Cleavages and Electoral Support to Islamist Party in Javan Urban Areas[1]: The Case of Prosperous Justice Party

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Abstrak

Beberapa studi berpandangan bahwa dukungan elektoral terhadap salah satu partai Islamis di Indonesia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), terpusat di daerah-daerah urban. Saya setuju dengan hal itu, tetapi studi-studi itu kurang memperhatikan keragaman kondisi sosial-politik di daerah-daerah urban yang turut membentuk dukungan elektoral yang juga bervariasi terhadap PKS. Salah satu dari kondisi sosial-politik itu adalah apa yang dikonseptualisasikan oleh Lipset dan Rokkan (1967) sebagai *cleavage* (pembelahan masyarakat). Berdasarkan kasus di daerah-daerah urban di Jawa dalam pemilihan anggota parlemen lokal tahun 2014 dan 2019, saya berargumen bahwa terdapat tiga pola *cleavage* yang terbentuk di daerah-daerah tersebut, yaitu dominan tunggal, dominan ganda, dan terfragmentasi. Setiap pola *cleavage* berimplikasi pada terbentuknya suatu tipe dukungan terhadap PKS. Pada daerah-daerah dengan *cleavage* dominan tunggal dan dominan ganda, partai Islamis itu cenderung memperoleh dukungan yang sedang atau rendah. Dukungan yang didapatkan PKS dengan yang diperoleh partai pemenang pun cenderung timpang. Di daerah-daerah dengan *cleavage* yang terfragmentasi, PKS cenderung mendapatkan dukungan yang tinggi atau sedang. Dukungan terhadap PKS dibandingkan dengan dukungan terhadap partai pemenang pun relatif tidak timpang. Data dalam artikel ini diperoleh dari data sekunder mengenai perolehan kursi PKS dalam pemilihan anggota parlemen kabupaten/kota tahun 2014 dan 2019 di 46 daerah urban di Jawa, wawancara daring, dan studi pustaka.

Abstract

Several studies have noted that electoral support for one of the Islamist parties in Indonesia,

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the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), is mostly concentrated in urban areas. While I agree with this observation, I found that these studies did not pay adequate attention to the diversity of socio-political conditions in urban areas that contributed to the varying electoral support for PKS. One of these socio-political conditions is what Lipset and Rokkan (1967) conceptualized as cleavages (divisions of society). Based on the results of 2014 and 2019 local parliamentary elections in Javan urban areas, I argue that there are three cleavage patterns formed in these areas, namely single dominant, dyadic dominant, and fragmented. Each cleavage pattern has implications for the formation of a type of support for PKS. In regions with single dominant and dyadic dominant cleavages, the Islamist party tends to receive moderate or low support. Further, compared to the the support gained by the winning party, PKS' votes tends to be much lower. However, in areas with fragmented cleavage, PKS tends to receive high or moderate support, and the votes gained by PKS tend to be comparable to that of the winning party. The data in this article were obtained from secondary data regarding PKS' gains in the legislative elections for district/city parliaments in 2014 and 2019 in 46 urban areas in Java, online interviews, and literature studies.

INTRODUCTION

One of the Islamist[3] parties in Indonesia that is considered the most successful electorally in the post-authoritarianism (post-New Order) era is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS: *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*). According to several studies, this party tends to reap its electoral support[4] in urban areas (Hidayat 2016; Woodward et al. 2013; Hasan 2012; Sukmajati 2011; Hamayotsu 2011; Hadiz 2011; Ufen 2008; Machmudi 2008, 2012; Bubalo, Fealy, and Mason 2008; Rahmat 2008). This cannot be separated from the growing middle class of educated Muslims, with their various problems, which form the socio-political basis of the Islamist party, most of whom live in urban areas. Depok and Bandung cities are two examples of urban areas where PKS has received signifi-

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[3]In simple terms, referring to Bayat (2013), Islamism can be interpreted as 'an effort to build a social order based on Islamic teachings'. Islam is not just a religion related to rituals but also to power. In Indonesia, political parties that are usually considered Islamist are PKS, PBB (Crescent Star Party), and PPP (United Development Party). All three are distinguished from Islamic parties, which usually refer to PKB (National Awakening Party) and PAN (National Mandate Party), which do not offer Islamism but have strong support among Muslim voters (see Hasan in Bayat 2013; Mujani and Liddle 2010; Ufen 2008; Baswedan 2004).

[4]Electoral support is the number of votes, which are then converted into the number of seats obtained by each political party in an electoral competition. Electoral support in this study refers to the number of seats each political party possesses in the Regional Representative Council (DPRD) at the city or district level, which is the result of the election of legislative members at that level.

cant electoral support. In the two cities, PKS became the party with the largest number of seats in local parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2019 (BPS Kota Depok 2020, 2018; BPS Kota Bandung 2020, 2018) and won the last three mayoral elections, both on its own and in coalition with other parties.

While I am fundamentally in agreement with these studies, I note that these studies did not take into account the varying socio-political conditions in these urban areas[5] that contributed to shaping electoral support for PKS, which also varied. For example, in an urban area with certain socio-political conditions PKS is able to garner high electoral support; however, in other urban areas with different socio-political conditions, PKS only receives low electoral support. The absence of discussion of these variations may be caused by the fact that urban areas are not the focal points of these studies. Hence, urban areas in these studies were only discussed in passing and interpreted loosely. The readers are considered to possess the knowledge of what is meant by urban areas.

These following examples confirm my critical review of these studies. In several cities, such as Padang (BPS Kota Padang 2020, 2018), Depok (BPS Kota Depok 2020, 2018), and Bandung (BPS Kota Bandung 2020, 2018), PKS has received high levels of electoral support. However, in several other areas, for example Blitar (BPS Kota Blitar 2020, 2018), support for PKS is low. In the cities of Magelang (BPS Kota Magelang 2020, 2018) and Tasikmalaya (BPS Kota Tasikmalaya 2020, 2018), PKS received a moderate level of support, even though stagnant. PKS also received decent support in Sukoharjo (BPS Kabupaten Sukoharjo 2020, 2018) and Surakarta (BPS Kota Surakarta 2020, 2018), however, the difference between the gains (seat acquisition) of PKS compared to the winning party, namely the nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), is remarkable.

In my opinion, the different levels of electoral support for PKS in these urban areas mentioned above are not an ordinary phenomenon of fluctuation, as often occurs in an electoral competition, such as the decline in the number of seats obtained by PKS or the Democratic Party in the 2014 General Elections, due to corruption cases involving party officials. Noting the number of seats that parties have obtained in a

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[5]The definition of urban areas in this paper refers to the criteria set by BPS, as can be seen in the Regulation of the Head of the Central Statistics Agency Number 37 of 2010 concerning the Classification of Urban and Rural Areas in Indonesia. Retrieved from https://jdih.bps.go.id/files/produk_hukum/perka/P08201037.pdf.

number of urban areas in Java, at least in the last two general elections (2014, 2019), there are patterns that reflect the socio-political conditions of each urban area, which vary from each other. One of the socio-political conditions is what Lipset and Rokkan (1967) conceptualized as cleavage, including the pattern of relations betwen cleavages.

The following examples give an indication of a linkage between cleaveges, or more specifically the pattern of relations between cleavages with the type of electoral support for PKS. In Surakarta, Sukoharjo and Klaten, a certain segment of the educated Muslim middle class that supports PKS, as a form of cleavage, develops amidst the domination of another nationalist cleavage. As a result, despite receiving consistent support, the number of seats obtained by PKS is always far below that of PDIP (see BPS Surakarta City 2020, 2018; BPS Sukoharjo Regency 2020, 2018; BPS Klaten Regency 2020, 2018). A similar thing is happening in Pasuruan City. In a city that is dominated by the nahdliyin cleavage, which channels its electoral support to the National Awakening Party (PKB), support for PKS tends to be insignificant (see BPS Kota Pasuruan 2020, 2018). Whereas in Depok City, where the cleavages are more diverse, especially those formed by migrant residents, PKS has been electorally successful (see BPS Depok City 2020, 2018).

To enrich these studies, with reference to the local parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019 in urban areas in Java, I offer the argument that three patterns of cleavages have been created in these urban areas, namely single dominant, dyadic dominant, and fragmented. In a single dominant cleavage, there is one cleavage which greatly affects the life of society and politics. Meanwhile, in a dyadic dominant cleavage, two cleavages are highly influential. Various cleavages with relatively similar influences can be found in urban areas with a fragmented cleavage.

Each cleavage pattern is related to the formation of one type of electoral support for PKS. The Islamist party tends to receive moderate or low electoral support in urban areas with single dominant or dyadic dominant cleavages. In addition, there is a quite significant gap in the support gained between PKS and the winning party. Meanwhile, in urban areas with a fragmented cleavage, the Islamist party tends to receive high or moderate electoral support. The support it received was relatively comparable to that of the winning party.

RESEARCH METHODS

The object of this research is electoral support for PKS in the election of members of the City/District Legislative Council (DPRD) (also known as the 2014 and 2019 legislative elections or *Pileg*) in urban areas on Java Island. These cities/districts are found across 6 provinces, namely Jakarta Special Capital Region, Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta Special Region and East Java. The reasons for the selection of the research object were (1) the number of seats contested in these areas, given the dense population, (2) intensive transformation from rural to urban areas through modernization and industrialization also occurring on this island since the New Order era to the present day, (3) the 2014 and 2019 general elections, including the legislative elections, being marked by the strengthening of identity politics based on religion[6], and (4) technically, the data for the two *Pilegs* are more readily available than that of the previous *Pilegs*.

The data in this paper were obtained through three data collection techniques, namely the use of secondary data obtained online, online interviews[7] and literature study. Secondary data are used to obtain information on cities or districts in the 6 provinces, which are categorized as urban areas. This technique is also used to obtain data on the number of seats won by PKS and other parties in the 2014 and 2019 city / district legislative elections in urban areas that become the object of this research. The secondary data are contained in a profile book for each urban area, such as *Kota [...] dalam Angka*, Such-and-such City in Figures, published by BPS for each region. Taking into account the latest data, the books used as the reference for this research are those published in 2018 (containing data for 2014 elections) and 2020 (containing data for 2019 elections). Online interviews with 10 researchers and local political activists as well as literature study were used to obtain data on the diversity of cleavage patterns and their implications in shaping the type of electoral support for PKS.

There are five steps taken to process and analyze the data in this article. First, based on BPS data, the researcher compiles the cities/districts that fall into the urban category: those that have more urban

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[6]See the discussion on this subject in Rakhmani 2019; Hadiz and Rakhmani 2018; Nastiti et al. 2018; Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018.

[7]This is done considering the Covid-19 pandemic situation. The use of secondary data obtained online and online interviews can minimize the spread of Covid-19 because there are no face-to-face meetings between the researcher and informants.

areas compared to rural areas are categorized as urban areas. Through this method, 46 regions (districts or cities) were categorized as urban. Second, by referring to the same BPS data, the author compiles data on the acquisition of seats for PKS and other parties in the 2014 and 2019 legislative elections in each of these urban areas. Third, the author determines the type of electoral support for PKS by calculating the average, standard deviation, ±½ standard deviation, interval from the acquisition of seats for each party, including PKS, in each urban area in the 2014 and 2019 *Pilegs*. From this calculation, the level of support (high, medium or low) provided for PKS can be calculated for each urban area.

The fourth step is to identify the cleavage system in each urban area based on online interviews with researchers, local political activists, and literature studies. The various cleavage systems are then arranged into three types, namely single dominant, dyadic dominant (two dominant cleavages), and fragmented (no dominant cleavage). Finally, through a data collection technique similar to the fourth step, the inter-relations between each pattern of the relations between cleavages and the type of electoral support for PKS are analyzed.

The data in this article were validated through three validation techniques, namely diversity of data collection techniques (secondary data utilization, online interviews, and literature studies), diversity of research informants (researchers and local political activists), and validation of findings by research informants (member validation).

CLEAVAGE

Lipset and Rokkan's concept of cleavage (1967) fundamentally refers to various differences in society (Ufen 2008a:7). The factors that underlie these differences vary, such as culture, religion, and so on (Ufen 2008:7). These differences are in turn reflected in the characteristics of political parties and the party system. For example, the cleavage of the state (secular) versus the church (religion) gives birth to the characteristics of political parties with a secular ideology versus those with a religious ideology; dominant versus marginal cultural cleavage encouraging the birth of national parties and local parties. A cleavage can also become the social basis of political parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lipset 1981; Sherman and Kolker 1987), such as parties with Christian ideology that become the main political channel for Christians. Cleavages and cleavage systems can influence the creation of an autocratic party system (concentrated on

one power that reflects a particular cleavage) or a competitive one (spread over the various powers representing cleavages).

Lipset and Rokkan (1967:13-14) argued that there are four forms of cleavage, namely (1) subject vs. dominant culture, (2) church(es) vs. government, (3) primary vs. secondary economy, and (4) owners vs. tenants, laborers and workers. The first cleavage deals with a national scale culture that deals with local (regional) cultures. This can give rise to parties that promote national culture or nationalism, versus those that fight for certain regional cultures. The second cleavage brings together religious institutions (churches) conflictually with the government that tends to be secular. This is manifested in religious-based parties-for example Christianity, Catholicism-and those based on secularism.

For the third cleavage, landowners and rural areas are facing industrialists and urban areas (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:19). These have different political channels. Landowners tend to vote for the conservative party, while industrialists give their votes to the liberal party. The next cleavage brings together employers (owners of agricultural land, plantations, factories) with their workers (plantation workers, factory workers). Employers may be predisposed to the conservative party and the liberal party, while the workers are more amenable to the workers' party: socialist or communist parties.

Lipset and Rokkan classified their four cleavages from what occurred in European countries, and hence, they associated these four forms of cleavages with major events in European history. The French Revolution, which later led to a similar revolution, the National Revolution, played a role in creating the first and second cleavages in several European countries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:14-18). The third and fourth cleavages have their genesis in the Industrial Revolution (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:14, 18-23).

Geertz's (1997) observation about the religion of Java and its relation to political affiliations, which later became known as *aliran* ('stream') politics, is to some extent consistent with Lipset and Rokkan's conception of cleavage. In simple terms, aliran politics is the manifestation of cleavages in the Indonesian context. Geertz defined three categories of religion in Javanese life, namely *santri, priyayi*, and *abangan*. The *santris* tended to vote for Islamic parties, Majelis Syuro' Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The *priyayi* (aristocrats) were mostly affiliated with the nationalist party, Indonesian Nationalist Party

(PNI). Meanwhile, the *abangan*, *hoi polloi*, tended to be sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

A study that is in line with Lipset and Rokkan's thoughts on cleavage is Ufen (2008a). In his research, Ufen concluded that in post-New Order Indonesia there were five forms of cleavages identified with support for seven political parties. The five cleavages are (1) center and periphery, (2) state and church, (3) urban and rural, (4) capital and labor, and (5) status quo and reform. The first cleavage is manifested in parties that tended to gain support in Java, such as PDIP, PKB, and outside Java, for example Golkar. The second cleavage can be found, among others, in PDIP and PD whose ideology is secular, and PKS and PPP, which are Islamist. PKB, with its support base in rural areas, and PKS and PAN in urban areas, are examples of the third cleavage. The fourth cleavage is reflected in PD, PKS and PAN supported by the middle class and PDIP and PPP supported by the lower class. Golkar and PPP represent the status quo cleavage, while PKS, PAN, PKB, and PD in certain respects represent the reform cleavage.

In his research comparing the results of general elections in Indonesia in 1955 and 1999, King (2003) more or less confirms the continued applicability of cleavage or stream politics. On the other hand, a number of criticisms have been directed at the cleavage concept. These are shown, among others, through what is conceptualized as dealignment (Ufen 2008b; Fossati 2019), created due to several factors such as authoritarianism in political parties, money politics, general election institutions, and so on. However, the emergence of identity politics in Indonesian politics in the last 5-10 years is seen by several studies (with various perspectives) as populism, Islamic populism (Muhtadi & Muslim 2020; Mietzner 2020, 2015; Hadiz and Robison 2017; Hadiz 2015), keeping the concept of cleavage relevant. Based on such a background, I intend use the cleavage concept as an analytical tool in this study.

URBAN AREAS IN JAVA

Referring to processed BPS data, from 120 districts and cities in Java, 46 can be categorized as urban areas (see Table 1). These urban areas are spread across five provinces in Java, namely Jakarta Special Capital Region, Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta Special Region and East Java. Among these urban areas, there are several areas that have the administrative kabupaten (district) status, which is commonly associated

with being rural, such as the districts of Cirebon in West Java, Kudus and Jepara in Central Java, Sidoarjo and Jombang in East Java.

From Table 1, it can be seen that for DKI Jakarta, all cities and districts fall into the category of urban areas, including Thousand Islands District, which is separated by the sea from the Jakarta mainland. Jakarta's position as the center of Indonesia's industrialization and modernization is the main cause. Industrialization and modernization, especially during the New Order era (1965-1998), resulted in the formation of urban areas throughout Jakarta.

Table 1. Urban Areas in Java

No.	Province	Cities/Districts	Numbers
1.	Jakarta Special Capital Region	**Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, North Jakarta, East Jakarta, South Jakarta**, *Thousand Islands*	6
2.	Banten	**Serang, Tangerang, South Tangerang**, *Tangerang*, **Cilegon**	5
3.	West Java	*Bogor, Bandung, Cirebon, Bekasi*, **Bogor, Sukabumi, Bandung, Cirebon, Bekasi, Depok, Tasikmalaya, Cimahi, Banjar**	13
4.	Central Java	*Klaten, Sukoharjo, Jepara*, **Magelang, Surakarta, Salatiga, Semarang, Pekalongan, Tegal, Kudus**	10
5	Yogyakarta Special Region	**Yogyakarta**	1
6	East Java	*Sidoarjo, Jombang*, **Batu, Surabaya, Kediri, Blitar, Probolinggo, Malang, Mojokerto, Pasuruan, Madiun**	11
	Total		46

Notes: Names in *italics* are districts (kabupaten); Names in **bold** are cities (kota)

Source: Jakarta SCR BPS 2020; Banten BPS 2019; West Java BPS 2018; Central Java BPS 2019; Yogyakarta BPS 2020; East Java BPS, 2019 data processed.

Apart from DKI Jakarta, provinces with a large number of urban areas are Banten (about 62% of the total districts and cities) and West Java (around 48% of the total districts and cities). This is a logical consequence of the geographic proximity of the two provinces to Jakarta. This closeness allows for an "industrial overflow", such as industrial relocation, construction of infrastructure to support industrialization, construction of housing for workers, from Jakarta to certain parts of Banten and West Java. In turn, these areas developed into urban areas. Meanwhile, the province with the least urban area is DI Yogyakarta. In this province, the only area that can be classified as an urban area is the provincial capital, namely the City of Yogyakarta. The lack of industrial estates in this province is probably one of the causes.

THREE CLEAVAGE PATTERNS IN JAVAN URBAN AREAS

In line with the arguments put forward at the beginning of this paper, based on field findings, there are three cleavage patterns with several sub-patterns that are formed in urban areas in Java, namely single dominant, dyadic dominant, and fragmented (Table 2). The single dominant cleavage pattern consists of two subtypes, namely nationalist single dominant and traditionalist Islam single dominant. The first one shows the strong domination of cleavage based on (Indonesian) nationalism. Nationalism becomes people's identity and influences their political preferences.

Table 2. Cleavage Patterns in Javan Urban Areas

Cleavage Pattern		Urban Area
Single Dominant	Nationalist	Klaten, Sukoharjo, Surakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Madiun, Kediri, Blitar
	Traditionalist Islam	Kota Tasikmalaya, Kota Probolinggo, Kota Pasuruan, Sidoarjo
Dyadic Dominant	Nationalist-Islam Traditionalist	Cirebon District, Banjar, Tegal, Surabaya, Malang, Batu

Cleavage Pattern		Urban Area
	Islam Traditionalist-Nationalist	Jepara, Pekalongan, Kudus, Mojokerto, Jombang
Fragmented		Jakarta Special Capital Region, Serang, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Tangerang District, Cilegon, Bogor, Bandung, Bekasi, Bogor District, Sukabumi, Bandung District, Cirebon, Bekasi District, Depok, Cimahi, Salatiga, Magelang

Source: online interview, literature study, processed.

As in the single dominant pattern, the dyadic dominant pattern can be classified further into nationalist-traditionalist Islam dyadic dominant, and traditionalist-nationalist Islam dyadic dominant. The first subtype is marked by the nuances of nationalism that are more pronounced in social and political life than the nuances of traditionalist Islam, whereas in the second subtype, the opposite occurs, namely the nuances of traditionalist Islam being more visible than the nuances of nationalism.

Further, as has been described in the theories section, in urban areas in Java there are areas with the fragmented cleavage pattern. In such regions, in contrast to other urban areas that are dominated by the nationalist or traditionalist Islam cleavages (or a combination of both), there is no dominant cleavage in social and political life.

Table 2 shows urban areas, mostly in the provinces of Central Java and East Java, with a nationalist single dominant cleavage pattern. These areas are Klaten, Sukoharjo and Surakarta, often identified as components of the "Greater Solo" region (online interview with Panji Anugrah and Hari N., Universitas Indonesia; Akhmad Ramdhon, Universitas Sebelas Maret, March 2021)[8], and Semarang, all of which are found in Central Java (online interview with Panji Anugrah and Hari N., Universitas Indonesia; Akhmad Ramdhon, Universitas Sebelas

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[8]Other areas that are often categorized as "Greater Solo" are Boyolali, Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Sragen. However, these districts have a rural characteristic, and thus not the focus of this study. See Miladan 2019.

Maret, March 2021). Other regions showing the nationalist single dominant cleavage pattern are Yogyakarta (online interview with Hari N., Universitas Indonesia, March 2021), and three cities in East Java which fall under the "Mataraman" sphere of influence[9], namely Madiun, Kediri and Blitar (online interview with Panji Anugrah, Universitas Indonesia; Abdul Azis M., LP3ES; Arief B.N., Universitas Brawijaya, March 2021; see also Hatta 2013; Ahsan 2017; Sasongko 2017). In all these urban areas, referring to Geertz's (1997) conception of stream politics, a strong *abangan* tradition is found.

The traditionalist Islam single dominant cleavage pattern is found in several urban areas in West and East Java (see Table 2). In West Java, this pattern is seen in Tasikmalaya-a city known as the "santri city" (online interview with Asep S., Universitas Negeri Jakarta, April 2021; Nurohman 2018). This pattern is also formed in Probolinggo and Pasuruan, which are found in the horseshoe-shaped far eastern area of the province (online interview with Abdul Azis M., LP3ES; Arief B.N., Universitas Brawijaya, March 2021). A similar cleavage pattern is manifested in Sidoarjo, a district in East Java included in the "arek" category (online interview with Panji Anugrah, Universitas Indonesia; Abdul Azis M., LP3ES; Arief B.N., Universitas Brawijaya, March 2021; see also Hatta 2013; Ahsan 2017; Sasongko 2017). The definition of traditionalist Islam, reflecting the santri tradition when referring to Geertz's (1997) idea of stream politics, usually refers to the Nahdliyin, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization, the pesantren community, and the kyai as the central figure (Ahsan 2017).

As previously described, the dyadic dominant cleavage pattern includes two subtypes, namely nationalist-traditionalist Islam and traditionalist Islam-nationalist (Table 2). The nationalist-traditionalist Islamic cleavage pattern can be seen in Cirebon District and Banjar City, West Java (online interview with Panji Anugrah, Universitas Indonesia; A. Syatori, IAIN Syekh Nurjati; Wawan Ichwanuddin, LIPI, March-April 2021),), which geographically borders with Central Java. The nuances of nationalism in the two regions may be influenced by similar developments in adjacent areas within Central Java. A similar cleavage pattern can also be found in Tegal City in Central Java (online interview with Hari N., Universitas Indonesia; Akhmad Ramdhon, Universitas Sebelas Maret, March 2021). Other urban areas that reflect

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[9]Other "Mataraman" areas with rural character are Ngawi, Pacitan, Magetan, Nganjuk, Tulungagung, Trenggalek, Ponorogo (Kompas.com 24 July 2008).

the nationalist-traditionalist Islamic cleavage pattern are several cities in the "arek" area in East Java, namely Surabaya, Malang and Batu (online interview with Panji Anugrah, Universitas Indonesia; Abdul Azis M., LP3ES; Arief B.N., Universitas Brawijaya, March 2021; see also Hatta 2013; Ahsan 2017; Sasongko 2017).

The second subtype of the dyadic dominant cleavage pattern, traditionalist Islam-nationalist, is found in several urban areas in Central and East Java. These are Jepara, Kudus, and Pekalongan in Central Java (online interview with Hari N., Universitas Indonesia, April 2021), all three of which are located in the northern coastal area of the province. Apart from in Central Java, the traditionalist Islam-nationalist cleavage pattern can also be seen in two urban areas in East Java, namely Mojokerto and Jombang. These two areas are usually considered part of the "arek" area (online interview with Abdul Azis M., LP3ES; Arief B.N., Universitas Brawijaya, March 2021; see also Hatta 2013; Ahsan 2017; Sasongko 2017).

The third pattern created in Javan urban areas is the fragmented cleavage. This is manifested in all cities and districts in Jakarta, most of West Java (except for Tasikmalaya and Cirebon) (online interview with Panji Anugrah, Universitas Indonesia; Bayu A.Y., Universitas Pertahanan, March-April 2021), all urban areas in Banten (online interview with Panji Anugrah, Universitas Indonesia; H.S. Suhaedi, UIN Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin, March 2021), and Salatiga and Magelang cities in Central Java (online interview with Hari N., March, 2021) (see Table 2). Perhaps as a consequence of urban development and urbanization due to industrialization, this third pattern seems to be beginning to develop in several cities and districts in Central and East Java, such as Pekalongan, Tegal, Jepara, Kudus, Madiun, Kediri, Mojokerto and Probolinggo; a separate research is required to confirm this observation.

CLEAVAGE PATTERNS AND
ELECTORAL SUPPORT TYPES

Based on the findings as shown in Table 3, there are indications of a link between the cleavage patterns (single dominant nationalist and traditionalist Islam, dyadic dominant nationalist-traditionalist Islam and traditionalist Islam-nationalist, and fragmented) and the intensity of electoral support (high, medium, low) for PKS in Javan urban areas

in the legislative elections at the district/city level in 2014 and 2019. In general there are two important findings regarding this matter, which basically confirms the arguments of this paper. First, in urban areas with the single dominant cleavage pattern (nationalist or traditionalist Islam) and dyadic dominant (nationalist-traditionalist Islam and traditionalist Islam-nationalist), PKS tends to get low or medium levels of electoral support. The electoral support achieved by PKS in such urban areas is also much lower compared to that obtained by winning parties, such as PDIP, Gerindra, Golkar (nationalist cleavage representation) or PKB (traditionalist Islam cleavage representation).

Table 3. Cleavage Patterns and Electoral Support for PKS

Cleavage Pattern		Type of Electoral Support		
		High	Moderate	Low
Single Dominant	Nationalist	-	Klaten, Sukoharjo, Surakarta, Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Yogyakarta	Klaten, Sukoharjo, Kediri, Blitar, Madiun
	Traditionalist Islam	-	Tasikmalaya, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan	Sidoarjo, Probolinggo
Dyadic Dominant	Nationalist-Islam Traditionalist	-	Cirebon District, Banjar, Tegal, Malang, Batu, Surabaya	Banjar, Malang, Batu
	Islam Traditionalist-Nationalist	-	Pekalongan, Kudus, Jombang	Jepara, Jombang, Mojokerto

Cleavage Pattern	Type of Electoral Support		
	High	Moderate	Low
Fragmented	Bogor District, Bandung District, Bekasi District, Bogor, Bandung, Bekasi, Depok, Cimahi, Jakarta, South Tangerang	Bogor District, Bandung District, Bekasi District, Bogor, Sukabumi, Bandung, Cirebon, Bekasi, Depok, Cimahi, Magelang, Salatiga, Jakarta, Serang, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Tangerang District, Cilegon	Sukabumi, Tangerang District

Source: Processed from the profile book for each urban area in 2020 and 2018, published by BPS for each of these areas; online interviews and literature study.

Second, in urban areas with a fragmented cleavage pattern, PKS tends to gain moderate or high electoral support. There is no significant difference between the electoral support achieved by PKS and those obtained by the winning parties, such as PDIP, PKB, Gerindra, or Golkar. In some areas with this cleavage pattern, nationalist parties take turns winning electoral competitions. In several other areas, PKS alternated with nationalist parties in winning the elections. Issues (positive or negative) relating to the party, party programs that are in direct contact with the community, party leadership, militancy of party members in mobilizing support, and party attitudes towards government policies are some of the factors that also seem to contribute in influencing the electoral performance of parties, including PKS, in urban areas with fragmented cleavage patterns.

Below is a more detailed description of how each cleavage pattern contributes to a specific type of electoral support for PKS. In urban areas with a nationalist single dominant cleavage pattern, such as Klaten, Sukoharjo, Surakarta, Semarang, Kediri, Blitar, Madiun, and Yogyakarta, support for PKS tends to be found at low or moderate levels (see Table 3). Based on the number of parliamentary seats gained, PKS ranks 2 to 5 among the parties that have seats in the DPRD. Despite the relatively good performance, in general, there is a significant gap

between the number of seats gained by PKS and those of the nationalist party (e.g. PDIP) that won the local legislative elections. In the 2014 and 2019 legislative elections in Surakarta, for example, PKS ranked second after PDIP. However, the difference between the seats obtained by the parties is significant, namely 19 seats in the 2014 legislative election and 25 in the 2019 legislative election.

The condition above, in which PKS gaining respectable positions in the local legislative elections, but having a much smaller number of seats compared to the winning party, reflects two things. On the one hand, in the midst of the domination of the nationalist cleavage, the fairly good performance indicates that PKS receives much of the votes of the ummah, while the performance of other Islamic parties tends to be poor (Tanuwidjaja 2012). On the other hand, the disparity in the number of seats shows that it is not easy for PKS to break through the domination of a political force that is strongly rooted in society (Hadiz 2011).

As is the case in urban areas with the nationalist single dominant cleavage pattern, in areas with a traditionalist Islam single dominant cleavage pattern, PKS also tends to receive low or moderate electoral support (Table 3), ranking between the 3rd-7th positions, and an unequal number of seats compared to those gained by the winning party (e.g. PKB). In these areas, PKS' performance was slightly worse (having a lower rank), but a smaller gap to the gains of the winning party, compared to in areas with a nationalist single dominant cleavage pattern. This can be seen in Tasikmalaya, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, and Probolinggo (Table 3). In Tasikmalaya, for example, PKS ranked 4th in the 2014 and 2019 legislative elections, and the difference in seats compared to the winning party, PPP, was 6 seats. Another example, in Sidoarjo, PKS ranked 6th and 5th in the last two Pilegs, with a difference of 8 and 7 seats, respectively, compared to PKB, the winning party.

There are two reasons why PKS received such a type of electoral support in areas with a traditionalist Islamic single dominant cleavage pattern. First, as both parties attempt to appear as the representative of Islam, it is more difficult for PKS to receive support. Second, even if parties that represent traditionalist Islam do not perform well, voters do not turn to PKS but to other traditionalist Islamic parties (PPP, PKNU) or nationalist parties (PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra), as happened in Probolinggo (online interview with Abdul Azis M., LP3ES; Arief B.N., Universitas Brawijaya, March 2021). This is possible because voters who

come from both cleavages (nationalist and traditionalist Islam) tend to have cultural and ideological overlaps (online interview with Abdul Azis M., LP3ES, March 2021).

Electoral support for PKS in regions with the nationalist-traditionalist Islam dyadic dominant pattern is generally similar as that obtained by PKS in areas with a nationalist single dominant pattern. In these areas, PKS tends to receive low or moderate support (Table 3). PKS ranks in the second to fifth position of seat gains in the DPRD, and the difference in the number of seats gained compared to the winning party (Gerindra, Golkar, PDIP) is quite significant. This condition can be seen in the electoral support for PKS in Cirebon District, Banjar, Tegal, Malang, Batu and Surabaya (Table 3).

In areas with a traditionalist Islam-nationalist dyadic dominant cleavage pattern, such as Pekalongan, Kudus, Jombang, Jepara, and Mojokerto (Table 3), PKS receives similar support to that of areas with the traditionalist Islam single dominant cleavage. In these areas, support for PKS is found at low or moderate levels, ranking between 3 and 7 in seat gains. The difference between the number of seats obtained by PKS and the winning party (PKB) is quite significant. In this cleavage, unlike in areas with the nationalist-traditionalist Islam dyadic dominant cleavage, PKS ranks slightly lower, with a slightly more unequal difference in seat acquisition.

Both in urban areas with the nationalist-traditionalist Islam and traditionalist Islam-nationalist dyadic cleavage patterns, PKS finds itself in a predicament. In the context of legislative elections (both local and national), this seems to have made it quite difficult for PKS to gain electoral support. Moreover, between the two cleavages, there is some sort of a cross-cutting in the aspect of culture, and even ideology to a certain extent, such as the issue of nationalism (Indonesianism), Pancasila, and view of Indonesia's diversity (online interview with Abdul Azis M., LP3ES, March 2021). According to one researcher (online interview with Abdul Azis M., LP3ES, March 2021), "At the grassroots level, they tend to [give their votes] to any of these choices equally." Political choices tend to move between parties that are considered to represent the two cleavages. They compete fiercely, and in some areas the two types of parties take turns in winning the Pilkada, by only a narrow margin of seats. But in regional head elections, both at the district/city and provincial levels, PKS can become a coalition partner of either of the two. If the coalition is successful in winning the Pilkada,

with the political incentives it gets, PKS has the opportunity to expand its support base.

Table 3 shows that in urban areas that have a fragmented cleavage pattern, such as Jakarta, most of the Banten region, almost half of West Java, and two regions in Central Java, electoral support for PKS tends to be at a moderate or high level. In such areas, in terms of the number of seats in the DPRD, PKS can position itself in the 1st to 3rd position. The number of seats gained by PKS is quite comparable to those of the victorious party (e.g. PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, PKB). In the 2019 *Pileg*, PKS won in Bogor, Bandung, Bekasi, Depok and Cimahi, and became the runner up in Bogor District, Bandung District, Bekasi District, Sukabumi, Magelang, Salatiga, and South Tangerang. The party ranked third in Cirebon, Jakarta, Serang, Tangerang, Tangerang District and Cilegon. In the 2014 *Pileg*, the PKS gains in these areas were 2-3 seats lower than in the 2019 *Pileg*. It should be noted that in the 2014 *Pileg*, PKS' electoral performance in general (at the local and national levels) indeed decreased due to, among other things, a bad image due to a corruption scandal involving the party president.

Fundamentally, in urban areas with a fragmented cleavage, any political party has the opportunity to garner significant electoral support, or even win the competition. This depends on the ability of each political party to attract voters through the image it displays to the public, the programs it offers to the public, the attractiveness of its leaders, its response to issues in society, and so on. Therefore, it is not surprising that in several areas, political parties take turns winning in elections from time to time. For example, PKS became the winner of the 2019 elections in Depok, Bogor and Bandung cities, while in the previous elections, PDIP won. PKS and Gerindra became the winners of the 2019 Pileg in Cimahi, ousting PDIP, which won the 2014 legislative elections.

However, in some regions in this category, there are indeed specific conditions that favor PKS and give it a greater chance of gaining significant support than other parties. These specific conditions include the large number of educated Muslim middle class (usually correlated with the existence of public universities) and professionals, who tend to be migrants and mostly living in housing complexes. It is these people, due to historical factors and ideological correspondence, which usually form the social political basis for the party (Lipset and Rokkan

1967; Lipset 1981; Sherman and Kolker 1987). This can be found, for example, in Depok, Bogor and Bandung.

CONCLUSION

This article enriches the body of knowledge that attempts to link urban areas with electoral support for one of the Islamist parties considered to be the most electorally successful in post-New Order authoritarianism era, namely the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This is done by showing that urban areas are varied, not homogeneous, due to their cleavages-a concept from Lipset and Rokkan (1967) referring to the division of society. This variation of cleavages is one of the factors that play a role in forming variations in the types of electoral support, namely high, moderate or low, for PKS.

By focusing on the support achieved by PKS in the 2014 and 2019 Pilegs in 46 urban areas in Java, this article shows that three cleavage patterns are found in these areas. The first is single dominant, namely an urban area dominated by one cleavage, which includes either nationalist or traditionalist Islam. Second, dyadic dominant, namely areas that are dominated by two cleavages. This cleavage also consists of two types, namely nationalist-traditionalist Islam (nationalist nuances are more pronounced than traditionalist Islam) and traditionalist Islam-nationalist (traditionalist Islamic nuances are more pronounced than nationalist). The third is an urban area with a fragmented cleavage pattern.

This article also shows that the various cleavages are related to the type of electoral support for PKS in the urban areas studied. In regions with the single dominant (nationalist or traditional Islam) and dyadic dominant (nationalist-traditionalist Islam or traditionalist Islam-nationalist) cleavage patterns, PKS tends to receive low or moderate support. PKS can be an alternative for Muslims to channel their political choices in areas with a nationalist single dominant pattern. PKS seems to have a difficulty gaining adequate support in areas with a dyadic dominant cleavage pattern, particularly in the traditionalist Islam-nationalist subtype. The intersection of culture and ideology between the nationalist and traditionalist Islam cleavages allow people's political choices to fall into one of the two cleavages, rather than to PKS. Meanwhile, in areas with a fragmented cleavage pattern, PKS tends to

gain moderate or high electoral support. In such areas, PKS has the opportunity to reap significant electoral support.

Some issues have not been explored in great depth in this study. This study only briefly discusses the social changes that have occurred in several regions, for example Pekalongan, Tegal, Jepara, Kudus, Madiun, Kediri, Mojokerto and Probolinggo, which have consequences on the possibility of new cleavage patterns and types of electoral support. In addition, this article only focuses on the church(es) vs. government cleavage (referring to Lipset and Rokkan's categorization), and gives little attention to other cleavages. Some of these may be explored in future studies.

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