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Organizational Conflict Model in Managing Indigenous Papuans Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Jayapura

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Abstract. The Mayor of Jayapura City is leading the city to be religious, advanced, modern, prosperous, and uphold local wisdom. As the capital of Papua Province, this city faces a prolonged problem of inequality from within the city, with the province of West Papua, and neighboring Papua New Guinea. The paper questions how Jayapura City, as the capital of Papua Province manages inequalities and drive the economic sector forward based on the Organizational Conflict Model of Pondy (1967). Results of in-depth interview and secondary data research were analyzed based on qualitative analysis. Inequalities have hit indigenous Papuans the hardest. They are also facing the pressure of higher skilled settlers from other parts of Indonesia and encroachment from the indigenous mountain Papuans. Based on the model, we have found that the Mayor has been responsive to mitigate potential conflicts. The bureaucracy is supported by the military, police, community leaders, and academics. We argue that representative bureaucracy taking into account customary law and indigenous beliefs will reduce tension in the society and receive support in program implementation of the city.

Keywords: indigenous Papuans, special autonomy, inequalities, conflict, local governance

Abstrak. Walikota Jayapura ingin memimpin kotanya menjadi religius, maju, modern, sejahtera, dan menjunjung tinggi kearifan lokal. Sebagai ibu kota dari Provinsi Papua, kota ini menghadapi permasalahan kesenjangan yang berkelanjutan dari dalam kota, antarprovinsi dengan Papua Barat, dan dengan negara tetangga Papua Nugini. Makalah ini mempertanyakan bagaimana Kota Jayapura, sebagai ibu kota Provinsi Papua mengelola kesenjangan untuk mendorong kemajuan di sektor ekonomi berdasarkan Model Konflik Organisasi dari Pondy (1967). Hasil dari penelitian dengan wawancara mendalam dan data sekunder dianalisis berdasarkan pendekatan kualitatif. Kesenjangan paling berdampak pada Orang Asli Papua. Juga akibat tekanan kehadiran para pendatang dari wilayah Indonesia dengan keterampilan lebih tinggi, dan perambahan orang asli Papua dari pegunungan. Berdasarkan model, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa walikota sangat responsif untuk memitigasi potensi konflik. Birokrasi didukung oleh militer, polisi, kepala adat, dan akademisi. Makalah ini berargumentasi bahwa birokrasi yang representatif akan mengurangi tekanan di masyarakat dan mendapat dukungan untuk implementasi program kota.

Kata kunci: orang asli Papua, otonomi khusus, kesenjangan, konflik, pemerintah daerah

INTRODUCTION

Since the Soekarno era, the Government of Indonesia has invested in the economic development of Irian Jaya, now Papua and Irian Jaya Barat, now called West Papua. The irony of the development policies is the fact that after 36 years, the problem of economic inequalities and poverty remains the same. Economic development in Papua exceeds those of West Papua and even Papua New Guinea (PNG). This increased economic and political tension between the provinces and the neighbouring country (Hasting, 1983). To solve the problem of regional inequality in Papua, the central government of Indonesia granted individual autonomy for indigenous Papuans as affirmative policy based on Law No. 21 the Year 2001 to manage their politics and achieve welfare in order to push development in these regions forward.

Jayapura, as the capital city of Papua Province, has

always maintained as the highest Human Development Index (HDI) in the region (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2017), and is one of the highest transit area or end destination of nation extensive travelers. The challenges are that it attracts indigenous Papuans from the mountains areas who live with an average HDI of 30% (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2015) and from PNG where more than 39% of its citizens are living below poverty (ADB, 2009). Incoming settlers, especially Javanese, Bugis, Butonese, and Makassar brings their skills and develop the economy of the city. This has led the demography of Papua Provinces being imbalanced. Based on internal documentation by Ilalang Papua, increased populations escalate the rate of criminal activities such as motor vehicle theft (curanmor), theft with violence (curas), and robbery (begal). The number of vehicle theft increased from 463 cases (2013) to 944 cases (2014), and heavy persecution from 571 cases (2013) to 944 cases (2014). Thievery dominates the criminal records in 2015

(Pasificpos, 2015). Conflicts documented in these provinces due to economic and demographic backgrounds are the conflict in Sorong (1990 and 2014), the Bugis-Buton-Makassar (BBM) conflict in Manokwari (2013), Jayapura (1996), and Timika (2014-2015). In the city, ethnic conflicts often happen at Expo Terminal in Waena-Jayapura between the Timorese and Makassar. The driver of these conflicts is the temperamental attitude of the BBM ethnic groups and indigenous Papuans, easily triggered by matters of identity, ethnicity, and religion.

The mission of Jayapura city is to be a model city for tolerance; economic development based on the city services and trade potentials, with sustainable environmental friendly city utilities. Mayor Mano created a professional bureaucracy with good governance. Policies are priorly evaluated based on future conflict potentials arising from inequalities, identities, and ethnic issues. The city program "Prospect" from the Special Autonomy budget concentrate to develop the skills of its citizen, especially indigenous Papuans to reach welfare and actively involved in the local politics while maintaining their traditional values and culture (Ajo, 2016). Innovative programs and public services proved to be successful and sustainable when indigenous institutions are involved (Harding and Sidel, 2015).

The city government created the Agency for Unity, Politics, and Community Protection Agency (Badan Kesatuan, Politik, dan Perlindungan Masyarakat/Kesbangpollinmas) in 2012 under the mandate of Law Number 7 the Year 2012 on Managing Social Conflict. The relationship between the Provincial Unity, Politics, and Community Protection Agency (Badan Kesbangpollinmas) with the agency in the city is administratively in harmony. The city bureaucracy was adjusted following social needs and the function of "community protection" was moved to the Public Order Agency (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja/Satpol PP).

In a conflict-prone society, the government organization will respond by developing skills and strategies to strengthen the internal organization and able to respond to external challenges (Perez, 2018). There are three inter-related events in observing conflict management: a) how unacceptable conflict is perceived or experienced; b) to diagnose the source of conflict; c) to intervene (Kilman and Thomas, 1978). Pondy (1967) has created a conflict model to analyze based on events or in which stage are the episodes. In other studies, organizational behavior and conflict pattern become the focus of the analysis (Pondy, 1992; Schein, 2010). In Pondy (1992), he argues with his conceptual views that conflict is the very essence of an organization. Internal and external factors escalate and de-escalate conflict through inter-connectedness between different independent entities. Destructive conflict should be managed, and resolution sought to avoid disruption.

The government of Jayapura City created policies and implemented programs to enhance indigenous Papuans in various fields in order for them to adjust to the economy of the city. Together with stakeholders in the community, the administration jointly manages the city challenges including conflicts. By using the Pondys' framework this paper elaborate on how the current bureaucracy manages to maintain the highest human development index in Papua Province.

RESEARCH METHOD

The case study of Jayapura City aims to find solvency for the problem of economic inequality, the conflict between indigenous groups, and migrants from other areas. How the city government can be proactive in preventing conflict. This research aims to analyze the bureaucracy and governance of Jayapura city in furthering the economy and managing conflict by using Pondys' (1967) framework to analyze government administration models. In Papua, governance based on customary law and strong indigenous ties plays a stronger role than public governance. In this situation, the public government should represent groups in the society, with a role in mediating between the local democracy and the bureaucracy design (Groeneveld and Van de Walle, 2010). The framework should capture the conflict phenomena in the city organization and classified them into three primary models: the bargaining conflict model looks at relationships among parties and interest groups; the bureaucratic conflict model sees the superior-subordinate relationship between the parties; the model, observe the lateral or working relationship among parties. Each type of conflict is identified in five stage episodes: 1) latent conflict; 2) perceived conflict (cognition); 3) felt conflict (affection); 4) manifest (conflict behavior); 5) conflict aftermath, as shown in the Figure 1.

The framework of a conflict dynamic episode looks at the conflicted relationship between two or more individuals in an organization, and analyze based on the sequences and episodes of the conflict. Several potential factors with variety of traits build up based on condition, affection, perception, and behavior. The culmination will be in the form of open war or aggression in an episode, however not all conflict reaches this phase.

The Latent conflict, consist of three basic types: 1) scarce resources competition; 2) in reach for autonomy; 3) the divergence of subunit goals. The potential conflict omits the role conflict, whereas, in a role set, each has its focal point and a role sender. When a person receives incompatible expectation or role demands, then conflict will happen (Hoang and Gimeno, 2005). Perceived conflict, is caused by parties misunderstanding arise from difficulties in understanding and accepting personal behavior or bad experience from task incoherencies. Action for resolution suggest for the members involved to be able to find and express their 'blind spots', admit their error or able to elaborate their misunderstanding (Einarsen, Hoel, Cooper, 2003). Sometimes people give wrong interpretation by negatively thinking about someone else. Therefore good communication to be able to express ones' feeling can lead to trust and strengthen the relationship (Abiodun, 2014). Felt Conflict, is the personalization of conflict that may lead to the organizational crisis by aggregated organizational and extra-organization actors. These interactions examine the level of trust that enables them to exchange essential or sensitive information (Jarzabkowski and Paul Spee, 2009). Manifested Conflict is based on the mind of the actor reflected in his or her behavior that frustrated the goal of one or several participants. This conflict has several varieties such as political turmoil, labor unrest, violence and prison riots; those are forms of open aggression. However, violence will rare happen when organizational

norms are present. The process of attaining social norms can be similar for different types of organization such as structure, roles, and capacity building, or different when

it involves advocacy and norm passed utilizing narration (Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton and Margolis, 2012). The effect of organizational conflict on individual welfare is not the




Figure 1. The Dynamics of a Conflict Episode (Pondy, 1967)
 Source: Processed by the author (2018)

focus of Pondys’ framework (Perez, 2018). Therefore improvement of organizational cohesiveness, solvency, adaptability, and equality will improve performance.

Pondys’ organizational model can capture how conflict creates dis-equilibrium by polarizing members of the society based on their differences in political preference, racial differences, economic inequalities, and access to resources. This model suggests that evaluation of conflicts should be based on its individual, and organizational functions or dysfunctions, to see their positive or adverse effects. Evolution of policy instruments can take the form of a market mechanism or a regulatory mechanism that assures the evolution of orderly allocation of scarce resources (Pondy, 1967).

Conflict management in administration will succeed if the appropriate measures are used for each different types of conflict. Pondy (1967) focussed on how the conflict will lead to effective organizational functioning, while recent studies found that different conflict leads to different innovation (Amason, 1996; De Clerq, Thongpapanl and Dimov, 2009; Jehn, 1995). Task conflict happens in group relationship over opinions and viewpoints in how to implement a task. This conflict affects the relationship between members, their performances and satisfaction (Curşeu and Schruijer, 2010). Process conflict emerges in dividing and delegating responsibilities (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). Status conflict is a conflict by an individual to gain or maintain their status (focus on

oneself) in a zero-sum game situation where the other will have a lower rank in the hierarchy (focus on the other) (Bendersky and Hays, 2012). Group conflict asymmetry will decrease group performance and creativity if the degree of conflict perception between the members is high (Dineen, Noe, Shaw, Duffy and Wiethoff, 2007; Klein and Kozlowski, 2000; Jehn, Rispens and Thatcher, 2010). Decentralization is an instrument for managing conflict aggravated by issues of ethnicity, religion, and even if too many political parties, in the political system (Prasojo, Maksu and Kurniawan, 2006). A representative bureaucracy should support the instrument, whereas equality of power, opportunities, and diversity of the government and its citizen forms the motives of the bureaucracy. Political power balance is taken into account to understand the level of the organization legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness. The goal is to maintain political stability, harmony, and control (Groeneveld and Van de Walle, 2010). When a conflict mechanism meets the demand of all participants, the relationship can be more orderly, with cooperative behavior to focus on solving potential conflicts. The mechanism should be the form of a new institutional arrangement with its organizational behavior that accommodates suppressed groups and interest together (Scott, 2005).

Jayapura City has an area of 940.000 Ha that lies in Humbolt Bay. This city is an administrative extension of Jayapura District. The area is divided into five districts,

i.e. Abepura, Heram, South Jayapura, North Jayapura, and Muara Tami. Since the Dutch occupation followed by the allies, Abepura has been the center of administrative activities together with Jayapura, separated by mountains. In 1962 the earliest transmigrant that came to Jayapura in large numbers were government officials. Through the years, more and more incoming settler came to Jayapura until the numbers exceed the indigenous Papuans. Distrust and jealousy of members of society are due to inequalities leads to conflicts. Moreover, crime rates are increasing due to more high skill criminals, inconsistent policy and approach on alcohol, and illegal smuggling of marijuana (Baharuddin, 2017).

The research was divided into three periods of eighteen months with a team that consists of two leading researchers based in Depok, one researcher and one assistant in Jayapura city. The first six-month was preparation period by reading all available literature on Jayapura City. Data compiled is reduced into relevant topics for the research study. Instruments for a qualitative study with research questions and training materials were design based on the literature review. In the second period, the research team of two people was formed in Jayapura City and trained on topics of Jayapura City and administrative studies, research methods, and the instruments that will be used for interviewing, observing, or organizing FGDs. They advised which informants we should interview from government officers, indigenous leaders, community leaders, religious leaders, and academics. During data collection, the local team is allowed to recruit volunteers. The interviews were informants of Jayapura citizen, various community organization, and religious and indigenous leaders, the police, and bureaucrats. The analysis aims to understand issues of indigenous Papuans from administrative studies perspectives. Data collected were analyzed in Depok and classified based on national policies affecting Jayapura, the government of Jayapura, and the society of Jayapura. Data reduction methods used the method from Huberman and Miles (2002). It was found that Jayapura City is managed under the public system and also by strong customary system governance. The team organized a focus group discussion (FGD) in Abepura by inviting all involved in the first phase data collection to present the analysis and discuss improvements. The aim was to confirm the result analysis from the first data collection. Back in Depok instruments for the next in-depth interviews were design based on the FGD discussion. In the last phase, the local researchers were trained to do an in-depth interview for at least two hours each targeting stakeholders affected by the policy with administrative problems. They were trained to observe and report local condition in support of the interview. The last batch of data was tested based on different theories and paradigm in Depok, to conclude that PONDY (1967) model was the most comprehensive tool to capture administrative matters managed by the public and customary governance.

We organize the article into three main sections, the introduction about the context of Jayapura city. Following the introduction is the methodology of how PONDY's model will be used. The result and discussion will elaborate cases in Jayapura city based on the Bargaining Model, the

Bureaucratic Model, and the System Model. The result aims to capture how Jayapura City manages inequalities based on PONDY's organizational conflict model.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Over the years the government of Indonesia created affirmative policies to solve inequality problem of indigenous Papuans and by giving them privileges to manage their land based on Law 21 the Year 2001 on the Special Autonomy of Papua Province. By looking at the case study of Jayapura City, this research want to see whether the Special autonomy or the policies by Mayor Benhur Tomi Mano such as building the Mama Mama Market (Pasar Mama Papua) and reactivating the Siskamling, community security system to prevent brawls between groups, works best of the citizen of Jayapura City. The types of governance during the different period of rules have an impact on character building in society. Legitimate coercive power in the Soekarno (1945-1967) and Soeharto (1967-1998) era created stress to indigenous Papuans. The autonomy policy given during Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) period motivated these Papuans to manage the land of their ancestors on their own. Mayor Mano together with the three pillars in the city of Jayapura achieved commitment from his citizen by keeping his administration legitimate, maintaining order by coercive action, and giving reward for achievements (Elangovan and Lin Xie, 2000). By using PONDY's Organizational Conflict Model, the study will analyze the source of conflict, different approaches to manage conflict, and the function of organization norms of Jayapura City government. The model can capture the function of public and based on customary law dual governance system.

Moreover, to analyze the leadership of Mayor Mano as the "middle man" that unifies between the two systems. Policies in Papua Province usually are less successful when local indigenous cultural aspects and political beliefs are not incurred in the planning and design. The local government has yet to find solvency to harmonize different customary law with public regulation. Jayapura city issues are centered on migrants in search of a better life in the city. Social and economy are external forces that redefine and restructure family life to create new standards, beliefs, and values. In the new environment, women gain more authority in the household when they have more opportunity to contribute to the family income (Foner, 2012).

For more than five decades, indigenous Papuans felt that they were neglected from development and marginalized on the land inherited from their ancestors. They expressed their frustration with violent means to gain attention from policymakers in fighting for their rights. Goal divergence was the source of conflict when two parties who must cooperate on some joint activity are unable to reach a consensus on concerted action. In response to the problem, the central governments released Law No 21 the Year 2001 by giving them Special Autonomy to manage their land. This regulation was made available as an instrument for local authorities to suppress social resentment of its' citizen, as potential accumulated anger

can explode when there is a trigger. In the city, competition forms the basis for conflict due to aggregated demands of citizen for resources exceed the resources available for them to live. Conflict arises when one party either seeks to exercise control over some activity that another party regards as his area or seeks to insulate itself from such control.

Further, in this section, conflict cases from Jayapura City will be elaborated based on the bargaining model, bureaucratic model, and system model. Each will elaborate in which conflict episode sequence is and how each stakeholder relates to one another. The cases of each model will identify whether the conflict is in the stage of potential conflict; cognition of perceived conflict; affection of felt conflict, manifested conflict behavior, or as the conflict aftermath.

The Bargaining Model

Jayapura city administration is divided into fourteen villages, fourteen sub-villages, and twelve indigenous villages. The city has two governance systems, one is the government bureaucracy, and the other is based on customary law led by indigenous leaders called *Ondoafi* or *Ondofolo*. The city is pressure by incoming settlers both legal and illegal affecting the demographic composition of the area. Different composition of ethnicity has potentials to emerge as conflicts when values central to each personality are not respected. These migrations drives land induces conflicts in three directions. First is when landowners and villagers in Jayapura city are disturbed by the presence of encroaching illegal settlers from the mountain areas. The second is conflict when the government needs common land to provide significant structural development for the general interest. The third is the land clearance of illegal occupied state-owned land to build construction of public use in urban areas; as conveyed by the head of Inter-Religion Communication Forum (FKUB):

“Suatu waktu akan terjadi konflik, konflik itu bisa terjadi menjadi tiga arah. Pemilik tanah dengan suku yang datang yang kemudian itu dengan pemerintah.” [At once conflict will happen, it will happen into three directions. A landowner with the incoming settler, and with the government] (Fr. Willem Itaar, March 26, 2018)

Based on the bargaining model, this sections analyzed how Mayor Benhur Tomi Mano deals with conflicts among parties and interest groups in Jayapura city, to foresee potential latent conflict from: 1) competition for scarce resources; 2) the drive for autonomy; 3) divergence of subunit goals. Informal norms have to have sufficient trust and social capital able to withstand high behavioral and environmental uncertainties. Informal social ties is a personalized process pushed by horizontal peers. On the other hand, formal ties are depersonalized processes enforced by a vertical authority. Strong informal ties are when the institution is strong with trust among the citizen. Weak-informal ties have to do with culture, religion, ethics, and the role of the clan. Strong-formal is related to cognition of the law and governance. Weak-formal is about market and delegation (Li, 2007). Community ties of household are friends and relatives as principal essential resources (Wellman and Wortley, 1990).

Regulatory mechanisms have usually evolved to guarantee the orderly allocation of scarce resources. In the case of Jayapura city, groups of people in the society, due to past issues, they adhere more to indigenous Papuans customary law system rather than public administrative mechanism. Many indigenous Papuans do not own citizen identity card (KTP), nor does not understand all the administrative papers needed such as the family card (*Kartu Keluarga*) to be legal citizen living in the territory of Indonesia. In 2000, indigenous mountain people migrated by foot and ships to centers of development in Merauke, Kaimana, Manokwari, and Biak. In Jayapura city, they occupy fringe areas in North Jayapura, South Jayapura, Abepura, Heram, Entrop, Gurabesi, Tanjung Ria Dok IX, Hamadi, and Youtefa (Jones and Suhartini, 2014) and create tension with the landowner of Nafri, Yoka, and Yahim villages (Riani and Pudjihardjo, 2012). Informal settlers in this city reach more than 25% of the population. They can occupy land and build semi-permanent low-quality houses by having informal or written permits from the landowner or the *Ondoafi*, with compensation informs of cash, in-kind, or share of interest, as stated by the Chief of *Ondoafi* Association (LMA):

“Kampung di sini itu punya Ondoafi, punya otoritas yang tidak bisa diganggu oleh kampung lain.” [Their *Ondoafi* rules the village here with authority that cannot be trespass by other villages] George Awi, March 28, 2018.

Government regulation proved to have failed in controlling the expansion of these types of encroachment. In this situation, informal leaders frustrate the function of public authority by manipulating social structures and influence (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). The explanation behind this is that the administration becomes irrelevant if it fails to incur social and political changes in the recruitment mechanism as political power-play will take over (Groeneveld and Van de Walle, 2010). Jayapura city should recruit individuals in the bureaucracy that is keen to increase minority group access of indigenous Wamena Papuans. Public bureaucracy has to have similar values and beliefs to the population it represents (Sowa and Selden, 2003).

Another trigger of conflict involving the two governance systems in the city is land tenure. Customary land (*hak ulayat*) in Jayapura is the city administrative problems. Customary lands are prohibited from selling to foreigners because it is a cultural identity. Public government ignores and often don not understand customary law and their governance structure. As a result, the public government creates conflict in two ways: first is publishing land permits for individual ownership, which is against customary rules. Weak capacity of government officials in the sub-village office (*Lurah*) office adds the problem. There are no maps of land ownership boundaries present in the office causing some land to have more than one owner. Second, compensation for the release of land is different between the public system based on individual permit ownership and the indigenous system whereas payment should be based on each tribal mechanism. When conflict arises due to issues of land, the military and the police will be regarded as an outsider in this situation, as explained by the Chief of *Ondoafi*

Association (LMA):

“Di sinilah peran pemerintah untuk membuat peraturan daerah untuk mengatur... terbitnya surat pelepasan hak, dan para pejabat terutama lurah dan distrik, dia juga harus ada peta di kantornya... ini tidak ada di tingkat kelurahan maupun distrik. Akhirnya dia jual di atas jual ke BPN, itu yang saya bilang potensi konflik, karena tidak tertibnya administrasi.” [This is the role of the government to issue local regulation ... the issuance of the release of rights letter, and the role of sub-district and village office official, he also must have a map at his office ... this is not available at the village level also district. At the end he sells land of owned land to the National Land Agency (BPN), I see this as a potential conflict, because of the disorderly administration.], George Awi 28 Maret 2018.

The wisdom and final decision of the *Ondoafi* in charge will be taken as the final say. A local regulation (*Perda*) is needed to bridge between national regulations and indigenous norms.

A conflict case of customary for extensive structural development is the building of the Holtekamp Bridge, a national construction project. Conflicts arose when the provincial government paid the compensation fee

to the wrong village the Tobati village and not to the Enggros village. The payment was also not according to customary mechanism and calculation. Willem Itaar, Chief of *Ondoafi* Association (LMA) mediated the conflict. He advocated for proper payment based on the land price in Kota Raja. The landowners receive less than this and blame the government for creating the conflict. In this case conflict, it is a complicated relationship, involving integrative (cooperative) and distributive (competitive) sub processes. Each of them aims to have the most significant total resources and to secure a large share for themselves. Solving these kinds of conflicts, integrative sub processes argue to have joint problem solving, while the distributive sub processes will calculate based on strategic bargaining. By involving the head of the LMA, each party attempt to secure backing from the third party as strategic management (Walton and McKersie, 1991). Mayor Mano took over the negotiation with the *Ondoafi*, asking for support of the Hamadi-Holtekamp Bridge, on their indigenous land. President Jokowi monitored the bridge on April 11, 2008, and the Provincial Government of Papua also monitors its progress.



Figure 2. Holtekamp Bridge
Source: Processed by the author (2018)

Ignorance of the dual governance system in Jayapura city and probably also in other areas of Papua Provinces is costly. Most of the civil infrastructure construction and policy deliverance work with the Provincial government office, and seldom further. Problems arising are that the government official in the city or district level is not well informed of the policies or projects running. When the project ends and is given to the city or district administrative responsibilities for maintenance, they feel indifferent and do not have the feeling of ownership.

Downtown in the city of Jayapura, indigenous Papua women called “mama”, were gradually marginalized by development and from incoming settlers. Indigenous mamas sell their produce on the street while watching another sellers from outside Papua occupying all the stalls in the market. This condition triggered them to fight for their rights. The “Role Conflict Model”, sees an organization composing of a focal person and his role sender with their own sets of role collection to define the conceptual analysis. Role conflict escalates, when a person

is designated to a new role and demanded to meet a new role set or a new identity by the new environment (Hoang and Gimeno, 2005). Relationship conflict is when the interpersonal condition is incompatible. While task conflict happens when members of a group have a different viewpoint regarding their duties (Hulsheger, Anderson, and Salgado, 2009; Kostopoulos and Bozionelos, 2011). This model can be used to analyze the potential conflict concerning Papuans mama. Indigenous Papuans selling on the street joint forces and formed an organization called the “*Solidaritas Pedagang Asli Papua*”, or Solpap, which translate to Indigenous Papuans Seller Solidarity. They advocate for a building that functions as a market, exclusively for indigenous mama-mama. The demonstration was held at the mayors’ office and pushed for regulations that can accommodate to make the building a reality. The Mayor of Jayapura City, Dr. Benhur Tomi Mano, MM., responded to Solpap request by providing land for the building. In this case, conflict resolution will try to decrease the demands of parties

involved or increase the pool of resources asked. To make the building a reality, Mayor Mano flew to Jakarta to sign an MoU with Perum Damri, the public company for passenger and goods services for buses and trucks, that owns the land. “*Mama-mama Market*” was part of the promise of President Jokowi campaign, the central government rallied state-owned enterprises (*BUMN*) to provided financial support and gave the authority to the city government to oversee the management of the market. In the decentralization era, Mayor Mano acts as the representative of the central government and has the authority to direct policy and programs by implementing planned change, regulated change, conflictive change, and competitive change (Van de Ven and Sun, 2011). Members of Solpap was relieved when their wish had become a reality, as stated by a Solpap activist:

“Mama dari pasar lama...kitong perjuangkan pasar sudah sembilang belas tahun baru Jokowi resmikan.” [Mama came from the old market, we fought for the market for nineteen years until inaugurated by Jokowi], mama pinang seller at *Mama-mama Market*, May 11, 2018

After 19 years of the struggle, President Jokowi and the first lady opened the three-story market place that is located in Gurabesi, North Jayapura.



Figure 3. Mama Mama Market
Source: Processed by the author (2018)

A new problem emerge, the market was not supported with a business plan. Negative rumors spread that only native Papuans can come or sell in the market; this rumor hindered customers from visiting the new and modern market. The mama needed longer more extended time to sell their produce as recorded:

“Di sini kurang pengunjung, ini mama jual ada yang seratus ribu, dua puluh ribu, dan sepuluh ribu. Mama keluar modal empat ratus ribu baru habis dua sampai tiga hari, dari situ hanya untung duaratus limapuluh ribu. Di pasar lama modal empat ratus ribu untung satu juta, habis hari itu juga.” [Fewer visitors are coming here, mama sells (different sets) for one hundred thousand, twenty thousand, and ten thousand. Mama used the capital of four hundred thousand, was only sold out after two to three days; from there the profit is only two hundred fifty thousand. In the old market, with capital of four hundred thousand, one million profit and finish on the

same day], mama pinang seller at *Mama-mama Market*, May 11, 2018.

Market mechanisms have usually evolved to guarantee the orderly allocation of scarce resources. The new “*Mama-mama Market*” building concept is a one-stop shopping as part of the city’s public service. Mama-mama sellers were reluctant to use the provided selling tables as they are not accustomed, thus spread a mat on floors to sell their produce, as distributed by the head of Jayapura City Department of Religion who has lived there for a long time:

“Pembangunan tidak dibarengi dengan analisis (business plan). Bahwa pasar adalah pertemuan antara penjual dan pembeli. Sebenarnya pasar yang baru adalah “one stop shopping”, ada tiga lantai, sebagai dari layanan publik. Namun para mama pada gelar tikar, katanya bawa barang berat, terbiasa duduk di lantai. Nah, ini kan salah analisis.” [The construction was not accompanied by analysis (business plan). The market is a meeting between sellers and buyers. Actually, the new market is “one-stop shopping”, as part of public services with three floors. But the mama spread a mat on floors, because they bring heavy items, (and) used to sitting on floors. Well, this is a wrong analysis], Syamsuddin, May 8, 2018.

The second and third floor was too challenging for them to carry their heavy produce upstairs. The effort from the management of the market building is by holding regular trainings to enhance the sellers’ capacity for free.

The Bureaucratic Model

The instrument used to reduce poverty and create welfare by giving authority to local leaders in managing their areas is using administrative expansion (*pemekaran*). This approach was successful when Jayapura City was expanded from Jayapura District. However, the instrument did not work for administrative areas in the mountains of Papan Province. The Bureaucratic Model helps understand how institutions along vertical hierarchical dimension are affected by external pressure and how they respond, mainly to prevent conflict. The areas that are established by administrative expansion are the districts of Jayapura, Manokwari, Paniai, Biak Numfor, Yapen Waropen, and Nabire. These areas have an average poverty rate of 49.76% as enabling an environment for potential conflict. Four more districts were expanded, they are Supiori, Jayawijaya, Yahukimo, Tolikara, and Jayapura City (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2015). The policy didn’t work for most of the district areas, therefore based on the model; actions of the citizen have to be interpreted by looking at the context of the situation. The mountain people districts preferred to migrate by foot to more secure areas near the coast. Most of them are the middle-class families with farming skills that provide food for the village and nurture the vulnerable groups of elderly, pregnant women, and children. Unlike Papuans living at the coast that are more open to foreign acculturation, the people of Wamena takes pride in their culture and believes. Migration of the middle class and rigid culture frustrate those who are left behind. No one remains in these villages to pass down farming skills and local wisdom to the younger generation. In 1998, a

program to aid the poor called “*Raskin*” reach these areas. The village social condition is negatively affected when the aids are up to six month undelivered due to shipping problems leading to malnourishment problems. The lack of jobs available and no farming skill pressured families to poverty. Most of them turn to alcohol or are involved in criminal activities. The Special Autonomy policy was design to solve poverty issues of indigenous Papuans. However, village leaders neither in the mountain and coastal areas have never heard nor seen the procedure, as explained by the Head of Jayapura Inter-Religions Forum (FKUB):

“Undang-undang ini (Otsus) juga belum pernah disosialisasikan secara baik mengenai pasal yang mengatur tentang kehidupan karena (dipersepsikan) dalam rangka menjawab seluruh kebutuhan hidup masyarakat dari Papua yang mengatur secara khusus, (atau) sebuah jembatan di mana Papua akan merdeka. Secara riil saya belum pernah lihat, saya belum pernah rasa undang-undang itu secara utuh.” [This law (Special Autonomy) has also never been adequately socialized regarding the articles governing life because (it is perceived) to answer all the needs in the presence of Papuans in a specific regulation (or) as a bridge for Papua independence. In fact I have never seen it; I have never felt the law as a whole.] Fr. Willem Itaar, March 26, 2018.

Involving city and district government is essential to bridge communication with indigenous system governance to progress a policy. Due to inadequate training and outreach design, local government staff had a hard time interpreting the Special Autonomy policy.

In society, alcohol addiction grew to be disturbing in all area of Papua Province. As a reaction, Provincial Government published Papua Province Regulation No. 15 the Year 2013 that Prohibits to Supply, Storage, Distribute, Sale, and Production of Alcohol Beverage, based on the aspirations from local governments. The provincial regulation is bureaucratic steps to substitute impersonal rules with personal control on matters of alcoholic beverages.

The District of Jayapura accepts and implements the regulation. However, the city government of Jayapura neglects this law because the provincial law has no national legal basis concerning the production and supply of alcohol based drinks. This situation is called the “zone of indifference”, when there are different expectation between the superior and the subordinate. When a bureaucratic organization grows more substantial, the needs, interest, or goals between superior and the assistant differ affecting the delegation to the subunits of organizations. Jayapura city autonomy is threatened as the city holds the right based on national regulation. National regulation states that only the capital city of Jakarta and the capital city of each Province are allowed to sell alcohol beverages. I cannot be aborted or changed by local regulations, as what the Provincial Government of Papua did by having Papua Province Regulation No. 15 the Year 2013, as explained by the former Head of National and Politics Unity Agency (*Kesbangpol*):

“Jadi kita di kota tidak (ada) perda tentang penghapusan dan pelarangan (alcohol) yang di provinsi bikin. Berarti yang boleh menjual minuman keras adalah kota

Jakarta, dan ibu kota provinsi. Jadi Kota Jayapura tidak salah sudah merujuk kepada peraturan yang lebih tinggi.” [We in the city do not (have) regulations concerning the abolition and prohibition (of alcohol) that the province made. That means that those who are allowed to sell liquor are the city of Jakarta and the capital city of the Provinces. So the city of Jayapura has correctly referred to the higher regulations] Evret N. Merauje, March 17, 2018.

In reconciling the relationship between the provincial regulations with those of the city is by having reconciliation efforts that are sensitive and answer the victims feeling of unjust. Successful reconciliation is when forgiveness and restoration of trust are available between the two conflicting agencies (Andiappan and Trevino, 2011). In Jayapura City, the permit to supply, distribute, and sell alcoholic drink is owned by Rudi Maswi, the owner of the supermarket chain Sumber Makmur, Jaya Makmur, and Saga. Alcohol sold on these premises is legal. The city government does not publish permits to local business owners. Jayapura city is drafting a special regulation on sales of alcoholic beverages by raising the tax to distributors to limit public access to alcohol drinks. Purchases will only be legal in pubs and hotels as part of the tourism service.

Another challenge faced by Jayapura city is the increased distribution of marijuana and imported new modes of criminal activities involving children. This condition creates fear among the citizen especially for those whose work until night. Interview with local “Taksi” bus driver revealed that many people high from marijuana are to be found in the city after eight p.m., especially at Expo Terminal. To keep themselves safe, Taksi drivers usually prepare protection rackets of five thousand or ten thousand Rupiah to prevent attacks from these groups of criminal, as explained below by the “Taksi” driver of route Youtefa Market to Perumnas III:

“Kaka, hati-hati kalau pulang malam jangan lewat dari jam 20.00. Di sini banyak orang mabok. Ini saya setiap hari selalu bawa duapuluh ribu – tigapuluh ribu untuk dipalakin sama orang (mabok itu), kadang saya kasih lima ribu, kadang sepuluh.” [Sister, be careful not to return home after 8:00 p.m., many drunk people are around. I will bring twenty thousand or thirty thousand every day - as prevention if I meet (drunken) people, sometimes I give five thousand, sometimes ten] “Taksi” driver Mei 6, 2019.

Marijuana is transported to Jayapura city from neighboring Papua New Guinea (PNG) in a small plastic bag hand carried. They cross the border from the woods until the roadway and take the “Taksi” to Abepura. Another way to enter the city is via sea by boat, by traveling until Hamadi. On February 2018, the Provincial Police Head, Inspector General Police, Drs. Boy Rafli Amar, MH, declared narcotics as an urgent problem in Papua. A meeting with the city and district level government of Papua Province came to the conclusion that Papua has become the market for narcotics and illegal drugs, mostly transported from the borders of PNG.

Manifested conflicts involving open aggression with verbal and physical violence are dealt with by the so-called “Three Pillars” of the city: the public government,

the police, and the military. They are responsible for conflict management and security of public order (*Kamtibmas*). Each of these institutions has its administration, bureaucracy, and leaders. The chief of Jayapura City Police (*Kapolresta*), Police Grand Commissioner Adjutant Gustav Robby Urbinas, SH., S.IK led the fight against criminal activities by declaring, “No to illegal alcoholic drinks, drugs, and gambling”. He rallied support from the Mayor, the military and important local leaders. Strict directions are used to control Criminal disturbance such as motor theft (*curanmor*) and activities using sharp weapons (*sajam*). Urbinas permitted to police officers under his authority to shoot delinquents on the spot for criminal activities involving violence and weapons (Evarukdijati, 2018). Perpetrators will be prosecuted under Law 12 the Year 1951. “Taksi” drivers praised the Jayapura City Police boldness and felt safer driving at night.

Security direction from Military Commander 172/Praja Wira Yakti, Colonel Infantry Jonathan Binsar Parluhutan Sianipar for Military District 1701/Jayapura, Military District 1702/Jayawijaya, and Military District 1712/Sarmi, stated that the backbone of territorial management are soldiers posted to aid village development (*Babinsa*), the Subdistrict Military Commander (*Danramil*), and the intelligence section to work together with the police, village leaders. He commanded to reactivate the traditional neighborhood security system (*Siskamling*) again. “*Siskamling*” posts are built and shared with the community assistance police (Binmas) to be closer to the community. Mayor Mano declared his support to the police and the military. He reminded the citizens of Jayapura City to participate in community security by taking part in the “*Siskamling*” system with neighborhood coordinator (RT) and hamlet coordinator (RW) as field leaders (Jayapura City, 2018).



Figure 4. Inauguration of the Security Post (Jayapura City Government, 2018)

Source: Processed by the author (2018)

On April 2017, the Head of Papua Province Police, Inspector General Pol. Drs. Paulus Waterpauw, launch an android application called the “Noken of Jayapura City Police Office”, to enhance public participation in fighting crime together. In addition to that, 12 CCTVs were installed in strategic locations and are connected to this application. Members of the society can report criminal

attack directly via their smartphone by downloading the “Noken” Application. The report will pop up in form of a red blinking dot at the monitor installed in the City Policy (Polresta) front desk. The police in charge will call back the victim to confirm and direct what the caller should do next. Police officers will be assigned from the city policy office or the nearest city unit to help on site. Another telecommunication-based collaboration by Police Grand Commissioner Adjutant Urbinas is by signing MoU with Telkomsel to launch SMS Broadcast with messages on public security (Ridwan, 2018).

Mayor Mano responsiveness to preventing conflict by gathering or visiting local leaders and community organizations (*paguyuban*), aims to create tolerance between the different ethnic, religious, and indigenous-incoming settlers. He will organize meeting with the relevant departments after receiving information on a potential conflict from the intelligence. He serves as the middle manager between the central government and the people living in Jayapura city, as an interface to connect actors and domains and break resistance from the community (Huy, 2002; Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd, 2008).

The System Model

Jayapura as the capital city of Papua Provinces has a very diverse demographic composition. The challenge for the city government is to provide public services and maintain order to guarantee economic development. The market is central to the life of people living in Jayapura, where indigenous Papuans and incoming settlers sell their products. By using the system model, the lateral relationship of the city government with indigenous Papuans, incoming settlers, and indigenous Papuans are residing in Jayapura and PNG.

The population growth of Jayapura city from 2005 to 2010 is 2.44% annually, with the highest increase in Muara Tami District of 5.1% due to spontaneous migration, and the lowest in South Jayapura. The density in Muara Tami is 626.7 km² or 66.7% from the total area of Jayapura City. In 2017, most of the average expenditure per capita in a month for food consumption was about 44.33 % from overall spending per capita in the city. A study on the potential asset for the income of Jayapura city in 2013, shows that the highest retribution contributing to the town from the market and terminal could reach Rp.30,189,520,000.-. Retribution is effectively only 19.29% because market facilities are not used following the purpose; the sellers are not paying the full price of the retribution, and the officer in charge does not give ticket on payment. Flooding affected Youtefa market in Abepura the worst, and when the market is flooded, it causes closure for several days without any economic activities (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2017).

The relationship between indigenous Papuans and incoming settlers are conflicting on power distribution, resource management, and problems related to politics, economy, and social issues. It has caused the inequalities in racial imbalance, gender discrimination, and pay gap affecting racialized beliefs and practice (Acker, 2006).

The source of resentment between the groups is due to the widening income gap between the second and third generation offspring of indigenous Papuans against

migrants over the years. The first generation came to Irian Jaya in 1960 under the Dutch Colonial transmigration policy. In the Soekarno era, this policy is continued under the “National Transmigration Movement” or *Gerakan Transmigrasi Nasional*. The land in Jayapura was suitable for agriculture, and the migrants produced rice, secondary crop (*palawija*), chilies, cucumbers, and others. Dosay, an area 60 km from the city had been supplying vegetables to the town. The area also has cocoa and coffee plantation. Arso, a well develop transmigration area 20 km from the city produces vegetables and fruits and has a palm tree plantation. Transmigrant families in this area were happy with their produce and market profit and brought their families from Java to expand

their cultivation. Spontaneous migrants raised up to 160,000 in the year 1983 adding pressure to the urban city that started to impact indigenous Papuans mamas’ (Hasting, 1983). This felt conflict become a potential latent conflict that will break out if there is a trigger of symbolic ones. The migrant offspring could compete in the market system and could earn between one to three million Rupiah per day. On the other hand, the families of indigenous Papuans from different villages in the Province are making less by the year. This study asked randomly to indigenous mama-mama, transmigration settlers, and incoming settlers, all from the second or third generations on their income as sellers in the market all over town to confirm the situation, as follow Table 1.

Table 1. Income of Indigenous Papuans versus Incoming Settlers

No.	Mama Origin	Selling	Initial Capital	Gross Income	Market
1	Wamena	Pinang	400,000	250,000/2 days drops 1 mil/day at old market	Mama Papua
2	Nabire	Noken	100,000	300 - 400,000 changed from vegetable sellers because unable to compete with supermarket	Mama Papua
3	Pangkep (migrant)	Rice	3 mill	1 - 3 mill/day	Skouw
4	Biak	Pinang	500,000	30,000/day drops from 70,000/day	Hamadi
5	Probolinggo (Transmigrant)	Fruits	3 mill	500,000 - 2 mill/month	Koya
6	Jayapura	Pinang	500,000	100,000 drops from 1 mill/day in old market	Youtefa

Source: Processed by the author (2018)

We wanted to know what caused indigenous Papuans, especially the mamas’ for their inability to compete and found that their belief and teachings affected the most. Indigenous Mamas’ believe that economic wealth, body health, and daily food for a living are provided by the Devine and have no correlation with market mechanism. They are uneasy with the concept of competition because resources to live are provided by Mother Nature. The exploitation of life and the shrinking land due to the expansion of the city decreased fertile cultivation land thus less produce. Another negative impact is environmental degradation and pollution affecting the health of Papuans. The feeling of helplessness and frustration became anger and resentment towards settlers who in their view has taken over their land.

The Behavior of the mama in the market also helps understand why government policies are not bearing fruit for them. In the market, indigenous mama-mama only sells fish, fruit, or vegetables without any motivation to process these raw materials further into various other forms of food or product aiming for a higher profit. In most cases, they set a fixed price to their products and don’t understand the concept of diminishing quality. They don’t give away bonus as a strategy to keep customers coming back but let close friend or family take their produce for free too often, as explained by the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security:

“Kalau mama Papua jual pinang satu bukit sepuluh ribu, nggak bisa ditawar. Sedangkan pendatang boleh

ditawar, boleh delapan ribu. Mereka tidak paham bahwa (pinang) berlaku timbangan menyusut, kalau kualitas menurun, mereka akan merugi.” [When Papuan mamas sell one stack of Pinang for ten thousand, this is non-negotiable. On the other hand, incoming settlers are open to bargain, eight thousand is acceptable. They don’t understand that (pinang) has traits of diminishing quality; they will loss.] Papua Desk, May 25, 2018.

In this endless conflicting lateral relationship between indigenous Papuans and incoming settler, Ponds (1967) suggest to having funding available as an incentive system. This mechanism is already available based on the funding earmarking under the Special Autonomy affirmative policy. We have explained earlier that it is not helping push indigenous Papuans to help them further their welfare because the policy only focuses on the budget allocation. Government officials as frontline facing communities are not well trained to help them understand the policies and what kind of program they should implement. Most crucial of all, customary land and the villagers are ruled by the *Ondoafis* or *Ondofolos*, yet many of them never saw or understood about the law giving privilege to them and their rights. Ponds suggest that government should make sure that parties are not competing for the same resources. Based on our observation, in most market, six to eight stalls are selling the same produce sitting next to each other. An area such as Arso is a well-established agriculture producer managed by second or third generation offspring of mostly Javanese

families. They provide the most significant numbers of products in the market. The economic system rules the market. Administrators with a lack of attention to social structure, and its consequences are prone to be manipulated to skilled political entrepreneurs (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006).

Another matter concerning indigenous Papuans is their kinship ties of the Melanesian race. This anthropological bond is stronger than administrative identities such as ID Cards or country borders. One such case is Mosso villagers; they work in the village from Monday to Thursday, and then cross to PNG to stay there from Friday to Sunday. Both the Indonesian government and the government of PNG keep its borders flexible for these constantly migrating Melanesian. This kind of regulation maintains internal equilibrium by enabling situation for communication exchange (Jarzabkowski and Paul Spee, 2009). Mayors from the surrounding area in both of the country, signed an MoU to regulate programs in solving problems of the society. These important steps was represented by Charles Malenki, mayor of Wewak from the Province of East Sepik; Koim Trilu Leaky, Mayor of Lae from the Province of Morobe, and the Mayor of Bololo from the Province of Morobe, PNG, with Mayor DR. Benhur Tomi Mano, MM of Jayapura City on issues of border, economic, and agricultural programs. Annually, the government sends Indonesian language teachers to schools in PNG as a social strategy (Jayapura City, 2018). Hostilities are reduced utilizing athletic activities by sending youth football club called "Tunas Muda Hamadi" to a football tournament in Momas Wewak, Papua New Guinea. These policies aim to guarantee indigenous Melanesian to have economic and social interaction in a peaceful environment.

CONCLUSION

The study analyzes affirmative policies implemented by the central government or programs initiated by Jayapura city mayor by using Pondys' Organizational Conflict Model, to understand which works best in solving problems related to indigenous Papuans and inequality in the city. Pondy models focus on the conflict in organizations and suggest ways to manage the conflicts to have a positive effect on the organization. The instruments can be informed of market or legislative instrument that takes into account individuals living in the city.

In Jayapura city and all over Papua Province, the customary law based governance and indigenous ties have a stronger role than the public system. Cultural aspects and local beliefs should be incurred in city planning for policies to succeed. Local regulation (Perda) can bridge between national regulations and indigenous norms. National infrastructure construction and policy deliverance in Papua should involve city or district government closely. They are representative of the central government and have the authority to direct policy and programs. The conflict between indigenous Papuans and migrants is due to the widening gap of economy, power, social and political issues. Administrative approaches should take into account indigenous beliefs and teachings to put forward the city program "Prospect" from the Special

Autonomy budget.

The limitation of the researcher is the inability to observe the impact of policies on the village level for an extended period due to logistical condition. Local enumerators that work on social, economic, and political issues were recruited to guide in-depth interviews and observe the *Ondoafis* in solving social conflicts. The researcher experienced that administrative science could explain the implementation of policies from the national level from an inward-looking perspective. Theories from political science and anthropological science were needed to explain phenomena at the local level involving indigenous Papuans. Future research is required to understand better the background of a massive expansion of indigenous Papuans from the mountains to emerging cities in Papua Provinces and why administrative development failed to halt this process.

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