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Wasisto Raharjo Jati

Research Center for Politics–National Agency for Research and Innovation,
wasisto.raharjo.jati@brin.go.id

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Cover Page Footnote

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Power-Sharing as the Key of Secessionist Conflict Resolution in Developing Democratic Countries

WASISTO RAHARJO JATI¹

Research Center for Politics–National Agency for Research and Innovation
Gedung Widya Graha LIPI level XI, Jalan Jenderal Gatot Subroto No.Kav 10, RT.6/RW.7, Kuningan Baru, Kecamatan Mampang Prapatan, Kota Jakarta Selatan, Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 12710
Email: wasisto.raharjo.jati@brin.go.id

ABSTRAK

Artikel ini bertujuan menjelaskan potensi pembagian kekuasaan (*power-sharing*) sebagai kunci utama dalam konflik etnis, khususnya di negara-negara berkembang. Adapun skema pembagian kekuasaan ini sebenarnya menawarkan mengenai adanya solusi positif yang seimbang dan setara antara aktor negara dengan kelompok separatis dalam memutus konflik dan kemudian beralih menginisiasi adanya perdamaian di level akar rumput. Dengan menggunakan analisa kuantitatif melalui analisis dataset yang dikembangkan oleh Power Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) and Implementation of Pacts Dataset (IMPACT), artikel ini menunjukkan dua termuan penting. Pertama, skema contoh pembagian kekuasaan yang menjanjikan adalah pembagian wilayah utamanya lewat pemekaran daerah dan pembagian kewenangan politik antara aktor negara dengan kelompok-kelompok separatis. Temuan kedua adalah pembicaraan negosiasi pembagian kekuasaan yang ideal sebelumnya antara para aktor negara dengan kelompok separatis menjadi relevan dalam nantinya menghasilkan kesepakatan pembagian kekuasaan yang terikat hukum antara aktor pemerintah dengan aktor separatis. Konklusi dari studi ini adalah kapasitas negara menjadi faktor penting dalam mengelola konflik. Kapasitas negara yang kuat akan mampu untuk mengelola konflik sedangkan kapasitas negara yang lemah malah justru memperburuk konflik tersebut.

Kata kunci: pembagian kekuasaan, pembagian kewenangan, pembagian/pemekaran wilayah, kapasitas negara

ABSTRACT

This article explains how power-sharing could determine conflict resolution in developing states, particularly in developing countries. This scheme offers a win-win solution between state actors and the separatist movements to curb conflict and initiate peace-building at the grassroots level. Using a quantitative analysis that employed datasets from Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) and Implementation of Pacts Dataset (IMPACT), this article notably reveals two important findings. First, the most promising power-sharing schemes are territorial and political power-sharing. Furthermore, the preliminary talk about ideal power-sharing consensus between the state actors and rebel groups is important to determine the outcome of power-sharing policies. Finally, this article concludes that the state capacity shows the final conflict resolution. Strong

¹The author is a researcher in Research Center for Politics–National Agency for Research and Innovation

states can manage ethnic conflict, while weak state capacity could exacerbate the ethnic conflict.

Keywords: power-sharing, political power-sharing, territorial reform/territorial sharing, state capacity

INTRODUCTION

Power-sharing is a crucial factor in managing harmonious relationships in divided societies. Unfortunately, conflict occasionally occurs due to unbalanced representatives at the state level. Therefore, power-sharing is the primary strategy to keep conditions of peace in society. However, it is important to note that the government implements power-sharing differently in the real world, especially when dealing with diverse ethnic groups.

There is an ongoing debate over the result of how power-sharing has been promoted in minimizing ethnic conflict in democratic countries. Chandra argued that power-sharing could be fulfilled if it applies to the patronage democracy (Chandra 2004). Furthermore, ethnicity is the possible point where rebel actors-turned-local politicians will direct their patronage in the context of restrained information. His argument means that political power-sharing would be the ideal conflict resolution because it enables the separatists to be leading actors in managing their region. Like Chandra, Lijphart also believes that political power-sharing is an ideal solution to resolve the conflict by offering proportional council seats and veto rights (Lijphart 2002, 2004). To sum up, political power-sharing incorporates the former rebel groups within the state system by appointing them as the official regional leaders.

In contrast to the previous argument, Huber argued that economic power-sharing would be relevant in shaping peace and conflict resolution (Huber 2017). Moreover, his argument emphasizes that when the number of poor people who belong to the majority ethnic group increases, it will lead to ethnic conflict at the grass-root level. These poor people often become separatists when fed up with economic inequality between the central and provincial governments. Similar to Huber, Horowitz adds on the notion that power-sharing has been powerless

to resolve the conflict due to political deadlock agreement if it is not followed up by mutual and balanced economic concessions between the minority and the majority (Horowitz 2014). In summary, economic power-sharing maintains the status quo of majoritarian ethnicity domination in accessing economic sources while allowing minorities to do so.

Regarding the debates mentioned earlier, the existing power-sharing works of literature seem to be pragmatic when it comes to conflict resolution. Furthermore, underlying country conditions like post-colonial situations should be a big picture of power-sharing policies. This paper would like to investigate the relationship between power-sharing and managing ethnic conflict with nation-state-building in the post-colonial context. This situation brings us up to the unsettled subnational problems that may cause conflict after the colonialism period. This paper also tries to discover different power-sharing policies that solve ethnic conflicts in developing countries. More specifically, this paper examines the effectiveness level of power-sharing in reducing conflict escalation. Both political power-sharing and economic power-sharing policies surely have positive and negative implications toward peace-building at the grass-root level.

The research question in this paper is “how does the possibility of power-sharing resolve secessionist ethnic conflicts in several developing democratic countries?”. This question addresses two critical issues here that are conditional political agreements between contested actors and government and the suitable conditions for power-sharing policy. The striking point I make here is that it does not matter whether economic or political power-sharing might be relevant in easing down the heightened conflict tension; it backs again to the state capacity to manage ethnic conflict.

The structure of this paper will be as follows: the next section introduces the literature on power-sharing and ethnic conflict as the theoretical point and develops two main expectations. First, the stronger the separatist movement at the subnational level, the less reasonable power-sharing measures will resolve the conflict. Second, the more

mutual concession between government and separatist movement at the subnational level, the more reasonable power-sharing measures will resolve the conflict. Moving on, this study narrows the literature reviews down to theoretical frameworks and several hypotheses. The last part of this study finally elaborates the findings and tables into the discussion section.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Concept of Power-Sharing in Politics

Power-sharing is a unique theory because it relates to the geographical condition instead of theoretical analysis. It also has a different solution for peace and conflict resolutions. Both conditions, therefore, make the study of power-sharing apply to the area studies rather than conceptual analysis. Moreover, the different outcomes of power-sharing in different countries are sometimes mixed. These latter obstacles will be an academic challenge for scholars to scrutinize something beyond previous and existing power-sharing policies.

Something beyond power-sharing policies perhaps is a state capacity. This refers to how the state shows its authority enforcement over citizens. In line with the power-sharing, the example of state capacity can be 1) military capacity, 2) bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and 3) political institution capacity. These three categories represent the ability of the state to deter and monitor rebel groups to bring them into the peace negotiation process (Hendrix 2010, 274–75). These three categories likely determine the power-sharing proposal between government and rebel groups. If the state can overcome the rebel with strong military action, it will have no power-sharing scheme. On second thought, if the state has less military action and is committed to the negotiation with administrative assistance, it will have territorial power-sharing or economic power-sharing between government and rebel groups. This second possibility is similar to the third one who believes that if the state capacity has a good and reputable political institution capacity, it will result in political-power sharing, particularly territorial reform. These

three possibilities surely depend on the conflict situation per country. More specifically, the conflict duration and the belligerents involved in the conflict will likely determine the power-sharing model.

Previous research on power-sharing studies primarily focuses on three scopes, such as in-country case, inter-countries case, and post-conflict period. These three areas give an idea of how conflict duration affects social relationships and peace negotiation during and after the conflict. They also have different methods and findings. The existing power-sharing studies should intertwine with ethnic conflict and peace-building policies in this study. Since majoritarian states and marginalized minorities make up the largest ethnic conflict in most developing democratic countries, the power-sharing policies should require peace-building initiatives. This kind of initiative can equal political representation and fairly economic distribution. Both policies need a strong state capacity to nurture and maintain peace-building at the subnational level. Here I examined a diverse range of readings to determine the factors shaping successful stories and why power-sharing failed to mitigate conflict.

Lebanon and Sri Lanka have a challenging situation in implementing the power-sharing resolutions from the in-country case. Both countries are also experiencing divided society with huge religion and ethnicity segregation. In the Lebanese case, the government has implemented power-sharing since 1990, soon after the civil war. The Lebanese power-sharing briefly appoints a Maronite Christian to be a President, a Shia Muslim to be a Speaker of the Parliament, and a Sunni Muslim to be a Prime Minister (Baytiyeh 2019). Although these political appointments ideally should be a good example of power-sharing, in reality, the situation does not support that ideal solution because high sectarian power-sharing causes political deadlocks at the elite level (Fakhoury 2019, 11). This condition leads to discord in the parliamentary and presidential rule. The religion-led parties contribute to the political blocks to access state resources (Fakhoury 2019, 14). The three political powerhouses (Sunni, Shia, and Christian) align with international actors such as Arab Saudi, Iran, and Western power. This

foreign involvement notably shows the proxy wars between three main political blocks, particularly in the Arab world. For the sake of Lebanese power-sharing, this external affiliation eventually guarantees there are no dominant actors in the political arena. Another purpose is ensuring no one single foreign bloc could interfere domestically with Lebanese politics and government system. However, these three strained political blocks do not bear the public responsibility (Fakhoury 2019, 19). In this sense, elites mobilize the religious sentiments to preserve their positions and make the intra-political sects in a stalemate.

Conversely, Sri Lanka's power-sharing case shows different arguments. While Lebanon shows power-sharing in strained political blocks, how Sri Lanka performed power-sharing has failed due to strong ethno-centric feeling (Kelegama 2015, 239). There was a strong hostile view from the Sinhalese ethnic groups and opposition parties to challenge Tamil's political devolution proposal (Kelegama 2015, 242). The main source of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was linguistic nationalism, particularly the Sinhalese language, and institutional decay (DeVotta 2005, 143). These two factors eventually led to the Tamil mobilization, a rebel group, namely Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The foreign interventions from Norway and India could not resolve the conflict because the central government and rebel groups do not share bilateral trust-building. The opposing view between government and LTTE shows institutional decay, which means weak political institutions causes a state's rule-making to become impartial and unconstitutional when facing rebel groups (DeVotta 2005, 152). This action, consequently, makes no power-sharing work in the Sri Lanka case. Instead, the strong military capacity from the central government relinquished the rebel group.

From both in-country cases, the probabilistic factors determining political sharing are the interplay between elites and its influence on the public and the extent to which political sharing scheme proposals can affect the dissidents. More specifically, this interplay also means that the power-sharing scenario should be acceptable between the government and separatists. If both actors worked together to propose an ideal

power-sharing, it would have balanced power-sharing. Conversely, if the government and rebel groups insist on proposing their plan without prior discussions, it will result in long-term disputes without resolution.

Compared with Asian experiences that showed turbulent and even deadlock power-sharing, European counterparts told a different story to us. One main point here is democracy in Europe, mostly in stable condition. This factor, therefore, affects balanced and widespread democratic understandings for those European countries. In his research, Schneckener compares six European countries, including Belgium, Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, and Bosnia to understand the success and failure stories about power-sharing implementation (Schneckener 2002, 211). These four regions represent the several multiethnic European countries that suffered from either ethnic conflict or identity disputes. These post-conflict periods surely bring a challenging situation to propose an ideal power-sharing policy. He splits the determinant factors into two groups: actor-oriented and structure-oriented. The former includes the elite's behaviors and relationship with the public, while the latter explains the territorial, social, and economic factors. Belgium and South Tyrol generally show successes, whereas Bosnia and Northern Ireland show failures. The successful or failed story here goes back to how the state and its dissident maturely negotiate and make perpetual power-sharing deals.

The important factors why Belgian and South Tyrol's success story are how they share economic development between different language speakers and not declare the state itself as the monocultural state (DeVotta 2005, 143). This economic power-sharing can come true because Belgium and the Italian government have enormous economic sources to tame dissidents. This decision has a mutual impact on nation-building development, especially between central and provincial governments. After the economic matters finished, they began to talk about mutual political concessions. This strategy is often popular, especially when the rebel group or dissidents agree to accept the economic consensus. In this sense, having a common ground in the economy firstly will lead to power-sharing by implementing linguistic pluralism

(Schneckener 2002, 218). These lesson-learned values would be a best practice, particularly for those governments that want to curb conflict without harming many innocent people.

Unlike Belgium and Tyrol, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland have politicized issues that lead to ingrained violence. People do not have a shared national identity in every three countries (Schneckener 2002, 214). There was no mutual agreement to negotiate because the government and rebel group acted selfishly rather than diplomatically working together. Both government and rebel groups still maintain their hereditary identities instead. For example, Turkish and Hellenic communities have their own governments instead of making a unitary government.

Another example is a Serbian community with its republic within Bosnia territory. These fragile conditions certainly make national instability in some respects. In this regard, elite behavior has been detrimental in implementing power-sharing.

In a nutshell, this literature would like to contribute to how the power-sharing concept can contribute to academic approaches to conflict studies. From the previously-mentioned country cases, we can draw out some typologies here. For example, in the in-country case, the proposal of power-sharing policies to curb conflict might be fairly economic distributions. The principle of state neutrality should be addressed to ensure all belligerents willingly put down their weapons. Meanwhile, for the inter-country, the proposal of power-sharing policies should be strengthening state capacity. Since the conflict involves a group of outsiders joining in domestic affairs, a strong state is indispensable to deal with the foreign ethnic forces. The power-sharing proposal might have a strong bureaucratic capacity for the post-conflict situation. The inadequate public services might be behind the conflict. It should be done with a similar ethnic composition within the bureaucracy system. Another power-sharing can be consociationalism that enables all the ethnic representatives to have a public office position. These typologies can contribute to the ongoing academic debates, whether economic or political power-sharing. They will help us understand power-sharing

in real-life conditions. Most importantly, they will help us know the power-sharing and its connection with state strategies to resolve secessionist conflict.

METHODS

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

The key idea of the power-sharing concept is the participation of all representatives in the decision-making process (Lijphart 2004, 97). This concept also means no majoritarian groups make a public decision without consent from other groups. Lijphart is one of political scholars in power-sharing studies. He describes three ideal types of power-sharing in a democratic system such as the consociationalism democracy, consensus democracy, and proportional democracy (Lijphart 2002, 108). The first idea refers to the political agreement among diverse society members to establish a democratic government with fair representatives' composition (Lijphart 2004, 98–99). The second idea is that mutual political accommodation comprises proportional election and a coalition government, and also checks on executive power (McGann and Latner 2012, 825). The third idea is the guaranteed representation for particular minorities in the parliament (Lijphart 2004, 100). In general, these three-democracy models in the power-sharing concept focus on two basic operational factors: representation and political autonomy. Both components subsequently determine the result of power-sharing implementation at the subnational level. Following Lijphart's ideas, having a peace agreement beforehand is the key to proposing power-sharing schemes for the separatist movement at the subnational level.

In summary, this first theoretical framework emphasizes equal and fairly political power-sharing to curb separatism. It suggests that territorial reform or public office appointments accommodating separatists or dissidents can be a good example of political power-sharing.

A divided society with high-intensity conflict is the primary concern in Asian and African countries at the subnational level. Although, the

power-sharing concept ideally can make a win-win solution between the central government and the challengers. In reality, the result does not follow the ideal pattern. Horowitz argues power-sharing sometimes is not workable if ascriptive cleavages are highly concentrated in politics (Horowitz 2014, 7). In this context, the primordial factors, such as different ethnic groups, religions, and languages, are the main conflict sources. Since the beginning, the challengers have refused to talk with the central government because of different political identities resulting in power-sharing being less likely to reduce conflict. Another critic considers unaccommodated political interests from the challengers. Therefore, there are no preliminary talks between the government and the rebel groups to reduce the conflict. This argument means the elite hegemonic order constraints itself to talk with the challengers because it will harm the national stability (Kelegama 2015, 238–39). This opposing view reflects strong state unity rather than accommodating the challenger's interests. At the same time, the challengers are disappointed with the government's stance. As a result, there is little hope for the power-sharing agreement at the grassroots level.

All in all, this second theoretical framework suggests the need to maintain the status quo at the subnational level through territorial reform. It will give authority for the locals to manage their home province before going to political sharing with the central governments. Most importantly, the sense of belongings over their home regions can bridge the unsettled political power-sharing between separatists and the central governments.

In line with the aforementioned frameworks, political power-sharing can work out if it involves balanced territorial reform. By contrast, half-hearted state capacity to reform the territory can result in the weak political power-sharing for the separatists. Therefore, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): the weaker governmental capacity to issue equal political and territorial sharing for the separatists, the less likely the power-sharing can curb the secessionist conflict.

The key definition of ethnic conflict is the violence conducted by an ethnic group to another, by a group on an individual, by the state on

a group, or by a group to the state (Ashutosh 2009). This broad definition means conflict usually involves two contested parties. I confine myself to the definition, “Ethnic conflict is the conflict perpetrated by the state on a group and vice versa,” for this research’s sake. This definition will guide me to understand the dynamic relationship between state and separatist movements in power-sharing. This dynamic relation, more importantly, is how the conflict shifts from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Most conflict cases worldwide have a series of negotiations that aim to reduce greater conflict. The results often succeed or fail. These binary results show the elite’s characteristics and political concession talks.

According to the ethnic conflict, three models explain the relationship between the government’s elites and the separatist’s elites. They are instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. Those three models show how elites use ethnicity as political bargaining to obtain mutual political concessions.

First, Instrumentalists argue that ethnicity is the main source of the pursuit of economic and political interests. The elites often manipulate ethnicity to extract the resources from the state (Ashutosh 2009). In addition, instrumentalists believe conflict is also a product of rational thinking among contested parties (Williams 2015, 148). This means having common ground about mutual political concession will resolve the conflict.

Second, constructivists argue that each society community has a historical cleavage because of different identity factors such as religions and languages. This argument means that ethnic conflict is inevitable in a divided society because it relates to inherent origins. In this sense, this approach does not explain enough about the power-sharing potency.

Third, institutionalists propose institutionalized power-sharing to resolve conflicts such as federalism, proportional representation election system, and vote rights for minorities. This approach is similar to Lipjhart’s theory about power-sharing. Following his theory, institutionalists have conflict resolutions through two dimensions. First, the execu-

utive-parties dimension comprises multi-party coalition, proportional election, and diverse society corporatism. Second, the federal-unitary dimension comprises bicameralism, judicial review, and federalism (McCann and Latner 2012, 825).

In summary, institutionalism and instrumentalism give more definitive power-sharing solutions than the constructivism approach. The institutionalists rely on how mutual trust-building can determine political negotiations among elites. The instrumentalists count on political agreements accepted by parties. Both approaches eventually agree that more concession will strengthen the power-sharing in resolving ethnic conflict. In line with both views, I expect strong peace commitment from government and rebel groups will impact more political concessions at the subnational level. Therefore, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): the more mutual concession between government and separatist movement at the subnational level, the more reasonable power-sharing measures will resolve the conflict.

Datasets

In this research, I use two main datasets from Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) and Implementation of Pacts Dataset (IMPACT) to measure the effect of power-sharing on ethnic conflict resolutions. The former dataset was released by the GIGA (German Institute of Global and Area Studies) in 2014. This data contains promise and practice between the government and rebel groups in 41 surveyed countries (Ottmann and Vullers 2014, 2). I employ this data to compare the ideal and the practical type of power-sharing implementation.

PSED dataset defines power-sharing as the peace agreement between government and separatist (Ottmann and Vullers 2014, 2–4). This definition enables me to figure out how power-sharing can resolve the conflict. However, the questions' answers should be probabilistic because both datasets also have limitations. This dataset only views power-sharing as the end product of power-sharing. Therefore, we do not know the dynamic process between the government and rebel groups. Another limitation is that datasets contain the empirical

findings from five and seven years ago. It means the dataset could not reflect the current power-sharing conditions. Therefore, we need to explain qualitatively, especially some exceptional power-sharing cases in some countries.

Data Explorations

I begin to extract information about the promise and practice of power-sharing policies from the PSED dataset. This dataset captured the information from 1986 to 2006. I pick up some countries that represent each continent. Interestingly, there is no American countries case in this dataset. Oceania region just contributes Papua New Guinea (PNG) dispute between the central government and Bougainville Islanders. I choose to abandon it because the PNG does not represent the Oceania case entirely. The countries I choose are those multiethnic nations with strong secessionist movements. After that, I try to compare the promise and the practice of power-sharing. Also, I want to analyze the probabilistic and determinant factors that determine the power-sharing results.

PSED dataset has two data observation parts. The first is the promised power-sharing proposal, and the second is the practical power-sharing agreement. The former data consists of mostly binary data, while the latter comprises mixed data (binary and categorical data).

I divide three power-sharing schemes: political power-sharing, economic power-sharing, and territorial power-sharing. These three policies arguably show the political bargaining mechanism between government and rebel groups to solve the ethnic conflict. I expect the stronger the separatist movement are, the more likely they want to make an independence referendum in the future. In other words, political power-sharing is the most preferred peace agreement agenda between government and rebel groups. However, my hypothesis could be wrong in practice because the ethnic rebel groups eventually accept self-governing rights in territorial and economic matters. The two tables below are my empirical analyses from the dataset.

Table 1: Promised Power-Sharing Agreement between Government and Separatist Movement

| Country name | Belligerents | | Political Power-Sharing | | Economic Power-Sharing | | Territorial Power-Sharing | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|----------|------------|
| | Government | Rebel Group | Ministerial seats | Parliament seats | Fair Revenue | State Companies | Devolution | Autonomy | Referendum |
| Serbia | Serbian Govt | UCK | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Bosnia | Bosnian Govt | Republika Srpska | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Croatia | Croatian Govt | Republic of Krajina | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Sudan | Sudan Govt | SELMA | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Congo | Congolese Govt | Cocoyes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Rwanda | Rwandan Govt | RPF | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Afghanistan | Afghanistan Govt | Hizb-i Wahdat | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| India | Indian Government | ABSU | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Indonesia | Indonesian Govt | GAM | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| The Philippines | Philippines Govt | MNLF | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |

Source: elaborated from statistical data.

DISCUSSION

Political and Territorial Power-Sharing as the Key of Conflict Resolution

The table, as mentioned earlier, shows government and rebel groups as two conflicted actors. In addition, three power-sharing provide policies proposal. There are ten multiethnic countries as the surveyed countries case. All the data is binary. This enables us to understand the probabilistic power-sharing factor in reducing conflict escalation. The probabilistic explanations could be much likely, more likely, or least likely arguments.

From Table 1, the most promised power-sharing agreement strongly emphasizes political and territorial power-sharing. Economic power-sharing is the least favourable option for the central government. This preliminary finding is in line with hypothesis 1: the stronger separatist movement is giving a dilemmatic power-sharing position for the government. Both preferred power-sharing proposals above show the stronger separatist tendencies at the subnational level. At the same time, national unity is the central government's priority to save the country. This condition gives an impression that power-sharing is less likely to finish the ethnic conflict. A referendum is the least option if power-sharing is failed at the subnational level. That is the most unpopular decision for all those surveyed countries.

Serbia and Bosnia implemented a balanced power-sharing policy regarding political and territorial matters from the European case. Bosnia proposes national power positions and autonomous region status for Serb ethnic groups, whereas Serbia only offers the autonomous region status for the Kosovan people. The Croatian case is exceptional because this country does not propose anything for the rebel groups. In summary, proposed power-sharing shows that territorial power-sharing and proportional democracy are much likely to solve an ethnic conflict.

From the African case, Sudan is the most advanced state, which proposes all power-sharing policies to solve the long conflict with southern rebel groups. However, Sudan also provides a referendum option for the rebel group. This means the strong separatist elites have better bargaining politics than the central government. This indicates that separatist groups gain a grass-root level; thereby, they can corner the government. Rwanda's case follows the European model that does not offer economic power-sharing for the Tutsi rebel groups. Nevertheless, the Hutu-led government proposes greater political and territorial concessions for Tutsi. In summary, proposed power-sharing is failed to propose consensus democracy due to strong elite behavior.

From the Asian case, three countries offer territorial power-sharing for the rebel groups. Afghanistan case is an exception here because it only offers ministerial positions. National stability is the main fo-

cus for India, Indonesia, and the Philippines as they lie on regional autonomy over political power-sharing. Although, Indonesia and the Philippines are adopting a unitary state system. Both countries are likely to implement federal ways to solve the conflict by agreeing on more self-governing rights for rebel groups. In this context, GAM and MNLF people have successfully constructed themselves to rebel on behalf entire Acehnese and Moro people. This is the instrumental ethnic conflict. Both rebel groups also represented two charismatic leading figures: Hasan Di Tiro and Nur Misuari.

For the Acehnese case, Hasan Di Tiro casts himself as a reborn and independent Aceh (Reid 2004, 307). His self-appointed declaration as the Acehnese patron assumes full responsibility for the recreation of Acehnese historical consciousness. To make it convincing, he reveals his blood lineage with Tengku Cik Di Tiro—a highly respected ulama who led a rebellion against the Dutch colonial government—and with Daud Beureu'eh—former Darul Islam leader in Aceh (Aspinall 2007, 252-253). As a result, Tiro successfully builds a charismatic persona to raise Acehnese nationalism through the “*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*” (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement. In this regard, this kind of nationalism wants to rebuild glorified Aceh as an Islamic sovereign state, albeit Acehnese nationalism is more secular than Islamic sense (Aspinall 2007, 251). As a result, Aceh ethnic conflict is resolved, and many former GAM officers run a public office at the regency and provincial levels.

For Moro case, Nur Misuari of Bangsamoro does not have strong personal histories like Hasan di Tiro does. However, he uses past histories to lift Bangsamoro nationalism instead—the basic ethnic conflict problem in Mindanao Island (Engineer 1984, 2155). Maguindanao Sultanate of Mindanao has fought to defend their land over three centuries against Spanish colonial rule (Engineer 1984, 2155). This historical fact gives strong shreds of evidence that Moro was an independent state before forcible accession to the Philippines. Nur Misuari later combines the glorified histories and the current marginalization and insecurity under Manila to establish Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

(Bertrand 2000, 44). MNLF is responsible for returning the lost lands to the Moro people, protecting a Muslim way of life, and preventing Christian immigrations (Bertrand 2000, 44). These ethnic demands eventually brought Nur Misuari to power as the MNLF leader and governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from 1996 to 2001. In the end, Mindanao ethnic conflict was still negotiating (Aurellio 2019).

These two-rebel groups represented homogeneous ethnic separatists who have a better bargaining political logic than government. The strong bargaining politics shows two manifestos that strongly show ethnic consciousness. Brown argues that this kind of consciousness encourages the elites to strengthen their authority and support through primordial sentiments (1988, 67). The rise of primordial sentiments can be successful due to long-term grievances against the central government. The source of grievances is mainly as economic disparities between locals and central government, but then it escalates into ethnic conflict war. These sentiments also mainly included a sense of vulnerability towards state penetration in their territories. This situation eventually installed elites to act as spokesmen and leaders of their communities (Brown 1988, 68). Another explanation about ethnic consciousness is the different ethnic histories between the national and local states. Rajah believes the state's origin depends on the myths from their ancestors (2002, 522). Therefore, rebel elites use those arguments to make bold arguments about a separate nation.

As a result, giving territorial power-sharing and self-governing rights are likely to reduce ethnic conflict potency for Aceh and Bangsamoro. Moreover, while Indonesia does not agree with a referendum in the power-sharing agreement, the Philippines offers a referendum for the Moro people. In summary, the Asian case is less likely to accommodate rebel groups at the national political level. Instead, it seems like territorial power-sharing is the government's way to localize the separatist movement by giving more self-governing rights.

Table 2: Realisation of Power-Sharing Agreement between Government and Separatist Movement

| Country name | Belligerents | | Pre-Perpetual Power Sharing Period | | Post- Perpetual Power-Sharing Agreements | |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| | Government | Rebel Group | More than one Rebel Groups | Previous Talks Before Signed Power Sharing | The realization of Power-Sharing Policies | Descriptive Explanations |
| Serbia | Serbian Govt | UCK | No | No | Agreed | New Autonomous Status Enacted |
| Bosnia | Bosnian Govt | Republika Srpska | No | No | Agreed | Federal Status is Given |
| Croatia | Croatian Govt | Republic of Krajina | No | No | Agreed | Territorial power-sharing |
| Sudan | Sudan Govt | SELMA | No | Yes | Agreed | Political power-sharing and Referendum |
| Congo | Congolese Govt | Cocoyes | Yes | No | Agreed | Military Integration |
| Rwanda | Rwandan Govt | RPF | No | No | In-between | Peace agreement signature Civil conflict recurrence |
| Afghanistan | Afghanistan Govt | Hizb-i Wahdat | Yes | No | Agreed | Political Power Sharing between Rabbani and Hekmatyar |
| India | Indian Government | ABSU | No | No | Agreed | Peace agreement signature |
| Indonesia | Indonesian Govt | GAM | No | Yes | Agreed | Territorial power-sharing |
| The Philippines | Philippines Govt | MNLF | No | Yes | Agreed | Territorial power-sharing |

Source: elaborated from statistical data.

The Final Results of Power-Sharing schemes in Several Democratic Countries

Compared with Table 1, Table 2 show the different structure. This table is not only providing binary data but also categorical data with a qualitative explanation. The binary data indicates the prior process and the final peace agreement results, where the categorial explains the empirical power-sharing outcomes. This analysis emphasizes the determinant factors.

Table 2 shows varied results in practical power-sharing after signing the peace agreement between governments and rebel groups. European and Asian countries' results are still consistent with previously promised power-sharing, while African countries remain turbulent. Based on Table 2, political and territorial power-sharing shows that power-sharing policies have successfully resolved the ethnic conflict. Both also sign more mutual concessions between government and rebel groups, especially proportional seats in political representation.

From the European case, territorial power-sharing is preferable to political power-sharing in the practical power-sharing policy. These three Balkan countries agree to give autonomous status to reduce further conflict escalation. Shared political seats and devolved government are the determinant power-sharing factors from the European case.

The African case showcases a series of preliminary discussions that has determined the final power-sharing results. As expected, stronger separatist southern Sudan groups corner the Sudan government in the stalemate condition. This result follows hypothesis 1, but it does not connect with hypothesis 2 because Southern rebel groups have stronger independence than the central government's control. Unlike Sudan, Rwanda's ethnic conflict remains turbulent. This condition certainly follows hypothesis 1 but not hypothesis 2. In short, the African case shows stronger ethnic resentments because power-sharing does not make it feasible to solve the conflict. Moreover, power-sharing leads to more complicated situations. The ingrained ethnic resentment is the determinant factor why power sharing is failed.

From the Asian case, political and territorial power-sharing is significant to resolve ethnic conflict in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The Indian case is unclear because the result does not provide a technical explanation. A shared ministerial position is a key to solving a conflict between two major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Devolved government form is significant to resolve conflict in the Philippines and Indonesia. These different approaches show that geographical condition is likely to determine the final power-sharing results. Because both

southeast Asian countries are island countries, it is reasonable to give more self-governing rights for the rebel groups to manage their regions.

Comparative Discussion about Power-Sharing and Its Implication toward Conflict Resolution

Both above-mentioned empirical analyses largely support my hypotheses. From the proposed power-sharing findings, the stronger separatist movements are, the less likely power-sharing to resolve the ethnic conflict. That is my first hypothesis. African and Asian countries seem to follow this pattern. However, Asian countries successfully reduce the stronger separatist movement by implementing territorial power-sharing and consensus democracy at the subnational level. This finding follows the second hypothesis. It is likely that territorial power-sharing also brings mutual concessions to the separatist elites and their peoples.

Implementing the power-sharing policy is much likely following the democracy model from Lijphart. Serbia and Bosnia implement proportional democracy and territorial power-sharing to the Kosovar rebels and Serbs in Srpska. This also shows the stronger homogeneous ethnic rebel groups in Serbia and Bosnia. However, the practical power-sharing shows different results from the promised plan. While Serbs rebels accepted the devolved government from the Bosnia government, the Kosovar people chose to take the independence option from Serbia.

The failure of power-sharing resolution in the African case shows that the weak state capacity exacerbates the ethnic conflict at the subnational level. The rebel elites use the instrumentalism ethnic approach to persuade their people to rebel against the state continuously. This approach includes using ethnicity closeness to increase local resentment toward the central government. While weak state capacity is the strong factor why power-sharing failed in Africa, the Asian case shows the geographical conditions are the significant power-sharing policy. Adopting the federalism principle in designing regional autonomy resolves the ethnic conflict between Aceh and Mindanao. It seems Indonesia and India follow Lijphart's theory about consensus democracy at the subnational level.

The discussions above draw out the typologies between the power-sharing strategies model and separatist conflict resolutions. I summarise it in Table 3 below here.

Table 3: The Typologies of Ideal Power-Sharing to Curb Secessionist Movement

| No | Power Sharing Strategies | Conflict Situations | Government | Separatists | Ideal Secessionist Conflict Resolutions |
|----|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---|--|---|
| 1 | Public Appointments | Post Conflict | The government may appoint the leading secessionist figure to set up several local office offices | The separatists should relinquish their secessions agenda once they are appointed to be head of regions. | Special autonomous region status/ Representative bureaucracy system/ Consociationalism government |
| 2 | Territorial Reforms | In-Conflict | Territorial reform is meant to localize ethical conflict within a devolved system. | Administrating their territory enables the former separatists to establish their own home rules that might differ from national rules. | Federalism system/Devolved administration |
| 3 | Balanced Economic Redistributions | Pre-Conflict | Allocating 50:50 public fund transfer to provincial governments | Greater access for locals to utilize the common goods, which were promised by the government | Fiscal Decentralisation/ Special Rights for the provincial government to propose a tax on its natural resources. |

Source: data elaborated on my own

Based on Table 3, the three strategies hail from political and economic power-sharing policies. Generally, there is no ideal solution to curb separatism because it depends on the context. For example, political power-sharing might be the strong policy to curb secessionist movements through peace agreements. This has an aim for maintaining stability at the subnational level. This also means the government is willing to give mutual concessions to keep national unity by transferring some political rights to the former separatists. Meanwhile, economic power-sharing seems to be a pre-emptive strategy to curb secessionists since the beginning. Compared with the political ones, the economy can be a pragmatic policy to give local insurgents money to put down their arms.

These typologies ultimately need long-term commitment between government and separatists to maintain joint stability. Nevertheless, most importantly, both actors should hold on to their egoistic attitudes

for the long peace condition. This prerequisite, consequently, always requires improved power-sharing policies that might keep commitments between the government and former separatists.

CONCLUSION

Power-sharing is a solution to resolve ethnic conflict in some multiethnic countries. Based on my findings, political-power sharing and territorial power-sharing are the best solutions to solve high ethnic conflict escalation. Proportional and consensus democracy are also the most preferred model. At the same time, these two approaches are arguably successful and failed in some countries. This argument depends on the specific in-country case.

The study shows that power-sharing policies can be divided into three phases like post-conflict, in-conflict, and pre-conflict. These three phases enable the government to have various power-sharing policies to deal with the separatists. First, economic power-sharing can be preventive to curb the greater possibility of insurgencies at the subnational level. This emphasizes mutually balanced public fund transfer and incentives from the central to provincial governments. It also requires wide access for locals to utilize their local resources and national interests. Political power-sharing can be the last and strongest power-sharing to curb secessionism by acknowledging the separatists as the leading local political figures. It can be public office appointments and territorial reform that might give autonomous status within the national system. More importantly, this scheme allows the government to keep the separatist under the radar.

From the country level, European and Asian countries show the power-sharing policies because of the committed peace agreement and consistent power-sharing implementation since the beginning. However, weak state capacity has been the major reason why power-sharing fails, particularly in the African cases. The limitation of this research is the outdated dataset, which implies a lack of the current power-sharing policies. If further analyzed using a more current dataset, the results could be similar with these research findings or perhaps different due

to changed context. This is an interesting topic that needs to be further researched.

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