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ESCALATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THE POST LAHORE DECLARATION (1999 – 2019): SECURITY DILEMMA PERSPECTIVE

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Abstrak

Tulisan ini memaparkan eskalasi konflik militer yang terjadi antara India dan Pakistan yang telah terjadi selama tujuh dekade dengan menekankan pada periode pasca perjanjian damai Deklarasi Lahore 1999. Setelah beberapa kali terlibat perang besar, konflik militer di antara kedua negara ini terus berlangsung hingga hari ini. Kajian terdahulu perihal konflik India-Pakistan hanya membahas perihal penyebab konflik ini terjadi dan upaya penyelesaian konflik yang terbagi ke dalam tiga sudut pandang besar yaitu keamanan, politik domestik dan ekonomi-politik, tetapi belum ada yang menjelaskan bagaimana konflik ini relatif langgeng. Dengan menggunakan dilema keamanan sebagai kerangka analisis, tulisan ini akan menjelaskan variabel-variabel dilema keamanan yang memiliki andil dalam ketegangan antara India dan Pakistan sehingga membuat tindakan ofensif lebih dipilih oleh kedua negara dari pada upaya defensif. Argumen utama tulisan ini adalah India dan Pakistan saling melihat perilaku satu sama lain seperti pembangunan kekuatan pertahanan, pengembangan nuklir dan tren aliansi sebagai ancaman sehingga keduanya selalu berada dalam situasi dilema keamanan.

Kata kunci:

India, Pakistan, Dilema Keamanan, Konflik Militer

Abstract

This paper describes the military conflict escalation between India and Pakistan in the period after 1999 Lahore Declaration. After several major wars, military conflicts between the two countries continued to this day. Previous studies on the India-Pakistan conflict only discussed the causes of this conflict and efforts to resolve conflicts. The studies are divided into three major perspectives, namely; security, domestic politics, and political economy, but none has explained how this military conflict is relatively lasting. Using security dilemma as an analytical framework, this paper will explain the variables of the security dilemma that have contributed to the escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. The security dilemma creates a circumstance where offensive action preferable by both states rather than defensive efforts. The main argument of this paper is that India and Pakistan see each other's behavior -such as the development of military defense capability, nuclear weaponry development, and alliance trends- as threats so that they are always remains in the security dilemma situation.

Keywords:

India, Pakistan, Security Dilemma, Military Conflict

INTRODUCTION

In the anarchic international system, security and stability is priorities sought by every sovereign state. Burke (2013: 163) stated that the way to secure a state is by gathering and building capabilities. The view that rooted from this understanding of realism stems from the idea that a state that has strong forces and weapons will be safe from threats because of its power preponderance. On the other hand, Mearsheimer (2010: 2) stipulates that this view carries a paradox because it is precisely due to the anarchic structure of the international system countries not only seeks safety but also acts aggressively towards one another. Under these conditions, a state will maintain vigilant behavior enface of other states. In turns, that make them unable to avoid security dilemmas both on a global and regional scale. In fact, the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1989 did not make the two states break free from the the security dilemma conditions. Although Russia's nuclear threat, which is considered to be the core of the problem, has been mitigated, the United States continues to maintain its combat-ready forces in Europe and East Asia.¹ This condition continues to this day when the United States and Russia were pulling out from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019.²

In South Asia, tensions between India and Pakistan also escalated after the end of the Cold War after the two states conducted nuclear tests in 1998 (Chari, 2004). The fact that India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapons states with a history of engaging in military confrontations make these two neighboring states continue to experience this military conflict and they are always in an unstable security condition (Gopalan, 2014: 688). Starting from the 1947 and 1965 War which was triggered by Pakistan that seized the Kashmir region (Mir, 2014: 108). Kashmir is the main symbol of chosen trauma by Pakistan, which connotes the myths of fear, anger, sadness and powerlessness of the people of Pakistan, therefore the struggle to defend Kashmir against India for Pakistan is a resistance (Hwang, 2019: 21). It was then followed by the 1971 War of independence by East Pakistan - that became the origin of the Bangladesh state (Mir, 2014: 109). In 1984 the confrontation occurred again due to the seizure of the Siachen Glacier carried out by Indian forces.³ These military conflicts preceded number of other lines of military conflict that continue to occur between India and Pakistan. The domestic issues and internal politics of the two states that are interrelated makes them in a war-alert position. Moreover, this condition is also amplified by a geographical proximity and the behaviors of the two states that signal threats.

To resolve this military conflict, a series of peaceful efforts have also been sought, such as the 1972 Simla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declaration.⁴ The 1972 Simla Agreement was a peaceful attempt to resolve 1971 Indian-Pakistani war. The agreement stipulates that each parties must withdraw their respective forces and conduct a Prisoners of War (PoW) exchange. This agreement was signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on July 2, 1972. This agreement also became a blueprint for agreements on amicable relations between the two states. The Simla Agreement consists of a set of guiding principles mutually agreed upon by India and Pakistan that emphasize mutual respect for the integrity and sovereignty of each region; non-interference in internal affairs, political independence; equality of sovereignty; and rejection of hostile propaganda. The principles are codified within the following points: (1) Mutual commitment to solving problems through a bilateral approach. (2) Building the foundation of cooperative relationships with a focus on people to people. (3) Maintaining the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, which is an important Confidence Building Measures (CBM) effort for India and Pakistan, and is the key to sustainable peace.⁵

Through the 1972 Simla Agreement, the two states committed themselves to seek bilateral solutions to problems in Kashmir, without interference from third parties such as the United Nations (UN), it was also reinforced with Line of Control (LoC) regulation. But few years after this agreement was signed between 1978-84, Pakistan and India carried out various expeditions to claim the Siachen region (Mir, 2010). Since India's preemptive capture of Salto Ridge, Pakistan has maintained constant pressure on the Indian troops by periodic military thrusts, shooting and shelling by heavy artillery (Mir, 2010). These series of military conflict culminates on what was became known as 1999 Kargil War. After the 1999 war, the two states returned to peaceful effort under the 1999 Lahore Declaration. This declaration lays points that demand each other to re-establish the spirit of the Simla Agreement in 1972. In addition, the 1999 Lahore Declaration also includes several new points, in which both parties: (1) committed to the goal of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and (2) take immediate steps to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating steps to build trust in the nuclear and conventional fields, which are aimed at preventing conflict.⁶ The 1999 Lahore Declaration had more specific content on the nuclear discussion, given in the 1998-1999 war both states carried out threatening

nuclear tests. In addition, this declaration is considered more comprehensive because it is equipped with a Joint Statement and Memorandum of Understanding.

The India-Pakistan military conflict, which has occurred for seven decades, piqued the interest of academics from Indonesia and other states. Broadly speaking, previous studies regarding the India-Pakistan issue were divided into three major perspectives namely; (1) security, (2) domestic politics, and (3) political economy. Studies that utilize the security perspective examine the conditions of the two states that continue to build the capabilities of their power, especially in the military realm, which highlights a more robust Pakistani formation after the 1971 War (Mohan, 2018; Malik, 1994). As a result of the two states that continue to build capabilities and military cooperation relations with America and Russia make a security dilemma unavoidable (Hafeez, 1993; Chari, 2004). This is worsened by ethnic conflicts and regional borders that fight over the Kashmir region (Wirsing, 2010). With a series of conflicts, the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) mechanism and nuclear weapons control regime are conflict resolution efforts (Carranza, 2003; Misra, 2001).

The second category is the study of domestic politics, these studies state that the Indian-Pakistani military conflict stems from the “inadequate preparation” of the British government when decolonizing these two countries into an independent state (Mir, 2010; Davis, 2011). Mir (2010: 101) also claimed that the British empires divisive policies which were aimed at creating rift between Hindu and Muslims in order to dilute any potential cohesive opposing force. The British pitted these two groups against one another, state furthermore provoked crises and conflicts (Mir, 2010: 101). This situation rationalized extreme violence mainly at border areas such as Punjab and Bengal that experienced the severest mutual violence with taking place on a wide scale (Dalrymple, 2015 in Hwang, 2019). The coercive diplomacy through military institutions has become a preference of both states due to the series of military conflicts and a nuclear ownership, (Ebert & Blarel, 2018). Several peace agreements were unable to resolve aforementioned conflicts (Gopalan, 2007; Misra, 2010). This condition caused a deadlock in both parties bilateral relations. This brought us to the third studies. The third studies stressed that the unfavorable economic conditions hamper trade activities between the two states. Both states preferred to allocate the high portion of their respective state’s budget at the expense of their citizens’ welfare (Iqbal, 1993; Rizvi, 1993; Khan, 2009).

The previous studies have showed that India-Pakistan hostile behavior towards each other resulted in precarious bilateral relations. But none of the above-mentioned

studies devote their inquiry on why the India-Pakistan military conflicts is still on-going and relatively lasting. With that mind, this paper attempts to utilize the concept of the security dilemma to explain on why each respective parties' behavior can be interpreted as a threat. Hence, the question that must be addressed is why does the India-Pakistan military conflict escalated after the 1999 Lahore Declaration? To answer this question, the next section of the paper will analyze both states behavior which can be deemed as threatening such as; improving security capabilities, building alliances to outside parties, defense equipment acquisitions, military exercises and nuclear weapon-testing; using the security dilemma perspective.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A security dilemma is a situation when a state adds or builds capabilities that results in the weakening of other states' capabilities (Jervis, 2009). The security dilemma itself is a concept of the realist school of thought. In the tradition of classical realism, the anarchic international structure forced all the state to adapt war-alert posture. This thought postulates that the state's behavior is akin to that of the men who is power-hungry and aggressive.⁷ Further, this thought was influenced by the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) "The Leviathan". In "the Leviathan" ([1651] 1968), Hobbes painted a grim picture in which that "the state of nature" is nasty, brutish, and short. Moreover, Hobbes also stated that this condition is a result of the absence of a "world government". Therefore, humans will behave according to what they may. Hobbes' postulate serves as a great contribution to the realist tradition, namely the self-help system. "Self-help system" obliges all the state to be responsible for their own security.

In the context of the scope of the state, there are two consequences that come from the absence of a world government are; first, there is nothing that can prevent the occurrence of war and second, every state is responsible for their own survival (Chiaruzzi, 2012). These conditions provoke the security dilemma situation in which a state will take into account the actions of its counterpart. Those can be interpreted as threats; hence the preferred way was to improve the state's own security. Improving the security will trigger similar reaction from its counterparts. Accordingly, the security dilemma circle will perpetuate itself.

In its development, the concept of the security dilemma was first described by the British historian Herbert Butterfield in 1949. The term itself was created by American political scientist John Herz in 1950. Both Butterfield and Herz have views that are in line

with realist views. Butterfield sees that security dilemmas is "the original sin of humanity" and according to Herz, the root of the security dilemma is anarchy itself.⁸ Their thought can be utilized to explain a great war like World War I or a competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War⁹. Then by elaborating on the two views of Butterfield and Herz, Jervis went further by claiming that the strengthening the military forces – out of external and internal concerns – provokes a similar reaction from other states. This is how the vicious circle is formed.

To improve a state's security is to improve its own military capabilities. Building up Military Defence Capability (MDC) is something that state should do constantly, because if it is not the state will be vulnerable to be defeated by other state who poses as threat (Juwana, 2003: 70). Further Juwana (2003) claimed that defence capability has evolved from its traditional form such as wall or fortifications and lakes into modern form of sophisticated military weaponry such as battle tanks, frigates, missiles, fighter aircraft, and even atomic bombs. Hence, his notion that the present form of defence capability may also become offensive capability is same with Jervis' view. Jervis (2009: 104) suggests that variables that contribute to the conditions of security dilemmas are; (1) a presence of defense equipment and (2) aggressive foreign policies. The first variable can manifest in the form of defense equipment acquisition, nuclear weaponry development, military exercises, military cooperation with other states, defense equipment development and so on. Jervis (2009: 106) also states no one can ascertain whether a certain arsenal will be utilized for offensive or defensive purpose. What must be stressed then, is uncertainty raises insecurity, and insecurity will affect how a state makes a decision or policy.

An anarchic international system then obliges every state to be prudent of its own action. In turn, this creates a difficult situation to promote a cooperative venture between states. In "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", Jervis (2009: 125) offers a view of cooperation between states in the situation of security dilemmas. Jervis mentions that there are at least four cooperation scenarios, namely: (1) each state cooperates and disarms; (2) the state maintains high-level weapons while others are disarmed; (3) arms competition and high risk of war; and (4) there are states that are disarmed while other states are armed. But Jervis (2009: 125) also realizes that there's a caveat, even though every state has a common goal of security and stability, they may not be able to achieve it because they do not trust their own counterpart.

Therefore, with Jervis' view in mind (2009: 125), it can be assumed that in the context of India-Pakistan military conflicts, it seems that the both states relations are now conforming the third scenario; arms competition and have a high risk of war. Further, the tension between India and Pakistan is also in line with the two variables proposed by Jervis because the two states continue to build defense forces and make offensive policies towards each other. This condition has prompted the two states to enter the arms races and their respective military forces clash. This also explains why the two states see each other as a threat. Therefore, both parties do not want to take the risk in making efforts to resolve the military conflict by carrying out disarmament. Instead of disarming, both India and Pakistan are looking for alliances capable of arming them and strengthening their military.

Based on this explanation, there are at least three reasons why the security dilemma concept is relevant in analyzing the behavior of India and Pakistan. First, this concept can explain comprehensively the dynamics that occur in South Asia, especially between India and Pakistan, it covers many aspects such as defense and security policies, defense equipment acquisitions, military cooperation, nuclear weapon competitions, and the amelioration corresponding capabilities. Second, the security dilemma concept is able to simplify the causes and explanations of war and conflict. And finally, this concept is able to explain the influence of national interests and global conditions of the respective state decision-making process.

RESEARCH METHOD

To answer the research question, this paper will use qualitative methods, especially process tracing to highlight the causal mechanism (Beach, 2016) within this case. The research data that being utilized are secondary source materials such as books, journals, and articles from online and printed media within a time 1999 (after the Lahore Declaration) until 2019. Then, the data collection method that being utilized are archival & desk research, and media monitoring, especially from the online media. After the data was collected, the author triangulated the findings in order to test the validity & reliability of collected data. Triangulation is done by comparing the data obtained in the study with the findings that corresponds with the inquiry. In the last section, this paper will look the development of the India-Pakistan military conflict after the 1999 Lahore Declaration until 2019, it is done in order to observe the escalation of the military conflict after the peace agreement was carried out.

DISCUSSION

This paper will use two security dilemma variables that proposed by Jervis (2009) to operationalize the analytical framework. The two variables that contribute to the security dilemma are; the development of defense forces and offensive policies (Jervis, 2009). Therefore, this paper will highlights increasing Indian and Pakistani military strength as a result of perception of threat in regarding each others behavior. Then, this paper will show offensive policies towards each other, especially foreign policy because the military conflicts that occur between the two states always stems from the respective state's decision to carry out attacks. At the final section, this paper will show data on military conflicts that occurred between India and Pakistan after the 1999 Lahore Declaration to 2019 to show that the peace agreement was unable to withstand the eruption of conflict, or possibly a war.

Construction of the Indian-Pakistani Defense System Strength

In this paper, the author will describe the behavior of India and Pakistan which could be classified as threatening such as the defense equipment acquisitions, a nuclear weaponry development, and forming security alliances within the period of 1999 -the post-Kargil War era- until 2019.

Development of the Strength of the Indian Defense System

The defense sector that is the main expenses in the Indian economy. To put into context, this can be understood by India's geographical conditions which borders seven neighboring states, and span the area of 15,000 km wide. These geographical features are a challenge for the Indian Defense Force.¹⁰ In this section the author will highlights India's defense spending.




Figure 1. Purchasing Indian Defense Equipment 1998-2018¹¹

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

The graphic shows data of Indian defense equipment acquisition from 1998-2018 with a relatively high frequency despite fluctuations. The data can be understood that there is a tendency of India to increase its defense capabilities. As the author mentioned before, acquiring defense equipment will increase the likelihood of the security dilemma condition.

Based on data taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from 1998-2018, India has carried out purchases of various types of defense equipment, including land, sea, and air defense, from 23 countries: Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, England, America, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Further, out of total 357 transactions, 285 of those are a new transaction, whereas 74 of those are a repeat order. This sum was generated due to inability to send the whole units that already purchased in a single transaction. For example, India has purchased 330 units of SA-316B Allouette-3 helicopter in 1962, yet India only acquire the full 330 units in 2003. In other words, it was because the unit was delivered gradually. India has the highest frequency of arms purchase with Russia. India conducts an arms purchase with Russia for 118 times. At the second place, Israel, in which India conducts 77 times arms purchase, and at the third place, the United States, in which India conducts 36 times arms purchase. It was then followed by Germany, with 18 times of arms purchase, and with Italy & Ukraine with 17 times arms purchases. Whereas for the rest of India's partners, India only conducts five

times arms purchases on average. The high frequency of transactions carried out by India and Russia shows that the two states have close cooperation, especially in the field of military cooperation.

The data shown above was released by UNROCA (United Nations Register of Conventional Arms). The study itself covers the year 1999 to 2017. In addition, a report from BBC, showed that Russia has been a major arms supplier for India for quite long time. India's defense equipment purchases to Russia reached its summit on 2012, with a total US \$ 10 billion transaction. India is also listed as the largest arms importer in the world, whereas Russia itself, supplies 70% of India's weapons needs.¹² The Russian-Indian military cooperation was increasingly marked by the "Make in India" program, namely India's efforts to modernize its defense industry by developing a domestic defense industry assisted by Russian arms exporter company Rosoboronexport. This collaboration was further discussed in the "Defexpo India 2016 International Land and Naval Systems Exhibition". Weapons exported from Russia and developed in India are the following; T-90MS Tagil-the new improved version of the best Russian MBT, T-90MS battle tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Kalashnikov 100 series assault rifles, air defense systems, and various naval vessels.¹³

Russia and India have established strategic relationships that are mutually beneficial, especially in the field of defense and military cooperation since the 1960s. The closeness of these two states provokes protests from the United States. India has received a warning from Washington about buying weapons from Russia. Under the current rules on Russia, the United States can impose sanctions on third party countries if they transact with the Russian defense or intelligence sector.¹⁴ This warning was ignored by India, given the amicable relationship between the United States and Pakistan. India itself is more comfortable in forging an alliance with the superpower that hostile towards Pakistan. This findings also show that the competition between India and Pakistan also impacted on how the both states form their own alliance. India sought an alliance with Russia in spite of warnings from the United States.

The row of defense equipment are increasingly strengthened by the presence of nuclear weaponry developed by India even since before its independences. India conducted its nuclear test in May 1998, in which India conducted five nuclear tests on an area within the proximity of Pakistan. These series of test provoked the 1999 Kargil War.¹⁵ In 2006, India collaborated with the United States -at the time of Bush's administration- in developing nuclear reactors. The cooperation was finally done after

the United States had opposed the transfer of nuclear weapon technology to India for several times.¹⁶ Whereas for 2019, India has signed an agreement to lease nuclear-powered submarines from Russia for the next 10 years. Russia is indeed the main supplier of weapons and defense systems in India after the Cold War. This is also done by India to counteract its rival Pakistan. The series of action that was conducted by India was eventually triggered a similar reaction from Pakistan. This situation is just like what Chari (2004: 19) argued that military conflict between India and Pakistan which reached the nuclear threshold was confirmed by the belief among the Indian bomb protagonists that ‘Pakistan is a rogue state’, its leaders are irrational and could not be trusted not to use nuclear weapons, therefore India had to be ‘prepared’.

Development of the Pakistan Defense System

In response to India, Pakistan sought to develop cutting-edge weapons. The following graphs shows Pakistan defense equipment purchase from 1998 to 2018:




Figure 2. Purchasing Pakistani Defense Equipment 1998-2018¹⁷

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

It can be inferred from the graphics that, although Pakistan has a comparatively lower frequency of a defense purchase, Pakistan is more consistent in its build-up. Based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistan conducted 214 various major conventional weapons purchase in which; 189 of those are a new transaction and 25 being a repeat order within the period of 1998-2018 with 23 different countries namely: China, France, Italy, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, the

Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. China is a major partner of Pakistan. Pakistan has conducted 63 times arms purchases with China, it is then followed by the United States with 60 times arms purchases. And in its France in the third place with 15 times arms purchases. Pakistan only conducted nine arms purchases on average with the rest of its partners.

Since the 1960s Pakistan has cooperated with the United States. In addition to the United States, Pakistan also cooperates with China, Russia and a number of Eastern European states. Pakistan's decision to cooperate with China provoked a hostile reaction from the United States, which can be seen on 1965 India-Pakistan War in which the United States halted its military assistance to Pakistan, and again in 1990s decade when the US halted its assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weaponry development. Being terminated with the US means greater opportunity for Pakistan to cooperate with China. A 2018 report mentions that China plans to build a second offshore naval base near a strategic port of Pakistan. The closeness of the two states was dubbed "iron brother" by the deputy chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Fan Changlong. The effort to increase this cooperation can be interpreted as balancing effort to counteract India and the United States (US).¹⁸ This military cooperation includes; design of JF-17 fighter jets by China and assembled in Pakistan; sales of secret submarines from China to Pakistan worth US\$ 5 billion; joint naval training; fighting terrorism, and high-level defense negotiations.¹⁹ Furthermore, security issues in Central Asia are described as "insecurity interdependence by external forces" due to the contestation of major powers such as the United States, Russia and China so that hostility patterns are more prominent in the region (Pratama, 2013: 91).

Pakistan's resources and economic capability, which is relatively smaller than India in, motivates Pakistan to seek a more alliance. Although the military cooperation does not run smoothly with the US, the US is still the main supplier of Pakistani weapons. But the most interesting thing is, Pakistan itself is playing a double game, seeing its relationship with the US deteriorates, Pakistan readied itself by strengthening its alliance with China. Therefore, both Pakistan and India are inseparable from the cycle of security dilemmas by taking action in the trend of alliances, arms races, and improvement of the defense system.

India has advantages in terms of military formations both in the number of troops and in the number of weapons. To counteract this, Pakistan has trump card namely; its nuclear capabilities which is claimed to be more powerful than nuclears possessed by

India. Based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in June 2018, Pakistan is said to have 140-150 nuclear warheads, while India only has 130-140 nuclear warheads. Pakistani independently developed nuclear was baptized as Shaheen-III. The missile is a short-range ballistic missile that can carry a nuclear bomb. This missile claimed by Pakistani officials will prevent India from launching a sudden conventional attack. The Pakistani military also announced that this missile could shoot down any weapon system. This is supported by the opinion of experts who said that, by increasing its rocket maneuverability while increasing its range from 60 to 70 km.²⁰ This weapon system is able to launch multiple missiles at once, hence it will allows Pakistan to attack several targets at the same time. Besides its nuclear superiority, Pakistan's superiority also lies in the abundance of nuclear resources, namely uranium, while India has more limited uranium resources.






India's nuclear weaponry development activities in collaboration with Russia has sparked a similar reaction from Pakistan. The development of Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons and Indian nuclear certainly increases the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. The development of the defense system in the end only perpetuates animosity between the two states.

Indian and Pakistani Military Strengths

Beside building the strength of the defense system from 1998-2019, India and Pakistan have more formidable military formations. Even though India has advantages in terms of numbers, Pakistan continues to offset India's strength. This can be seen from Pakistan's efforts to continue to strengthen its defenses both from the land, sea, and air forces, by continually adding & renewing weapons and by strengthening military cooperation with various states. Whereas for Pakistan, the state itself has purchased defense equipment with the same number of countries as India did, namely 23 states.

The defense system in the military field is classified into several categories. This categorization refers to the Major Conventional Arms of a state. The weapons category is as follows:

Table 1. Categorization of Major Conventional Weapons²¹

| | |
|---|--|
|  Category I - Battle tanks |  Category II - Armoured combat vehicles |
|  Category III - Large-calibre artillery system |  Category IV - Combat aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) |
|  Category V - Attack helicopters |  Category VI - Warships |
|  Category VII - Missiles and missile launchers | Detailed category definitions > |

Source: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

The following is the 2017 data released by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) concerning the numbers of owned Pakistani and Indian Major Conventional Weapons based on the Main Conventional Weapons categorization:

Table 2. Amount of 2017 India-Pakistan Major Conventional Weapons²²

| | <i>India</i> | <i>Pakistan</i> |
|--------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Category I | 248 units | 636 units |
| Category II | 0 unit | 910 units |
| Category III | 6163 units | 358 units |
| Category IV | 160 units | 171 units |
| Category V | 145 units | 31 units |
| Category VI | 10 units | 12 units |
| Category VII | 20.752 units | 10.464 units |

Source: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

From these data, it can be seen that each state has a weapon advantage in certain categories. In categories, I and II show that Pakistan is superior in the number of battle tanks and in the possession of armored combat vehicles. India does not even have armored combat vehicles at all in 2017. India outperformed Pakistan in category III, namely the number of ownership of large-caliber artillery systems. Category IV (fighter aircraft) and category VI (warships) both states have competing numbers. Then in category V (attack helicopters) and category VII (missiles and launchers), Pakistan again outnumbered with India.

From the data of India and Pakistan defense system, it appears that the two states have formidable military power that able to launch an attack towards each other. The ability of states to make strategic adaptations in anticipating the unpredictable character of war must be developed to maintain its survival (Widjajanto, 2013: 7). The view that

each other is a threat manifested in the form of continuation of military build-up and state's ability to perform strategic adaptiveness. The purchase of weapons continues to be carried out consistently by both states. India has a number of advantages compared to Pakistan, both from the number of troops and the number of weapons. Pakistan is trying to keep up with it by buying the latest units from every categories even in small quantities. The condition of this dilemma was strengthened by the actions of the two states that developed nuclear weapons, despite the 1999 Lahore Declaration in which Pakistan and India had agreed on nuclear non-proliferation.

Offensive Policy

The second variable of the security dilemma based on the Jervis view is the policies that tend to be offensive. The policy is an instrument of a state in maintaining sovereignty and maintaining stability. From Jervis' point of view, the series of actions by two states can be interpreted as an interplay of soft and hard power to maintain their own stability. The development of a defense system is an act of hard power. The use of hard power itself needs to be supported by policy or soft power that supports it. Therefore, a capable defense system must be supported by offensive policies. The policy, in this case, is the foreign policy in the military field. That is what makes these two variables complement each other, and further lead to a situation of relatively lasting security dilemmas. This section will discuss Indian and Pakistani policy, especially in the military field which has offensive indications.

India Foreign Policy

India is a state that has strong dominance in the South Asian region. This can be seen from India's hard power such as a strong defense system, solid military formation, and technology that continues to be developed (Bhatnagar & Passi, 2016). In addition to hard power, India's dominance is supported by soft power which is can be observed in its policy. Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi aims to maintain India's stability as a regional hegemon. This aspiration translated into "Neighborhood First" foreign policy.

"Neighborhood First" foreign policy is Indian foreign policy which emphasizes the maintenance of its main relationships with SAARC member states (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), neighboring states in the East Asia region and, the Eastern parts of Southeast Asia region (Bhatnagar & Passi, 2016). Pakistan is one of

the member states of SAARC, so through this policy Pakistan has not “escaped” the attention of Indian foreign policy. Bhatnagar and Passi (2016) also emphasized that SAARC is a regional organization that aims to integrate states in the South Asia region that are always full of suspicion towards each other, with India and Pakistan as the most prominent example. Besides that, geographically-speaking, India is the state with the widest territory in South Asia, also India has a strategic position located in the middle of the region. With land and maritime territory that separates every state in the region except Pakistan and Afghanistan, making Pakistan an Indian-Locked area, because to access Pakistan must cross India (Bhatnagar & Passi, 2016). Therefore, although this policy seems to have a broad scope, through the Neighborhood First policy it becomes a gap for India to lock in Pakistan.

India perceives Pakistan and China economic cooperation in 2015 called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a threat. In Asia, India is China’s equivalent counterpart, then the conflictual degrees of India and Pakistan are at a very high point. The alliance of China and Pakistan is of course seen as a threat by India, both a threat to the status quo stability of India in the region and stability in terms of “bilateral” relationship with Pakistan itself. This high conflictual history with the two states made the Indian government respond to China-Pakistan cooperation by changing the orientation of Neighborhood First policies be more offensive towards the two states, especially Pakistan. The change in orientation of this policy is mainly in the sphere of defense. In this case, India's defense interests under PM Narendra Modi are categorized into two locus: (1) defense from the threat of terrorism which manifested in the signing of the MoU on cooperation against terrorism with the United States in 2015 (US Embassy & Consulates in India), and (2) Kashmir's territorial conflict with Pakistan (Testimony, 2018). Therefore, if there is a provocative attack or behavior from Pakistan or a Pakistani terror group, the Neighborhood First policy becomes the justification of India's attack on Pakistan.

The latest case of India and Pakistan, namely the attack on each other using air forces on 26 and 27 February 2019, is an evidence of India’s offensive foreign policy. The attack was initiated by Indian Air Forces by entering the Pakistani region of Kashmir and firing on a militant group based in Pakistan called Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India admitted that its air force has carried out attacks in Pakistan, targeting camps run by the JeM militant group. Indian Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale, claimed to have succeeded in killing a large number of militant Jaish-e-Mohammed, including trainers, commanders,

and groups who were being trained for *fidayeen* (suicide) in the operation. Subsequently, an Indian security official told DW that the operation utilized a Mirage 2000 aircraft, which flew across the Line of Control (LoC) and dropped 1,000 kilograms of bombs. Mirage 2000 is a fourth-generation single-engine fighter jet made in France manufactured by Dassault Aviation.²³

The operation of the Indian military air force was triggered by a suicide bombing by Pakistani militant Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) which killed 40 Central Reserve troops in Pulwama district, Indian-controlled Kashmir on February 14, 2019. This JeM group attack occurred when 78 Indian convoy vehicles carrying 2,547 central reserve police forces were attacked by a terrorist bomb blast. This attack is the bloodiest incident since the 2008 Mumbai attack.²⁴ Things are becoming more complicated because the Indian government believes that the Pakistani government is the mastermind behind this incident, so this is the basis for India to retaliate Pakistani security measure. The Indian government seems to never refrained in initiating the first strike if it is related to Pakistan. India must attack, especially what must be attacked is "Neighborhood First".

Pakistan Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is formulated based on the state's national interests. As with India, Pakistan's national interest is to maintain its stability from external threats. With South Asian regional security and India's dominance in mind, Pakistan then prioritized two issues to be addressed with its foreign policy namely; adequate defense in the face of neighboring states (India) that were relatively much stronger and a priority to increase bargaining position towards India in the Kashmir problem (Syaifuddin, 2005). These two issues are security issues have the potential to disrupt Pakistan's stability. Further, the Kashmir region military conflict can be amplified by India's nuclear weaponry development and an increase in India's medium-range missile capabilities that can reach Pakistan. The issue of Kashmir and India's nuclear weaponry program are interrelated issues, so it is therefore logical for the Pakistani foreign policy focuses on tackle these issues.²⁵

Foreign policy can also change depending on national interests and international conditions, this is also what happened to Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1990s experienced a shift. Initially, Pakistan can be characterized as "inward-looking", and it shifted its focus to become more open to the outside world, especially with the US invasion of Iraq related to the events of 9/11 (Khan, 2007: 461).

Khan (2007) also suggested that Pakistan even posture itself as a “frontline state” in the War on Terror which was pioneered by the United States. This action thus automatically triggered a reaction from India. In addition to the United States, Pakistan has also formed a strategic partnership with China which aims to check Indian power in the region.

Pakistan is well aware of its geographical, economic, defense and military position. Unstable relations with India make Pakistan must always be in a "standby" position. It is understandable due to India relatively higher capabilities. To mitigate this, Pakistan also cooperates with superpowers such as the United States and China, in addition to building a defense system. This is the formula for Pakistan's foreign policy. From this, it can be said that the characteristics of Pakistani foreign policy in the 21st century are seeking security through external alliances (Chaziza, 2016: 2).

Concerning the discussion, the latest Pakistan's foreign policy that must be observed occurred on February 2019. At the time, the Pakistani government carried out an offensive maneuver against India by shooting down two fighter planes of Indian military forces that entered the territory of Pakistani Kashmir. Military spokesman, Major General Asif Ghafoor said that Pakistani Air Forces shot down the two fighter jets in their own territory. One fighter jet fell in the Pakistani region of Kashmir, while another crashed in Indian territory.²⁶ Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Faisal stated that the only purpose of the action was to demonstrate Pakistan's right, willingness and ability to defend itself. Mohammad Faisal then added that the Pakistani government does not want an increase in hostility, yet fully prepared if the circumstances dictates them to do so.²⁷ From the statement, it can be concluded that Pakistani Foreign Policy contains offensive values in terms of willingness to take offensive actions to maintain sovereignty. This is also in line with Jervis' view of (2008) the security dilemma that postulates “*it is better if a war can be averted, should it can't, that war must be won*”. So better warfare does not occur, but if it has to happen then the state must win. With this view, any party will not reduce the intention of an attack on a state that is considered threatening.

Escalation of Military Conflict Post-Lahore Declaration 1999

The 1999 Kargil War was one of the major battles between India and Pakistan, although still with the same motive, namely the dispute over the Kashmir region. Based on the data the author obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in the armed conflict sector (Armed Conflict Dataset), there were 10 armed conflicts with 1,527

victims after 1998. Following are graphs of the Indian-Pakistani armed conflict from 1998-2017 displayed by UCDP:




Figure 2. Escalation of the India-Pakistan Armed Conflict 1998-2017²⁸

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

From these data, it can be seen that there were 10 armed conflicts after the signing of the 1999 Lahore Declaration. The conflict itself reach the summit 1999 itself. Then, a high level military conflict occurred again in 2003, it was when India and Pakistan conducted a nuclear test. The India-Pakistan military conflict was amplified by the presence of militant groups based in Pakistan who also carried out acts terror. Reported by the BBC, in 2002, members of the militant groups based in Pakistan carried out an attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir which killed at least 31 people at an Indian military base in Kaluchak near Jammu. Most of the victims were civilians who were relatives of soldiers. Then in 2016, at least 19 Indian soldiers were killed when Pakistani militia groups again attacked Indian military bases in Uri. This attack was immediately followed by Indian military retaliation which killed the famous militia member Burhan Wani. In 2018, more than 500 people were killed, including civilians, security forces and militia members due to clashes between the two countries.²⁹

This shows that the 1999 Lahore Declaration was not the endpoint of the two states' disputes. The peace agreement can only temporarily reduce military conflict. A series of military conflicts always occurred between India and Pakistan within 20 years after the signing of 1999 Lahore Declaration. These situations were also reinforced by conflicts throughout the 2000s which were marked by the militant groups based in Pakistan to the latest armed terror and military conflict in 2019. It was when the two states mobilized their air forces to attack each other. Several times India has called on the United Nations to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed as a state-sponsored terrorist group, but Pakistan

has always opposed the measure, and denies on the basis of “groundless accusation”. This Pakistani statement was later corroborated by support from China.³⁰ Therefore, the Indian-Pakistani military conflict persists not only due to the actions of a “legal entity” but also number of militant groups.

CONCLUSION

An anarchic international system of encourages each state to prioritize the stability of their respective states. The stability is enhanced by building defense capabilities. This view which rooted in realism proposes that a state that has strong forces and weapons will have great power so that it will be safe from threats. But the caveat is this view is also contains an element of paradox because the anarchic international structure forces dictate the every state to be aggressive towards each other in order to be safe. This situation in turns, creates the security dilemma condition. The security dilemma itself can be observed with two variables in mind, (1) the development of defense system, and (2) offensive policies. This situation manifested in the relationships of India and Pakistan, which continued to experience an escalation of hostility towards each other, despite the existence of 1999 Lahore Declaration peace agreement. The peace agreement that has been carried out is not able to stop the military conflict, but only temporarily dampens it, because India and Pakistan see each other's behavior such as building defense forces, nuclear weaponry development, and alliance trends as threats. The military conflict between the two states is relatively “persistent” due to the security dilemma.

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