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Factors Supporting Turkey's Policy to Purchase Russian S-400 Anti-Air Strike Defense Units

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ABSTRACT

Turkey is a member of the NATO military alliance since 1952, as a member of NATO, cooperation between Turkey and Russia invites counterparts from other NATO alliance countries. But even with criticism, Turkey continues purchasing S-400 from Russia. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the factors that support Turkey's policy on purchasing S-400. This research is a descriptive research through internet-based literature. Turkey's policy in purchasing S-400 analyzed using the concepts of Arms, Alliances and Security Tradeoffs proposed by James D. Morrow. James stated that there are three factors that influence the state to conduct arming; economic & military technological factors, the lack of alliances effectiveness and differences in national interests between alliances. This study found that all of these factors occurred in the conditions of Turkey and NATO. With fulfillment of these three factors, Turkey chose to do arming instead of allying in facing national threat

Keywords: National Security, Turkey, NATO, S-400, allying, arming.

1. Introduction

Turkey is a member of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military alliance that has joined since 1952. Since then security challenges for Turkey and NATO have greatly developed, and Turkey has also felt the benefits of being a member of NATO, especially for Turkey's national security. (Aybet, 2012).

As the country with the second largest number of troops in NATO (Mortimer, 2018). Turkey is a strong and important actor in the Middle East now, as a limiting gate between Europe and the Middle East makes Turkey playing a crucial role for NATO and the European Union to get more attention in the security field. Moreover, Turkey borders directly with two failed states, namely Syria and Iraq, which makes Turkey under continuous threat caused by the regional conflict (Seren, 2017).

With conditions vulnerable to air strikes and other small missile attacks, Turkey at the end of 2012 requested assistance from its allies in NATO to add air defense systems to protect Turkey's territory bordering Syria (World Bulletin, 2018). Responding to the request from

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Turkey, NATO in early January immediately placed six missile defense units (missiles) to help Turkey to defend its territory from possible attacks from Syria (NATO, 2018).

The missile assistance was supplied by 5 Turkish alliance countries in NATO, namely: Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the United States. However, in August 2015 the United States and Germany decided to withdraw their patriot and Germany declared that the NATO mission to protect the Turkish border had been successful (Hurriyet Daily New, 2018). With the withdrawal of two air defense units by Germany and the United States, and also preceded by withdrawal of units from the Netherlands, Turkey is now only dependent on two Spanish PATRIOT missile defense units and Italy's SAMP / T to defend against possible air attacks will come from the direction of Syria (NATO, 2016).

Quoted from Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey's national news agency), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that between Ankara and Moscow had agreed to complete the process of selling high-tech defense equipment. Turkey has signed an agreement to buy Russia's S-400 defense system. The next process, carried out by shipping from Russia to Turkey. Both Presidents, both Russian Presidents and Turkish Presidents are determined to finalize this purchase agreement, said Erdogan on September 10, 2017 (Munyar, 2018).

With the start of the S-400 purchase agreement made between Turkey and Russia, the United States as a Turkish alliance in NATO spoke out about the Turkish purchase. The reason is that Russia, along with Iran and North Korea, was subject to CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions. With CAATSA, the United States imposes sanctions on any country related to defense and intelligence agreements with these countries. According to Section 231 of CAATSA, the US President has the authority to impose sanctions on countries conducting transactions in the defense and intelligence sector with the government of the Russian Federation (US Department of State, 2018). Section 235 explains one of the points of the sanctions is export sanctions: The US President may order the United States Government not to issue special licenses and not give any special permission or authority to export goods or technology of any person to the sanctioned person (US Department of State, 2018).

In this case, the United States through its Assistant Secretary, confirmed Turkey that the purchase of the S-400 had an impact on the prospects of cooperation with Turkey's US military industry, including the F-35, a jet that Turkey had ordered in the US earlier (Koc,

2018). Turkey is also likely to lose state income from exports of goods to the US, which in 2017 reached \$ 9.413 trillion (US census, 2018).

The important meaning of NATO for Turkey is to fight terrorism which makes Turkey and NATO increase the intensity of efforts to tackle terrorism. In addition, the relationship between NATO and the European Union, which made NATO and the European Union collaborate on all aspects relating to security, defense and crisis management (Gonul, 2010). Damage to relations between Turkey and NATO will make the intensity and efficiency of their cooperation decrease.

From a technical standpoint, the Russian-made S-400 defense system is rated by the NATO alliance as not having compatibility with the NATO joint defense system that has been formed so far. It will be difficult if Turkey still wants to operate the S-400 side by side with joint military equipment owned by other NATO countries. With the purchase of the S-400 the operating system needed to use the S-400 will not be the same as the system that was first used by NATO, which will make Turkey have a military capacity that is independent of the NATO alliance, and the NATO commander will not have control over the unit . This is because the IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) software used to identify opponents / friends in the S-400 will not prevent Turkey from using it against its allied aircraft and missiles at NATO. And also to achieve full operational capability will require Russian personnel who will be stationed in Turkey for advice, assistance and training (Gorka, 2017).

Despite facing many contradictions from the United States and NATO which is an alliance, the Turkish government continues to purchase the S-400 weapons unit. This study aims to explain the factors that support Turkey's policy to conduct joint purchases of S-200 units with Russia, amid criticism from NATO members, especially the United States which has been helping to maintain Turkey's national security.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Previous Research

The first reference used in the study was a journal article written by Ramazan Gozen entitled Turkish-American Relations in 2009 (Gozen, 2010). According to Gozen the main agenda between US-Turkish relations is to promote security and stability in various aspects. However, other issues such as the economy, diplomacy and military trade are no less

important. Indeed, the true relations between the two countries are based on the national interests of each country, but further this partnership aims to go further to form a new "order and mechanism" to resolve regional and global problems. One of them is to alleviate problems in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and Afghanistan, and also to suppress the influence of Russia and Iran in the region. In this way, Turkey and the US are trying to form a stable and orderly territory by supporting each other.

The second article is *Reconciling US-Turkish Interest in Northern Syria* written by Aaron Stein (Stein, 2017). This paper shows how the dispute between Turkey and the US in northern Syria, even though they have a common interest in defeating the Islamic State. This is caused by the political instability within Turkey due to the PKK (Turkish Kurdish Party) uprising. The most likely approach is to encourage the resumption of peace negotiations between Turkey and Kurdish representatives, to reduce frontline conflict between US-supported Kurdish (SDF) Kurdish militias. Intense US diplomacy will also prevent Turkey's direct action against the SDF. With this Russia can utilize this sub-conflict to its geopolitical advantage, especially if tensions between Turkey and the US worsen the atmosphere in NATO.

The third article is *Turkey-NATO Relations and NATO's New Strategic Concept* written by Vecdi Gönül who is a former Turkish defense minister (Gonul, 2010). The article states that Turkey is aware that globalization is not only opening up to the economy, alleviating poverty and promoting democratic values, but also as a medium for spreading radicalism and terrorism to the people, including in facilitating the most dangerous flow of weapons; nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Therefore Turkey is implementing a new approach in security cooperation, namely through cooperation between countries and organizations. NATO has played an important role in Turkey's security in 58 years, which has made Turkey integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Vice versa, Turkey is trying to support all the tasks and roles given by NATO, as much as possible. Being a member of NATO for 58 years, Turkey has clearly demonstrated its commitment to peace and security in the world.

The fourth paper used as a literature study in this study is an article with the title *Turkey and Russia: A Fragile Friendship* written by Hasan Selim Ozertem (Ozertem, 2017). In the journal describing the ups and downs of relations between the two countries. One of the peaks of the Russia-Turkey gap was when Turkey shot down a Russian military aircraft that was rotating in the Syrian area, claimed by the Turkish government over its country's air

limits. The shooting was more about the results of the two countries' relations rather than the causes. Both parties chose to deepen bilateral cooperation in economic matters, but ignored constructive regional problems. However, despite such circumstances, it is no secret that Turkey sees Russia as a balancing actor against the West. This became clearer, especially after the failed Turkish coup in July 2016. While the West was hesitant to show solidarity at the level sought by Ankara, Putin immediately condemned the coup and convinced the Turkish government for Russian support. However, relations between the two countries did not develop through international institutions, but were directed by political leaders in Russia and Turkey. In this sense, bilateral relations are more driven by actors. In post-crisis settings, Putin and Erdoğan were more inclined to coordinate with each other, rather than acting unilaterally.

The four writings above discuss relations between Turkey, NATO, the United States and Russia. But from the previous research above, there has been no research that focuses on the policy of purchasing S-400 weapons units between Turkey and Russia. Besides that, the analysis of Turkish defense policy above has not yet used the framework of the concept of Arms, Alliances and Security Tradeoffs from James D. Morrow. James to explain the factors that support Turkish security policy. These two things are the novelty of this research.

2.2 Arms, Aliances, Security Tradeoffs

In International Relations study on alliances, the BoT (Balance of Threat) theory was proposed by Stephen M. Walt in 1987 which explains how a country forms an alliance is to balance a threat posed by another country. However, James D. Morrow in his journal entitled *Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the search of Security*, he tried to do a new construction of the view of a country's alliance, namely by echoing between armaments (arming) and alliances (alliances) is a better characterization for security policy making in a country (Morrow, 1993).

Therefore, in being to get a higher level of security, and also in response to a threat that arises the country is conducting arming or alliancing. The state uses an effective combination of the two methods (Morrow, 1993). With the ultimate goal is to add value to the country's net security.

2.2.1 Alliance

Alliance is defined by Kegley and Raymond as a formal agreement between sovereign states with the aim to coordinate their actions if there is a possibility of a military emergency situation (Kegley, Raymond, 1990). Alliancing in this context, is not only limited to forming new alliances, but can also be to strengthen and deepen cooperation from previously formed alliances. The purpose of the alliance is to strengthen national security and the security of allied countries, even to weaken and overthrow the opposition alliance (Walt, 1979).

A country will do alliancing with other countries when the interests of these countries do not conflict with the interests of their allied countries. Because if a country forms an alliance with a state that has interests that conflict with its alliance state, it is feared that the country is bound to resolve the interests of its alliance so that the country's own interests which are the priorities of domestic political actors will be left behind. Domestic political actors can be in the form of state elites and even the people. With domestic interests neglected, internal public support for policies made by the government will decrease (making domestic groups reject the policy) (Morrow, 1993). Alliancing is carried out by a country if they feel that the threat received requires a quick reaction to maintain national security. Because indeed by relying on alliance countries, the state will immediately get reinforcements from its allies

2.2.2 Arms

Arming is an action taken by the state to increase military power, both in the form of additional weaponry and the addition of military personnel. Kenneth Waltz also referred to this as internal balancing, in which the state took actions to increase economic power aimed at strengthening military power that made the country more capable in arranging the next strategy (Waltz, 1979). From the above definition it can be concluded that arming is a form of state independence by relying on itself in maintaining national security.

Internally, the state carries out arming when in the country there are economic resources that can be utilized to realize this policy. Therein lays the dilemma caused by arming, where the people of the country indirectly bear the economic burden caused by the policy. Whether it's raising taxes or adding to military service. There will be some groups who oppose this policy because of this, there are some who support. It is this supportive group that will advocate for the policy so that the country can get broader economic and political support.

Countries with a more rapid development of military technology would prefer to do arming. This is consistent with Waltz's statement, that doing arming will be more reliable than doing

alliancing which is more dependent on allied military forces (Waltz, 1979). This is because the state will find it easier to estimate the power that can be calculated, namely their own military strength, compared to assessing the strength of the military and the reliability of the alliance that will guard them. Increasing the country's weapons on the one hand can guarantee the national security of the country in its own hands, but on the other hand this increase in weaponry will be viewed by other countries as a new threat, even though basically the state has no intention to attack other countries.

3. Research Method

In this study, researchers used a qualitative data analysis method developed by Miles and Huberman consisting of three stages (Milles, Huberman, 1994):

1. Data reduction, which consists of the process of organizing data and categorizing data with the concept that data will be arranged systematically. All data obtained from the source, sorted so that it gets relevant data.
2. Presentation of data (data display), the process of connecting data with the conceptual framework used. After the relevant data is obtained, then it is linked and analyzed according to the conceptual framework.
3. Drawing conclusions and verification, consisting of an evaluation process and reporting the findings. After analysis, the conclusions obtained from the study.

4. Results

Factors supporting Turkey to purchase weapons units with Russia rather than maintaining an alliance with NATO are:

1. The state of Turkey's economy is improving, followed by the development of Turkey's defense and aviation industry which encourages Turkey to have more weapons of its own and develop its weapons. Followed by a vision of self-sufficiency in 2023 Turkey.
2. NATO's ineffectiveness as a Turkish alliance in providing assistance to the national threats received by Turkey from various aspects. So Turkey decided to have its own anti-air unit.

3. There are differences in national interests between Turkey and at least some NATO members, especially the differences in interests in North Syria and the United States.

5. Discussion

5.1 Turkish military technology and resources

Turkey as one of the countries that has a fairly good economic development from the beginning of 2000. This is evidenced by the rapid increase of Turkey's national income in the 2001-2008 period where in 2001 Turkey was recorded to have a GDP of USD 200,252 billion and in 2008 it was more than 3 times that, which is USD 764,336 Billion (The World Bank, 2018). Even Turkey reached its national income peak in 2013 which reached USD 950,579 Billion (The World Bank, 2018).




Figure .1 Turkish GDP Growth 2002-2018

Source: Trading Economics 2019

Turkey's GDP growth chart shows a positive trend that is an indicator of Turkey's economic progress from year to year. The graph shows that Turkey's GDP growth is above 2%, except in 2008-2009 where there was a global recession (Rawdanowicz, 2010). Turkey's average GDP growth rate from 1999-2018 shows 4.73%. Where according to Barro Iron Law which states to be a 'steady-state' or a stable country requires GDP growth of 2% (Barro, 2012) These facts make Turkey one of the countries with a fairly good and stable level of economic development.




Figure .2 Chart of Turkey's military funding allocations 2009-2018

Source: Trading Economics 2018

Switching from state revenues, in terms of the allocation of funds provided by Turkey to the military shows a graph that continues to increase from at least three years. Turkey's military spending increased to 22,088 million USD in 2018 from 17,824 million USD in 2017. The average allocation of Turkey's military funds reached 8,151 million USD from 1953 to 2018, and reached the highest expenditure figure in 2018 (Trading economics, 2018). This shows the seriousness of Turkey in building military power and national security, in line with plans for the independence of Turkey's defense industry in 2023, which wants Turkey to be able to meet its own defense needs (TRT World, 2019).

Turkey is a country with military power ranked 4th in NATO after the US, France and the United Kingdom in a row (Global Fire, 2019). With a total air force reaching 1,067, including aircraft, military transport, helicopters and attack helicopters. As for the rocket projector, Turkey has 350 units. Overall Turkey is ranked 9th in military power among all countries in the world (Global Fire Power, 2019).

For decades, Turkey has been a buyer and market for foreign-made weapons systems. But in recent decades Turkey has changed from just a buyer and target market from international weapons, to buyers, producers, co-producers and partners for making weapons (Defense News, 2017). The progress made by Turkey is very significant where in 2002, Turkey's local industry fulfilled 24% of the country's procurement requirements, of which the ratio now reaches 64% (Defense News, 2019). Not only that, Turkey's defense minister is targeting 80% in the near future.

One form of attitude towards Turkey's desire to be independent in a military context is, with the commencement of the HISAM project (Turkish surface-to-air missile system) which began in 2007, where Turkey issued requests for information to domestic and international defense companies to meet air defense requirements for short and medium range. Where in the end ASELSAN (a military company controlled by the Turkish government) managed to become the main contractor along with ROKETSAN (a company making weapons and defense contractors of Turkey) in this project. Broadly speaking, HISAR is a surface-to-air missile system that is being developed by ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, consisting of a Low Altitude Air Defense missile system (HISAR-A) and a Medium Altitude Air Defense Missile (HISAR-O) (Seren, 2017). With an intercept distance of 15km for HISAR-A and 25km for HISAR-O. The function of HISAR is to defend against helicopters, cruise missiles, air-to-ground missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to protect military bases, ports, facilities and troops from air threats. Hisar-A and Hisar-O are respectively expected to operate in 2020 and 2021 (Daily Sabah, 2018).

As for Turkey's need for a long-range anti-missile defense system, Turkey has prepared a 'Siper' program which is expected to be ready by 2021 (Defense News, 2018). The responsibility for developing this program rests with three national companies in Turkey, namely ROKETSAN, ASELSAN and TÜBİTAK SAGE. Erdogan stated that Turkey had increased the level of locality in the defense industry from 20 percent to 65 percent and would reach Turkey's strong and independent target by relentlessly continuing national defense measures that had begun in the defense industry (Daily Sabah, 2018).

Even the defense industry sector has become one of the influential industries in helping to increase state revenue. This is evidenced by the increase in Turkey's total exports in the aircraft and defense industries. According to the TIM (Turkish Exporters Assembly) this sector in the range of 2017-2018 experienced an increase in exports by 9.3% and increased much more rapidly in the range 2018-2019 by reaching 64.4% (Turkish Exporters Assembly, 2019).




Figure 3: Turkish Aviation and defense export chart per \$1000

Source: Turkish Exporters Assembly

5.2 NATO's Efficiency for Turkey in Facing Threats

As an alliance organization, NATO aims to provide security for the people of its member countries. Likewise with Turkey as one of its members, although the alliance does not always provide security for its members, but this is ideally a reciprocal relationship where each member country becomes the recipient as well as a provider to contribute in creating security.

Turkey's joining as a NATO member cannot be separated from the threat of the Soviet Union as one of the superpower countries that emerged after the end of World War II. In the year One of the threats from the Soviet Union at that time came in the form of the Soviet Union's request for control in the part of the Turkish strait which became the crisis of the Turkish strait later. Where in March 1945 the Soviet Union began launching anti-Turkish propaganda and challenged Turkey with several requests for Turkey and the Soviet Union to have joint control or joint management of defense in the Turkish strait, while also asking for military bases in the strait, while Turkey also had to change borders East of his country (Lika, 2015). The Soviet Union's control over the strait will make it easier for the Soviet Union to explore southern Europe and make a gate for the Communists to exert influence in Europe.

In resolving this crisis, Turkey is assisted by the US financially and militarily. Through Truman Doctrine, the US agreed to provide financial assistance to Turkey. In October 1946 the US and Britain reaffirmed their support for Turkey (Hasanli, 2011). Over time, Turkey in

1952 joined NATO and successfully rejected Soviet requests for control of the Turkish Strait. This success is in line with the initial goal of the formation of NATO, namely to stem the movement of the Soviet Union in Europe. The resolution of this crisis was at the same time NATO's first success in protecting Turkey's national security.

But that was before, when the cold war took place where NATO and Turkey had the same goal, namely to stem the movement of the Soviet Union after World War. The effectiveness of NATO as an alliance organization for Turkey is declining, this refers to several events between Turkey and NATO.

At the end of 2012, precisely on December 4, 2012, Turkey requested assistance from its NATO allies in NATO to immediately send assistance to send an anti-air attack defense unit to protect Turkey's southern border which is vulnerable to the threat of missile attacks from the Syrian border (NATO, 2016). In January 2013, 5 NATO member countries (US, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) agreed to send anti-air strike units to Turkey. But in August 2015 the Americans and Germans withdrew the units they had placed in Turkey, arguing that the NATO mission in protecting the Turkish border was considered successful (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). Until June 2018 Turkey did not have its own ballistic missile defense system, Turkey relied on Patriot Advanced Capability-2 and SAMP-T placed by Spain and Italy, (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2019) Although NATO stated that NATO's mission in assisting defense Turkish air has been completed, but actually Turkey is still exposed to missile threats such as threats from Kurdish rebels and terrorist militant groups (BBC, 2019).

One of the points of concern for relations between Turkey and NATO is the US's unwillingness to sell PATRIOT units (anti-air defense units) to Turkey. As stated by the Turkish Foreign Minister, that Turkey is in a state of urgency because Turkey does not have an air defense system at all, but Turkey cannot buy weapons to the US, even to buy a shotgun only Turkey has difficulty due to the concerns of the US Congress when selling weapons to Turkey, because of this Turkey must buy it from another party (RT, 2019). Even as an alliance country Turkey has intended to buy PATRIOT in the US for the past 10 years, but the cooperation contract was never agreed upon, and in the end Russia came to offer the offer needed by Turkey to sell its S-400 (Defense News, 2018).

From this incident it can be concluded that as one of Turkey's alliance countries in NATO, the United States is considered unable to carry out what NATO has assigned to all its members: committed to protecting its member states through political and military means. The US's reluctance to sell PATRIOT to Turkey does not reflect the attitude of protecting fellow alliance countries, this requires Turkey to look for other alternatives and find an S-400 offer from Russia.

The purchase of S-400 by Turkey is not a form of political 'message' for its alliance at NATO. Turkey's decision to choose the S-400 is based on Turkey's urgent need for an air defense system, as well as several other technical and economic reasons, such as the S-400 unit's superiority from competitors of its kind with better prices and faster delivery times (Al-Jazeera, 2017). Turkey's intention to continue to show willingness to cooperate among NATO members is demonstrated by the agreement of the initial agreement with the consortium of EUROSAM (a company developing air defense systems in France and Italy) in developing, producing and using air defense systems. This development openly reveals that Turkey will work with its allies to develop a defense system in the medium and long term. But for immediate defense, Turkey needs S-400 from Russia (Al-Jazeera, 2017).

With the start of the S-400 purchase agreement made between Turkey and Russia, the United States as a Turkish alliance in NATO spoke out about the Turkish purchase. The reason is that Russia, along with Iran and North Korea, was subject to CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions. With CAATSA, the United States imposes sanctions on any country related to defense and intelligence agreements with these countries. According to Section 231 of CAATSA, the US President has the authority to impose sanctions on countries conducting transactions in the defense and intelligence sector with the government of the Russian Federation (US Department of State, 2018). Section 235 explains one of the points of sanctions is export sanctions: The US President may order the United States Government not to issue special licenses and not give any special permission or authority to export any goods or technology to people affected by sanctions (US Department of State, 2018).

In 2013 Turkey even announced that it would purchase air defense units and get offers from several companies:

Table 1 Turkey's air defense unit offering in 2013 (Meick, 2013)

NEGARA	Perusahaan	Sistem Misil	Jarak Tempuh	Harga Ditawarkan
Tiongkok	CPMIEC	FD-2000	~200km ketinggian 30km	\$ 3,44 Milyar
Italia/ Perancis	Eurosam	SAMP/T Aster 30	>100km ketinggian 20km	\$4,4 Milyar
AS	Raytheon/ Lockheed Martin	PAC-3	~45km ketinggian 15 km	\$4,6 Milyar
Rusia	Rosoboronexport	S-400	~ 400km ketinggian 50km	\$ 8,4 Milyar

At that time Turkey chose to make a purchase of FD-2000 owned by China because it was considered very in accordance with the terms and conditions that Turkey wanted, and also beat the offer of its competitors in terms of price, technology and the division of local labor and technology transfer. China's willingness to co-produce FD-2000 in Turkey and technology transfer became a major factor in Turkey's decision to choose FD-2000, due to Turkey's desire to increase self-sufficiency in its defense industry (Meick, 2013). However, this agreement failed to proceed due to the possibility of leakage of internal information due to the presence of NATO technicians from China who worked to install and maintain FD-2000 in Turkey.

With threats threatening Turkey's defenses and the lack of maximum efforts by NATO to act as an alliance in providing solutions to Turkey's needs, they must obtain their own air defense system units, no matter what. As explained above, the purchase of S-400 is not a 'political message' that Turkey wants to convey to stay away from NATO, but cooperation with Russia is based on the urgent need for Turkish air defense units, while the US as a NATO member is reluctant to agree on a contract for the sale of the air defense unit.

5.3 Differences in Interest between Turkey and NATO

One factor that makes countries prefer to arm themselves rather than relying on the strength of the alliance is the difference in national interests. If the state chooses to improve alliance relations, the country will increase the risk of neglecting national interests and referring more to the common interests / interests of the alliance. The collective strength of the alliance

cannot be fully relied on, because there is a risk of the state being in a situation of entrapment and abandonment. Entrapment occurs when a force is dragged into a conflict to defend the interests of an alliance that even the state has no national interest at all. Abandonment is a situation where the alliance fails to provide help when needed.

Since spring 2015, Turkey has experienced a wave of high-level terror attacks linked to ISIS and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In response, Turkey mobilized ground combat forces across the border into Syria, with the aim of pushing ISIS and the Syrian Kurdish (SDF) forces from the northern Syrian border region. This military operation, dubbed the Euphrates Shield, is part of a new security strategy for Turkey to attack terrorists where they are based, rather than just waiting for them to infiltrate Turkey (Stein, 2017). In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), Turkey exercises "self-defense rights" and announces to the international community the launch of OES (Operation Euphrates Shield) on August 24, 2016 (Yesiltas, Seren, 2017).

Article 51 of the UN Charter stipulates that if an armed attack occurs against members of the United Nations, member states can exercise the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense until the Security Council takes the steps necessary to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, Ankara takes action to eliminate the threats posed by terrorist organizations present in Syria, particularly ISIS, and exercise martial rights even aggressively on other countries' land, if necessary as determined by law international (Yesiltas, Seren, 2017).

Operation Euphrates Shield was launched by Turkey with the support of the FSA (Free Syrian Army) which is the Syrian government opposition forces with the main objective of OES for Turkey is to push the ISIS movement away from the border line while disrupting the movement of ISIS at its center and preventing ISIS attacks especially against provinces that bordering Turkey. In addition to blocking the development of the SDF in Syria by taking control of Syria's northern border which borders directly with Turkey (Yesiltas, Seren, 2017). SDF itself is an organization that is considered for Turkey as part of the PKK in Syria, while the PKK itself in Turkey is considered a terrorist organization (Hurriyet Daily, 2019). Likewise with the European Union and NATO consider the PKK as a terror organization (Huff Post, 2019).

But herein lies the conflict of interest between Turkey and NATO members, especially the US, where Turkey is trying to get rid of the YPG / SDF in northern Syria, while the US has chosen to provide assistance to the SDF on the grounds the US needs partners to get rid of ISIS in Syria (Stein, 2017) . Even Turkish president Erdogan said NATO's stance as his alliance did not reflect good, Erdogan said NATO had supported terrorists with thousands of arms trucks while ignoring Turkey's request to buy their weapons (Al-Jazeera, 2017).

Turki menginginkan wilayah Manbij di Suriah agar dibebaskan dari kendali teroris SDF dan agar segera diberikan kepada penduduk lokal. Manbij telah berada dibawah kekuasaan SDF yang didukung oleh AS semenjak 2016 (Al-Jazeera, 2017). Permintaan Turki ini disebabkan mereka memandang pengaruh yang diberikan SDF di utara Suriah sebagai salah satu ancaman nasional bagi Turki. Namun hingga akhir 2018 SDF masih tetap menduduki Manbij, Turki merasa kecewa karena para pejuang Kurdi yang didukung AS di Suriah tidak meninggalkan kota Manbij, sebagaimana disepakati dalam kesepakatan AS-Turki yang telah disepakati sebelumnya (The Guardian, 2018).




Figure 4 Map of the Distribution of Occupied Syria

Source: Al-Jazeera, Syria's war: Who Controls What?

To make it easier to understand how conditions are happening in Syria, it can be seen in Figure 4.2 where on the northwestern border of Syria, Turkey and the FSA succeeded in occupying the region. And through Operation Euphrates Shield Turkey succeeded in

occupying Jarablus (BBC, 2019), and Turkey also hoped that Manbij would continue to be freed from SDF occupation.

Turkey's disappointment with the US culminated when the US asked for guarantees for Syrian Kurds who fight ISIS to be safe from the Turkish army, after the US army decided to withdraw from the Syrian conflict (BBC, 2019). Erdogan stated that the US request was not acceptable. He said Turkey would do everything that needed to be done to combat the presence of terrorists, adding that military operations in areas under Syrian Kurdish control would soon be carried out in the near future (BBC, 2019)

6. Conclusion

From this research it can be concluded that although Turkey has been a member of NATO for many years and has gained security from the alliance, that does not mean that Turkey will not change its attitude. The increased risk of Turkey's internal and external security, coupled with differences in interests between NATO and Turkey, has caused this alliance to be ineffective in maintaining Turkey's national security. Coupled with an increase in Turkey's military economy and technology targeting self-sufficiency in 2023. When the alliance strategy is no longer effective and not in accordance with the national interests of the country, the country will choose another option, namely arming to maintain the stability of national security.

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