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**Shortcut To Terrorism: Self-Radicalization And Lone-Wolf Terror Acts:
A Case Study Of Indonesia**

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Abstract

A surprising phenomenon was observed in the lone-wolf terror terrorism that occurred in Indonesia. This is associated with the fact that the perpetrators of seven out of thirteen cases reported were exposed to radical information through social media and the internet without directly joining a terrorist group. The process involved the intensive exploration of the internet by people previously interested in radicalism content which eventually led to self-radicalization and the subsequent terroracts. Meanwhile, Fathali M. Moghaddam proposed that the process of radicalization before a terroract is conducted involves six stages of action known as the staircase to terrorism. This concept was, however, observed to be irrelevant to the lone-wolf terror act considering the fact that the second to fifth stairs are usually reached through a shortcut based on the activities conducted on the internet. Therefore, this study proposed an adjustment to the Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism due to the rise of self-radicalization through the internet and also developed a prevention mechanism which involves community engagement to build community resilience towards preventing the shortcut through the provision of efforts to complement the actions of security forces in order to stem the prevalence of lone-wolf terror in the country.

Keywords: radicalization, social media, terrorism, staircase to terrorism, shortcut to terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, 63 countries have reported one casualty from a single act of terrorism and this means terrorism is still a serious threat to global security despite the reduction in the casualties for the fifth year in a row (Vision of Humanity, 2022). Indonesia is one of the countries with high prevalence of

terrorism as indicated by 552 terror acts reported from 2000 to 2021 (Lab 45 Analyst Tea, 2021). It was discovered that there was a transition from group-style attacks such as those conducted by JI to single- or cell-style attacks by JAD during this period. This shift occurred in 2016 or approximately 2 years after the establishment of ISIS in 2014 (Utomo,

2019) which led all countries in the world to face the threat of terror attacks from two transnational organizations considered to be dangerous due to their ability to strongly indoctrinate their followers. A previous study also showed that the ISIS power base is solid despite suffering several defeats in recent years (Mabrurroh & Purwado, 2022).

Radicalization is the main driving factor for the perpetrators of terror acts and the concept is simply defined as the ideological socialization influencing a person or group of people to desire fundamental political changes (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). According to Moghaddam (2005), there are approximately six stages to be radicalized and these include (1) the ground floor where the individual experiences some kind of injustice as well as feelings of frustration and shame in society, (2) the first floor involves looking for solutions to the problems, (3) the second floor focuses on developing a readiness to commit aggression and finding opportunities to proceed to the next stage, (4) third floor involves finding transnational groups that share similar justification for achieving the “ideal” world at all cost, (5) fourth floor involves joining the transnational groups and being unable to step back, and (6) fifth floor is the stage of psychological preparation and readiness to conduct a series of terrorist attacks often

accompanied by casualties (Moghaddam, 2005).

Terrorism is also associated with the rapid development of technology, specifically with the internet and its services such as social media which allow people to upload their activities and at the same time download information from different sources. Interestingly, this activity can be conducted from anywhere and anytime at a low cost as long as there is an internet connection (Hossain, 2018). This was confirmed by the findings that seven perpetrators of lone-wolf terror attacks had close contact with radical content on social media platforms of transnational groups (Densus 88 Anti Terror, 2021) as observed in (1) SA (Kholid, 2016; Winarno, 2016), (2) IAH (Kompas.Id, 2017; Simbolon, 2016), (3) MID (Tempo.co, 2017), (4) GOH (BBC News Indonesia, 2018), (5) IM (Meilisa, 2019; Ronald, 2019), (6) ABD (Arnaz, 2020; Rahma & Sugiharto, 2020), and (7) ZA (Aditya, Guritno, & Galih, 2021; Putsanra, 2021; Yahya & Galih, 2021).

The presence of social media has been proved to be accelerating the radicalization process and willingness of an individual to commit terror acts. This means there is a need to further investigate the radicalization process which is known as the Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism. Therefore, this study was

conducted to answer two questions which include how does the radicalization process occurs in current society? and what preventive measures can be taken in relation to such radicalization?

Radicalization and the staircase to terrorism

Radicalization is a process of ideological socialization among young people that leads to fundamental political changes. Its tactics are usually in the form of violent conflict against political enemies and their followers (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). This concept has been used by transnational groups to recruit followers and sympathizers observed to be manipulatable for their agenda. According to Moghaddam (2005), the proponent of the Staircase to Terrorism model, an individual that has experienced radicalization usually goes through the aforementioned six stages. The ground floor is the stage where the individual experiences some kind of injustice as well as feelings of frustration and shame with society and this shows the possible relationship of extremism with education level and family economic background because this kind of psychological factor can be experienced by everyone. This is normally followed by the movement to the first floor where the individual finds a solution to the problem identified, and this is based on two

factors which are the (1) possibility of independent movement and (2) perception of procedural justice. The feeling of confidence in the solution usually leads the person to move to the second floor which involves preparing to conduct some kind of aggression. In this stage, the individual begins to accept the moral reasons for the promotion of terrorism acts and also find the act and the transnational group of perpetrators as “justifiable” to achieve an “ideal” society. This leads to the third floor where the individual considers the transnational group as the real hero while the government is the enemy that should be defeated because it hinders the achievement of the ideal society aspired by the individual. This idealism is the reason for the individual, who is at the latter stages of the radicalization process, to commit to the struggle of the transnational groups and execute several strategies that usually consist of isolating, affiliating, pursuing secrecy, and spreading fear. The completion of this third floor is immediately followed by a transition to the fourth floor where the decision to join the struggle is made after which the individual is placed in a kind of small cell prepared to conduct a series of terrorist attacks. The culmination of this radicalization process is the fifth floor which is focused on the psychological preparation of the person to

conduct a series of terrorist attacks with casualties (Moghaddam, 2005).

This radicalization process can be prevented by considering the following implications in the relevant policy formulation process (1) prioritizing the prevention aspects, (2) supporting the contextualized democracy through procedural justice, (3) providing education for minds such as me-against-them, and (4) promoting inter-objectivity and justice (Moghaddam, 2005). These are expected to lay a solid foundation for contextualized democracy to ensure individuals have very little incentive to continue to be exposed to radicalization. This is toughest challenge in preventing radicalism because as long as there is justification for the morality of transnational groups, radicalization will continue. The fact that technological advancement does not always necessarily guarantee the disappearance of terrorism as long as the radicalization process is allowed to continue should be taken into consideration as well (Chen, 2016).

Social Media

Social media refers to all internet or cyber-based applications enabling content creation by users (Hossain, 2018). Humans are observed to be inseparable from social media like YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram,

Twitter, and Facebook in the present era of technology. The emergence of social media was reported to be marked by the creation of blogs several years ago (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010) and its presence has created "the proportion and diversity of platforms that can be used" in a country. This "proportion and diversity" comes to the surface after the disclosure of the surveillance program case by Edward Snowden which led to the openness and lack of restriction in communication around the world due to the possibility of having cross-continental communication in a fraction of a second between one individual and another or between one group and another (Chen, 2016).

The figure of Internet users has also been significantly growing throughout the globe and this situation has resulted in a significant increase in the status of social media as the most popular means of communication (Klausen, 2015). This is due to its ability to make people easily and quickly read, comment, or share information either separately or together as a group. It also offers the option to maintain the privacy of the users adequately through several features such as "closed groups" and "private conversations" on different platforms as well as the option of openness through "open group" or "public page" features (Hossain, 2018). This means

users can share their perspectives, opinions, and even discussions, thereby, making the platform very popular among people, including transnational groups. Previous studies showed that transnational groups use social media to easily recruit and/or communicate with followers while staying connected around the world (Klausen, 2015; Hossain, 2018).

Several transnational groups such as ISIS, Jabhat Al Nusra, and Al-Qaeda have been proved to be using social media as a means of communication with their supporters as these groups publicly disseminate their activities on the behalf of “Jihad” (Hossain, 2018). Some of the strategies used by Al-Qaeda include (1) publicizing lectures by Al-Qaeda leaders, (2) inciting people to conduct jihad using violence, (3) urging the public to support Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, (4) spreading Al-Qaeda textual propaganda, (5) hailing the jihadist “martyrs”, (6) threatening the targeted people and communities, (7) conducting military training, (8) broadcasting reports from the battlefield through web sites, (9) publishing radical online magazines, and (10) translating propaganda materials into different languages using social media in order to gain more followers, specifically in the West (Rudner, 2016).

The ease of executing the radicalization process online through social media clearly

requires attention, specifically in relation to single terrorist or lone-wolf attacks. This is necessary because a close contact with radical social media accounts is feared to further increase the risk of terrorism throughout the globe (State of the Art, 2022). Moreover, the more frequent use social media by transnational groups has led to tremendous pressure from governments or international organizations on social media companies to filter and eliminate radical-leaning content as well as monitor all activities of these groups on their platforms. This monitoring initiative has also been implemented by the police and the intelligence community globally on different platforms and networking sites to eliminate accounts or materials with radical views more effectively (Montoya & Hofstetter, 2014). This subsequently led to the emergence of a new habit among transnational groups in the form of periodic or random changes of social media accounts to avoid being tracked by the police or intelligence community (Hossain, 2018) and this is a challenge for the monitoring efforts of the social media companies and the community of security agencies.

Transnational groups generally use three forms of social media platforms to launch their radicalization process and these platforms include (1) online libraries, (2) digital communication technology for the preachers

of extremism, and (3) a forum for discourse of radicalism (Rudner, 2016). These are normally used to disseminate different writings, lecture contents, and radical-minded forums due to their easy accessibility by anyone and from anywhere and this is the reason social media has become a very effective vehicle to implement jihad, recruit, train, raise funds, and plan terror operations. The platforms are also used for the activities of establishing an operational base for communication, gathering intelligence, sharing technical information, performing recruitment, and undergoing training. A report from Simon Wiesenthal Center in 2014 has discovered more than 30,000 forums, networking sites, and social media accounts forging act of terrorism in the United States and beyond and showed an increasing number of social media networks being set up by extremists to recruit “opponents” (Hossain, 2018).

In addition to these phenomena, social media is also often a place for transnational groups to develop a strong relationship with profiles of new social media users to serve as the foundation to induct them into several radical forums. For example, several members of Islamism and extremism forums establish communication pertaining to ideological discussions and propaganda dissemination. A previous study also showed that IS and Al-

Shabaab have been the users with high-profile social media, specifically Twitter, in comparison with others (Knox, 2014). In addition, other extremist groups that enjoy the use of social media are namely (1) Ogaden Liberation National Front (Somalia), (2) Uyghur Militants (China), (3) Patani Separatists (Thailand), and (4) Chechen Groups (Caucasus) (Vergani & Zuev, 2014). It is important to note that these groups clearly have hidden agendas behind their use of social media with most of them observed to be targeting all vulnerable Arabs and Europeans speaking English in their daily communication (Hossain, 2018).

Lone-Wolf Terror

The lone-wolf terror is an attack usually conducted by only one person to implement a certain terrorism ideology with politics and/or religion-based orientations against non-military targets without any direction nor coordination (Feldman, 2013). A lone-wolf terrorist internalizes a rigid knowledge during the process of conducting the act in order to justify the action. An example of this rigid internalization of knowledge can be traced back to the confession of Anders Behring Breivik, the lone-wolf terrorist against the Norwegian Government, during the trial (Feldman, 2013):

The attacks of July 22nd were preventive attacks, serving the defense of the Norwegian indigenous people, ethnic Norwegians, our culture, and I cannot declare myself guilty before the law for conducting them. I was acting in defense of my people, my culture, my religion, my city, and my country. Therefore, I demand to be acquitted of all charges.

This shows how rigid lone-wolf terrorists can be concerning their perspectives based on the belief that they are doing the right thing in line with their ideals. In the quote, Breivik considers that the action is right and necessary to defend the country from the onslaught of foreign influence, thereby, requesting a release instead of being sentenced criminally. This kind of rigid belief should be observed carefully due to the possibility of its manifestation in the structural – organizational communication between disconnected members and the random recruitment of new members (Jafar, Sudirman, & Rifawan, 2019). The impact of such communication is the emergence of lone-wolf terrorists that do not receive direct orders from the affiliates of any transnational group. The main characteristics of these so-called lone-wolf terrorists are self-selection, self-radicalization, and self-training (Hoffman & Reinares, 2014).

Lone-wolf terrorists are generally classified into four categories which include:

(1) loners such as individuals planning and attempting to execute attacks without affiliation to transnational groups but using their ideology; (2) lone-wolf which includes individuals acting alone but affiliated to transnational groups; (3) lone-wolf pack such as individuals that have internalized the ideology of transnational groups as a result of the radicalization process; and (4) lone attackers which include individuals operating alone but affiliated and closely related to active transnational groups (Pantucci, 2011). These profiles further lead to two other categories which include the (1) disconnected-disordered such as the individuals with complaints and experience of using weapons but seem to be alone and have symptoms of psychological disorders and (2) caring-compelled which are those with very strong sympathy for the others' suffering and a sense of responsibility for avenging the suffering (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014).

Community Resilience

Social media offers convenience in sharing content for everyone and this is the reason it is normally used as a tool by transnational groups to disseminate radical propaganda narratives in order to attract more followers with a wider reach. This is certainly advantageous to their cause because they do

not need to spend a lot of money due to the accessibility of social media from anywhere and anytime as long as the user is connected to the Internet. This was reported to be effective for ISIS observed to be conducting its allegiance process only through social media (CNN Indonesia, 2022; Majni, 2019). It is important to note that it is also possible to use social media and other online media to build community resilience as proved by several movements triggered by a single piece of content which is widely spread on different platforms. An example of this event was well illustrated by Oscar Morales in 2008 that was fed up with kidnappings and other actions done by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia known as FARC and made a social media page to condemn the actions (Ressa, 2013). Unexpectedly, several people had the same concerns as Morales and this led approximately 10 million people in Colombia and 2 million people abroad to enter the streets and oppose the FARC.

This situation shows that social media is a concept with two sides of a coin and this is the reason it is important to make efforts towards creating a counter-narrative measure to fight the radicalization process currently being intensified by transnational groups using the platform. There are certain conditions to be fulfilled to ensure society is united towards

making the right decisions to achieve this goal and these four prerequisites include (1) diversity of opinion, (2) opinions separated from each other, (3) decentralized opinions based on the differences in the knowledge and specialization of the people, and (4) a mechanism to make personal judgments a shared decision (Ressa, 2013). These prerequisites clearly emphasize the importance of collaboration within society itself and this means having the same understanding can make it easier to implement the resolutions made. Moreover, the public understanding of the radicalization and terrorism acts concepts can assist in mitigating terrorism, thereby making terrorists, specifically lone-wolf, think twice before committing the crime (Tsauri, 2021). This community resilience is expected to be a very effective prevention tool when combined with social sanctions which are considered to be sometimes more "cruel" than criminal sanctions (Ismail, 2021).

The only aspect to be considered in supporting the community resilience is the family due to the fact that it is the initial process usually experienced by individuals to understand the environment before entering larger society. Therefore, the involvement of the family in preventing radicalization has its benefits and this can be illustrated through the

situation of a family trained on how to filter radical contents to aid the recovery process of a lone-wolf terrorist from radicalism. This is very possible considering the importance of family to individuals and all activities related to their lives (Hussain, 2013). Specifically, the involvement of the family is absolutely necessary because it is the closest contact with the lone-wolf terrorists and also has the ability to serve as the "spy" to monitor their movements and radicalization process.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach supported by data analysis (Leavy, 2017) while the staircase to terrorism model proposed by Moghaddam was reviewed in relation to the lone-wolf terror acts and social media was applied as the catalyst for the radicalization process. Data were collected using two methods which include observation by visiting data sources and making direct contact with the phenomena being studied as well as literature study which involved searching information from secondary sources such as journals, newspapers, and textbooks (Leavy, 2017). The primary data including the lone-wolf terror acts between 2006 – 2021 directly related to radicalization on social media were obtained from the field while secondary data related to the catalyzation of

radicalization processes through social media and the review of the Moghaddam model were obtained from secondary sources (Leavy, 2017). The data were later analyzed according to the theoretical perspective previously described to have a better description of the catalyzation for the radicalization process.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The current dynamics within the development of digital technology has resulted in a great shift over the radicalization pattern. The radicalization process that once used to be held through face-to-face meeting now can be held online. The effective and efficient online media has been benefited significantly by the terrorism groups in order to spread their agenda and recruit more people to their cause through the radical contents uploaded into their social media channel. The process of the so-called online radicalism happens in minutes and can even be more effective than the one conducted through a face-to-face meeting. Consequently, more people are prone to being radicalized and manipulated in committing themselves to the act of lone-wolf terrorism. This situation has exposed a new challenge, especially for the security forces in specific and the terrorism mitigation in general, since more attacks can be launched at anytime with random target and victim. Reflecting on the currently developing

situations, the concept of staircase to terrorism should be said irrelevant since the process in the second to the fifth floor can be shortened or catalyzed by the use of social media channel owned by the terrorism groups. Thus, a concept known as shortcut to terrorism can be introduced in order to adjust and accommodate the previous concept, shortcut to terrorism, within the current development of online radicalism.

Catalyzation of Terrorism Acts

The terrorism acts in the last 10 years were observed to be mostly dominated by the use of technology in the form of social media (Hossain, 2018). This is due to the consideration of social media as a very effective means of spreading the radical propaganda of transnational groups and recruiting participants from all over the world, thereby limiting the efforts directed towards the eradication and prevention of these acts. It is also important to observe that the brains or masterminds of terrorist acts have not been revealed even though perpetrators are often arrested and this is because they are always behind the scenes. Their main responsibility is to recruit and indoctrinate perpetrators that already have these seeds of extremism with all the operational stages, from preparation to execution, implemented through online

communication due to the high level of confidentiality usually associated with the operations of these transnational groups (Moghaddam, 2005). Social media provides a platform for these people because of its several features that can be used to protect the privacy of account owners. The masterminds only give orders during the execution time and disappear, thereby leading to the arrest of only the perpetrators by the security forces. Moreover, the investigation also showed that the perpetrators only receive instructions online through social media, and this modus operandi was observed to be more effective because transnational groups switch to a cell system where they prepare small groups to be mobilized according to instructions (Montoya & Hofstetter, 2014). Communication with these cells runs effectively and efficiently with the support of social media which has a high level of privacy and can be accessed easily from anywhere and anytime as long as the people are connected to the internet (Hossain, 2018).

Reflection on previous activities showed that this kind of dynamic is unprecedented previous technologies did not support effective communication with small groups or cells. Becoming a terrorist during the period requires undergoing a kind of "guidance" process divided into several stages which were

analyzed empirically and presented as a staircase to terrorism model by Moghaddam. This staircase has six stages as previously explained with the individual observed to be experiencing a radicalization process through internalization of transnational group doctrines which usually leads to a shift in perspective which leads to the acceptance of the transnational groups as heroes while the government is the real enemy. This occurs because the individual has developed similar ideals with these groups and even becomes even worse when government policies conflict with the aspirations and ideals of the individual. This makes the individual perceive the government as the source of the problems to be solved, thereby leading to the voluntary desire to be part of a transnational group. The radicalization process ultimately makes the individual very rigid in the belief that the fight is to have a better situation despite the harm the terror act is going to cause several parties.

The presence of new technologies such as social media in the present period seems to have accelerated the traditional radicalization process such that the previous "guidance" model which usually requires a long time as previously explained is shortened to just a matter of days or even hours. This acceleration or catalyzation process cannot be separated

from the role of social media that offers effective and efficient communication platforms in the world. Its high flexibility indicated by the accessibility from anywhere and at any time as long as there is an internet connection is the main reason the transnational groups switched from a face-to-face "guidance" model to an online "guidance" model. This new model is the source of the terror acts conducted by single or lone-wolf terrorists which are mainly characterized by self-selected, self-radicalized, and self-trained processes. It is important to note that the perpetrators of recent terror act, specifically single terror acts, voluntarily made their choice to adopt a radical ideology in accordance with their ideals and voluntarily allow themselves to undergo a radicalization process followed by independent training. All these processes are normally facilitated through social media where the transnational groups only need to provide directions and training materials as well as attack plans for execution. Moreover, the terrorists are also allowed to independently determine the date and method of attack as well as the training materials to be used without waiting for orders and directions from the transnational groups concerned. As previously described, it is possible to divide these perpetrators of a single terrorist attack into several categories namely: (1) loner; (2) lone

wolf; (3) lone-wolf pack; and (4) lone attacker. Their similarity is related to the use of social media to conduct their radicalization process through the guidance of transnational groups.

The pattern of recent terror attacks shows that social media has the capability to accelerate or catalyze the radicalization process due to its easy accessibility from anywhere and at any time. Moreover, it protects the privacy of users despite its openness and this is observed from features such as “closed groups” and “private conversations” as well as channels created by distributing propaganda narratives and executing their radicalization process. The social media channels generally used by transnational groups include: (1) online libraries; (2) platforms for preachers of extremism; and (3) a forum for radical discourse (Rudner, 2016). These are normally used to share different writings, lecture contents, and radical forum links and have been proven to be effective as indicated by the investigation in previous cases of terrorism attacks. Almost all the perpetrators of the terror attacks arrested stated that they got the impetus to carry out the action from social media. This statement is in line with the strategies used by transnational groups in online radicalization which involve (1) presentation of radical content, (2) public

incitement to carry out jihad using violence; (3) public encouragement to support radical groups, (4) dissemination of radical propaganda, (5) hail toward the terror perpetrators, (6) threat against the targeted people and communities, (7) conduct of military training, and (8) publication of radical online magazines (Rudner, 2016). The close contact with the social media of transnational groups is certainly very worrying because it can make individuals become radicalized independently and enhance their readiness to attack. Furthermore, these activities manifest into terror attacks to disrupt national security and order.

This means there is a need to review the staircase to terrorism model described by Moghaddam and this led to the reduction of the six stages to three stages due to the existence of social media. It shows that several stages can be passed when individuals experience the radicalization process through social media and this is illustrated through two case examples. The first case is the Thamrin bomb attack conducted by the members of JAD cells in Jakarta members of the JAD cell in Jakarta with the perpetrators grouped as lone-wolf packs because they are in the same group and receive the same “guidance” process from one figure (BBC Indonesia, 2016). The attack is a clear example of the process that follows the

staircase to terrorism with the perpetrators reported to have followed all stages from the ground to the fifth floor.




Figure 1: Moghaddam’s staircase to terrorism vs shortcut to terrorism self- radicalization with social media

The clearest indication for this radicalization process is the participation of the perpetrators in military training in Jalin, Jantho, Aceh Besar, Indonesia, but the pattern changed in only a few years as indicated in the fast radicalization process of ZA in the attack on the National Police Headquarters. In this case, the perpetrator mostly lock himself or herself in the room (Mantalean, Simanjuntak, & Guritno, 2021) and this indicates the possibility of undergoing radicalization through social media. ZA was reported to have spread ISIS-related content in family chat groups on WhatsApp within days and created an Instagram account to upload all content about ISIS within hours (Gunadha & Bhayangkara, 2021). This attack is also categorized as a lone wolf because ZA

operated alone but has an affiliation with the ISIS transnational group (Pantucci, 2011). Regardless of the differences in the Thamrin and Police Headquarters attacks, the two events showed the orientation of the perpetrators as caring-compelled because they were observed to have very strong sympathy for the suffering of others (Muslims) and feel responsible to retaliate against the party considered to have caused the suffering, the government (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014).

These two attacks have the same characteristic because they are both driven by the radicalization process but have certain differences. The Thamrin attack followed the staircase to terrorism closely (Moghaddam, 2005) with the perpetrators observed to have experienced a ground floor stage by having the seeds of extremism which were later developed at the next stages such as the first, second, and third floors. The fourth-floor stage of military training was also followed in Aceh Besar with the perpetrators discovered to have received instructions or orders from transnational groups through social media in the fifth floor. This is clearly different from the Police Headquarters attack where ZA was reported to have been self-selected, self-radicalized, and self-trained (Hoffman & Reinares, 2014) by voluntarily accessing

radical content on social media and undergoing a self-radicalization process. In relation to the staircase to terrorism model, it means ZA already had the same seeds of extremism required in the ground floor (Moghaddam, 2005) but found a solution to the problems identified and conducted other activities such as the preparation for aggression, identification with transnational groups, and determination to engage aggression through close contact with the social media of transnational groups in the second floor (Moghaddam, 2005; Rudner, 2016). This catalyzation through social media made ZA immediately enter the fifth floor which is the readiness to conduct the aggression. This situation was further exacerbated by the three characteristics mentioned, especially the self-trained aspect, indicated by the use of an air gun and a video record showing that ZA attended shooting training at a shooting club in Jakarta.

This trend of radicalization through social media is clearly very dangerous because it shows that the transnational groups have a low-cost propaganda tool with very effective results of promoting more people to "sacrifice" for their cause. This hinders the efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism by competent authorities. It is also important to note that the implementation of appropriate action against

the radicalization process through social media will be challenging in the long term due to its quick and fast movement and subtleness. Therefore, the most relevant action is to involve the people closest to the terrorists with the support of competent authorities. This initiative is described comprehensively in the next section of this discussion.

Family and Community Engagement as an Effort to Prevent Radicalism in Society

The recent terror attacks were mainly caused by the radicalization process, both conventional through face-to-face "guidance" and non-conventional through social media. Moreover, the government is barely able to stem the radicalism movement because of its "silent" or almost unknown nature. The government has made attempts to prevent and eradicate terrorism by taking action against the perpetrators but this is not enough because the radicalization process continues even though the perpetrators are arrested. This allows the terror attacks to continue and this means the efforts are in vain.

The two factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of radicalization prevention include, first, individuals having close contact with radical groups as part of their radicalization process are closed individuals. This is clear from the investigation which showed that they rarely mingle and only

receive information unilaterally and this became even more severed with the inclusion of social media in the process because individuals engaged do not only cover themselves up but also spread radical narrative contents through the platform. This was observed to have been implemented by ZA a few hours before executing the attack on the National Police Headquarters (Aditya, Guritno, & Galih, 2021).

Second, society tends to ignore events in their environment because the people are already busy with their respective activities. This was observed with the fact most families admit they did not know what had occurred to the perpetrator during the process of searching their residences and only reported that they noticed strange behaviors but did not report.

This means the law enforcement apparatus needs to be used in analyzing this situation because the "silent" characteristic of the radicalization process, specifically those conducted through social media, is likely to continue when the chain is not broken. One of the efforts to break this chain is to involve society in the strategies to prevent and eradicate terrorism because they are at the forefront and always the first to be harmed from any terrorist attack. This means society needs to know the threat of radicalization existing in their environment in order to

implement the necessary preventive actions.

An important factor to be strengthened is the family due to the fact that it is the core of every community or society. As a first step, the apparatus can invite society leaders to provide an initial understanding of the dangers of radicalization and its material and non-material impact on society. This is to be followed by asking for the assistance of society leaders in passing information received to each family in the environment.

On a larger scale, the apparatus can gather society leaders and families to disseminate information on the dangers of radicalization and their impact on society at large in order to build community resilience. Furthermore, the apparatus should ask society to immediately report when their family members have unusual behavior and this means they inevitably become active and play a role in society supervision to assist the apparatus in maintaining security and order. This allows society to know early the dangers of terrorism due to radicalization.

This shared understanding can be enhanced towards building a shared narrative which can later be used as a guideline or "weapon" against the radicalization process and expected to be implemented immediately as long as the individual is at the ground floor stage to inhibit the progress to the first floor

and prevent greater losses. Meanwhile, the compilation of the narrative requires the consideration of four principles which include: (1) diversity of opinions; (2) separation of diverse opinions; (3) decentralization of the opinions due to the difference in the knowledge and specialization owned by the people; and (4) a mechanism to make personal judgments a collective decision. The separation of diverse opinions is an absolute prerequisite to form a narrative and this can be referred to as a counter-radicalization narrative. This is due to the ability of the diverse opinions to complement and strengthen each other considering the difference in the backgrounds and knowledge of society members, thereby limiting the possibility of the radicalization process. Moreover, the discovery of these opinions is expected to lead to a common thread to provide a common perspective in the counter-radicalization narrative which is to be used by society to develop a mechanism to assess the participation of one of its members in a radicalization process and also to jointly decide the preventive action to be implemented. This narrative can be uploaded to social media to match and suppress the propaganda narrative of transnational groups.

The government needs to formulate policies oriented towards preventing the

radicalization process in society in order to strengthen the counter-radicalization narrative. The formulation process is recommended to be based on four aspects which include: (1) the determination of priorities in the prevention aspect; (2) the provision of support for contextualized democracy through procedural justice; (3) education for minds such as me-against-them; and (4) promotion of inter-objectivity and justice. The prevention aspect should be prioritized because the main objective of the policies is to prevent the development of the radicalization process. Moreover, democracy which involves developing people's rights through relevant justice procedures should be supported to make the individuals experiencing radicalization realize they are using the wrong approach. This is expected to be used in educating and influencing the individuals to accept being a part of the society and that their plan will harm them and their environment. Finally, the individual concerned can be promoted to see things more objectively and fairly and this indicates the counter-radicalization narrative and appropriate prevention policies as well as the apparatus and society can combine efforts to prevent the further development of the radicalization process.

CONCLUSION

Several conclusions were drawn from this study with the first showing that Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism model is irrelevant to internet radicalization and lone-wolf terror acts. This is observed from the reduction of the proposed six stages to three due to the presence of social media. Second, the radicalization process through social media is much more effective than the conventional ones because the platform is easy to access from anywhere and anytime as long as there is an internet. Third, all the forms of radicalization process pose a threat in the form of terror attacks. Fourth, the process can be prevented from developing further through the involvement of society and this can be made more effective by enhancing the ability of each family to counter radical narrative. Fifth, the government through its apparatus should make several prevention-oriented policies to support the joint efforts being made to prevent and eradicate terrorism.

Several suggestions were also made in line with these conclusions. First, future studies should include more recent data because the staircase to terrorism model reviewed was based on empirical data. Second, the radicalization process through social media needs to be given greater attention considering

that most terror attacks are conducted by single actors groomed through this process. Third, community engagement for preventing and eradicating terrorism can be facilitated through an official agreement such as an MOU in order to provide a strong foundation between the society and the apparatus in disseminating the narrative and making efforts to ensure its appropriate management when there is a potential threat of terrorism radicalism.

Fourth, the government can issue prevention-oriented policies to strengthen cooperation between the apparatus and the society in an effort to prevent the development of radicalization.

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