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Stanislaus Riyanta

University of Indonesia, stanislausriyanta@gmail.com

Amy YS Rahayu

University of Indonesia, amy_soeroso@Yahoo.com

Benny J. Mamoto

University of Indonesia, benito5577@yahoo.com

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**REVISITING THE DERADICALIZATION IN INDONESIA: A
PROPOSAL FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION**

Stanislaus Riyanta

Doctoral Program, Faculty of Administrative Science, University of Indonesia

stanislausriyanta@gmail.com

Amy Y.S. Rahayu

Faculty of Administrative Science, University of Indonesia

amy_soeroso@yahoo.com

Benny J. Mamoto

School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia

benito5577@yahoo.com

Abstract

Terrorism has been one of the most concerning issues in Indonesia since it has penetrated all layers of society, including families and even police officers. Interestingly, some of the terrorist attacks have been launched by the ex-convicts of terrorism and this finding indicates that the deradicalization program, as one of the ways for mitigating the massive wave of terrorism, turns out to be ineffective. If this situation is not given proper attention, then in both the near and the far future it can be predicted that terrorism will be a recurrent theme of issues in the state. Therefore, there should be a concerted effort toward battling the terrorism and such concerted effort can be pursued through a collaboration between the academicians as part of civil society and the government. In relation to the statement, through this article the possible ways to involve the academicians in order to improve the implementation of the deradicalization initiative in Indonesia will be discussed so that better results can be achieved.

Keyword: terrorism, deradicalization, ex-convict of terrorism, collaboration

Abstrak

Terorisme merupakan salah satu isu yang mengkhawatirkan di Indonesia karena merasuk ke seluruh lapisan masyarakat, termasuk keluarga dan bahkan anggota kepolisian. Menariknya, beberapa serangan teroris telah dilakukan oleh para mantan narapidana terorisme dan temuan ini mengindikasikan bahwa program deradikalisasi, sebagai salah satu cara untuk memitigasi gelombang massif terorisme, tampaknya tidak berjalan dengan efektif. Apabila situasi ini tidak diperhatikan dengan seksama, maka di waktu mendatang dapat diprediksi bahwa terorisme akan menjadi salah satu tema isu yang berulang di dalam negeri. Oleh karena itu, harus ada usaha Bersama untuk memerangi terorisme dan isaha Bersama ini dapat dicapai melalui kolaborasi antara akademisi sebagai bagian dari masyarakat sipil dan pemerintahan. Sehubungan dengan pernyataan tersebut, melalui artikel ini berbagai cara yang mungkin dilakukan untuk melibatkan akademisi guna meningkatkan implementasi program deradikalisasi di Indonesia akan dibahas guna menemukan pencerahan yang akan membawa hasil yang lebih baik.

Kata Kunci : terorisme, deradikalisasi, mantan narapidana terorisme, kolaborasi

Introduction

Terrorism has been a concerning issue in Indonesia. A number of dreadful terrors, as a manifestation of terrorism, have taken place in numerous parts of Indonesia from the era of New Order until the era of Reformation itself. Indonesia alone has become the seedbed for the sleeping cells of the psychological militants. The Chief of Indonesian National Police, Tito Karnavian, in the Middle East Special Operation Commanders Conference (MESOC) said that 2,000 militants have received the military training programs in Afghanistan and the Philippines (Detik.com, 2018). In addition, it has been confirmed that roughly 3,000 members of Al-Qaeda have settled in Indonesia and this figure has not included the supporters and sympathizers of ISIS (Kfir, 2018). Interestingly, amidst these people here are some of the Indonesian National Police members and these members have been impacted by the radicalism, the so-called root of the terrorism. For example, in 2015 Brigadier Syahputra, the member of Batanghari Resort Police Department joined ISIS in Syria (CNN Indonesia, 2015). Several years later, on May 2019 a policewoman taken under custody at Juanda Airport because she had left her station in North Moluccas Regional Police Department due to being

exposed to radicalism (Kompas.com, 2019). This is surprising because the education in such institution is strict and full of high indoctrination of discipline and nationalism.

The case of terrorism in Indonesia has grown more concerning because it has evolved in adaptation with the development of the current situation. The solid proof of the statement is the outbreak of three terrorist attacks in Surabaya on May 2018. The outbreak of those terrorist attacks has been a new role model since it involves a core family. Indeed, it was taken place in Indonesia for the very first time due to the involvement of a father, a mother, and their two children (BBC Indonesia, 2018). Similar attack has also taken place in West Java and this time the target is one of the State Officials namely the Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Security Wiranto. He was attacked by a couple of husband and wife during the tour duty in the region (Bisnis.com, 2019). The two cases have been more enough to assert that such a phenomenon is surprising and uncommon in the history of terrorism. The reason is that it is quite unlikely for any Islamic radical organizations to involve a core family in launching any terrorist attack. Even the most lethal Islamic radical organization such as Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah, being

known for perpetrating a number of terrorist attacks from the era of the New Order until 2013, has never involved any women and children within their recruitment. The statement is already stated in the General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah under the Section *An-Nidhomul-Asasiy* (Anonymous, 1996). These guidelines serve as the regulations that define the order among pilgrims and they assert that that an individual can seize the opportunity to become the pilgrims after he or she has been in the puberty (Chapter X Membership Article 30 letter e) (Anonymous, 1996).

From all of the terrorism cases in Indonesia, the perpetrators are ex-convicts of terrorism and they used to attend the deradicalization program. With regards to the finding, the Head of the National Board of Counterterrorism, General Police Commissioner Suhardi Aliyus, states that 20% of these convicts have committed a number of terrorist attacks again right after they have been released from the correctional institutions (Okezone.com, 2016). Thus, it seems that attending the deradicalization programs in order to tone down the number of terrorism case has been insufficient.

In other words, there are some facts that indicate the weak prevention against

radicalism and terrorism (Shodiq, 2018). One of the indications is that the law enforcement that the government has pursued does not guarantee the decreasing rate of terror taking place in Indonesia. The data on the perpetrators of terrorism within the timeline between 2000 and 2018 show that approximately 1,799 people have been the perpetrators, 906 perpetrators have been sentenced and released from correctional institutions, and 52 other perpetrators return to terrorism after they have been released (Shodiq, 2018).

Paying attention to the concerning problem in terrorism mitigation, an immediate action should be taken within the immediate time so that the rate of terrorism case can be decreased significantly and effectively. One of the initiatives that can be taken in this light is to revisit the deradicalization program that has been implemented by the government. In other words, radicalism should be one of the main subjects in the efforts to mitigate terrorism throughout Indonesia. Therefore, through the article a thorough discussion on how to shape the ideal deradicalization program will be outlined.

Discussions

In general, rehabilitation as part of deradicalization entails two elements namely independency and personality.

Independency aims at mentoring the ex-convicts of terrorism so that they will internalize special skills and expertise. In turn, these ex-convicts can seize employment by the time they have been released from their correctional institutions. On the other hand, personality aims at establishing dialogue with the ex-convicts in order to change their mindset. By doing so, it is believed that these ex-convicts can be more comprehensive and acceptable toward the different entities who live among them (Golese, 2009).

With regards to the two elements that have been mentioned above, a number of experts have shared their thoughts and opinion. Makruf, for example, states that he does not trust deradicalization that takes the form of any debate and argumentation stating that the interpretation of these terrorists toward their religious creeds has been incorrect since it has been ineffective (Makruf, 2020). It will be better if there is a model that can cut off the terrorists the activities from their affiliations so that they will not commit the same mistake. At the same time, these terrorists should be put into the people with more moderate people so they can have a change of mind. Not only that, people who have been radicalized should be provided with more space so that they can learn to engage themselves with

the people from diverse background and thus they can things from more diverse perspectives (Makruf, 2020).

In order to do so, a cooperation or joint effort should be established between the National Board of Counterterrorism and the civil society. As the leading institution in the domain of terrorism mitigation, the National Board of Counterterrorism should operate in highly strategic aspects by formulating policy and coordinating civil society. By doing so, the Board can cover the gap in such deradicalization initiative and the efforts of covering the gap can gain more success through the engagement of part-time academicians. These academicians can be engaged, for example, in the study related to the domains of radicalism and terrorism. They can deliver highly significant results rather than the staffs of the Board themselves. Furthermore, in order to be more effective and efficient, the Board should coordinate and make the policy so that they can gather the feedback for the President due to the fact that terrorism has been the common enemy. Therefore, the State, through the Board, should cooperate with society through civil society organizations and alike.

Similarly, Lasmawati argues that mental disorders that the perpetrators of terrorism have might not be the cause

behind the act of terrorism. For example, a psychopath strives to satisfy his or her desire at all cost while a terrorist commits terror under a political agenda and aspiration that has been considered noble. Therefore, personal approach to each ex-convict of terrorism should be pursued in order to identify their true needs. By accommodating these needs, the State can prepare these ex-convicts to live a better life within the society (Lasmawati, 2020). Furthermore, the deradicalization programs have to involve many stakeholders such as close relatives, religious figures, academicians, and alike in line with the needs of the ex-convicts. Within a correctional institution, the mentors of these convicts should have the ability to identify the needs of each convict since difference needs should be accommodated by different approach. In the light of this situation, academicians can debrief the correctional institution officers who accompany the convicts of terrorism (Lasmawati, 2020).

Another expert on terrorism, Hikam, notifies that terrorism still endangers the national security, asserting that deradicalization has not gained any successful change on the part of the convicts (Hikam, 2020). In his argument, the terrorism situation nowadays does not imply that the sentence for these convicts

have been any stricter. On the contrary, what has happened is that the supervision toward these convicts has been less strict. Consequently, it is very possible that these ex-convicts will return to their affiliations as soon as they are already released. By the time they have returned to their affiliations, they will embolden themselves to launch more and more attacks to the state as they have some kind of reinforcement on the part of action and ideology (Hikam, 2020).

With regards to the statement, Hikam suggests the use of two deradicalization measures, namely the hard measures and the soft measures, for these ex-convicts since they used to be involved in the act of terror which displays the level of ideologization that has been accepted (Hikam, 2020). Considering the situation, the hard measures should be implemented first by strictly monitoring and supervising the ex-convicts in adjustment with their position in their organization despite that they have been released from their correctional institutions. Then, the soft measures should be implemented by engaging any civil society organizations that re-educate the ex-convicts, establish social networking with the ex-convicts, and persuasively monitoring the ex-convicts. In implementing these measures, the top priority should be the disengagement from

the hard-line groups in terms of physical contact and information network. Furthermore, cross-religion cooperation among religion-based institutions, religion figures, and civil society organizations for the sake of strengthening and disseminating religious tolerance through actual reinterpretation. In turn, the religious teachings through the frequent promotion toward the designs of cross-religion program, specifically in relation to education, can target the low level (grassroots) to the high level of the society so that terrorism and radicalization can be mitigated (Hikam, 2020).

The arguments proposed by the three experts previously deal with the involvement of the civil society into the deradicalization program outlined by the government in order to achieve more promising results by means of effective and efficient manner. The idea has been initiated by Priyanto through his experience. He admits that the Institution of Psychological Research, the Centre of Police Science Research the University of Indonesia, and the Special Detachment 88 are among the first institutions that implement the deradicalization program toward the convicts, the ex-convicts, their relatives, and their network (Priyanto, 2020). Through the program, a more

humane approach has been implemented by treating the convicts and ex-convicts as someone having the equal position. Throughout the progress of the program, some of the ex-convicts state that the activities by the National Board of Counterterrorism are formal and the staffs in the Board itself have kept distance with them (Priyanto, 2020).

Unfortunately, Priyanto should admit several obstacles in such collaboration. Based on his experience, the collaboration between the Special Detachment 88 and the General Directory of Correctional Institution has been good but any official cooperation with the National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector of counterterrorism has been absent. He also states that some of the staffs in the Board have not internalized sufficient understanding toward terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, the funding for the deradicalization initiatives should be made flexible, especially in time allocation, so that these programs can be flexibly adapted into the growing needs and situations within the field (Priyanto, 2020).

In order to do so, the deradicalization program is ideally managed under the single command (collaboration) since the deradicalization is still partial. At the middle and the high level (the core and the

militant group), the deradicalization should be under the coordination of the Board. As an alternative, the implementation at the low level (the supporters and the sympathizers) can be handed over to expert, academician, and practitioner who have experiences in cooperation with the government at the field (Hikam, 2020). Paying attention to the dynamic situation, it will be better if the quality and the quantity of the staffs handling the domain of terrorism is expanded in order to understand the situation better so that better collaboration can be achieved with the civil society (Priyanto, 2020).

Apart from the feedback, the ineffective of the deradicalization program has not only been highlighted by the experts but also by the ex-convicts. For example, Abas states that several police officers have implemented the personal approach during his 11-month detainment, resulting in his being less radical and more tolerant. In turn, he volunteers himself to be the pioneer of change along with a team that has been established by Prof. Sarlito. After he has been deradicalized, he has started to facilitate the deradicalization program with the government since 2006. Departing from his experience, Abas argues that the Board should pursue the deradicalization by delegating some of the tasks to the

institutions or the NGOs that operate in the same domain since the terrorists have deemed the Board as their enemy (Abas, 2019). In other words, engaging the stakeholders from the civil society will facilitate the deradicalization from the part of the government. In this regard, most of the ex-convicts assert that it is difficult for the National Board of Counterterrorism to directly implement the deradicalization program. Thus, by handing over the deradicalization to the hands of the academicians, it can be expected that the deradicalization program will gain more success as having been proven by Abas and the team in which he has been serving.

In a rather different manner, another ex-convict named Sofyan Tsauri states that deradicalization pursued by the government can be considered as a failure since the ex-convicts are both pragmatic and opportunistic (Tsauri, 2021). He even states further that the deradicalization itself does not focus on the situational comprehension and does not even target the core issues of radicalism and its root cause; instead, it only provides low economic incentives, which means nothing. As a result, the convicts play safe by attending the deradicalization so that they will be deemed as being not radical anymore. In addition, Tsauri mentions that the Government or the

National Board of Counterterrorism should not be the one managing the deradicalization program since both institutions are already considered as enemies. Alternatively, the external parties such as ex-convicts who have disengaged themselves completely from any terrorism activities, public figures of all religions, and even the relatives of the ex-convicts themselves can implement such initiative (Tsauro, 2021). If one would like gain the success from deradicalization, then the involvement of neutral entities such as external parties can be made as a priority.

Another ex-convict named Zulfahri, who used to attend the deradicalization program, has also shared similar arguments. He has been deradicalized when he attended several independent reviews during the detainment. It is after his release from the correctional institution that he starts to engage into the deradicalization initiative by the Board (Zulfahri, 2019). In his opinion, the deradicalization should proceed through joint coordination between the Board and the Regional Government. Through such joint coordination, it is expected that the deradicalization will target the economic autonomy development so that the ex-convicts can pursue a better life after their release from the correctional institution (Zulfahri, 2019).

As a response to these criticisms, The Director of Prevention the National Board of Counterterrorism, Hamli, has emphasized that it is important to involve academician and educational institution into counterterrorism. Structurally, the Board has assigned a number of expert staffs consisting of professors from top universities despite their being insufficient in terms of number. Then, the Board holds a routine forum involving these expert staffs in order to gain their significant feedback (Hamli, 2019). In addition, he also explains that outside the Board a number of seminars have been held in order to establish interactions with numerous academicians over the given domain. In these seminars, the Board gathers feedback and criticisms that the academicians deliver around counter-terrorism.

The success of implementing the deradicalization program is defined on the change of the perspective among the convicts and the ex-convicts. Through the change of their perspective, a number of benefits can be gained (Mareta, 2018). First, they can return to their society. Second, the society can accept them without any stigma. Third, they can enjoy their normal life. Fourth, they can internalize new life skills that have been gained from the rehabilitation process. Fifth, they are

empowered to admit their mistake in the past. Sixth, they can criticize and develop themselves and they can also embrace people from different group; at the same time, they can also empower themselves by being critical and tolerant. Seventh, they are can disseminate the religious teachings of compassion for fellow mankind, harmony amidst society, and willingness to live together with different religion disciples within correctional institution. Eighth, they can internalize local wisdoms in Indonesia, can embrace nationalism, can be aware of the governing law, and can also admit and pledge allegiance toward the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Ninth, or the last one, they can start a new life, internalize fundamental skills, or gain independency for earning livings in order to support their daily life.

From the overall discussions, mainly within the involvement of the civil society into the deradicalization program, a model known as collaborative governance can be elaborated according to the perspective of academicians, the ex-convicts of terrorism, and the Board officials (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011). This model consists of several components and each component can be outlined briefly since it has been implemented without being realized by all of these parties. Despite that, there should

be strict definition on these components so that the deradicalization can return in higher rate of success. For example, the first component, Principled Engagement, has been found in the deradicalization program in Indonesia. This component is already occupied by the National Board of Counterterrorism. Indeed, the Board is assumed to take leadership on counterterrorism, as having been supported by the statement from Mr. Joko Widodo, saying that terrorists are a common enemy require the stakeholders and Indonesian people to be actively involved in counterterrorism, especially in the context of deradicalization program (Kompas.com, 2018).

Then, the second component, Shared Motivation, consists of: (1) Elements of Trust; (2) Commitment; (3) Legitimation; and (4) Shared Understanding (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011). The second component has been strong since there is a persistent effort to free Indonesia from terrorism and it has become the main motivation among the stakeholders. Despite that, still the shared understanding and commitment, the strong foundation for the implementation of collaborative governance, especially in the deradicalization, should be achieved first. Thus, pursuing shared understanding and

commitment is important since terrorism has been the common enemy.

Next, the third component, Capacity for Joint Action, consists of: (1) Elements of Common Procedures and Agreement; (2) Leadership; (3) Knowledge; and (4) Resources (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011). This component is, unfortunately, still poorly addressed within the Indonesian government. Therefore, in relation to the statement, the capacity, especially among the Correctional Institution staffs, in performing deradicalization throughout the sentence should be improved since sentence can serve as the most suitable period for the implementation of deradicalization since these convicts are also monitored under the quite strict regulation and control during that period. Therefore, the ability of the correctional institution officers in mentoring these ex-convicts should be improve since the insufficient deradicalization ability can backfire (Zulfahri, 2019). Therefore, in order to avoid such backfire, the funding should be made sufficient or both the convicts and the ex-convicts cannot undergo the deradicalization properly (Priyanto, 2020).

Furthermore, the fourth component, Impacts and Adaptation for Collaboration Dynamics, can be adjusted into the deradicalization based to the revised

legislation since the revision strives to strengthen function of terrorism and counterterrorism management in Indonesia. In this regard, the temporary impact can be positive, as having been shown by the ex-convicts who turn into the agents of change within the deradicalization. Thereby, the adaptation, such as improving the ability of the correctional institution officers by the Board, can serve as the starting point.

The engagement of civil society, notably by academicians and activists, in deradicalization can gain more success when collaborative governance is at play. The assumption is based on the fact that collaborative governance refers to the process that has been structured in order to manage the formulation of the public policy decision; thus, collaborative governance involves actors from various backgrounds in government, in public and private institution, and in civil society as well. By doing so, the common public objectives can be stated so that they can achieved through common initiatives (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011).

The collaborative governance is not solely limited to the formal level and the state creation (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011). This concept can serve as the process and the structure for making decision and managing public policy since

it entails the civil society constructively by working beyond the boundaries of public institutions, governments, and / or public environments, private environments, and state administrations. This model can be more significant when deradicalization engages academicians through non-formal method implementation so that the the convicts and the ex-convicts can accept such initiative.

In relation to engaging civil society into deradicalization, this idea should be in relevance with the principles of collaborative governance since collaborative governance entails the type of community-based collaborations and altogether proceeds the resource management and the inter-governmental collaboratives. Last but not the least, the academician involvement throughout deradicalization should also be in line with the collaborative governance. In other words, collaborative governance can be put into use for explaining participative governance and civic engagement.

Conclusions

Departing from the discussions above, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the deradicalization program in Indonesia has not been effective since it has not touched the core issues that have been related to the factors of radicalism. Second,

the funding for the deradicalization has not been flexible as well since it provides low economic incentives, causing both the convicts and the ex-convicts returning to their affiliations and launching more attacks. Third, in order to break the convicts and the ex-convicts away from their old affiliations, the civil society can be involved into the deradicalization programs since after the release the ex-convicts will return to the society. Fourth, the National Board of Counterterrorism can openly gather feedback related to deradicalization from academicians as part of civil society. Fifth, or the last one, Collaborative Governance can be implemented as an idea to strengthen the government-civil society collaboration in relation to the deradicalization.

Based on the conclusions, it can be suggested that the Collaborative Governance can be implemented as the main model or main framework of collaboration between the government and the civil society. Since the collaborative governance offers a more human approach, by admitting the convicts and the ex-convicts as equal entity, it can be expected that the rate of terrorism can be decreased. In turn, the terrorism can be eventually driven away from the state and thus the national security and order can be well maintained.

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