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Muhammad Zaenuddin Firmansyah
Universitas Indonesia, mzfiransyah4610@gmail.com

Sapto Priyanto
Universitas Indonesia, sapto.priyanto09@ui.ac.id

Megan Bilney
Murdoch University, bilneymegan94@gmail.com

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**Collaboration Strategy in The Penta-Helix Concept: Deradicalization
Program for Terrorist Separatism Groups In Papua**

Muhammad Zaenuddin Firmansyah

Terrorism Studies, School of Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Indonesia
mzfiransyah4610@gmail.com

Sapto Priyanto

Terrorism Studies, School of Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Indonesia
sapto.priyanto09@ui.ac.id

Megan Bilney

International aid and Development & Security, Terrorism and Counter Terrorism
Murdoch university
bilneymegan94@gmail.com

Abstract

On 29 April, 2021, The Indonesian Government declared the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) as a Separatism Terrorist Group (KST), in response to the casualties, both from the military and civilian parties. In particular, the death of the Kabinda of Papua and Bharada Komang was a catalyst for this announcement as previous conflict resolution steps failed to address the ongoing conflict in Papua. The increased risk of terrorism in the Papuan region is driven by the lack of research into focused deradicalization programs. In this article, the author seeks to address how a targeted deradicalization program is an appropriate conflict approach to this situation. This paper proposes the Penta-Helix concept as a suitable program, which seeks to facilitate the specific needs for deradicalisation in this region. The Penta-Helix concept is based on five factors: the history of separatism in Papua, the traditions of the Papuan people, the variance between religious and secular radicalism, the concept of deradicalisation and disengagement, and the TNI-Polri *Operasi Penggalangan* and the current deradicalization program in Indonesia. The collaboration and cooperation of the Pentahelix concept's five factors, in the form of representative actors, are essential in the development and implementation of three stages of the proposed deradicalization program: identification, psychological adjustment, and aftercare. Finally, this paper outlines eight recommendations, called the "Optimization Strategy for the Deradicalization Program", which intend to be applied for sustainable deradicalisation of Papuan terrorism separatists.

Keywords: Deradicalization, Penta-Helix, Separatism, Strategy, Terrorist.

INTRODUCTION

On Sunday, April 25, 2021, Brigadier General Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, the Head of the TNI Papua Province, died due to a shootout with the Papuan Separatist Terrorist Group (KST) in Dambek Village, Beoga District, Puncak Regency (Taher, 2021). This incident occurred when the TNI and Polri Task Force carried out a patrol shortly after an incident of violence in that area by the Kabinda group so that government forces could oversee the aftermath of the Kabinda attack and restore security in the area (Kompas, 2021a). This was shortly followed by another attack in the Ilaga District on April 27, 2021, with one member of the Nemangkawi Task Force killed and two members injured (Kompas, 2021b).

Mahfud MD, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenkopolhukam), stated that the increase in terror acts, including the two incidents in April 2021, by the KKB (Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata or armed criminal group) was the main reason for the group's designation as a terrorist group (Kompas, 2021c). Furthermore, 59 civilians, 27 soldiers (TNI), and nine members of the National Police (POLRI)

have died in the last three years (Warta Ekonomi, 2021). This status change was further supported by the various State institutions, including the TNI, Polri, the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), and the MPR, together with several prominent community leaders and organizations (CNNIndonesia, 2021). Finally, Mahfud emphasized that the KKB has also fulfilled the formal legal aspects of the definition, as set out by Indonesia's terrorism laws, which specifies that anyone who is planning, mobilizing and running the organization will be subject to criminal sanctions (Republika, 2021b). The aligning of these three events has contributed to the shift in the Papuan security approach.

The proposal for the KKB as a terrorist separatist group is an old government approach to conflict resolution in Papua. The desire for KKB to be included in the terrorist list included calls by Bambang Soesatyo, chairman of the Indonesian Legislative (DPR), who requested that the KKB be included in the terrorist list on December 12, 2018. Further calls occurred on December 26, 2019, when the Kemenkopolhukan urged community leaders to do the same (Republika, 2021b). The Head of the National Counterterrorism Agency

(BNPT) expressed support regarding the labeling of terrorists to the KKB at the DPR Commission III meeting on March 22, 2021, and a month later, BIN officially classified KKB as a Terrorist Separatist Group (KST) (Republika, 2021b). However, the official designation of KKB as a terrorist group occurred when the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs held a meeting with representatives of the TNI Headquarters, Police Headquarters, Head of the Strategic Intelligence Agency (Kabais), Heads of the BNPT and PPATK, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The designation was also supported by the Papuan Indigenous Consultation, the Papuan Customary Council (DAP), and the Indigenous Peoples Institution (LMA) (Republika, 2021b).

Some notes need to be underlined regarding the policy steps taken by the government before assigning a terrorist label to the KKB as a conflict resolution step in Papua. The Indonesian government has implemented a similar soft approach in Papua as in the Aceh region, which had some similarities. However, the successful implementation of asymmetric decentralization or special autonomy in Papua per Law no. 1 of 2001 did not

necessarily produce the same results as in the Aceh region. The conflict between the separatists and the TNI/POLRI continues to cause several casualties on both sides. The continued conflict is explained by the failure of asymmetric territorial initiatives and the decentralization of Papua remaining one-sided, elite-driven, and designed without adequate consultation with Papuans to address their concerns. Ultimately, the process resulted in poorly designed policies that failed to accommodate Papuan demands for recognition, protection, and affirmation schemes. These policy failures have created a greater sense of deprivation and grievances among the Papuan population (Lele, 2021).

The decision to label the KKB as a terrorist separatist organization or group raises important questions about the impact of labelling KKB as a terrorist separatist organization and how to implement an appropriate deradicalization program for Papuan terrorist separatist groups. These questions include who are the key actors in resolving the conflict, what human rights issues are involved, and what methods and mechanisms will be most impactful in implementing counterterrorism strategies in the region. Although several studies

raise the same topic, namely handling terrorist separatism and even deradicalization programs in Indonesia, there are still differences in the Papuan people's history, customs, culture, and local wisdom that need to be considered. The Indonesian government has not yet officially issued the latest blueprint that discusses the handling of separatist terrorists and their deradicalization program. This paper attempts to address this gap by providing sustainable recommendations involving collaborative strategies that the Indonesian government can implement.

Several previous research papers have analyzed various forms of deradicalization programs around the world. One such, involved Horgan and Braddock (2010) researching the effectiveness of deradicalization programs focused on reducing recidivism in Northern Ireland, Columbia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Neumann (2010) conducted a series of studies in 15 countries, including Indonesia, and classified these countries into four groups: prison regimes for terrorists, prison radicalization, collective deradicalization, and individual deradicalization. Furthermore, Weeks (2018) suggests that

there are individual and group approaches to deradicalization. In agreeing with Neumann, Weeks (2018) also concluded that collective deradicalization and disengagement have several shared characteristics with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. In contrast, individual deradicalization requires personalization to address the driving and pulling factors (Weeks, 2018). Struegher (2013) focused on the push and pull factors of individuals disengaging or remaining with terrorist organizations by examining deradicalization programs in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Research by Islam (2019) found that it focuses not only on theoretical analysis but also on case studies of deradicalization programs in Islamic countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia.

Priyanto and associates (2020) researched the release of terrorists in Indonesia using *Islah* Islamic methods and local wisdom in focus group discussions between victims, terrorists in prison, ex-terrorist convicts, and their networks. This study shows that *Islah* has been successfully applied in Indonesia as a natural release method between victims and terrorists. However, *Islah* is less

effective for perpetrators from Poso, Central Sulawesi, because they still perceive them as victims. Priyanto and associates (2020) also examined the implementation of deradicalization programs in Indonesia to prevent recidivism using a SWOT analysis. It was found that Indonesia's strength in carrying out deradicalization was the increasing role of the government and society. The drawback is the lack of good cooperation between deradicalization implementers. Therefore, terrorist recidivism is theorized to be prevented by improving personnel training, using evidence-based deradicalized methods, and increasing access to materials, tools, and money.

Hettiarachchi (2018) discussed Sri Lanka's deradicalization program for the separatist militant organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The rehabilitation program is designed for prisoners and detainees, and contains six components and community roles that claim to go beyond disengagement. These six targeted components seek to bring the individual back into mainstream society, with the benefits of the process being maintained during and after reintegration into society. This study found that former LTTE members faced challenges returning

to society, making them vulnerable to re-radicalization. Therefore, it was identified that community involvement and reconciliation were vital in the rehabilitation process. In contrast, Zhou (2019) found different things about China's deradicalization program for separatist terrorists in the western region of Xinjiang. Some of the main deradicalization approaches include "five keys," "four prongs," "three contingents," "two hands," and "one rule" approaches. In addition, there are detention, post-prison, and social programs to target three groups: imprisoned radicals, released radicals, and those who were radicalized but not prosecuted. This deradicalization program also encourages community involvement to support the goals of this program.

The above research shows that there is no detailed discussion of a deradicalization program for the KKB separatists in Papua. Although several studies raise the same topic, namely handling separatist terrorists and even deradicalization programs in Indonesia, there are still differences in the history, customs, culture, and local wisdom of the Papuan people that need to be taken into consideration. The Indonesian government has not officially issued a blueprint that

discusses the handling of separatist terrorists, especially the deradicalization program through the BNPT regarding these considerations. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide recommendations that can be implemented by the Indonesian government and involve various government and non-government actors.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study utilized a qualitative approach with the researchers analyzing, describing, and summarizing the data obtained during the research. The central concept of Penta-helix consists of Government, Academic, Community, Business, and Media groups that work together in each program deradicalization. At first, the Penta-helix concept was used to develop an economic theory for progress in business (Sudiana et al., 2020). However, through the integration of the groups mentioned, it is theorized that this concept is an applicable and relevant concept for deradicalization in Papua. Furthermore, the rational choice theory framework regarding deradicalization and disengagement is also used to guide the recommendations, especially after reintegration and community resocialization.

The primary data collection technique was interviewing one of the personnel in the joint TNI-POLRI operation assignment in Papua for the 2020-2021 period. Additionally, secondary data is obtained through literature studies from national and international scientific journals and sources of information or news obtained from online seminars and published by credible and trusted institutions. The data analysis technique uses a qualitative interactive model approach consisting of data collection, data presentation, data reduction, and conclusion or verification initiated by Miles and Huberman (Creswell, 2013; Miles et al., 2014; Miles & Huberman, 1992).

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

Before presenting the concept of an appropriate deradicalization program for terrorist separatist groups, it is necessary to have a further and in-depth understanding of separatism in Papua, the customs (traditions) of the Papuan people, the differences between religious and secular (political) radicalism, the concept of deradicalization and disengagement, the current joint TNI-Polri raising operations

and deradicalization program in Indonesia and their evaluation.

Separatism in Papua

Separatism is labeled as one of the most violent and violent types of conflict because separatist conflicts involve at least two conflicting parties: the non-separatist majority group (hereinafter referred to as the “majority”) and the separatist group (Mashuri & van Leeuwen, 2018). Historically, West Papua was part of the Dutch East Indies and was under the same administration as Indonesian territory. International pressure on the Netherlands built over the following years, with Indonesian President Soekarno as the actor. At the height of the Cold War, the Kennedy administration mediated efforts to reach a settlement that would balance the interests of Indonesia, its allies in fighting communism, and the wishes of the Papuan people (Crowther, 2019). On August 15, 1962, the New York Agreement allowed Indonesia to gain temporary control over the territory of West Papua. On November 19, 1969, West Papua was officially integrated into Indonesia through the People's Opinion (PEPERA) or Act of Free Choice on November 19, 1969 (Sabir, 2018). However, the legitimacy and

legality of these actions have been questioned by many West Papuans who have pushed for their demands to separate from the republic (Mashuri & van Leeuwen, 2020) and carry out armed actions and international campaigns (Nainggolan, 2014). Apart from the above political aspects, factors such as exploitation of natural resources (economic aspect) (Mardiani et al., 2021) and military repression in West Papua reinforce the claim of secession, which makes this problem an unresolved national problem (Mashuri & van Leeuwen, 2020). Another reason for the formation of the OPM (Free Papua Organization) is also due to the marginalization of the Papuan community (social aspect) in terms of unequal education (Mardiani et al., 2021).

On December 7, 2014, a form of solidarity in the resistance of separatist groups in Papua was manifested in the formation of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) in Port Vila, Republic of Vanuatu, who fought politically abroad to support separatist groups who fought using weapons (Sabir, 2018). The main goal of the ULMWP is to seek support from various countries in the South Pacific region by bringing up human rights and

democracy issues. The existence of external support is evidenced by the establishment of OPM representative offices in Papua New Guinea, Australia, the Netherlands, Vanuatu, and the UK (Sabir, 2018). The separatist movement in Papua is divided into two categories, political approaches and armed approaches. Benny Wenda led this political movement as chairman of the ULMWP abroad, and the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), led by Viktor Yeimo, was engaged domestically (Waterpauw, 2021). Meanwhile, armed criminals are carried out by the Armed Criminal Group (KKB), which is currently referred to as KST, led by ten figures, one of which is Lekagak Talenggen. These separatist actors also utilize social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube, to discuss and spread the perceived government injustice, reports of human rights violations by security forces, and the existing economic, social, and educational welfare inequality.

Papuan customs and traditions

The Papuan people prioritize dialogue in the traditional decision-making process, and each tribe has an equal position. Papuans recognize that there are

seven customary areas or customary law, namely: the Mamta Tabi or Memberamo-Tami area in Tabi Land (region I), Saireri Region (region II), Doberai Region (region III), Bomberai Region (region IV), Anim Region Ha (region V), La-Pago Region (Region VI), and Me-Pago Region (region VII) (Kemenpppa, 2019). This means that every native or non-indigenous Papuan living in the customary area is obliged to obey and follow the customary norms of each ethnic group in accordance with the division of its territory.

Traditionally, the Papuan people resolve conflict by Bakar Batu (burning pigs paid for by the perpetrators), customary fines, distribution of customary lands and dialogue processes mediated by tribal chiefs. This is because the understanding of the structure of indigenous peoples in Papua is represented through the Indigenous Peoples Institution (LMA), which the government formed, and the Papuan Customary Council (DAP), which accommodates the customary structure as a whole. The Papuan indigenous peoples also have customary power that comes from God, which is passed down from generation to generation from the ancestors of the Papuan Indigenous Peoples (Kemenpppa, 2019).

Thus, the role of religious leaders, such as pastors and priests, has a sufficient role in helping to resolve conflicts and problems and all forms of direction and advice are still welcome.

The LMA structure starts from the Papua LMA in large, then forms and oversees the district LMA divided according to their respective districts scattered throughout the Papua region. The district LMA forms and oversees the sub-districts, and the smallest is the village LMA. In other words, the formation of the LMA structure is top-down in distribution and bureaucracy. The DAP structure starts on the opposite side or is bottom-up, starting with the Village Customary Council, then the Local Customary Council, the Regional Customary Council (7 Regional Customary Councils) and the Papuan Customary Council (Papuan Customary Council). Meanwhile, the leadership structure at the village level consists of the village head, the customary leader and the LMA leader as a traditional community in a village (Dewi, 2017).

The formation of the Village Customary Council or tribe is formed by a hamlet or village that has the same regional language in a customary area which is also born from the leadership system in which

all tribes in Papua collectively reach consensus and provide benefits to various parties (Irawati & Widjaja, 2006). The same mechanism also applies to regional or regional adat councils formed by tribal adat councils of a region with legislative, judicial, and executive powers run by regional executive bodies consisting of adat expert staff in their respective fields. The formation of the Papuan Customary Council is carried out by the tribal adat council and the regional adat council, with the number of adjusting members from the two adat councils below it so that it becomes the highest adat government in Papua (Irawati & Widjaja, 2006). In other words, the role of customary leaders, LMA and DAP dramatically influences the decisions of the residents within a tribe and as decision-makers in a conflict or problem.

Religious versus Secular Radicalism

The concept of deradicalization exists due to the concept of radicalization that occurs at both group and individual levels. Therefore, it is necessary to understand radicalism itself. Neumann (2010) states that most definitions currently circulating describe radicalization as an ongoing process by

which groups or individuals ultimately participate in the use of violence for political ends. Some authors refer to violent radicalization to emphasize violent outcomes and distinguish processes from nonviolent forms of radical thought (Neumann, 2010). In general, radicalism is based on religion and secularism. Religious radicalism is radicalism that tends to be based on religious ideology. It can appear in any religion even though nowadays it is often stereotypically associated with specific religions because of large terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS in the past. Religious radicalism is based on religious doctrine based on a literal understanding of the source of religious teachings and fosters social conflict, and horizontal and vertical violence. The cycle that occurs starts from religious doctrine, religious radicalism, and religious violence and committing acts of terrorism at its peak. There is also religious radicalism in the form of discourses that do not commit acts of violence but produce propaganda narratives that can generate radical thoughts and behaviors. In contrast, secular radicalism is based on secular politics and ideology, such as white supremacy, separatism and ethnonationalism.

Therefore, deradicalization focuses on changing radical discourse and actions to address the roots of the radicalization process.

Deradicalization Vis-À-Vis Disengagement

The lack of consensus in defining radicalization and violent extremism also extends to deradicalization with different conceptualizations and theoretical models. It is even proven that theories and research related to the goals and processes of radicalization are much larger than theories and research that discusses disengagement and deradicalization (Davis & Cragin, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010). Broadly, deradicalization can be understood as a process of changing one's internal beliefs and opposing radical ideologies (Islam, 2019).

John Horgan (2008) defines deradicalization as a social and psychological process by which a person's commitment to engage in violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that the individual is no longer at risk of engaging in criminal activity. In comparison, some scholars have defined deradicalization as the process of changing individual beliefs and embracing mainstream values by rejecting radical or violence-oriented ideologies (Rabasa *et al.*,

2010). In this case, the deradicalized person will stop providing physical support to the terrorist group, however the individual may still share the beliefs of the groups (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). Deradicalization can also be said as a gradual way of accepting pluralist social, political and economic discourse (Ashour, 2010).

So far there is no standard framework for deradicalization programs and there are various proposed models available for effective deradicalization according to each country. Regarding individual-focused deradicalization programs, there is a broad understanding that such programs should be based on individual perspectives, beliefs, and motivations to join terrorist groups or engage in violence. Therefore, a successful deradicalization initiative will be based on active efforts to change the radical beliefs of individuals. This not only reflects a change in behavior, but a shift in perspective and ideology (Rabasa et al., 2010). In this case, deradicalization programs must be designed based on extremist nature. For example, a former radical who left his organization by choice had to follow a different program than a

radicalized person and was then detained by the authorities (Islam, 2019).

Meanwhile, according to Horgan (2008), disengagement is the process of an individual experiencing a change in role or function, which is usually associated with reduced participation in violence but is most often associated with significant temporary or permanent role changes. Disengagement is more accessible than deradicalization. It is difficult to change individual belief systems and ideologies and, more importantly, serve as the basis for terrorist deradicalization (Striegher, 2013). A terrorist who abstains from the violent activity does not necessarily mean that the terrorist has completely contradicted his extremist beliefs (Horgan, 2008). Therefore, a trustworthy and successful deradicalization program must produce changes in the underlying beliefs of the individual, not just changes in behavior as in the disengagement process, so that there is a reduced risk of re-engagement in terrorist activity.

Although disengagement plays an important role in deradicalization, there is a significant possibility of recidivism without a holistic deradicalization process (Islam, 2019). Recidivism may include individuals rejoining the same or other

terrorist groups, or engaging in other violent crimes. In this sense, deradicalization is more difficult than breaking away (Bertram, 2015). Some scholars argue that it is easier to convince someone not to engage in violence, but more complicated to separate them from their group-specific ideology and associated commitments based on what they have and are taught by their leaders or fellow members (Rabasa et al., 2010).

Therefore, a true and successful deradicalization program must produce a change in the individual's underlying beliefs, not just a change in behavior. As mentioned earlier, behavior can change while goals remain constant. This points to some potential problems with deradicalization programs. According to Rabassa et al. (2010) there are three potential problems that can arise in the deradicalization program. First, it is very difficult to determine whether a person is truly deradicalized or just released by certain indicators, the only way to judge a person's fundamental purpose is to observe his words and actions. But words and actions do not always accurately reflect goals. Secondly, even if deradicalization is a viable possibility for some extremists, others are likely to be irreconcilable

because committed terrorist militants refuse to renounce their beliefs or refrain from the use of force. Unfortunately, there is no reliable method for identifying or reconciling this condition. As a result, some deradicalization programs simply assume that high-level members of fanatical terrorist organizations cannot be helped. However, there are examples of high-level or violent radicals who later disengaged and, in some cases, even openly abandoned their former extremism (Rabasa et al., 2010).

These issues then raise an important question: should state-sponsored programs aim to deradicalize their detainees, or is disengagement a more plausible goal? It has been emphasized that deradicalization should be the ultimate goal as it results in more durable changes that significantly reduce the chances of recidivism (Rabasa et al., 2010). If a militant disengages only for instrumental reasons, the barriers to recidivism are only as strong as the inducements offered. On the other hand, if deradicalization accompanies disengagement, it will create further barriers to a return to extremism (Ashour, 2010). In this view, letting go is a temporary condition that is expensive to realize and often backfires. As a result,

more lasting attitude changes must be made. Others, such as Bjørge and Horgan, argue that policymakers should focus on more achievable disengagement goals (Smith, 2010).

In addition, although a person's personal beliefs as a terrorist may be very contradictory to society at large, it is only that person's actions that actually cause harm. Consequently, efforts to rehabilitate terrorists must focus on changing their behavior. Consistent with this skeptical view of deradicalization, some programs appear to be embracing a more modest goal of disengagement. For example, the Saudi government seeks to compensate for past failures and increase the effectiveness of deradicalization programs by emphasizing behavior modification rather than ideological change (Gasptack, 2015). While disengagement is a more viable goal for government-sponsored programs, it does not mean that deradicalization is impossible. In some cases, disengagement can actually be the first step on a long-term path to deradicalization.

Deradicalization Program in Indonesia and Its Evaluation

Unlike other deradicalization programs, the deradicalization program in Indonesia is a disengagement initiative

centered on police agencies as the main perpetrators of persistent terrorism throughout the Indonesian archipelago (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Its first full-fledged programme, which ran between 2005 and 2007, paid no particular attention to religious re-education and furthermore, they used ex-terrorists as interlocutors and as opponents of religious clerics to persuade their prisoners to stop terrorism (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Neumann, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010). The focus is on disengaging from the strategic utility of armed forces, and not on the ideological beliefs, principles or religious legitimacy of their actions (Neumann, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010). The Indonesian program is similar to the Saudi Arabian program in that it prides itself on using logistical and financial support including education to gain cooperation from prisoners and promote family involvement (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010).

Kurlantzick stated that Indonesia has a cutting-edge deradicalization policy to stem the growth of militancy of ex-terrorists with programs broadcast on national television depicting the brutality of their crimes and expressing regret for killing fellow Indonesians in 2009 (Stregher, 2013). In addition, ex-militants

are invited to visit convicted terrorists in prisons to talk with them about religious issues with compassion and try to use other, more gentle tactics to prevent them from using terrorism and calls for cooperation (Rabasa et al., 2010). Indonesian officials claim their program is successful due to the use of ex-militants in their program (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010). Whereas Rabasa et al. (2010) stated that despite Indonesia's ad hoc efforts and lack of incentives to encourage collaboration, the program has achieved some degree of success. Horgan and Braddock cite Abuza as saying that Indonesia's programs are not well financed, properly staffed or well institutionalized. McDowell (2010) further describes Indonesia's program as inadequate due to its lack of ideological reinterpretation to its detainees.

While these examples are only a brief overview of programs that have seen partial success and failure, it remains unknown whether a focus on ideological change, or skills upgrading and financial rewards is more effective as a deradicalization strategy. The majority of the literature states that the success or failure of a program often depends on factors including objectives, adequate

funding, incorporation of cultural norms, financial support for families; and support after treatment (Neumann, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010). Neumann (2010) states that effective strategies and programs cannot be copied and placed on all candidates and that they must address the type of inmate population, the nature and ideology of the group, the society from which they belong, and the dynamics of conflict with other external influences. Neumann further recommends that programs should employ a mix of strategies, combining ideological retraining with vocational preparation, that the use of credible interlocutors is essential, that the transition of prisoners into mainstream society is critical, and that discouraging extremists through agreement and commitment to family they are a significant means of deterring and changing the behavior and ideological direction of violent extremists (Neumann, 2010).

Individuals in each organization are affected differently by their conditions and there is no single way to force individuals to change course. From this it follows that identifying and then presenting the right combination of push and pull factors can help provoke individuals to re-evaluate their position in an extremist group. It can

also be argued that the disengagement effort will be much more successful if the organizational leadership is a party to the disengagement effort (Neumann, 2010). While paying attention to the civil liberties of individuals who have not committed a crime, push and pull factors when better understood can be used to exploit the inducement to abandon the path to violent extremism as well as any weakening links to terrorist organizations (Striegher, 2013).

The improvement of counter-terrorism policies in Indonesia was marked by the formation of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010. Furthermore, the agency that is under and responsible to the President, after Law Number 5 of 2018 has enacted the main task, one of which is to carry out deradicalization according to article 43F. This means that BNPT has the authority to coordinate related agencies and institutions regarding the deradicalization program. In Law no. 5 of 2018 is also more detailed about who deradicalization is targeting, starting with suspects, defendants, convicts, convicts, ex-convicts, as well as individuals or groups who have been exposed to radicalism. Article 43D on deradicalization explains that these people must go through stages starting from

identification, rehabilitation, re-education and resocialization. The essence of the deradicalization process which is regulated through Article 43D paragraph 5 states that the development of insight and nationality, religious insight and entrepreneurship must be given to the target of deradicalization. This soft approach step is added to Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 with one of the pillars being deradicalization.

Therefore, there are two main programs in deradicalization carried out by Indonesia with the assistance of BNPT as the coordinator. The first is deradicalization in prisons, which targets prisoners in community facilities. According to BNPT data as of March 18, 2019, 597 people have been de-radicalized in 89 prisons in 25 provinces, with details of suspects arrested and sentenced to a total of 406 people and details of 191 people being detained. Second, deradicalization is carried out outside the prison by people or groups that have radical potential for ex-convicts, families and terrorist networks. Data from the BNPT as of January 2019 shows that the targets of deradicalization outside prisons are ex-terrorists and their networks, families, and returnists of Jihadis/Foreign Fighters with as many as

632 released, including 90 former well-known leaders spread across 20 provinces. In addition, the individual level classifications for deradicalization outside and inside prison are the same: sympathizers, supporters, militants, and hard core.

The stages of deradicalization in prisons are identification, monitoring and evaluation. If the individual undergoing deradicalization has met the specified requirements, the rehabilitation stage will be carried out. After undergoing good rehabilitation, re-education is carried out so that they can proceed to the resocialization stage. This means the cycle consists of identification, monitoring and evaluation in the first stage, followed by rehabilitation and massive counter-radicalization. The individual after experiencing these four cycles will be released if they are judged to have carried out all the processes in accordance with the considerations of the officers and other previously appointed assistance personnel. However, if it fails, the individual must go through the cycle again, starting from the rehabilitation stage in prison. The expected output is that apart from being monitored and monitored, the individual can also be reintegrated into the general public.

Some elements of rehabilitation in the deradicalization program in Indonesia are sometimes still constrained by unsuitable infrastructure or facilities, especially as it is recommended that the detainees are concentrated in one facility for detention and one special place for rehabilitation. If the physical structure is single, then it is separated into two functions, namely detention and rehabilitation. The involvement of actors in deradicalization is not only the government but also involves non-government. The rehabilitation approach taken must be able to clearly distinguish between deradicalization and release and directly or indirectly. Measurement in rehabilitation consists of identification and evaluation. Then in the group-based rehabilitation program (classic class), semi or customized (individual / personal counseling) and in order to maintain the sustainability of the budget, it must be in accordance with the needs and the programs and facilities are getting better. However, there is barriers that must be overcome. Firstly, the rehabilitation of terrorists in prisons has not been optimal. Secondly, there is still a lack of concentrated facilities, a limited budget provided by the government, few

personnel who have good competence and ability, and lack of training. Thirdly, in practice there is no clear distinction between the phases of rehabilitation, re-education, and resocialization or reintegration and sometimes overlaps with one another. Finally, there is a lack of effectiveness measures and a humanistic and gender-based approach in the current and past approaches.

The focus and key to understanding the success of the concept of deradicalization is the notion of cognitive shift and the use of counter-ideology and theological deconstruction, and ultimately the will to reintegrate into society. Two possible outcomes of terrorist rehabilitation efforts are deradicalization which means completely unsubscribing to the previous ideology, or at least partially. However, research evidence shows a low level of effectiveness when applied directly. The second is the release or disengagement which is an older concept than deradicalization. The deradicalized individual only experiences a change in behavior, away from violence. The reasons terrorists give for abandoning their violent ways often have nothing to do with changes in ideological beliefs, instead frequently being due to vocational training,

education, community building, or linking terrorists to individuals who have been successfully rehabilitated. The facts on the ground show that deradicalization is difficult to be the main target. Deradicalization or counter-ideological programs require psychological or emotional or relational preparation. So in this case, indirect or indirect methods may be needed, in this case variants of disengagement methods such as vocational training, education training, art therapy, to gradually target changes in attitudes towards ideological beliefs (deradicalization).

TNI-POLRI Task Force Operations

The Nemangkawi Task Force is a Joint Task Force between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) which aims to win over members of a separatist terrorist group residing in the Papua region. The Nemangkawi Task Force carries out law enforcement operations or legal action against KKB/KST which have carried out attacks on both Papuan natives and non-natives (CNNIndonesia, 2021b). This Task Force also conducts intelligence operations in the form of finding figures who have been designated as DPOs (List of People

Searching) by the police, in this case the Papuan Police. Various kinds of news that have been broadcast in various national media have shown the success of legal action carried out by the Nemangkawi Task Force. However, the hard approach that has been published so far has also had a negative impact with the death of personnel from both the TNI and Polri, as experienced by Bharada Komang.

The success of the approach through dialogue becomes a double-edged sword. Intelligence officers who carry out intelligence operations are at greater risk than personnel who carry out conflict resolution with a hard approach or are armed. Whenever conducting face-to-face meetings with either direct targets or agent nets, these personnel must keep themselves safe. When using weapons, even long-barreled weapons (a term for weapons that use 5.56 mm ammunition and the like) can create insecurity and suspicion towards targets and nets. Therefore, the risk and morale burden is greater for the intelligence apparatus.

One example of the success of the TNI-Polri Task Force was the success of the Mandala I TNI Task Force in the Papua monitoring area of the city of Wamena, Jayawijaya. This was marked by the

handing over of two looted KKB/KST firearms. The handover of the makarov and revolver short-barreled weapons was carried out directly by the Commander of the Wamena Tactical Unit by Captain Inf Andy Satria to the Military District Commander (Kodim) 1702/ Jayawijaya Lieutenant Colonel Arif B Situmeang (Amirullah, 2021). These two pistols are looted weapons obtained when KKB attacked the Pirime Police, Lanny Jaya Regency. The TNI deliberately did not mention the person who handed over the firearms for the sake of personal and family safety. Individuals who hand over weapons are also guaranteed their safety from being prosecuted (imprisoned) as a form of appreciation for their cooperative actions. The involvement and openness of the community as well as religious and traditional leaders played a significant role in winning the hearts and minds of members of the KKB/KST group.

Penta-Helix Concept and Deradicalization Program

After knowing and understanding about separatism in Papua, the customs (traditions) of the Papuan people, the difference between religious and secular (political) radicalism, the concept of deradicalization vis--vis disengagement,

joint TNI-Polri raising operations and the current deradicalization program in Indonesia and its evaluation , it is recommended that a deradicalization program concept is developed using innovation and the elaboration of the Pentahelix concept. The Pentahelix concept consists of Government, Academic, Community, Business, and Media groups. All of whom should adapt to the conditions, situations , opportunities and challenges specific to Papua. At first the Pentahelix concept was a concept used in the development of economic theory for progress in the economy or in the business sector (Sudiana et al., 2020).

1. Government

Five key actors represent the government in the Penta-helix concept: BNPT as coordinator, Kemenkopolkam as a supervisory body, BIN as coordinator, and the Center for intelligence information and TNI-POLRI as direct actors who interact in the field. Although the five key actors are given particular functions and autonomy, they still require assistance from the relevant ministries of institutions such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Health, other Ministries and assistance from the local government.

2. Academic

The Penta-helix concept is particularly relevant when considering the role of customary tribal chiefs of the occupied area, by ensuring customary norms and applicable laws are instilled in the participant. The role of LMA and DAP leaders is also an important consideration in this deradicalization concept. In addition, the role of religious leaders, such as priests or pastors in the target area who must be involved in an academic context or people who are more knowledgeable in Christianity and Catholicism following the beliefs of the majority of Papuan people should be included during the planning and implementation.

3. Community

Community groups in the Penta-helix are represented by NGOs and CSOs or social, religious, and educational-based community organizations that care about Papua's problems. For example *Barisan Merah Putih* (BMP) in Wamena, *Gerakan Mahasiswa Pemuda Indonesia* (Gemapi), and Papua Peach Networks (PPN) which carried out peace campaigns in 2013 and 2016 (Pamungkas, 2017). In addition, the role of the general public is to help the government by not being involved in

terrorist activities or separatist actions and to provide important information related to KST.

4. Business

Penta-helix concept presents a group of private and government business actors to assist in skills training and create job opportunities, especially for actors who have returned to the Republic of Indonesia. The availability of job opportunities and business actors' willingness to accommodate former terror separatist groups is highly expected. Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise initiatives can also be held privately by former KST members with continued support from private and government business actors.

5. Media

The role of the media in the Penta-helix concept is quite significant because the propaganda products that terrorist separatist groups produce are still effective in recruitment. There needs to be collaboration and cooperation from the national media and other private media in Indonesia to help spread valid information without any political interest or framing to specific institutions. Field journalists also assist the government in fighting all forms of hypocrisy and news bias that always lead to opinions against the security forces.

Social media applications such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter must also be maximized by stakeholders or actors from the Penta-helix concept to help spread information related to the success carried out in the deradicalization process. Aside from forming positive opinions to the people in Papua, it is also a form of increasing trust from non-Papuan communities in Indonesia and abroad. The international community that supports the Papua referendum is also increasingly aware of the successes carried out by the Indonesian government. Other media functions include assisting in anti-propaganda campaigns and establishing an integrated information network or hotline in emergencies.

Identification

The first step in recommending a deradicalization program with the Penta-helix concept is the identification, or assessment, stage. The role of the Penta-helix actor here is the TNI-Polri, especially those who are carrying out the assignment of Nemangkawi or the TNI Mandala Task Force. Cooperation between the two task forces can also be carried out in order to provide an appropriate assessment of

whether the group member who will be continued in this deradicalization stage is a sympathizer, supporter, militant or a hard core political or armed movement leader. In addition, the role of BIN is also to provide additional information and as a form of checking information regarding the wanted list of people who are determined before being disseminated. BNPT is the coordinating body and establishes good communication with the TNI-Polri field actors and BIN in the implementation of activities. Then a detailed assessment of the root causes and causes of the participation of members to carry out acts of terrorism both politically and armed. So far, there have been many findings on the motivations of the perpetrators of acts of terror such as pain against the government, economic and educational inequality, fear or threats to family security, revenge, and the consequences of propaganda from previous group members. In addition, the role of the media here is to assist in disseminating the DPO which is disseminated to the public through various electronic and print media as well as other official social media accounts.

Psychological Approach

The next stage in the deradicalization program is the Psychological Approach stage. At this stage, the focus is more on raising spiritual, emotional, economic, health and educational approaches to the target and the people around him who can psychologically change his separatist perspective and ideology. This concept is often referred to as winning the heart and the mind. Actors who play a role include personnel from the Mandala Task Force Post and Nemangkawi who are spread throughout the Papua region by addressing the root causes of involvement in terrorist separatist groups. BIN personnel assigned to certain areas must also establish good cooperation with the Danpos of each of these task forces. The need for good collaboration between the three actors will determine the outcome of this stage. As mentioned above, these three actors will require help from other Pentahelix concept actors. Furthermore, the role of pastors and other spiritual leaders are very influential. The role of traditional leaders in the emotional and family approach of the target can assist in changing the involvement of those involved in terrorist

organizations, either in the form of encouraging changes in action or ideology. There is also the role of community groups, CSOs/NGOs such as Gemapi, BMP and PPN who can assist in a humanist approach through dialogue.

In addition to spiritual and emotional approaches involving religious and traditional intellectual leaders, in the context of health, education and economic approaches, it is necessary to involve relevant ministries in the target area. Such as providing free medical treatment which is routinely carried out, or by reviving Posyandu in remote areas with supervision and security from the TNI-Polri apparatus. Attention in the form of providing free basic necessities to the community, especially the target families, will also be an important point of consideration that by rejoining the Republic of Indonesia, it will be better for personal and family life. A sense of security and comfort without worry will certainly be another consideration. Another thing that is most important in this second process is the need for bonding in terms of trust building and trust and security guarantees before, during and after the deradicalization program. Talking about the location and time carried out in this stage is flexible, which means

that there are no specific standards or criteria but programs should still pay attention to the emotions, attitudes, behavior, actions, opinions, and motivations of the participant. Sooner or later, this process is marked by several indicators, including handing over firearms, both booty and homemade, or providing other important information regarding the movement, funding, recruitment and position information of other figures. The role of the media here serves as the dissemination of the success of the second phase of the recommendation for the deradicalization program of terrorist separatist groups.

After Care

After passing and being declared to have passed the psychological approach stage, marked by several indicators that have been described previously, the former members of this terrorist separatist group still have concerns. The various kinds of concerns are most dominant due to security factors, fear of being prosecuted or imprisoned and economic factors. In terms of economy, in addition to the role of the TNI, Polri and BIN task force personnel in the field, they also need assistance from the regional government, especially for

business actors from outside the region or within their territory to continue to provide assistance. During the terrorist separatist actions, these former members received guaranteed financial support as well as food and other basic materials from foreign parties, such as political separatist groups residing abroad and other examples in the Tembagapura area for stealing money from freeport employees. So after returning to support the Republic of Indonesia, former KST members need a new source of income to meet their daily needs. The need for fulfilling food needs, daily staples and even money is very much needed because many former KST members have families. Therefore, the role of regional business actors is to be able to provide employment assistance or provide knowledge and skills to establish their own businesses. In addition, the TNI-Polri Task Force, BIN and local governments must also continue to provide routine assistance as long as there is no independent source of income for former KST members who have returned to the Republic of Indonesia. The second factor is providing security guarantees and no imprisonment for former KST members and their families must be guaranteed by members of the TNI-Polri task force, BIN, and local security forces

such as Babinsa and Bhabinkamtibnas. This is in addition to being one of the steps from the results of the handling actions at the identification stage, it is also evidence of assurance at the psychological approach stage. Therefore, if the two things above are not carried out, in accordance with rational choice theory, this deradicalization program will only reach the concept of disengagement, which means that the possibility of re-joining KST will be wide open. The role of actors who are included in the community also plays a big role, such as as a forum for new organizations that are pro-NKRI as well as other forms of social cooperation that can create a more harmonious life.

CONCLUSION

The Penta-helix concept involving five groups of actors, resulting in three stages of deradicalization programs. The three stages involve collaboration and cooperation of government and non-government actors at each stage. Some recommendations to ensure the sustainability of the Penta-helix approach are:

1. Capacity building for TNI, POLRI, BIN, security, and territorial personnel by providing training or courses in mastering

regional languages per the target monitoring area and understanding the history of separatism in Papua.

2. Increase good cooperation and collaboration to avoid misunderstandings while carrying out the duties of each actor in the Penta-helix concept. This will require putting aside the sectoral ego and ego centrality of each agency, especially for government actors.

3. BNPT as the coordinating body and Kemenkopolkam as the implementation supervisor must be firm and position themselves well.

4. The relationship between the five actors in implementing this deradicalization program should not be rigid, with emphasis on high and sustainable goals to ensure mutual desire for success.

5. There needs to be an evaluation of funding and budget support for the three actors in direct contact in the field (TNI, POLRI, and BIN) to reduce jealousy and competitiveness at the implementing level, which can psychologically affect professionalism.

6. Profiling and assessment for traditional leaders, religious leaders and community organizations, business actors, and the media involved in the Penta-helix

concept to identify assumptions, biases, and beliefs.

7. Research is needed on specialized deradicalization programs for Papuan prisons, with indicators of prison facilities' readiness and the ability and quality of local prison officers.

8. Continuously evaluate each deradicalization program implementation to get better and maximum results in the future.

Therefore, the labeling of terrorists for the KKB generates various kinds of questions and challenges ahead for the government, one of which is regarding the deradicalization program for terrorist separatists. Various previous research literatures have been carried out in various countries (including Indonesia) and on the same problem, namely terrorist separatists, but have not found any concrete examples that can be applied in Papua due to differences, culture, customs, traditions and local wisdom of the indigenous people. Apart from that, a guideline in the form of a blueprint has not been established from the government represented by BNPT in order to discuss the process and who are the actors involved in the deradicalization program for members of terrorist separatist groups. So this article tries to answer

theoretically combined with factual conditions in the field regarding how the deradicalization program is appropriate as a form of optimism for conflict resolution in the form of labeling the KKB as part of a terrorist group.

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