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THE PATH TO SUSTAINABLE DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM

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Abstract

Deradicalization program is a never-ending challenge for any country to pursue the most viable model, which actually can be done by enhancing the different methods from one country to another. Deradicalization is also a challenge for multidisciplinary research to continue to understand the various phenomena of terrorism and how to integrate their response solutions into a definitive program. The author conducts a qualitative study on contemporary literature and various researches on deradicalization program and approaches that can be used and sustain in this country. This article is presenting the comparison as well as advantages and deficiencies of the implementation of global deradicalization programs from (five) regions, namely in the America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The results shown that a concrete form of deradicalization and disengagement program under public private partnership scheme is possible to be implemented in a comprehensive and sustainable manner.

Key words: global, deradicalization, disengagement, public private partnership, sustain

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INTRODUCTION

The author begins by citing what Meloy & Yakeley (2014) said, that it is important to know as early as possible the worst risks that can arise from an individual by better understanding what they think and feel.

(Hoffer, 1951, in Meloy & Yakeley, 2014) writes:

"The vanity of the selfless, even those who practice utmost humility, are boundless".

Deradicalization program basically requires many approaches in accordance with the characteristics of the radicalization process that occurs and is experienced by certain individuals or groups. The implementation of the deradicalization program starts with the understanding that terrorism starts from the process of radicalization, so that to combat terrorism, it is more effective to break the process of radicalization.

By knowing the process of radicalization as a process of understanding or mindset that justifies acts of violence, what needs to be done is to improve the thinking in accordance with the background that shaped it through different approaches based on their respective causes.

The deradicalization program is a challenge to find the best program model, by applying different methods from one country to another. Deradicalization is also a challenge for multidisciplinary research to continue to understand the various phenomena of terrorism and integrate their response solutions into a program. The author conducts a qualitative study specifically of the literature and contemporary research on deradicalization, as well as an analysis of a model of deradicalization program and approaches that can be used and can benefit Indonesia.

For that reason, the author limits the analysis into four parts, namely:

- I. The global de-radicalization program, along with its advantages and disadvantages in:
 - a. United States of America,
 - b. Europe (the Netherlands and Denmark),
 - c. Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Yemen),
 - d. Africa (Nigeria and Egypt), and
 - e. Singapore.

- II. Disengagement & Deradicalization (DDP) Program;

III. The benefits are for the Deradicalization program in Indonesia; and

IV. Three approaches to running a DDP program.

DISCUSSION

I. Global Deradicalization Program

a. United States (US)

The US basically runs programs and policies related to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and deradicalization more critically and carefully in recent years (Koehler, 2017; Salyk-Virk, 2018; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). There are concerns about violations of civil rights such as freedom of political and religious opinion because the government of the United States (US) runs CVE aggressively towards the Muslim community in the US.

In April 2016 in Minneapolis, the State of Minnesota, a coherent first deradicalization program was established in the United States (Koehler, 2017; Salyk-Virk, 2018). At the same time, academic institutions in the United States have begun developing special units to monitor CVE issues for example, George Washington University through the Center for Cyber and Homeland

Security. Some non-governmental organizations also continue to specialize in CVE and counter-radicalization approaches, such as, for example, Minneapolis-based *Heartland Democracy*, *Life After Hate* in Chicago, and *Muflehun* in Washington State, and a number of Muslim community organizations have created CVE programs alone.

Some of these organizations specialize in four areas (in addition to policy and counseling strategies), namely: Prevention (community resilience, CVE awareness), Interventions ('ideological disengagement' and 'social and spiritual interventions'), Interdict (law enforcement training, detection, disruption), and Re-Entry (ideological and physical separation, reintegration, deradicalization). Counter-radicalization and online recruitment through social media and clandestine approaches are also carried out, including targeting and connecting with radical or vulnerable youth without an visible intervention agenda (Talbot, 2015 in Koehler, 2017).

Advantages:

(i) Salyk-Virk (2018) mentions in his research that in order to prevent the flow of individuals going into the ISIS

region, the administration of President Barack Obama at that time created a breakthrough. He started a pilot program through a public-private partnership (PPP) partnership focused on fighting violent extremism (CVE) in the US called "Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Extremism of Violence in the US". Programs like this are the first time in the US.

(ii) The focus of this program initiative is on the emphasis on communities with government intervention, which distinguishes them from previous efforts. The US Department of Justice stated that the aim of the pilot program was to "broaden the base of community leaders and key stakeholders involved at the local level to help eliminate conditions that lead to alienation and violent extremism, and also to empower youth there.

(iii) According to the US Department of Justice, the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, both in the State of Minnesota, was chosen because of conditions of community involvement between the Somali community and local law enforcement that had already existed. A significant chain of events between 2014 and 2016

led Minnesota to begin its program. In 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an investigation in the Twin Cities after intelligence was gathered that ISIS had infiltrated the community to recruit youth to join the war in Syria. Since then, it has been reported that about a dozen individuals have managed to travel to Syria. In September 2014, the deradicalization pilot program officially launched in the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul) was named 'Building Community Resilience', and in February 2015 the plan was presented at the Summit at the White House during a program on Resistance against Extremism and Violence (Salyk-Virk, 2018).

(iv) Three specific target areas are included in the program: engagement, prevention, and intervention. Engagement involves better connections between various levels of law enforcement and the community. Prevention includes youth involvement through programming, both after school or between mentors. The intervention includes a two-pronged approach from schools and community-based programs to bridge the differences between various stakeholders. For example, in

school-based programs, including connecting school districts with parents and students. In the community sphere, this includes collaborating with civil society partners. The framework developed was promoted as a community driven model.

(v) The Twin Cities were chosen by the Obama administration at the time as a reference to address the broader concerns of "homegrown terrorism" in the US. Specifically, the US government wants to explore targeted recruitment of ethnic Somali populations in Minnesota by groups such as ISIS.

(vi) This year the center for terrorism studies at the University of Maryland, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, initiated a study project named Profile of Individuals in the United States - Desistance, Deradicalization and Disengagement (PIRUS-D3). The results of the PIRUS-D3 project show that the risk of recidivism among US extremists is potentially high. More than 49% (149 out of 300) extremists in PIRUS-D3 repeat the criminal acts after the crime has motivated the previous ideology. Of these individuals, 18% turned to non-

ideological crime after committing at least one ideologically motivated offense. It is known that individuals often experience periods of reengagement with extremist groups or ongoing criminal activity, before achieving the desired outcome of the project (Jensen et al., 2019).

Deficiency:

(i) From Salyk-Virk's research (2018) it can be seen that the term 'deradicalization' is not of interest to most of the residents of the Twin Cities. They are more interested in talking about the 'Building Community Resilience' program only as a CVE program, not as a pure de-radicalization program.

(ii) The nature of the program is difficult for the local community to accept because the program is too focused on the Muslims in the Somali community living in the Twin Cities.

(iii) The program was built with a PPP scheme but is not based on strong public / government and private relations.

(iv) Lack of good infrastructure and protocols for deradicalization regarding court decisions, programs for prisoners, post-criminal reintegration,

and readjustment (Koehler, 2017; Salyk-Virk, 2018).

(v) There is no open collaboration in the PPP scheme, thus the public and the government instead become competitive with each other and the program becomes ineffective.

(vi) Although this program was launched in the era of the Barack Obama administration, it was not followed by the era of President Donald Trump's administration. This is shown by not prioritizing a soft-approach in terms of religion and culture, and vice versa the Donald Trump government instead imposed an Islamic counter-extremism program (Pettinger, 2017). This is in line with the trend of falling democratic values in the US as called Diamond (2019), that the series of US government actions under Donald Trump has dropped the percentage of supremacy of democratic values from 64% at the end of President Barack Obama's office to under 49% when Donald Trump took office, where Diamond (2019, p. 20) mentioned that the US community itself has gradually lost faith in the democratic model and US democratic values that they have always believed.

(vii) From the research of Jensen et al. (2019) through the PIRUS-D3 project, U.S. extremist actors generally faced several obstacles in undergoing a program of de-radicalization and reintegration into society after detention. Socioeconomic advancements, such as stable employment or educational opportunities, are often not available to individuals serving sentences for extremism. So far in the Trup government there are no policies and programs that aim to help individuals escape extremism and achieve reintegration goals.

b. Europe (Denmark)

Denmark is one example of the success of countries in Europe in implementing CVE and deradicalization programs (Koehler, 2017; Bertelsen, 2015). This program in Denmark is known as the Aarhus deradicalization model. In order to implement the model, between the years 2007-2009 the Danish government launched a national action to prevent radicalization, with the name of the program "special interventions against young people who are already in the process of radicalization" (special interventions towards young people who are already

in the process of radicalization) . The program is then followed by other programs such as "exit talks" conducted by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), with financial support from the European Union, which aims to persuade radical individuals who have not committed serious crimes to leaving their radical groups. In addition to the two programs, in 2011, another program called "Back on Track" - was launched to focus on rehabilitation of extremist prisoners in prisons by the Danish Prison Institution and Probation Service (Danish Prison and Probation Service), also with funding support from the European Union. In 2014, the Danish government also launched an "exit center" which was carried out in coordination with Danish city councils.

In February 2016, a nationwide counseling hotline against radicalization hotline was launched involving police and civilian experts on this topic. The task force formed designs and implements case-based intervention strategies and contacts for individuals when needed, from initial prevention (for example, problems finding work, drug problems) to reintegration and deradicalization after returning from fighting in, for example, the country

Syria, by way of psychological assistance. Family counseling and mentoring are also important components of Aarhus's deradicalization model (Koehler, 2017; Bertelsen, 2015).

c. European (the Netherlands)

Since 2012, the Netherlands has been actively implementing a de-radicalization program by pioneering a more specific reintegration and rehabilitation approach for extremists and terrorists detained with mixed results, and many Dutch civil society organizations are also active in that field (Schuurman & Bakker, 2015 in Koehler, 2017). In 2015, the Dutch Moroccan Foundation (SMN), a non-governmental organization, started a family counseling assistance project and received more calls and cases. In parallel, two additional programs were created with financial support from the Dutch government and were run by the Fier Foundation, which specializes in counseling for cases of domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution. The two new programs were announced as part of a number of new steps in the national action plan in August 2014.

Furthermore, in 2015 in the context of counter-radicalization, the Dutch government provided a political basis to build a two-part de-radicalization network consisting of a special family support unit (Familiesteunpunt) and an exit program for individuals ("EXITS"). The two units, although separate as an organization, work in close and integrated cooperation with existing civil society organizations working in the CVE field or in the field of intervention. In short, the counter-radicalization strategy and the Dutch de-radicalization program were developed from a community and a civil society-led approach focused on cohesion and integration into strategies made by the government, with a focus on holistic ideological ideals (Koehler, 2017; Dement & De Graaf, 2010).

Program strengths in Europe:

(i) Ongoing funding support from the European Union for structured and integrated deradicalization programs in several continental European countries.

(ii) There is cooperation with the community in the community and coordination between the local city councils, and in general this is also

important to be seen as the key to fighting the process of radicalization and violence.

Lack of programs in Europe:

Problems in continental Europe are mostly caused by immigrants and refugees on the continent, especially after the 9/11 attacks on the US, civil war events in Syria in 2011, and areas that are the basis of terrorist attacks (Beck et al., 2017; Çoban , 2010, Goldman, 2010).

d. Africa (Nigeria)

In Nigeria, the government implements prison-based deradicalization programs (Clubb & Tapley, 2018; Koehler, 2017). The program targets incarcerated Boko Haram fighters (prisoners), and the country has also implemented a new counter-terrorism strategy in 2014, including a program specifically designed based on religious counseling through mosque priests, vocational training, psychological counseling, drug therapy, and sports. Basic education (for example, mathematics) also aims to train prisoners in critical and logical thinking, which is considered to help them recognize the risks involved in extremism. This program is designed by a forensic-psychologist. Initially,

inmates were persuaded to participate by offering medical care and welfare. In addition, this program has the potential to provide financial assistance for the prisoners' children (Wallis, 2015 in Koehler, 2017). This program is run by the Nigerian government with funding from the European Union. But so far the program only aims to reduce and prevent the use of violence, not to individual beliefs.

Advantages:

In July 2015, it was reported that the program had rehabilitated around 305 participants (Imam, 2015 in Koehler, 2017). In early 2016, the Nigerian government launched a new "technical committee" to further develop and coordinate the country's counter-radicalization activities against Boko Haram (Adebowale, 2016 in Koehler, 2017). In addition, Nigerian civil society organizations are also very active in countering radicalism, such as the Society for Peace Studies and Practice (SPSP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Save the Children Nigeria who have run programs, sometimes in collaboration with the Nigerian army, to create community resilience, work with

victims of terrorism, and provide counseling to young people.

Deficiency:

Lack of human resources, ongoing funding support, and professional training have hampered this grassroots activism in the fight against brutal extremism that occurred in the past (Clubb & Tapley, 2018; Koehler, 2017).

e. Africa (Egypt)

Chernov-Hwang (2018) and Koehler (2017) state that the collective deradicalization of many organizations in Egypt is unique in its efforts to deradicalize. One reason is because of the political situation in the State of Egypt which is believed to provide a rare opportunity to analyze the conditions in which terrorist organizations are very violent, and after years of fighting against the government, finally decided to renounce violence and stop all terrorist activities (Chernov -Hwang, 2018; Koehler, 2017).

As said by Ashour (2009) that the four main factors affecting the rejection of violence by the two organizations in Egypt are due to the charismatic leadership at the level of the downward movement that is able to impose a decision, the existence of repression by

the government, the presence of selective persuasion, and the presence of interaction within and among radical and moderate groups in Egypt. In addition, counter-radicalization communication from Al-Azhar University and general changes in Egyptian society to violence have also influenced leadership in many organizations in Egypt to deradicalize.

For example, as happened between 1997 and 2007, two jihadist terrorist organizations in Egypt, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad, decided to renounce violence. Although there was no coherent deradicalization program at the time, the Egyptian government's decision influenced this process - although it was still considered controversial whether the organizational process was initiated and led by the government or from the leadership of the organization. In Egypt the actual process of deradicalization can be started earlier if the government supports it (Harrigan & El-Said, 2012 in Koehler, 2017).

In 2007, the leader of the al-Jihad Organization, one of the organizations close to al-Qaeda, abandoned the way of violence and ideologically legitimized it. Al-Jihad has struggled

with de-radicalization since 1997 and the reappearance of its imam, Sayyid Imam ai-Sharif (1987-1993), was crucial for success at the ideological and behavioral level. At the organizational level, the group still suffers factionalism, because its two parts still oppose the ideological component of the process of de-radicalization and one faction, allied with Al-Qaeda and opposing the whole process (Chernov-Hwang, 2018; Koehler, 2017). Beyond deradicalization, many sympathizers and former members of al-Jihad participated in the Egyptian parliamentary elections in 2005. Their participation shows that there is moderation (from deradicalization to electoral Islamism) in the Egyptian State.

Advantages:

(i) The efforts of the deradicalization program in the State of Egypt benefited greatly from certain political situations.

(ii) the existence of charismatic leadership at the grassroots level that is able to impose a decision, combined with repression by the government, selective persuasion, and interaction within and between radical and

moderate groups in Egypt, including from Al Azhar Cairo .

Deficiency:

(i) Dependence on certain political situations makes the direction of the deradicalization program to be run by the Egyptian government unclear.

(ii) The lack of follow-up on the results of the de-radicalization of these organizations prevented the Egyptian government from carrying out a structural reintegration program. One example is ideological reorientation that is not combined with a reintegration approach for the purpose of improving the practical living conditions of an ex-terrorist (Harrigan & El-Said, 2012 in Koehler, 2017).

f. Middle East (Saudi Arabia)

In Saudi Arabia, deradicalization programs are carried out on a prison-based basis. One part of the program is informal discussions between prisoners and priests, and this is part of an integrated program that has been running for years. The Saudi Arabian government is also trying to find a life partner for the prisoners later when they are released. Former terrorist inmates are also often used if possible in prison programs to encourage the deradicalization of subjects, and it runs

classes in various fields to educate prisoners, preparing them for eventual rehabilitation.

The religious subcommittee in Saudi Arabia is part of the Saudi approach to deradicalization, consisting of people who are approved by the state (scholars, university scholars, religious experts) who discuss with detainees their interpretation of religious texts "with the aim of convincing them to adopting a more moderate ideology, "which basically also seeks to suppress radicalism. In addition Saudi Arabia also implements a series of different programs simultaneously and thoroughly (Capstack, 2015). By targeting individual religious beliefs, psychological conditions, socio-economic positions, family groups, and even social life, and therefore the Saudi government is able to reshape all aspects of the lives of ex-convicts, offering them a release from their past as jihadists. But Saudi Arabia also conducts strict supervision of ex-convicts after their release from prison.

Advantages:

(i) Saudi Arabia is well known for developing a comprehensive Deradicalization and Disengagement (DDP) program; in addition to the

ideological focus that was first established, the Saudi Arabian government also combined "political education, vocational training, painting, physical education and social and economic programs to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners".

(ii) The Saudi Arabian model has been seen as an example of a DDP program which involves ideological deradicalization and ongoing disengagement through the reintegration of ex-terrorist prisoners back into their communities.

Deficiency:

(i) There are doubts about the severity of the criteria for releasing prison rehabilitation programs. Individuals may stop showing beliefs that make them inclined to act violently, but they may still be radical enough to spread their beliefs to others. This makes some people question whether the program is enough to make the difference between promoting total deradicalisation of individuals or simply breaking away from jihadist activities (Capstack, 2015);

(ii) The credibility of the ulama involved in Saudi Arabia is the most important thing. This cannot be replicated for programs in other

countries. One example is that many rehabilitated jihadist leaders can now work for the deradicalization program in Saudi Arabia (Speckhard in Capstack, 2015).

g. Middle East (Yemen)

What is deemed or claimed to be a de-radicalization program, which targets ideology as the main cause of terrorism, began the country of Yemen through its own initiative, specifically in relation to attacks by Al Qaeda groups. As a result of further worries about Western intervention after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Yemeni government felt they had to adjust to a failed policy and unpopular crackdown on Al Qaeda, to then include a 'reeducation' of captured militants. And then the Yemeni government formed the Yemeni Religious Dialogue Committee (Pettinger, 2017).

Advantages:

Prisoners are challenged by the Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), which consists of five national scholars about their views and beliefs. RDC uses the Koran to debate with them, "not on content but on their understanding of verses and hadith". Although stopped in 2008 as a result of controversial decisions (such as releasing several

attackers to the aircraft carrier USS Cole), ideas developed in this program were exported throughout the region, mainly to Saudi Arabia, but also to Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Horgan argues that the Yemeni program will be "very similar to what is expected of 'deradicalization' ': softening of views, acceptance that the pursuit of individuals for the purpose of using terrorism is illegal, immoral and unjustified" (Horgan, 2009, in Pettinger, 2017).

Deficiency:

This approach that focuses on fighting the ideology of prisoners does not actually make the level of re-
recidivism in Yemen low, because as many as 70% of these prisoners continue to carry out acts related to terrorism even after the completion of the program.

h. Singapore

According to Koehler, (2017, p. 116) a DDP program is usually run by government or non-government actors. The difference between government and non-government actors lies in their financial resources and legal responsibilities and obligations. In addition, the role and importance of civil society actors in general varies

between countries, especially between Western and Middle Eastern democracies, and people in the Southeast Asian region. Although the inclusion of non-governmental actors or even the full implementation of DDP through NGOs is more common in Western countries, it is a rather new and carefully introduced aspect of Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries to work with civil society actors , including in Singapore. In Singapore there is a Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) which is an association of civil society, whose members consist of prominent religious authorities to carry out tasks in the form of religious counseling of prison inmates (Ramakrishna, 2014).

Suratman (2017) further states that due to the small number of acts of terrorism, Singapore prefers to carry out CVE rather than focusing on deradicalization. The CVE program has been carried out through courses given to students to understand the theoretical foundation against violent extremists and radicalization. The efforts of the Singapore government are different compared to other countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. The government prefers to conduct an

'inspection process' to check whether its people are influenced by radical views or not. Aslam et al. (2016) in Suratman (2017) said that the examination process was aimed at screening out potential prisoners who were actively involved in terrorism. Although there were no terror attacks in Singapore, in September 2017, the government under the ISA (International Security Act) arrested two suspects - Imran Kassim (male) and Shakiran Begam (female), who tried to go to Syria to jihad (Channel) News, 2017 in Suratman, 2017).

Advantages:

Even though terrorist attacks are very few in number or almost nonexistent, Singapore has an adequate CVE program to anticipate and ward off radicalism.

Deficiency:

There is no focus to develop and build an integrated deradicalization program.

II. Deradicalization and Disengagement Program (DDP)

Based on the global de-radicalization program described above, it can be seen that there are a number of countries that have basically implemented the DDP model in their deradicalization programs, such as in

Singapore or Saudi Arabia. By knowing the advantages and disadvantages of the global de-radicalization program as referred to in part I, the author wants to conduct a study of research previously conducted by Daniel Koehler, an expert on de-radicalization from the German Institute on Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies (GIRDS) and researchers in the field of Extremism at George Washington The university.

According to Koehler (2017) in his writing it is necessary to clearly distinguish between deradicalization and disengagement. Disengagement is a change in the role and behavior of breaking away from elements that have the potential to become violent. The importance of deradicalization through a disengagement and deradicalization program (DDP) previously emphasized by Daniel Koehler in his research (Koehler, 2017), serves as the author's reference for understanding global deradicalization programs as discussed in Part I.

Koehler (2017) also firmly stated in his research that understanding an individual's cognitive factors is in principle important for carrying out a deradicalization and disengagement program. While Kruglanski (2018)

mentions the process of deradicalization requires the reverse process of radicalization by: (i) restoring the motivational balance in the life of the individual as an example regarding self and family safety, work opportunities, and relationships in the family and its environment; (ii) there is disappointment with what was previously believed, for example militant fighters who left the ISIS group because they saw the ISIS justification in combating other Muslims is wrong (Neumann 2015 in Kruglanski 2018); (iii) rehabilitation programs that touch on an individual's personal factors, namely psychological counseling, religious and religious counseling, skills training, and continuing education, and (iv) restoration of social interactions by withdrawing and avoiding social ties that cause them to be radicalized, as in refugee groups or immigrants who have no life expectancy.

Koehler (2017) further explained that the government of a country must be able to make a communication strategy proactively and gradually so that the de-radicalization and disengagement programs can run effectively for the actors. The element of caution is needed because the

communication also cannot be done directly which aims to change the ideology of the individual at once, because it can misinterpret cognitive factors and ideological motivations that can actually make the program fail because the offender is in a position to reject or even strengthen his motivation to radicalize and become a terrorist. This happened in the countries of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

In his writings Koehler (2017, p. 125) states that the type of program suitable to be initiated in the Southeast Asian region (and the Middle East) is the Active Government Program encompassing Ideology (Type D programs). The purpose of this type of program is so that the government can de-radicalize directed towards the concept of the actor's thoughts, for example, there is a misconception on Islam or an ideology that is understood by the actors so that the State government needs to involve religious authorities and academics to discuss and give a better understanding good to the perpetrators. Conversely, if the program is passive, the Government is waiting for individuals to be de-radicalized.

DDP (Deradicalization and Disengagement Program) is a model of

social reintegration and rehabilitation, as well as prevention tools for further involvement that lead to violence (Koehler, 2017). Even though according to him the program still carries two strategies namely hard approach and soft approach, but the social component of society must be more highlighted so that its usefulness will have wider scope, including in terms of overcoming the threat of terrorism.

Without the need to appoint we already know that the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) is a government agency that has an important role to carry out and coordinate a DDP program. The author further refers to Koehler's research (2017, p. 133) where he mentions a Type G DDP program namely Passive Public-Private Partnership (PPP) which covers ideological issues. Although mentioning this was done passively, but given that this program is right to be implemented in terms of individuals potentially becoming terrorists in Indonesia, the author believes that this type of PPP could need to be combined with an active government DPP program (Type D) so that the results could become a PPP program Active which includes ideological problems

(hereinafter referred to as "Active PPP"). This is due to the need for a combination of disengagement programs (through psychological counseling and psychoanalysis to touch into the roots and the subconscious mind of the perpetrators as well as its cognitive behavior), with the de-radicalization program that is indeed part of an active program by the government. The involvement of private or non-government parties in this matter is also needed, among others in:

- a. Religious counseling;
- b. Psychological and social counseling, psychological interventions, and family counseling. Koehler (2017, p. 126) notes that persuasive cognitive openings are needed to ensure a stage of de-radicalization that can reach the target, due to the possibility of psychological resistance and the lack of motivation from individuals to abandon the ideology they have understood so far.
- c. Psychotherapy;
- d. Skills and expertise training;
- e. Support of training and financial material; and
- f. Continuing education in the various fields of science and religion.

We can also take one example from the experience of the German

State in implementing the Counseling Network Radicalization program which is under the control of the German interior ministry. In the three years since the DDP (Type G) program began in 2012 there were 2000 communications made with potential individuals, and there were 780 successful counseling cases (Koehler, 2017, p. 134).

III. Benefits of DDP for Indonesia

By knowing the existence of a global de-radicalization program that has also used the DDP model, according to the authors this can also be applied in Indonesia by means of a holistic approach. If the program standard is well-designed and rigorous, then PPP collaboration can cover the vast territory of Indonesia, including the distribution of radicalization maps in Indonesia more optimally. The challenges as well as material for further research, especially for writers, are:

a. DDP program design with Active PPP type must be made and synergized with related parties, bearing in mind that it is very complex with very broad scope;

b. the range of DDP programs with this type of Active PPP must also be able to reach various types of individuals and groups, for example individuals with the type of hard-core radicalist;

c. strategies to overcome the difficulty of the communication chain and coordination of the parties involved;

d. making a standardized design of performance, evaluation, and ongoing monitoring of ex-convicts who have participated in the DDP program;

e. the liability of the private or non-governmental parties involved; and

f. Existing laws and regulations must enable DDP programs with this type of active PPP, and most importantly there must be political willingness from the legislative and executive bodies, so that government policy can direct the relevant institutions, especially the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) as the coordinating agency to implement a DDP model like this.

Referring to the current practice carried out through BNPT coordination, the deradicalization program in Indonesia is carried out through two strategies. First, change the paradigm of

thinking of core groups and terrorist radical militants so that they do not return to radical acts of terrorism. secondly, the deterrence of ideology, which is aimed at all components of society so as not to be easily influenced by radical terrorism understandings and actions, for example through anti-terrorism training to social organizations (Organizations) and Training of Trainers to the members of religious education institutions (Raharjo, 2017).

The two strategies are carried out through 4 stages. The first is the identification stage, which is the data collection and grouping of suspected terrorist prisoners, their families and their networks. The second stage is rehabilitation, which is to change the orientation of radical ideologies and violence towards an ideology orientation that is inclusive, peaceful and tolerant. To support this stage, it requires the involvement of ex-terrorist prisoners who are aware, proven and proven to have a national commitment. Third, the reeducation stage, which is to provide a re-understanding of terrorist prisoners and their families about the teachings of true religion. This stage enlightens terrorist prisoners to have an

open attitude towards differences in religious life. The fourth stage is resocialization, namely returning terrorist prisoners / ex-terrorist prisoners and their families to be able to live and interact with the community properly.

The strategy and stages of the de-radicalization were carried out by BNPT together with the TNI, Polri, BIN, and civil society. Since April-October 2014, there have been 170 convicted terrorists who have undergone a de-radicalization program at the Indonesia Peace and Security Center (IPSC) complex, Sentul, Bogor, which was built with a budget of 1.64 trillion rupiah (Raharjo, 2017; Musyarrofah, 2018; Chernov-Hwang, 2018). The de-radicalization program aims to neutralize the influence of radical ideologies, especially those that originate from an understanding of Islamic religion, which forms the basis of terrorism. Therefore, de-radicalization must be a comprehensive, broad, long-term, integral and integrative program that involves all components of society, especially components of Indonesian civil society and the organizations within it. Community involvement is important

because they are the most disadvantaged parties in acts of terror. The main foundation of the de-radicalization program should be the socio-cultural dimension with a multiculturalism perspective that offers understanding and respect among ethnic, racial, and gender groups.

In practice, the government through the BNPT has coordinated through the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT), which works in an integrated manner with the Kesbangpolinmas regional offices, Dikdasmen Regional Offices, Dikdasmen Regional Offices, Dikti Dikwil, Religion Regional Offices, Kanwil Law and Human Rights, TNI, Polri, and all elements of society such as religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth leaders, community organizations, and academicians. It is planned that FKPT will be established throughout Indonesia, but only 21 have been completed (Raharjo, 2017; Musyarrofah, 2018).

The author also agrees with the argument of Musyarrofah (2018) that it requires a more structured, polite and full effort to deradicalize the values of eastern culture through the internalization of multiculturalism-

inclusivism values in religious life in Indonesian society. According to the author, the deradicalization program which has the character of religious life in Indonesia is the one that distinguishes it from the de-radicalization programs in other countries such as Europe, America and Africa as discussed earlier in Part I.

The internalization of multiculturalism-inclusivism values is actually an antidote to exclusive religious values. Certain values are certainly not expected by Islam, because Islam in its preaching orientation always teaches the value of rahmatan lil alamain, full of dialogue and elevates humanist values. Most of the facts about the perpetrators of radicalism and terrorism are Islam in Indonesia, and madrasa education or Islamic boarding school alumni that cannot be avoided (Musyarrofah, 2018). According to M. Khusna Amal (Suprpto, 2014 in Musyarrofah, 2018) the process of de-radicalization will be more effective if it involves boarding schools. One of the efforts to deradicalize religion is to carry out a process of understanding and forming a mindset, by instilling the values of multiculturalism and inclusivism through pesantren education. Character

education in pesantren is an attempt to change the behavior of individuals or groups to have values that are agreed upon based on Islamic Sharia, philosophy, ideology, politics, economics, social, culture, and defense and security.

In addition, the authors also agree with the advice as written in the U.S. Hikam (2016) in Raharjo (2017) that for the development and dissemination of de-radicalization in the future it is also important to have the main strategies of policy implementation which consists of three aspects, namely political, legal, and social. In the political aspect, there needs to be an effort to increase political support for the de-radicalization program of all elements of the nation. In the legal aspect, efforts are needed to form various laws and regulations, implementing regulations (regarding de-radicalization), and / or revise existing laws and regulations. Furthermore on the social aspect, there needs to be an increase in the role of community leaders, religious leaders, families, and youth in providing an understanding / understanding of the dangers of the development of radical teachings. As mentioned by Shodiq (2018, p. 27) the paradigm of de-

radicalization must create a counter-ideology program of terrorism and institutionalize in everyday life to the lowest layers of society.

Therefore, in order to achieve this, efforts need to be made to strengthen coordination of all stakeholders and the synergy between the government and non-government parties and civil society, as explained in the discussion about DDP at the beginning of part II of this article.

IV. Approaches to help the implementation of DDP programs

Of the various approaches available, there are three approaches that can be taken to help the implementation of the DDP program as outlined in sections II and III above, namely:

a. Psychoanalysis approach

As an important part of the disengagement process, Gill & Corner (2017) states that the psychoanalytic approach can reveal the conscious and subconscious nature of a person related to their psychological development since childhood, which later has the potential to generate an unconscious motivation and impulsive action due to mass trauma little which is not independent of the theory of Oedipus

complex Sigmund Freud (Borum, 2004).

From the point of view of psychoanalysis (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014) in general, an offender with the potential for violence is related to the possibility of an individual's profile, namely early adulthood, has a disorder with the prefrontal cortex (one of the anterior parts of the brain located in the frontal lobe), impulsive, delusional disorders (psychological grandiosity), vulnerability to self-identification, and anomalous hormone movements. These things can cause confusion about the identity of the perpetrator, he will feel whether he has the same identity and behavior with other terrorist actors or similarity as an actor military officer who becomes his inspiration (fictitious or non-fictitious thoughts) or in general terms this is understood as an imitation act. The purpose of the action according to the perpetrator is a form of aggression of violence on the basis of the superego (the moral or ethical part of the personality) which is prohibited according to the morality of the environment.

Psychoanalysis of an individual can be based on the following:

(i) his inner psychological power motivates him not to achieve instrumental things (such as politics or economics) but to rationalize his acts of terror (Geoghegan, 2016, p. 9);

(ii) from the perspective of Michel Foucault, the position of principals are subjects who have dangerous behaviors that sometimes adopt the role of certain subjects, and sometimes find that they are given a certain 'role' due to their past development or the actions of other subjects (Geoghegan, 2016, p. 40);

(iii) experiencing certain trauma in childhood, breaking away from idealism in the surrounding culture, and then consciously adopting a suitable fundamentalist ideology, to further develop it into an act of violence (Geoghegan, 2016, p. 195);

(iv) The existence of mental disorders. Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) is a defensive mechanism in itself. This can be seen that the disorder is marked where things which according to him are good and right are in the perpetrators and while things that are according to him are evil and wrong are outside of him (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014, p. 8). In the psychoanalytic approach, NPD is seen as the relationship between

consciousness and the subconscious mind and focus on psychological development from childhood. NPD is a personality problem that is often encountered, where this disorder causes the offender to feel superior to others, interpersonal problems, ego problems, caused by emotional injury and result in sensory paralysis of oneself as an adult.

b. Radical Behaviorism Approach

Basically this theory from B.F. Skinner is in the same scope as its initial theory, namely the theory of Behaviorism. The theory of behaviorism was brought by John Broadus Watson as a further criticism of structuralism from Wilhelm Wundt (Chiesa, 1994). Skinner believes that behavior is controlled through the process of operant conditioning. This process is interpreted as a process of operant behavior (positive and negative reinforcement) which can result in the behavior being able to repeat or disappear as desired. According to Skinner, humans are not autonomous, not independent, cannot determine their own actions, but rather depend on stimulus responses in the reality of their lives. For Skinner, the study of personality is aimed at finding distinctive patterns of the relationship

between behavior and the consequences it reinforces.

Skinner outlines a number of techniques used to control behavior, namely: (i) physical restraint, (ii) physical assistance, (iii) changing stimulus conditions, (iv) manipulation of emotional conditions, (v) carrying out other responses, (vi) punish yourself positively. The basic principle of the Skinner approach is that behavior is caused and influenced by external variables. There is nothing in humans, there is no form of external activity, which influences behavior. This notion of self-control does not control the power within "self", but how "self" controls the external variables that determine behavior.

c. Social Cognitive Approach

Albert Bandura (1973) in Victoroff (2005) explains social cognitive theory (social cognitive theory) as a result of the expansion of social learning theory (social learning theory), and is a theory that bridges between behaviorism theory and psychoanalytic approaches. This theory focuses on how cognitive factors play a major role in human development to study the environment and life experiences.

Being an individual actor is clearly different from the actors coming from a group. There are different roles, functions, hopes and experiences, especially in terms of self-involvement, routine activities when becoming a terrorist, and ultimately escape. Victoroff (2005) argues that terrorist groups typologically show an organizational hierarchy with various existing roles, and are able to attract the attention of an individual through different ways and influences because these individuals look for their roles and levels according to their own psychological factors and also personal factors (Noormila, 2017).

Horgan (2008) also underlines the importance of understanding how a person can become a terrorist, through three phases: getting involved, being a part, and breaking away. This phase can show how an individual can be radicalized or become a member of a group. Shaw (1986) in Gill & Corner (2017) also explains the following phases: the process of socialization, narcissistic personality disorder / NPD, escalating events, and personal relationships with certain militant groups (Gill & Corner, 2017, p. 236). It is noteworthy that personality disorders

or personal factors fall into behavioral categories such as childhood life experiences, social cognitive factors such as risk-taking and reducing social relations with others (Taylor & Horgan, 2006), self-radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011), or carry out aggression (Moghaddam, 2005). The psychological approach, especially psychoanalysis, can also help speed up the process of disengagement of a person from his desire to become a terrorist or become part of a terrorist group (Kruglanski et al., 2018).

CONCLUSION

Based on studies of: (i) the global de-radicalization program, (ii) the DDP program, (iii) the benefits to be implemented in Indonesia, and (iv) three approaches to assist the implementation of DDP as described in sections I through IV of this article, it is hoped that a concrete form of a de-radicalization program in Indonesia that can be implemented with a comprehensive and sustainable PPP scheme. We can also learn from Horgan's experience, where from ex-terrorists with various backgrounds whom he interviewed from 2006 to 2008, almost all of them can be said to have succeeded in disengaged but the

majority of individuals the individual did not succeed in being de-radicalized. This in turn points to a conclusion that is useful in research and the practical need that: an individual may break away in terms of his criminal behavior, but still be committed to a radical ideology.

Departing from examples of programs carried out by the governments in this article that: (i) extensive psychological training and counseling conducted by health professionals and researchers with adequate numbers, (ii) cognitive behavioral therapy, (iii) offered various types of counseling (especially psychological, social, and family), will be hugely effective in achieving desired goals in an effective DDP program, and (iv) there is a counter-radicalization initiative in the form of social service programs together with social organizations community, so that the program can directly have a concrete impact on democracy, namely through social empowerment activities without violence, and this must be done thoroughly, continuously and sustainably to the grassroots level and evenly distributed across the nation from the Western part until the most Eastern part of Indonesia.

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