ANALYSIS OF THE END OF THE KURDISTAN PARTIYA KARKERÊN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN TURKEY

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Analysis of The End of The Kurdistan Partiya Karkerên Terrorist Organization In Turkey

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Abstract
This paper analyzes the end of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey. The PKK is a terrorist organization based on the aim of separatism from Turkey. Since its founding in 1978 until now, various acts of terror have been carried out by the PKK and Turkish authorities view the PKK as the most dangerous terrorist organization in its territory. The type of research used is descriptive qualitative. Politicization factors are the main variable in analyzing the end of the PKK in Turkey. The result of the analysis is that the PKK will soon end through constitutional agreements through Kurdish representatives in the Turkish parliament which were won by HDP, a pro-Kurdish political party. HDP’s success as the first pro-Kurdish party to enter the Turkish parliament even broke the 10% threshold, becoming an important momentum for the PKK and the Turkish government to conduct constitutional negotiations.

Keywords: terrorism organizations, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), Turkey, politicization.

BACKGROUND
Turkey has been fighting terrorism since the 1980s. Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party) or PKK, formed in 1978 led by Abdullah Ocalan. At the beginning of its formation, the PKK’s goal was to carry out a communist revolution in Turkey. However, Abdullah Ocalan began to transform the PKK movement towards liberating Kurds. So since then, the PKK's goal has been to build an independent state called "Great Kurdistan" (Yaziki, 2016). In other words, the PKK experienced a shift in orientation based on the spirit of ethnic
separatists. Ideologically based on Marxist-Leninist principles. In achieving its goals, the PKK uses threats of terror and violence. The territories targeted by the PKK include areas inhabited by ethnic Kurdistan such as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran (Haddad, 2001).

The PKK's rebellious stance is not without foundation. Historically, the Kurds have been discriminated against by the Turkish government. Even in some cases there were massacres against ethnic Kurds. For example, in 1930, the Zilan Massacre occurred which killed about 15,000 Kurds. The incident was carried out by a Turkish military operation in the Zilan valley, Van Province, Eastern Turkey. In the period 1935-1938, 1.5 million Kurdish people in Turkey experienced massacres and deportation. Kurdish nationalism was increasing at that time. Moreover, the number of ethnic Kurds living in Turkey is quite large, namely 14.5 million (Yazici, 2016).

Repression of cultural aspects also influenced the PKK's resistance. The Turkish government prohibits the use of the Kurdish language and symbols representing their ethnicity. The Kurds get discriminatory treatment in the social, cultural and economic sectors. This condition is a factor that encourages the PKK to separate from Turkey. In 1984, the PKK increased the intensity of attacks on Turkish government infrastructure. The PKK's enthusiasm to establish its own country has also increased. The PKK's main target at that time was the temporary village guards, namely paramilitary forces formed by Turkey to fight the PKK at the village level. The PKK also attacked Turkish diplomatic offices and commercial establishments in several European regions in 1993 and 1995. In its various attacks, the PKK used the suicide bomb method. The PKK also kidnapped foreign tourists in Turkey in the early to mid-1990s (Kuzu, 2016).

The Turkish government urged the Syrian government to deport Abdullah Ocalan. With important assistance from American intelligence, Turkey managed to arrest Ocalan and put him on trial in 1999. Ocalan's arrest had an impact on shifting the orientation of the PKK movement. After 1999, the PKK agreed to hold a ceasefire and adopt a less violent tactic political strategy to continue its campaign (O'Connor, 2017). In the aftermath of Ocalan's arrest, the PKK quelled its demands for an autonomous Kurdish state and instead called for greater autonomy in Turkey. The PKK and the Turkish government agreed on a ceasefire agreement. From 1999 to 2004, the security stability between the PKK and the Turkish
government gradually improved. Even in 2002, Turkey released the state of emergency that was previously imposed in several provinces of southeastern Turkey which incidentally became the bases of the PKK. However, in 2004, the PKK ended the ceasefire and regrouped its militants to start attacks (Home Office, 2018).

The constellation of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government has lasted nearly 30 years. Various violent incidents have colored the dynamics of the conflict between the two parties. Since 1984, the PKK has insisted on demanding the separation of the Kurds because the Turkish government is considered to have discriminated against them. On the other hand, the Turkish government is reluctant to grant independence to ethnic Kurds because it involves national sovereignty. However, since 2000, the PKK ideology has begun to shift. Ocalan, who in fact was a former PKK leader and is still an important PKK figure to this day, published writings on the new ideological direction of the PKK movement as a solution to the interests of the Kurdish community. Although the escalation of the PKK threat since 2000 has continued, peace efforts and the end of the PKK as a terrorist organization can now be analyzed. In the Discussion Chapter, this paper will comprehensively analyze the downfall of the PKK using the politicization indicator.

RESEARCH METHODS

This journal uses descriptive qualitative research. The data sources obtained are secondary, through online data searches, journals, books, and official websites. The data obtained are then narrative and ultimately lead to an analysis of the end of the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey. Political indicators or approaches are the main variables used in this journal in analyzing this.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The PKK and the Turkish government have experienced precarious times during the decades. In order to produce peace, the two sides had a ceasefire. However, this did not have a significant impact on the realization of peace. For nearly 30 years, the PKK has fought the Turkish government with terror and violence and demanded independence. For example, on May 11, 2013, two car bombs exploded resulting in 52 deaths in the city of Reyhanli, Hatay Province, Turkey. Responding to the actions carried out by the PKK, the Turkish government used a more dominant military approach in suppressing the PKK (Starr, 2013). However, the military approach actually did not have a significant impact in
bringing down terrorist organizations. Seth G. Jones & Martin C. Libicki (2008) in their book entitled How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda states that the military approach only has an impact on 7% regarding the end of terrorist organizations. Furthermore, Jones & Libicki (2008) stated that the political approach or politicization contributed the most to ending terrorist organizations.

The biggest indicator for ending the PKK movement is transforming the terrorist organization into a constitutional political movement. As explained by Seth G. Jones & Martin C. Libicki (2008), 43% of the tendency of a terrorist organization to end because of the political process. The purpose of the terrorist organization is one of the important variables in analyzing the end of the organization’s operations. According to Jones & Libicki (2008), the narrower the goals of a terror organization are, the easier it will be to reach a political agreement and to end the organization. The purpose of narrow goals, namely such as policy change, territorial change, regime change, and other things that can still be negotiated with state authorities.

The following figure shows several variables with each percentage of the possibility of a terrorist organization falling. Based on the table, it can be seen that politicization contributed the most as a variable to the downfall of a terrorism organization. In addition, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) in her book entitled How Terrorism Ends describes seven main factors that can make a terrorist organization end. One of the seven factors is the transition to a legitimate political process. The opening of negotiations can be a catalyst for the decline or end of a terrorist organization. Terrorist organizations can turn to political legitimacy and move away from terrorist behavior after a formal political process. So in analyzing the end of the PKK, the politicization variable will be the main focus in this paper. Before heading to the analysis, it is necessary to first observe the dynamics of the political transformation process of the Kurdish community in Turkey and their relationship with the PKK.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Before heading to the analysis of the end of the PKK in Turkey, this journal first describes the dynamics of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey until the formation of the PKK. Then observe the ideological shift experienced by the PKK. These explanations will then lead to the analysis of the end of the PKK in Turkey.

Results

A. Dynamics of Kurdish Community Political Movements in Turkey

Since the late 1980s, several circles in Turkey have started to pursue constitutional paths to achieve their goal, namely ethnic Kurdish legitimacy. The PKK's methods of violence and terror are considered to have not resulted in a significant solution. In 1990 the first political party to represent and fight for the rights of the Kurds was formed, namely the Halkm Emek Partisi (HEP). The four basic principles of HEP are democratization, economic improvement, cultural rights, and foreign policy. This party declared itself as not part of the PKK. So that HEP is here to eliminate the public perception that Kurds always use violence to fight for their rights. However, in 1993 HEP was dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court because it was declared affiliated with the PKK (Emek, 2015).

After the dissolution of the HEP, a pro-Kurdish political party called the Partition Democracy (DEP) was formed again. Similar to HEP, the basic objective of DEP is to fight for the ethnic rights of Kurds through efforts to prevent ethnic conflicts and find permanent solutions to reconciliation. The fate of DEP is also the same as that of HEP which was disbanded because it was affiliated with the PKK in 1995 (Emek, 2015).

The Kurdish political struggle was continued through the Halkin Democrat Partition (HADEP) led by Murat Bozlak. The existence of HADEP as a pro-Kurdish political party began to show significance when it succeeded in gaining votes from all provinces with a Kurdish majority population in the 1995 legislative elections. HADEP's key figures were PKK supporters. Although the PKK leader, Ocalan was arrested in 1999, HADEP continued to express loyalty to the PKK. Ultimately HADEP was dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 2004 (Emek, 2015).

In 2005, the pro-Kurdish party, the Democratic Toplum Partisi (DTP), was re-formed. The basic principles of the DTP are not much different from those of its predecessors. Some of the differences from DTP are its political agendas towards
multiculturalism, equality, justice, freedom and peace. In other words, DTP is not just focused on the rights of ethnic Kurds. But also fighting for the rights of other ethnic minorities in Turkey. The party has received some support from ethnicities other than Kurds. As a result, DTP succeeded in becoming the dominant party in the Kurdish ethnic base areas and several other ethnic areas in the 2007 legislative elections. DTP's political struggle was halted in 2009 because it was dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court as a result of being affiliated with the PKK. Since the Kurdish struggle has continued with the Baris Ve Democrat Partition (BDP) party after the dissolution of DTP. The party is led by Pervin Buldan and Idris Balukan. Has the same agenda and principles as DTP, because BDP members are former DTP members. Similar to previous pro-Kurdish parties, BDP was disbanded in 2012 for the same reason, namely that it was proven to be affiliated with the PKK (Emek, 2015).

The dynamics of political struggle experienced by the Kurds always end in the same pattern, namely being dissolved by the Turkish authorities because of their association with the PKK. This makes the Kurdish community and the PKK have to find the best alternative so that they can continue to fight for their rights in constitutional ways. In 2012 a pro-Kurdish political party which still exists today, namely the Halklarin Democrat Partition (HDP). Radical nationalist ideologies that were previously the reference for pro-Kurdish parties were removed from the HDP. Although dominated by Kurds, HDP does not make the liberation of the Kurdish community a political goal. HDP also embraces other ethnicities such as Albanians, Greeks, Roma, Zaza, and Pomaks. In addition, HDP is supported by other groups such as environmental groups, LGBT people, and trade unions. So it can be said, the concept of this party is more progressive by promoting equality and freedom for all Turkish people (Grigoriadis, 2016).

Since its inception, HDP has attempted to shed the stigma that the pro-Kurdish party only aims to achieve independence and secession from Turkey. This can be seen from the inclusion of other ethnic groups and groups in the HDP's political struggle. HDP's struggle bore fruit in the legislative elections in 2015. In the elections held on 7 June 2015, HDP collected 6,058,489 votes or 13.12 percent. The vote acquisition made HDP successfully cross the threshold or threshold of 10%. HDP won 80 seats in the National Assembly, which has
550 members. The increase in HDP votes demonstrated the AKP's failure to secure a parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002 (Grigoriadis, 2016). The HDP, at that time led by Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, became the first Kurdish-based party that was able to break the 10% threshold and successfully entered parliament (O'Connor, 2017).

B. Ideological Shift in PKK

The HDP relationship cannot be separated from the PKK. Even though he was arrested, Ocalan became an important figure in HDP, especially in the formulation of ideology. Ocalan was previously known as a Kurdish and PKK figure who was very radical in fighting for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. After 2000, the PKK's ideological framework underwent a shift through a series of texts written by Ocalan. Some of Ocalan's writings on solutions to Kurdish ethnic problems and the ideology of the PKK movement such as Declaration on the Solution of the Kurdish Question, Urfa: The Symbol of history, divinity and wretched [ness] in the basin of the Tigris-Euphrates, From Sumerian Clerical State towards People's Republic I-II, The Defense of Free Man, and Defending a People (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2013).

Through his writings, Ocalan tries to develop political ideas about democratic confederalism or also called democratic autonomy. This political idea aims to reform Turkey's political constitution. The drafting of a new constitution has become a real political demand for the Kurdish movement and the PKK, although within the PKK there are still different views on the idea. In the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, citizenship is equivalent to Turkish. This makes it not difficult for ethnic Kurds to get the same rights as other Turkish citizens. Ocalan's new constitution defines citizenship in civil terms (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2013). In the sense that all ethnic groups in Turkey are entitled to their respective recognition.

In detention since 1999, Ocalan was inspired by Murray Bookchin's writings on democratic confederalism or democratic autonomy. This idea formed the basis for rethinking modern politics and the reconstruction of the Left, an issue which was of major concern to Ocalan regarding the future of the Kurds and the PKK. According to Bookchin (1991) in Akkaya & Jongerden (2013), the greatest failure of the movement for social reconstruction, referring to the Left and organizations that position themselves as the oppressed is that the lack of a political path taken will take people beyond the limits
set by the status quo. For Bookchin, such social reconstruction must reach beyond the focus of the state, or more specifically, the idea of the nation-state (Bookchin 1990 in Akkaya & Jongerden 2013).

The idea of democratic confederalism is defined as a model for democratic self-government (Öcalan 2008 in Akkaya & Jongerden 2013). This idea is called an alternative democratization project, which will be organized from the ground up and starting at the local level. The birth of a constitution in the form of democratic confederalism allows self-government of local communities and is organized in the form of open councils, city councils, local parliaments, and larger congresses (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2013). People of each ethnicity become agents of self-government, not state-based authorities. This project provides a special system aimed at the development of its own social, cultural and economic area.

Broadly speaking, the democratic confederalism or democratic autonomy offered by Ocalan focuses on the definition of citizenship and the organization of each ethnicity. Thus, democratic confederalism is said to be a strategically dispositive that can provide a political orientation to the contemporary Kurdish struggle in Turkey. So that the methods of terror and violence that have so far been carried out by the Kurds, especially through the PKK, can be stopped immediately. Therefore, it can be observed that Ocalan no longer refers to Marxist-Leninist thoughts and the formation of the Great Kurdistan. Rather, it seeks a more constitutional platform to achieve the interests of ethnic Kurds in Turkey.

DISCUSSION

Observing the dynamics of the Kurdish ethnic political movement and its relationship with the PKK as well as the PKK's ideological shift, it can be predicted that the downfall of the PKK will occur through political processes. Referring to Jones & Libicki (2008), the downfall of terrorism organizations through the political process is mentioned in the politicization indicator. Most terrorist organizations can end up pursuing goals through political mechanisms. Terrorist organizations that end because of politics refer to narrow policy objectives, such as policy change, territorial change, or regime change. There are two main logics at play through this assumption. First, the narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely the government and the terrorist organization concerned will agree to a settlement. Second, the narrower the objectives, the more non-violent means
are emphasized by the terrorist organization (Jones & Libicki, 2008).

PKK since 1984 has carried out a number of acts of terrorism in achieving its goals. Even the Turkish government considers the PKK to be the most dangerous terrorist organization in Turkey. However, since the 1990s, especially when Ocalan began publishing writings on democratic confederalism, the direction of the PKK movement began to be combined with political mechanisms through pro-Kurdish political parties. Starting from the Halk Emek Partisi (HEP) party in 1990-1993, Partition Democracy (DEP) in 1993-1995, Halkin Democrat Partition (HADEP) in 1995-2004, Democratic Toplum Partisi (DTP) in 2004-2009, Baris Ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) in 2009-2012, and Halklarin Democratic Partition (HDP) since 2012 and still exist today. Although structurally the PKK is not directly involved, the correlation between PKK figures and the parties is unavoidable. This shows that the PKK has begun to set aside the means of terrorism in achieving its goals, even though the attacks carried out by the PKK are still being carried out.

Political peace settlement involves a bidding process between the government and terrorist organizations to disperse their militant wings and transition to political parties. This can be for a number of reasons. One reason is that structural conditions have changed and the two sides have reached a stalemate. The following image projects the objectives of a terrorist organization:

Based on this figure, it can be seen that the goals of terrorist organizations range from narrow (such as securing policy change) to broader ones (such as changing a country's social fabric). On the right on the x-axis, broader goals, starting with the status quo and moving through policy change, territorial change, regime change, empire, and broad social revolutions. At the same time, the state's willingness to bargain with terrorist organizations decreases as the group's objectives become broader. The reason is simply that the government has to lose more. In other words, reaching agreement on such a narrow goal as changing policy is easier than agreeing to cancel the entire social order.
There are several examples of political settlements taking place between governments and terrorist organizations. One of them is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which ended the terrorism movement after negotiations with Britain and the Republic of Ireland. The Belfast Agreement (Good Friday), announced April 10, 1998, addresses key issues of internal governance and constitutional amendment measures, decommissioning, security and paramilitary detention. In El Salvador, the FMLN began disarming following the Chapultepec Peace Accords in January 1992. The agreement outlined reforms of the armed forces and police into legal political parties. In Mozambique, Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO) signed a peace agreement with the government in October 1992, covering a ceasefire process, disarmament and demobilization, and multiparty elections. RENAMO won 112 seats in the national assembly in Mozambique's legislative elections in October 1994. Then Movimiento 19 de Abril or M-19 in Colombia negotiated a settlement with the Colombian government in 1989 and participated in discussions to draft a new constitution. The government offers M-19 participation in the political system and a role in forming political parties. In all of these examples, the terrorist organization has sufficiently narrow objectives so that conflict resolution can be negotiated and agreed upon (Jones & Libicki, 2008).

Such cases can also occur with the PKK in Turkey. When observed, all the examples of cases described above succeeded in reaching an agreement and ending the terror movement because it shifted to narrower goals, such as changing the constitution. The same is true of the current PKK case in Turkey. If in 1984 to 1999 the PKK insisted on the creation of a Kurdish state and secession from Turkey, since 2000 these ideas began to shift. Ocalan became an important figure in the PKK ideology shift. Starting in 2000 Ocalan published articles on new ideas to achieve Kurdish interests, namely through democratic confederalism or also called democratic autonomy. This idea suggests that the PKK movement must be combined with constitutional political steps.

In this case, Ocalan emphasized that the confederal structure is not an association of sovereign member states. On the other hand, democratic confederalism aims to consolidate and deepen democracy at the grassroots level based on community. But there is also a need to regain juridical and political procedures, to reshape the political organization of a country. Ocalan proposed a
democratic republic as a form of government that could solve the problems of Kurds and other ethnic minorities and then develop the concept of democratic autonomy as a pattern of relations. Democratic autonomy refers to the type of relationship with the state and its jurisdiction. In the Turkish context, it is presented as an option for a democratic political solution to the Kurdish problem, which requires constitutional recognition of a Kurdish national identity. For Kurdish society, democratic confederalism as a form of political and social system is a project for its own free life (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2013).

During this period the PKK underwent a comprehensive restructuring of its organization, ideology and political-military struggle. Organizationally, the PKK has developed into a complex system of parties and institutions, in contrast to the Leninist style of the pioneering party which directly supervised all of its activities. Although there have been many changes in the organizational structure, the role of militant bodies within the PKK is significant. This agency plays a major role in carrying out a series of acts of terror (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2013). The change at the organizational level towards a more complex organizational structure is a reflection of the praxis that has developed in the PKK.

This ideological shift resulted in the PKK leaving its original ideology, namely Kurdish independence. According to Mustafa Karasu, an important PKK figure, socialists should not place too much emphasis on the formation of the state as a political project. The concept of the nation state, he argued, was not socialist, but bourgeois. The PKK project on the idea of democracy-confederalism, develops a bottom-up democratic system, aims to fundamentally fulfill the interests and rights of the Kurdish community (Karasu 2009 in Akkaya & Jongerden 2013). Through its political projects that refer to democracy-confederalism, the PKK is developing a new agenda for self-determination using constitutional measures.

The PKK has changed its organizational direction and demands for Kurdish identity into a project of democratic confederalism. This was achieved through the elaboration of new ideological and political approaches, which created opportunities for the PKK to expand the scope of its interests and activities. PKK began to focus on struggling politically and constitutionally rather than just emphasizing acts of terrorism.
In order to achieve this goal, the PKK needs a "political vehicle", namely a political party. Various pro-Kurdish political parties that have been born since 1993 have always ended up being dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court because of their involvement with the PKK. However, the political efforts of the Kurds and the PKK have not stopped. When a party is dissolved, a new party is formed with the same objective, and so on. Until the formation of the Halklarin Democratic Partition (HDP) party in 2012 until now. HDP is the only pro-Kurdish party still operating. Even the HDP’s existence in politics in Turkey can be said to be the most significant compared to its predecessor parties. This is evidenced by the vote acquisition of 6,058,489 or 13.12 percent which was achieved in the 2015 Turkish legislative election. The vote acquisition made HDP successfully cross the 10% threshold. HDP won 80 seats in the National Assembly, which has 550 members (Grigoriadis, 2016).

HDP is also the first pro-Kurdish party that is able to break the 10% threshold and successfully enter the parliament (O'Connor, 2017). Thus, the Kurds and PKK already have several representatives in the Turkish parliament. This is certainly a valuable momentum for the PKK to take political steps to achieve its interests. More specifically about the implementation of the idea of democratic confederalism initiated by Ocalan. It is not impossible if later the PKK through HDP succeeds in settling the peace by referring to the demands of democratic confederalism. So that the Kurdish community can obtain broader social, cultural and economic rights without having to resort to the path of terrorism.

In addition, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) in her book entitled How Terrorism Ends describes seven main factors that can make a terrorist organization end. One of the seven factors is the transition to a legitimate political process. The opening of negotiations can be a catalyst for the decline or end of a terrorist organization. Terrorist organizations can turn to political legitimacy and move away from terrorist behavior after a formal political process. Regardless of the outcome of successful negotiations, a general effect of the political process is the division of the terrorist organization into factions that support the negotiations and those that do not. For example, the IRA split into the Real Irish Republican Army; and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the PFLP - General Command (GC) parted ways with the PLO over the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Cronin, 2009).

This also happened within the PKK. After Ocalan was arrested and began to change the PKK’s ideology, several important PKK figures established the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks or Teyrebazen Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK). At first, TAK was called the terrorist proxy of the PKK. The activities carried out by TAK are still part of the command structure with the PKK. However, in 2004, TAK separated from PKK because it was considered incompatible (Gurcan, 2016). Therefore, it can be seen that the internal divisions that have occurred within the PKK are a consequence of the PKK’s attempts to transition to a formal political process.

Cronin (2009) describes various variables that can determine the outcome of broader negotiations to end terrorism. First is the nature of the organization. Terrorist organizations that are hierarchical have the advantage over groups that cannot control the actions of their members. The second is the nature of organizational leadership. Terrorist organizations with strong leaders have advantages over decentralized ones (Rohman, Syaiful & Nurhasanah, Siti 2019). Third is the nature of public support. Terrorist organizations with ambivalent constituencies are more likely to compromise. These three variables are owned by the PKK. First, the PKK is a hierarchical terrorist organization. Every operation that is carried out must go through structured coordination with the central leadership. Second, Ocalan's influence is still very strong in the PKK even though he is in detention. This can be seen from the acceptance of Ocalan's writings regarding changes in the PKK's ideology and starting to transform the PKK's direction of movement according to the ideas contained in the writings. Third, the support of PKK members and the Kurdish community to shift to the idea of democratic confederalism through constitutional channels is quite large. This can be seen from the large Kurdish and PKK support for the pro-Kurdish political party, HDP. Although there are some circles in the PKK who do not agree with this idea, the number is considerably lower than those who support it.

CONCLUSION

The constellation of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government has lasted nearly 30 years. Various violent incidents have colored the dynamics of the conflict between the two parties. The PKK has since 1984 insisted on independence and ethnic separation of Kurds from Turkey. In achieving its goals, the PKK often carries out
acts of terrorism. Even the Turkish government considers the PKK to be the most dangerous terrorism organization in Turkey. However, the PKK began to experience an ideological shift since 2000. The former PKK leader who had been arrested by Turkish authorities, namely Ocalan, published articles on political ideas called democratic confederalism as a new step towards achieving the interests of ethnic Kurds. Through this idea, Ocalan hinted that the PKK should no longer prioritize Kurdish independence, but instead demanded a new Turkish constitution to grant wider autonomous rights to ethnic Kurds. This shows the PKK is starting to combine its objectives with political and constitutional measures.

As explained by Jones & Libicki (2008), the political process or politicization is the biggest indicator in ending terrorist organizations. In addition, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) in her book entitled How Terrorism Ends describes seven main factors that can make a terrorist organization end. One of the seven factors is the transition to a legitimate political process. Cronin (2009) also describes three variables that can determine the outcome of broader negotiations to end terrorism, namely: the nature of the organization; organizational leadership traits; and the nature of public support.

Thus, this paper analyzes the downfall of the PKK through the politicization indicator. The result of the analysis is that the PKK will soon end through constitutional agreements through Kurdish representatives in the Turkish parliament that were won by HDP, a pro-Kurdish political party. The success of HDP as the first pro-Kurdish party to enter the Turkish parliament, even breaking the 10% threshold, is an important momentum for the PKK and the Turkish government to conduct constitutional negotiations. Thus, the PKK, which was originally a terrorism organization, could be defeated by transitioning to politics.

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