups in Indonesia have the same vision, which is to establish an Islamic state. However, the difference is seen in the Al-Qaeda group, which prioritizes the liberation of the Muslim world, particularly Palestine, from American colonization, and the JAD group more prioritizes the purification of monotheism.

Furthermore, regarding ideology as a guide for political change, Zulfahri has made a mapping of the ideological points of terrorist groups in Indonesia based on variables compiled by Abu Mush'ab As-Suri (As-Suri, 2009), a senior figure of the Al-Qaeda organization in his book Da'wah Muqawamah Islamiyyah 'Alamiyyah (Zulfahri, 2020: 114–166). The main variables of Asuri's ideology include the law of the government and its apparatus; the issue of disbelief; the law of government scholars; the issue of democracy; the issue of Salaf and Madhhab; attitudes towards other Islamic groups; the issue of nationalism and nationality; the issue of the Islamic world; and the issue of confrontation with America and the West. The results of ideological mapping show that JAD ideology is at the highest level of radical/extreme ideology.
The second level is occupied by NII ideology, followed by Al-Qaeda Indonesia ideology and JI ideology which is at the lowest level of radicalism (See Zulfahri, 2020; see also As-Suri, 2009).

The conclusion of the ideological mapping of terrorist groups in Indonesia based on the highest to the lowest level of terrorist ideology is depicted in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3. Ideological Map of Terrorist Groups in Indonesia

| Ideology of JAD | Ideology of NII | Ideology of Al-Qaeda Indonesia | Ideology of JI |

Parameters of Terrorism Ideology in Indonesia

Based on the theories developed around the discussion of counterterrorism, the most effective method for rehabilitating terrorists is through a soft approach, which can be done by running deradicalization and disengagement programs. Deradicalization is a program that aims to de-indoctrinate or moderate a terrorist's radical ideology. Meanwhile, disengagement is a program to change a person's behavior by refraining oneself from committing acts of violence and pulling an individual out of the organization or network (Zulfahri 2020).

There has been debate among terrorism scholars regarding which programs are considered more effective in countering terrorism. Bjørgo and Horgan (2009), for example, consider deradicalization unrealistic to be relied upon in handling terrorism. Accordingly, the state's strategy should focus on disengagement efforts or severing the attachment of terrorist members to their network through activities such as encouraging them to pursue entrepreneurship and others. Furthermore, determining whether someone is radical is a complex task that is difficult to assess. According to Horgan's analysis, in the context of counterterrorism, disengagement is more important than deradicalization since disengagement can be implemented without having to involve deradicalization (Horgan, 2014; Horgan, 2009).

Rabasa et al. (2010), however, expressed a different view, contending that the primary objective should still be deradicalization, as this would generate a permanent change and substantially diminish the potential for recidivism. Nonetheless, disengagement still continues to be a crucial strategy of counterterrorism as well (Rabasa et al., 2010). Rabasa et al. add that a person may leave a radical organization and abandon violent ways because of the government's increasingly effective financial assistance or entrepreneurship programs. Although these perpetrators may temporarily leave the organization or its network if radical ideology is still lodged within them, they are likely to return to terrorism in the future when conditions change – behavior can change while goals remain constant. Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of the deradicalization program run by the Indonesian government has been questioned by many parties because of the continued emergence of terrorism case recidivists.

Furthermore, Chaidar argues that the rise of terrorism in Indonesia is not only caused by the weak Terrorism Law but must also be regarded as a failure to deradicalize former terrorism convicts (Chaidar, 2016). Chaidar also suggests that the current deradicalization carried out by the BNPT and the Correctional Institution has failed because the Deradicalization program in Indonesia does not have a clear concept. The recidivism of terrorism cases and the exodus of former terrorism convicts to Syria and Mindanao are considered failures of the deradicalization program run by the government. Jones also expressed the same opinion, stating that government-funded rehabilitation programs to deal with terrorists released from prison have not been successful. Ex-convicted terrorists have no skills or jobs and end up rejoining their groups. Moreover, the program does not have clear parameters (Jones, 2013).

From the vantage points above, referring to Horgan’s opinion that the degree of radicalization is difficult to measure and Jones’s opinion that deradicalization has been running without clear parameters, this paper argues that the most important thing that should be the primary concern is not the success or failure of the implementation of the deradicalization program. Instead, the focus should be on creating ideological parameters while running the deradicalization program. With clear ideological parameters, the success or failure of the deradicalization program becomes measurable and cannot be claimed arbitrarily.

Ideological parameters are an absolute necessity since their absence has caused various problems in running the deradicalization program, not only in efforts to rehabilitate terrorists but also in efforts to garner support from Muslims. So far, some Islamic groups in Indonesia have often associated the discourse of deradicalization with Islamophobia. They interpret deradicalization as a program that will have a negative impact on Muslims because it is believed to be a concept that wants to corner and discriminate against Islamic Sharia (Malaka, 2016). Although the vision of terrorists is to realize an Islamic state, it is not right to view every Muslim who discusses the idea of implementing Islamic Sharia in Indonesia as an individual who has been exposed to radicalism or terrorism. Historically, there have been Islamic nationalist groups with similar ideas. Instead of committing acts of terrorism or taking the path of violence to achieve ideological goals, they prefer to seek the formalization of Islamic Sharia through constitutional processes. The Islamic Nationalist group is filled with people such as former Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir, Haji Agoes Salim, and K.H. Wahid Hasyim from Nahdlatul Ulama, Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo from Muhammadiyah, and other Islamic figures who are founders of the nation and have had great services for the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia (Zulfahri, 2020).

It is imperative to bear in mind that the Jakarta Charter, which included the
obligation to implement Islamic Sharia for its adherents, was initially part of the state constitution of Indonesia. This reflects the founding fathers' recognition of the strong connection between the country and its Muslim population. Although the phrase was later revised to "God Almighty," founding fathers like Soekarno and Hatta were aware of Muslims' desire to formalize Islamic Sharia in Indonesia. Against this situation, Hatta, in his book entitled "Around the Proclamation," explained:

"At that time, we realized that the spirit of the Jakarta Charter did not disappear by removing the words 'Deity with the obligation to implement Islamic Sharia for its adherents' and replacing them with 'God Almighty.' In the State of Indonesia, which later adopted the motto of Unity in Diversity, any regulation within the framework of the Islamic Shari'a, which concerned only Muslims, could be submitted as a bill to the DPR, which, once accepted by the DPR, would be binding on Indonesian Muslims. In this way, there will gradually be for the Indonesian Muslims a system of Islamic Sharia organized in law, based on the Quran and Hadith, which is also in accordance with the needs of the present Islamic society" (Hatta, 1970).

In the course of the history of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, between 1955 and 1959, a session of the Constituent Assembly was held to create a new constitution to replace the Temporary Constitution of 1950 (UUDS 1950). During the trial process, the Constituent Assembly was divided into two factions:

1. The Islamic faction consisted of Masyumi, Nahdhatul Ulama, PSII, Parti, Akui, Gerpis, and Channeling. They wanted the Pancasila formulation in line with the formulation written in the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945.

2. The secular faction consisted of the PNI, PKI, Parkindo, Catholic Party, PSI, IPKI, and several small parties. They wanted the formulation of Pancasila in accordance with the formulation written in the Constitution of August 18, 1945.

In the trial process, the votes of each faction in the Constituent Assembly did not reach a quorum (2/3 of the total number of votes present), so the session experienced a deadlock. This fact eventually prompted President Soekarno to issue a Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959, to mediate the dispute between the Islamic and Secular factions (Rizieq, 2012). In the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, Soekarno stated:

"Whereas we are convinced that the Jakarta Charter of June 22, 1945, animates the 1945 Constitution and is an integral part of that Constitution, therefore, on the basis of the foregoing, We, the President of the Republic of Indonesia / Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, declare the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, declare that the 1945 Constitution shall again apply to the entire Indonesian nation and the entire Indonesian blood, as of the date of the decree, and that the
Temporary Constitution shall no longer apply” (Soekarno in the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959).

The Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, is still in effect today. It explicitly states that the Jakarta Charter animated and constituted a unitary series with the 1945 Constitution. This statement was realized with the legality of the implementation of Islamic Sharia in Aceh Province. This is an authentic proof that the idea of implementing Islamic Sharia in the framework of the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is not included in the category of radical ideology or terrorism.

There is a significant difference between the Islamic Nationalist group and the terrorists, although both have an idea of implementing Islamic Sharia in Indonesia. Islamic Nationalists want to implement Islamic Sharia in Indonesia but still uphold the pillars of the Indonesian Republic. Meanwhile, the terrorists want to destroy all the pillars and change the form of the Indonesian state into an Islamic state. That is the main reason why the ideology of the Islamic nationalist group is safe. They, in fact, lack the vision of terrorist groups who want to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. The Deradicalization Program must be able to provide limits on how ideology is categorized as radicalism or terrorism.

In Indonesia, the term "radicalism" originated from discussions concerning terrorism. The mass media, whether print, electronic, government officials, or different organizations, concluded that terrorism stemmed from one cause, i.e., radicalism. Responding to this situation, the Indonesian government has devised a counter-terror program called the "Deradicalization" program. Given that the four main groups discussed above—Islamic State Indonesia (NII), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Al Qaeda Indonesia, and Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD)—have historically been responsible for terrorist acts, the discourse on radicalism in Indonesia needs to be limited to the ideology giving rise to terrorism.

By referring to the previous discussion, this paper sets the boundaries and classification of terrorism ideology as a parameter, as illustrated in Figure 4 below:

Figure 4. Ideological Parameters of Terrorism in Indonesia

Reconceptualizing Deradicalization Strategy
Ad’ha Aljunied suggests that rehabilitating terrorists involves the use of counter-ideological discourse, which is an effort to build alternative narratives to moderate the radical ideology of terrorists (Ad’ha Aljunied, 2012). Alternative narratives are constructed to provide other perspectives from the terrorists' religious beliefs. This is done with the expectation that their thinking
horizons will be opened and their religious insights will increase so that they can get out of the narrow religious doctrine that has been shackling their minds. For example, referring to Ismarwan's case, even though he has received entrepreneurial assistance and nationalism insight material continuously for years, it turns out that it could not prevent him from becoming a recidivist. This suggests that the alternative narrative through the provision of nationalism insight material that he has received has not been able to moderate the radical ideology that exists in him. Ultimately, the financial assistance that had been provided was also in vain.

Deradicalization is not as simple as providing entrepreneurial assistance coupled with nationalism insight material. Such an approach may only promote a pragmatic attitude from terrorists. Various financial assistance provided will only be considered as a temporary financial solution to their daily needs. Similarly, the nationalism insight delivered may only be perceived as a fictional narrative that must be endured to receive financial support.

The essence of deradicalization is the effort to build an alternative narrative to moderate the radical ideology of the terrorists. It should be the primary focus in running the deradicalization program—the provision of financial assistance and entrepreneurship functions as supplementary support. Any financial assistance provided must be relevant to the process of moderating the terrorists' radical ideology to ensure that state expenditures are not squandered. In essence, deradicalization and disengagement are like two sides of a coin that synergize and run simultaneously.

A terrorist is an individual who has been exposed to a very strong and structured radical ideology indoctrination process. Therefore, the alternative narrative presented in deradicalization programs must be similarly robust and structured. The process of altering a person's deeply ingrained radical ideology is a formidable challenge. Nonetheless, as Charles J. M. Drake asserts, ideological doctrine is the most crucial factor in a person's decision to engage in terrorism (Drake, 1998). Consequently, any attempts to rehabilitate terrorists must prioritize strategies that focus on dismantling their radical ideology.

The deradicalization program should be carried out using the ideological parameters as described, in which the ideology of the JAD group is at the highest ideological level, which is then sequentially followed by the ideology of the NII group, Al-Qaeda Indonesia, and Jamaah Islamiyah. By identifying these ideological parameters, deradicalization can be pursued with greater conceptual clarity. Furthermore, the treatment of terrorists can be different or tailored to the level of radical ideology to which they belong.

In a focus group discussion (FGD) with the Indonesian Ulema Council in July 2022, Sofyan Tsaury, a former believer of the ideology of JAD leader Oman Abduallahman, gave an example of the difficulties he faced in accepting the insight of nationalism while at the JAD ideological level. Tsaury admitted that he could only accept the alternative narrative emanating from the Al-Qaeda...
group because of the strong hatred of the Indonesian government in JAD's ideology. Tsaury further confirmed that he could only accept the narrative of nationalism when his beliefs aligned with those of the JI group. This argument is then affirmed by information conveyed by Ali Fauzi, a former JI member, who stated during a focus group discussion at the Indonesian Police headquarters in May 2019 that he did not find it challenging to accept nationalism insights since he did not infidelize and hate the government apparatus since joining JI. Although Tsaury and Ali Fauzi still view the implementation of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia as an open discourse, they both now actively cooperate with the Indonesian government in counterterrorism programs to protect Indonesia from acts of terrorism.

Hence, this paper suggests that the appropriate strategy for running the deradicalization program should use ideological parameters. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to determine the success or failure of the deradicalization program based on the occurrence or absence of recidivism since the process of rehabilitating terrorists is a dynamic and progressive one that heavily depends on the context and circumstances. Although a terrorist who has completed a deradicalization program may not engage in further terrorist activities in the short term, it is still possible that they may do so in the future. In addition, the fact that the majority of terrorist acts in Indonesia are committed by the JAD group, it does not necessarily imply that individuals who are not affiliated with this group have been successfully deradicalized. If terrorists have not achieved a safe ideological standpoint (Ideology of Islamic Nationalist / Formalistic Islam), any cessation of terrorist activity may only be temporary.

In light of the preceding discussion, the subsequent task at hand is to conduct research to create appropriate alternative narratives that correspond to each ideological level. The deradicalization program can be deemed effective if it is capable of moderating the extremist ideology of terrorists to a safe level. The higher the percentage of terrorists who have been successfully moderated to a safe level, the greater the success rate of the deradicalization program, and vice versa. The alternative narrative utilized to moderate terrorists' ideologies must consider their current ideological level, progressing gradually from level to level until they have reached a safe threshold, such as the ideology of the Islamic Nationalist group.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism, as an ideology-driven violence, is indisputable. This assertion is corroborated by various theories and empirical evidence. Since terrorism has been employed by a vast array of actors in pursuit of ideological objectives, counterterrorism measures should prioritize the development of a strategy that focuses on the terrorist ideology, particularly when assessing any possible changes to it. BNPT's Deradicalization Program, which aims to rehabilitate terrorists, has faced much criticism due to the high number of recidivists and the absence of clear ideological parameters. Hence, this paper establishes ideological parameters from the results of identifying and mapping the ideologies of terrorist groups in Indonesia.
By using this ideological parameter, the deradicalization program can be implemented with a clear concept, in which the treatment of terrorists can be different or tailored to the level of radical/extreme ideology. The success of the deradicalization program can be measured by its ability to moderate terrorists’ radical/extreme ideologies to a safe level.

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