Reversing Democracy: Examining the Nagari Institution in West Sumatra, Indonesia

Tengku Rika Valentina
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Andalas, Padang; Indonesia

Roni Ekha Putera
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Andalas, Padang; Indonesia

Irawati Irawati
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Andalas, Padang; Indonesia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/jbb

Recommended Citation
DOI: 10.20476/jbb.v26i1.10084
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/jbb/vol26/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Administrative Science at UI Scholars Hub. It has been accepted for inclusion in BISNIS & BIROKRASI: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi by an authorized editor of UI Scholars Hub.
Reversing Democracy: Examining the Nagari Institution in West Sumatra, Indonesia

Tengku Rika Valentina¹, Roni Ekha Putera², Irawati³
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Andalas, Padang, Indonesia
tengkurika@soc.unand.ac.id¹; roniekhatputera@soc.unand.ac.id²; irawati@soc.unand.ac.id³

Abstract. Democracy consolidation is a process that reduces the possibility of reversing democratization, for the process is featured by negotiations among actors that wants to "promote" the new system or "rules of the game" rather than to damage the old system, and everything is reflected in the process of returning to the nagari in West Sumatra, Indonesia. There is an anomaly of power when the nature of state authority finally raises a "drama" of a political system directly applied to local nagari institutions. The renewal of nagari from previously imposed uniformity under the Village Government Law 5/1979 cannot be analyzed merely as an issue of autonomy and governance. It must be understood within regulative, normative, and cultural orders that shape institutions and their actors. This study adopts a sociological and historical analysis of neo-institutionalism to examine the political dynamics of nagari. The key problem discussed in this article is how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures affect local elites and communities during the consolidation of local democracy in nagari in West Sumatra. A post-positivist explorative method is applied as a tool to dissect and analyze problems with the aims to yield solid, conceptual, and varied findings and data analysis. Analysis and discussion are directed to two findings: first, traditional and modern nagari government institutions; second, consolidation process of nagari institutions in West Sumatra. Overall, the analysis and discussion of the political and governance system of traditional and modern nagari become an interesting object study to thoroughly examine the local democracy consolidation journey occurring in West Sumatra.

Keywords: nagari, local institution, democracy consolidation, sociological and historical analysis, neo-institutionalism

INTRODUCTION

Democracy consolidation is a process that reduces the possibility of reversing democratization by negotiating new "rules of the game" rather than damaging old systems. Consolidation stabilizes, internalizes, and legalizes political structures and procedures. It establishes an operational democracy and credibility within the community and state (Linz and Stepan, 2001; Freedman, 2006). To analyze the consolidating of local democracy in Indonesia is to discuss democratization and the rise of civil society through decentralization (Nordholt and Klinken, 2007: 2). The relation between decentralization and democracy is characterized by an increase in political participation, institutional transparency, and dynamic regional politics (Baswedan, 2007).

When consolidation shifts from state-centered to society-centered, its study shifts to analyzing the many participants in local institutions (Agustino, 2007: 144-145). NGOs and civic associations assist in the maturation of democratization (Agustino, 2007: 144). By exploring how structures, rules, norms, and political institutions work when they become part of a political institution (Miler, 2011: 22), this study extends the literature of democratic consolidation at the local level.

Decentralization in Indonesia means that the central government established local such as nagari, gampong, desa, and subak. In Indonesia, the neo-institutional...
consolidation of democracy created problems. Among them, shifting from centralized to decentralized government is not synonymous with shifting from authoritarian to democratic government. Abandoning a strong state does not necessarily form a strong civil society, nor does weakening central government automatically strengthen local democracy (Nordholt and Klinken, 2007: 203; 224, 417). Although institutionalization locally is inseparable from institutions of local government (Mariana, 2008: 90-91), no studies since Nordholt and Klinken (2007) observe the complexity of historical and sociological analysis that traces the changing continuities on neo-institutionalism in Indonesian local political dynamics.

Indonesia’s revival of nagari invites a structurist analysis of autonomy, good governance, and public service management (Agustino, 2014: 80). It compels considering the regulative, normative, and cultural factors that shape political behaviors (Miller, 2011: 22). It particularly calls for examining how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures affect local elites and communities during the consolidation of local democracy in nagari in West Sumatra?

That consolidation triggered conflicts among central, provincial, and district governments and elites in each nagari. We perceive an anomaly of power when the nature of state authority leads to a drama of political system directly applied to local institution of nagari. An important point to develop the process of consolidation of demoration that occurred in the Nagari in West Sumatra by looking at: 1) The structure of traditional and modern nagari government institutions; 2) consolidation process of nagari institutions in West Sumatra.

Overall, the analysis and discussion of the political and governance system at traditional nagari became an interesting object study to thoroughly examine the local democratic consolidation journey occurring in West Sumatra.

**RESEARCH METHOD**

The study uses an explosive post-positive method. Straus and Crobin (2009: 350) emphasize that a qualitative study will generate a conceptual and varied solid theory by using the data source from in-depth interviews and field observations.

(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 351) State that in a qualitative or postpositive study, data source is similar, namely field observation and interviews. This postpositive method describes several effective and highly influential procedures. The procedures are constant ratio, generative questions, the framework of the study to solidify concepts and conceptual integration variations. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 352), in practice, postpositive researchers view a study as a series of logically linked stages, believing in the diversity of perspectives from participants, supporting appropriate and meticulous data collection and analysis methods, encouraging the use of the approaches of validity and writing qualitative studies in the form of scientific reports. An example of a postpositive framework according to Creswell (2014: 32) can be seen in the systematic procedure of grounded theory.

The primary data of the study are obtained from in-depth interviews with related parties such as faculty members at the School of Humanities, Andalas University, Padang, and the Head of the Institute of Minangkabau Studies of Andalas University, Padang. The selected informants have the ability and experience to participate directly in the process of writing the political history of nagari. The field observation focuses on the collection of secondary data, spread across several libraries and the center of study and research at Andalas University, written in the form of hard files and soft files such as journal articles, e-journals, books, e-book, and ancient manuscripts related to the topic of the study. In the process of in-depth interviews, field-log is used so that the authors can generate a general sense from the information obtained and reflect on its meaning as a whole before it is analyzed.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

**Social Development toward Democratization**

The scholars studying democratic consolidation give more emphasize on democratic stabilization or deepening democracy², example Asrinaldi (2014) emphasizes that the deepening of democracy does not only involve democratic structures and procedures, but even more, how the quality and substance of democracy is meaningful to society. Asrinaldi’s (2014) opinion is then juxtaposed with theoretical arguments brought by Robert (1998: 19) who: “value[s] democracy primarily as a Process of popular empowerment- that is, as an arena for the self-constitution of popular political subjects and the exercise of popular sovereignty over collective decision making. The logic of this conception leads inexorably to an emphasis on the progressive ‘deepening’ or extension of democratic norms and practices”

And only few discuss the quality of democracy towards consolidation, i.e. discussing and analyzing the role of norms and culture, as well as the community structure in influencing the democratic consolidation. Particularly during the last two generations, several topics in political comparisons have generated much research and debates in the subject of democratization and the consolidation of democracy. A number of scholars in the last decades can be viewed as part of the political comparative literatures that have emerged since the period of post-second-world-war, such as Jepsen (2011: 275) who examines subjects such as “democratic prerequisites” and pre-conditions of democratic governance. Initial analysis by Jepsen (2011) suggests that over the last 35 years there have been many debates from scientists trying to explain the cause of democratization and how a democratic government can survive in a regime. The authors attempts to synthesize the main arguments made by those scholars in their literature.

Initially, Schedler (1998: 91-157) asserts that the consolidation of democracy is meant to describe a new democracy in a country. According to him there are two positive versions of the democratic continuum towards consolidation: firstly, the consolidation of democracy, i.e. the continuation of democratic transition by conducting a series of liberal-democratic electoral process; secondly, the continuum of democracy as the creation
of liberal deepening democracy, pushing the political system toward the consolidation of democracy. To do so, according to Linz and Stepan (1996), there are several criteria mostly used by some scholars to identify a country as part of democracy, namely the enforcement of civil and political rights, as well as competitive and inclusive elections.

The theoretical discussion was even more interesting when Linz and Stepan (1996), Schedler (1998), Freedman (2006) and others coin the term democratic consolidation to describe a process that reduced the possibility of reversal of democratization. According to them, consolidation of democracy is influenced by the process of negotiation (transaction) that promotes a new system or rule of the game rather than damages the old system. The political structures and procedures that take place during the transition process will be strengthened, internalized, and even validated in the consolidation process. Finally, the consolidation process will operationally lead to the establishment of a democratic system, and will gain credibility before the public and the state.

Despite differences of opinion about the concept of democratic consolidation, the authors attempts to avoid partiality and try to provide a kind of literary landscape and reinforcing findings that strengthen the arguments on democratic consolidation.

The authors looks at the various approaches used by some scholars on the idea of democratic consolidation that lead to two aspects: i) the process of democratic transition for consolidation seen from the electoral process; ii) the "continuum" of democracy by intensifying the analysis of liberal democracy.

There is an 'empty gap' that has not been analyzed by scholars in terms of democratic consolidation: that the process of democratic consolidation requires the habituation of norms, cultures, and institutionalizations; the State's intermediation with local people is reflected in the form of policy as a way to see democratization. In the stage of democratic consolidation, democracy must be well managed; there must be an institutionalization to strengthen democratic elements. The authors takes a different perspective: a democratic country whose political institutionalization is chaotic shall result in the country's poor stability. One of the conditions that mitigate this impact is the strengthening the political institutionalization and government at the local level, i.e. villages or nagari.

**Neo-institutionalism: A Socio-historical Perspective**

Neo-institutionalism emerged during the mid-1990s and became dominant in political science. Fearing that behavioralism would obscure analysis of institutions, political scientists began to question whether they should ignore the traditionalist interest in institutions during the mid-1980s (Marsh and Stoker, 2002: 42-57; Rhodes, 2006: 91-92; Ishiyama, 2011: 22-23). Consequently, post-behaviorism reclaimed political science. The underlying reason is institutional analysis is central to the identity of political science as a discipline. It explores how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures inhibit individual choices and behaviors as they become part of political institutions (Miller, 2011: 22). It combines the traditionalist's attention to rules and institutional structure with the behaviorist's interest in individual political actors (Miller, 2011: 23).

Olsen (2001: 193) asserts that political institutions play a more autonomous role in shaping political behavior. He argues that examining behaviors without studying institutional barriers yields incomplete understanding of political realities. Rhodes et al. (2006: 3) echo that institutional approaches permit the discovery of more political complexity.

Marsh and Stoker (2002) note that normatively and historically bound structures shape political behaviors. Neo-institutionalism must not equate political institutions and organizations since institutions are repetitive and stable patterns of behavior. When neo-constitutionalism is concentrated to informal habits and organizational structures, it requires attention to how institutions establish values and power relations, since neo-institutionalism is methodologically more drawn to theoretical models of how institutions influence behavior instead of functioning as an inductive descriptive method to generate conclusions.

Baswedan (2007), Schmidt (2010), and Abrutyn and Turner (2011) identify three pillars of neo-institutionalism. The regulative pillar is comprised of institutions that disburse reward and punishment formally (police and court) or informally (folkways). These regulative or rational choice institutions work through repression and constraint, but they also empower utility-maximizing participants. The normative pillar is the values and norms that govern social life (Schmidt, 2010), guide participants to define goals, and direct their achievement. Normative institutions are related to historical institutionalism (original institutional theory). The cultural-cognitive pillar is the assembly of social institutions formed by external cultural frameworks. It determines how people and organizations interpret the world and behave.


Historical neo-institutionalism asserts that formal and informal procedures, norms, and conventions inhabit the structures of politics and political economy (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938). It differs from sociological neo-institutionalism in being a typical approach to political inquiry (Ramsey, 2010). Historical neo-institutionalism configures interactions among political institutions, notably central and regional institutions (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 2-22). Historical neo-institutionalism focuses on the construction and adaptation of multiple institutions across complex processes (Miller, 2011: 26). Ribot (2007: 43-49) outlines how decentralization in developing countries...
empowers elected regional governments by transferring power to local private institutions, customary authorities, and non-governmental organizations. Noting examples from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Mozambique, and Indonesia, Ribot (2007) explains decentralization’s promises to increase community participation in decisions and promote local democracy. However, recent studies document the call to restore the authority of original local institutions rather than diffuse power among new local institutions. Baswedan (2007) examines the effects of policy decentralization, relations between regional autonomy and democracy, and the design of regional autonomy in Indonesia.

Our study differs from previous literature by adopting a behavioral and neo-institutional perspective. It explores how institutional structures, norms, and culture inhibit individual choices within political institutions; however, it also takes a post-positive perspective. It tries to understand the reversal of democracy among Indonesia’s nagari by analyzing institutions at all levels.

**Sociological and Historical Institutionalism: The Structure of Traditional and Modern Nagari Government**

Local political settings in pluralistic Indonesia were created by local institutions and conventions that long pre-date the Village Law in 1975 (Law 5/1979 on the Village). On the one hand, villages (nagari, subak, gampong) are self-managing institutions descended through generations. Managing conflict is particular to their identity. They are communities of indigenous laws that are entitled and able to organize and manage their interests independent from central and provincial governments. On the other hand, they are part of the modern government bureaucracy. The effort to balance standardized governmental functions in a unitary state and the authority of custom makes village-level governments (nagari in West Sumatra, the Katamanggungan in Kalimantan) "double faced" (Santoso, 2003: 240-241).

Nagaris in West Sumatra resemble tiny countries created by the central government. They are governed by an executive (Wali Nagari), a legislative body (the Nagari Consultative Body (BMN/Bamus), and a judiciary (the Nagari Customary Council (KAN) as specified by Regional Regulation 2/2007 on Nagari Government). Decentralization and local democratization in West Sumatra have been polemical, starting from Law 5/1979 on Village Government during the 1970s. Indonesia began to centralize laws and standardize regional governance. Law 5/1979 adopted the Java village model throughout Indonesia. In West Sumatra, this was implemented in 1983 to Law 6/2014 on Village. The people of West Sumatra accepted intervention from the central government by eliminating the local political identity and self-governing community based on nagari (Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 2007: 419-420). The intervention in question is the uniformity of the nagari government into village governments under Law 5/1979, and the replacement of jorong as an administrative territory under nagari into a village to obtain aid funds (bandes). Interference by central and local governments undermines nagaris by damaging relationships between local chiefs and communities. Among other economic, social, and cultural effects, the transition to villages marginalized the nagari and eliminated local identities (Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 2007: 422-424).

Transforming nagari to a village shifts power and local leadership to the village government. Village governments run the lowest governmental functions throughout Indonesia, while the nagari are restricted to dealing solely with customary issues. Valentina and Putera (2010) demonstrates that from 1979 to 1999 conditions worsened as the village head's leadership was overtaken by the "tali tigo saplin" and "tigo tungku sajarangan" (i.e., ninik mamak as the penghulu (chief), alim ulama (clerics), and cerdik pandai (scholars) of nagari). The transition did not create a communitarian democracy in the nagari, nor has the state provided financial compensation for village apparatuses (Hasbi et al, 1990: 30; Naim, 1990: 48, 60).

"From the colonial period to the post-independence period of the New Order, there has been a tendency for the undermining and weakening process of the nagari system" (Chairiyah, 2008: 78). Nagari do not meet Weber's definition of an institution—i.e., an entity that has a monopoly over legitimate use of violence. Theoretically nagaris are autonomous, self-governing communities with a unified socio-cultural order (Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 1979). However, regime change (from the New Order to Reform) revived decentralization and local democracy, creating euphoria throughout West Sumatra (Eko, 2003). Decentralization reversed social-political boundaries. As provincial governments ceded power, after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia massively renegotiated administrative, political, and social boundaries. The legislature laid the foundation for negotiation by loosening boundaries between central and regional governments and shifting power to lower administrative levels, especially districts. There were two consequences: the reorganization of village governments through Law 7/1999 and reconsideration of the Minangkabau identity within the greater Indonesian government (Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann in Nordholt and Klinken, 2007: 417-418). District governments asserted their autonomy over provincial and central governments. District governments defined the model of democracy for each nagari and the boundaries of authority between the government and indigenous communities.

Converting territorial boundaries of villages into nagari compelled the rural populace to redefine the village's internal relations and restore social and economic relations while using the village as the lowest form of government. In short, reform altered relations internally among nagari governments, institutions, and communities and externally between the nagari and central, provincial, and district governments within a centralized state (Eko, 2003: 257). Doing so created a problem: the state sought to renew nagari institutions in accord with governance reforms (Eko, 2003: 257-258), but failure exacerbated potential for conflict with the state.

Overall, Indonesia's first democratic consolidation created a paradox. It reversed democracy through state dictate and gave central and local governments power to obstruct interests of groups within the nagari. However, it
strengthened democratic elements within the nagari (e.g., the bamus, KAN, and Wali Nagari). Institutionalization that creates chaos threatens the stability of a democratic state. One path to stability is to strengthen local political institutions and governments, among them the village or nagari.

Institutional analysis, in particular the work of Amenta and Ramsey (2010), offers the best assessment of Indonesia’s actions. Its two legislative initiatives empowered the pillars of local democratic process. The significant revision, if examined based on institutional theory applied to politics per, is to place two forms of analysis: i) Judging from the influence of the institution on the formed political policy as perceived from political policies made by the local government for nagari, for example the formation of adat nagari in the Agam District and direct election of Wali Nagari (Pilwana); ii) Judging from political actions with The distribution of nagari budgets of approximately RP1 billion without considering the readiness of nagari apparatuses.

That was the case in every Nagari in West Sumatra, as well as institutions able to limit some political actions with As the judiciary KAN retains influence over all decisions by nagari apparatuses (as in Nagari Lawang and Nagari Tigo Balai in Agam District and Nagari Pariangan in Tanah Datar District). Regarding the election of the wali nagari, the first decision on who would nominate is formulated by KAN (in Nagari Lawang and Nagari Tigo Balai) and the Lembaga Unsur (for Nagari Pariangan). The district government as an extension of the provincial and central governments acknowledges the decision of these two institutions. From the perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism, a constitutive institution will build a model for political institutions. This is evident in the constitutive nature of the institution that revives society’s neglected cultural structure. For example, the amendment to Perda 9/2000 in conjunction with Perda 2/2007 on the institutional structure of nagari government, KAN is included in the structure of the nagari government as its judiciary. In addition, under Perda 2/2007 the Wali Nagari reports to the regent without regard for the sub-district head, his supposed superior.

We interpret Perda No. 9 in conjunction with Perda 2/2007 as a search for legitimacy through policy imitation and diffusion of institutional forms. Based on this paradigm, there are normative approaches and cognitive institutions such as efforts to: i) "preserve" Kerapatan Adat (KAN/judiciary body) that have existed since Law 5/1979 during the New Order, although according to Shamad (2014: 5–6) a strong central political system retains hegemony over the region as well as the factor of elite’s commitment especially local elite behavior which was controversial toward local culture; ii) design custom village (desa adat) as mandated by Law 6/2014 (as conducted by the local government of Agam).

From the sociological and historical institutional approach, the making of rules and norms by the West Sumatra Regional Government in the form of Perda on the nagari, and the overhaul of institutional structure have been rationally and culturally constructed, including the change from village to nagari governments. In the sociological neo-institutionalism of Amenta and Ramsey (2010: 20) state intervention in policy creates national political stability. However, in this study, stability in regional political institutions is closer to central intervention in the implementation of autonomy and decentralization (Valentina and Putera, 2011: 211-219).

Consolidation Process of Nagari Institutions in West Sumatra: A Historical Review

When regional autonomy was implemented by the central government in early 2001, many parties questioned whether it would automatically lead to fundamental and structural paradigm changes. With regional autonomy, it is expected that there will be a paradigm shift from centralization to decentralization, from a guided culture to emphasizing the principles of democracy, initiatives and aspirations of regional people. Structural changes that are worth noting from Law 22/1999 which was later renewed into Law 32/2004 and in 2014 was revised again into Law 23/2014 concerning Regional Government, is the desire to realize the implementation of regional autonomy as a whole and widely in districts and cities, while provinces only have limited autonomy.

How is the nagari? Year of Politics, that’s the term that is often described in seeing local democracy (Nagari) in West Sumatra when it entered the early years of 2000 and is the beginning of the process of consolidating local democracy. The prospect of returning to nagari, turned out to lead to political discussions concerning two problems that are often mixed up. The first problem is about the territorial base for the village (read: new nagari), and the second concerns the organizational model to which the nagari must be returned, whether the pre-colonial, colonial, Old Order, or New Order models.

There were two groups formed when the discussion revolved around returning to this nagari, the first group were optimists, namely traditional leaders who insisted that returning to nagari would solve all the problems that had been faced by the village, this group hoped that respect would grow for the adat and the adat leaders in the nagari government will be formed, and this group will come from LKAAMII (Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo, Ketua LKAAM Kubuang Tigo Baleh, Kecamatan Kubung, Kabupaten Solok). The second group came from skeptical voices, urban and rural intellectuals who were afraid of losing their positions while still in the village were (Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo, Ketua LKAAM Kubuang Tigo Baleh, and The researcher crossed the check again with the reorganizing team with nagari in West Sumatra namely Rusdi Lubis and Hasan Basri).

As expressed by Rusdi Lubis in an interview stated: "In fact, this situation is feared that the loss of functional positions is a group of elites who refuse to return to this religion, which during this time when their villages got a strategic position. Another reason is the lack of financial resources that support the conflict of interest between indigenous groups (KAN) and the Village Head".

Likewise, what was revealed by Hasan Basri in the interview explained: "In the view of groups who refuse to return to nagari, the return of traditional leaders in the nagari government
is not one good solution to returning to the nagari now, and this is what should be considered as to how the model returns to nagari14.

The phenomenon of the emergence of the "ambition" of the ruler must be based on the lineage of the adat group (read: the head), resulting in local politics in nagari understood as the result of a combination of centralized political pressures and demands of centripetal political pressure for post-New Order decentralization. Although in the early days the institutionalization of decentralization this pattern has not been clearly seen, but the desire to revive the oligarchy of power of customary leaders to return to the spirit of romanticism in the model of the nagari political structure in pre-colonial times is increasingly clearly visible.

Back to Nagari in West Sumatra, will you consider the culture and segmentation of local communities that are the source of political legitimacy? This is what is feared by the political policy makers about returning to Nagari in West Sumatra after long intervening with the New Order's authoritarian political system14 (Interview with Sutoro Eko in Yogyakarta). Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990) in fact, it has explained the work of the "cultural" force - for example kinship - will result in pseudo democracy15. Pseudo-democracy what is meant is Nagari/Village/Gampong/Subak/Marga, is only a legal subject. Although Nagari/Village/Gampong/Subak/Marga are customary law community units, only a portion of the Ministry of Home Affairs element views Nagari/Village/Gampong/Subak/Marga as a whole and recognizes them as legal subjects. Other ministries such as the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Public Works (PU), and Bappenas, do not use the terms Nagari/Village/Gampong/Subak/Marga, but use rural and specifically rural development. Then the paradigm of "country building villages" emerged. As a critical note from the results of research by IRE and Tifa Foundation (2006) published two books entitled Rich in Poor Policy Projects later, the phenomenon of the emergence of the "ambition" to revive the oligarchy of power of customary leaders to return to the spirit of romanticism in the model of the nagari political structure in pre-colonial times is increasingly clearly visible.

In this logic, the existence of formal democratic political institutions such as Nagari, Gampong, Marga and others will result in the domination of power becoming invisible (Dwipayana, 2003: 6, 154). David Held (2007) also explained, even though many countries currently adhere to democratic ideals, actually the political history of the country reveals fragility and vulnerability in terms of democratic order.

The middle ground that researchers take for the above question is that democratization generally includes several processes or stages, namely liberalization, transition, installation and consolidation, with the expansion of the meaning of democracy finally bringing the topic of analysis of scientists to "consolidating democracy." According to Singh (2014: 10) when discussing and analyzing the consolidation of democracy scientists cannot ignore the importance of political structures at the macro level. The meaning is that democratic consolidation is usually characterized by understanding and commitment among elite groups to implement democracy.

Based on empirical analysis, researchers about the process of consolidating local democracy in nagari, re-nagari which is formulated is a transition from "order" to "disorder", namely the changing continuities of the old elite rulers (in this case researchers see it to the traditional rulers who do not get a place when nagari turns into a village) against local government institutions that will be formed (return to nagari). Although decentralization will not automatically result in local democracy, it will give birth to past sustainability but the researchers see a different analysis when combining several empirical records related to the consolidation of nagari's democracy. There are social values and political culture as a consequence of the emergence of the arena of democracy which is a condition for the consolidation of democracy that can be further elaborated, to see the process of consolidating nagari's local democracy.

Decentralization and returning to nagari in the form of a process of consolidating local democracy, more than just talking about geographical reconfiguration and administration. There is considerable differentiation between the provincial and district governments in realizing this concept of re-nagari. Besides talking about social boundaries, again nagari also discussed local elites involved, and how the customary law community unit was associated with cultural identity that had long been embedded in Minangkabau society based on the political system of the aristocratic Koto Piliang and egalitarian Bodi Chanago. Nagari is thus becoming more complex social and political communities with diverse government structures.

Talking about nagari turns out to contain two problems, namely the relationship between nagari and the state and the relationship between nagari and the community. How the internal political system in nagari processes in the consolidation of democracy is not seen in the tradition of society, but is better seen in the tradition of its community. The renewal of the nagari by showing the romanticism of the past was too excessive, in fact what happened was the re-creation of the nagari, because the structure of the nagari was no longer like a "small republic" in the pre-colonial and colonial times. The format of the nagari has now changed following new thoughts and spirit and changes based on the periodization of the ruling regime. The arrangements and regulations made by the state make nagari and nagari government rich in the dynamics of democracy, and all according to researchers lead to one goal, which is to achieve democratic consolidation. Although not perfect, the re-creation of nagari and nagari government from the period 2000-2015 has aroused new enthusiasm, namely the growth of revitalization of local identity, and communal democracy in the Minangkabau.

Democracy that is built is a participatory communal based democracy which is believed to be a genuine democratic tradition of the Minangkabau people, which is far superior to the aristocratic-style democracy in
Java. Regardless of which democratic model is used, furthermore there is actually a meaningful meaning of the local-based nagari renewal strategy that can be formulated namely: i) clear authorization to nagari and nagari government; ii) the creation of a strong institutional strategy both at the community level and at the nagari government institution. Strong institutional presence of the nagari will have implications for the seeding and adoption of local democracy.

CONCLUSION

There are several reasons for designing a democratized nagari model, starting with two reasons for the return of the nagari, namely: i) Sociologically and philosophically and Institutionalisation, nagari lies in the uniqueness of the Minangkabau people who are genetically adhering to the matrilineal system, with two forms of political system The Koto Piliang's aristocracy and the egalitarian Bodi Chaniago and Lareh Nan Panjang (Kubuang Tigo Baleh); ii) juridical reasons, the basis of the argument that should be used in strengthening the legitimacy of the desire to return to nagari is the 1945 Constitution (IV Amendment), Article 18 along with its explanation.

The process, the transition to democracy towards the consolidation of nagari democracy, made the face of hegemony transform into an egalitarian in exercising its power. Although this is a strategy to "tame the people" of West Sumatra, to participate in the rules of the game made by the central and regional governments. But, back in nagari by looking at the democratic process that accompanies his journey, participation and local wisdom is a goal to strengthen the cultural symbols of the nagari, namely adat basandi syara' and syara' basandi kitabullah and adat salingka nagari.

ENDNOTES

1Straus and Crobin (as cited by Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 351) state that in a qualitative or postpositive study, data source is similar, namely field observation and interviews. This postpositive method describes several effective and highly influential procedures. The procedures are constant ratio, generative questions, the framework of the study to solidify concepts and conceptual integration variations. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 352), in practice, postpositive researchers view a study as a series of logically linked stages, believing in the diversity of perspectives from participants, supporting appropriate and meticulous data collection and analysis methods, encouraging the use of the approaches of validity and writing qualitative studies in the form of scientific reports. An example of a post-positive framework according to Creswell (2014: 32) can be seen in the systematic procedure of grounded theory.

2Interestingly Asrinaldi (2014) emphasizes that the deepening of democracy does not only involve democratic structures and procedures, but even more, how the quality and substance of democracy is meaningful to society. Asrinaldi’s (2014) opinion is then juxtaposed with theoretical arguments brought by Robert (1998: 19) who: “value[s] democracy primarily as a Process of popular empowerment- that is, as an arena for the self-constitution of popular political subjects and the exercise of popular sovereignty over collective decision making. The logic of this conception leads inexorably to an emphasis on the progressive ‘deepening’ or extension of democratic norms and practices”

3Fearing that behavioralism would obscure analysis of institutions, political scientists began to question whether they should ignore the traditionalist interest in institutions during the mid-1980s (Marsh and Stoker, 2002: 42-57; Rhodes, 2006: 91-92; Ishiyama, 2011: 22-23). Consequently, post-behaviorism reclaims political science. The underlying reason is institutional analysis is central to the identity of political science as a discipline.

4During the 1970s, Indonesia began to centralize laws and standardize regional governance. Law 5/1979 adopted the Java village model throughout Indonesia. In West Sumatra, this was implemented in 1983.

5The intervention in question is the uniformity of the nagari government into village governments under Law 5/1979, and the replacement of jorong as an administrative territory under nagari into a village to obtain aid funds (bandes).

6Transforming nagari to a village shifts power and local leadership to the village government. Village governments run the lowest governmental functions throughout Indonesia, while the nagari are restricted to dealing solely with customary issues.

7After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia massively renegotiated administrative, political, and social boundaries. The legislature laid the foundation for negotiation by loosening boundaries between central and regional governments and shifting power to lower administrative levels, especially districts. There were two consequences: the reorganization of village governments through Law 7/1979 and reconsideration of the Minangkabau identity within the greater Indonesian government (Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann in Nordholt and Klinken, 2007: 417-418).

8Converting territorial boundaries of villages into nagari compelled the rural populace to redefine the village's internal relations and restore social and economic relations while using the village as the lowest form of government.

9The formation of adat nagari in the Agam District and direct election of Wali Nagari (Pilwana).

10The distribution of nagari budgets of approximately RP1 billion without considering the readiness of nagari apparatuses. That was the case in every Nagari in West Sumatra.

11As the judiciary KAN retains influence over all decisions by nagari apparatuses (as in Nagari Lawang and Nagari Tigo Balai in Agam District and Nagari Pariangan in Tanah Datar District). Regarding the election of the wali nagari, the first decision on who would nominate is formulated by KAN (in Nagari Lawang and Nagari Tigo Balai) and the Lembaga Unsur (for Nagari Pariangan). The district government as an extension of the provincial and central governments acknowledges the decision of these two institutions.

12Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo, Ketua LKAAM Kubuang Tigo Baleh, Kecamatan Kubung,
Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo, Ketua LKAAM Kubuarg Tigo Baleh, and The researcher crossed the check again with the reorganizing team with Nagari in West Sumatra namely Rusdi Lubis and Hasan Basri.

Interview with Sutoro Eko in Yogyakarta

Nagari/village/Gampong/Subak/Marga is only a legal subject. Although Nagari/village/Gampong/Subak/Marga are customary law community units, only a portion of the Ministry of Home Affairs element views Nagari/village/Gampong/Subak/Marga as a whole and recognizes them as legal subjects. Other ministries such as the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Public Works (PU), and Bappenas, do not use the terms Nagari/village/Gampong/Subak/Marga, but use rural and specifically rural development. Then the paradigm of "country building villages" emerged. As a critical note from the results of research by IRE and Tifa Foundation (2006) published two books entitled Rich in Poor Policy Projects and Dismantling the Failure of Village Development and Development that Marginalized the Village, exemplifying Bali. When the local wisdom and traditional government structure of Bali prioritizes cooperation and consensus and balance which ultimately provides a strong foundation for village development, what happens instead is that development decisions originating from outside the village create problems and local development initiatives and cause conflicts within them.

REFERENCES


Agustino, Leo. 2014. Politik lokal dan otonomi daerah. Alfabeta: Bandung


ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper is a small part of a research funded by LPPM Universitas Andalas with the Contract Number 78/UN.16.17/PP.GB/LPPM/2018, in the research scheme for Acceleration to Professors. For this reason, the authors express their gratitude to the LPPM Universitas Andalas and all those who helped in this research.