July 2021

The Quality of Peace in Post-Conflict Situation: A Comparative Study Between Armed Conflicts in Aceh and Bangsamoro

Ikhwan Rahmatika Latif  
*Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, ikhwanrahmatikalatif26@gmail.com*

Dyah Mutiarin  
*Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, dyahmutiarin@umy.ac.id*

Achmad Nurmandi  
*Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, nurmandi_achmad@umy.ac.id*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global](https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global)

**Recommended Citation**

DOI: 10.7454/global.v22i2.430  
Available at: [https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global/vol22/iss2/3](https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global/vol22/iss2/3)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UI Scholars Hub. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional by an authorized editor of UI Scholars Hub.
THE QUALITY OF PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN ARMED CONFLICTS IN ACEH AND BANGSAMORO

Ikhwan Rahmatika Latif, Dyah Mutiarin, and Achmad Nurmandi

Department of Government Affairs and Administration
Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Email: ikhwanrahmatikalatif26@gmail.com; dyahmutiarin@umy.ac.id & nurmandi_achmad@umy.ac.id
Submitted: 7 January 2020; accepted: 4 May 2020

Abstract
This article investigates the quality of peace in armed conflicts that occurred in the Southeast Asia region. The authors compared the cases of Aceh, where the armed conflict between the Free Aceh Movement or GAM and the government of Republic Indonesia ended peacefully with the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, with the conflict in the southern Philippines, where a peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, was successfully achieved between the government of Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This research employed document analysis to analyse the peace settlement documents of both parties and the derivative laws of the agreed settlements, as well as other relevant sources as the secondary data. All documents and sources were processed through the NVivo 12 application. The findings revealed that in both Aceh and Bangsamoro, the quality of peace is far from significant, for not all the terms of the agreements had been realised and there was still mutual suspicion prevailing between the two fighting parties. Therefore, what had been agreed upon in the Aceh and Bangsamoro post-conflict agreements must be accomplished as they should be in order to create a lasting peace, thereby allowing the people to experience a sufficient quality peace together.

Keywords:
peace, armed conflict, Aceh, Bangsamoro, conflict resolution
INTRODUCTION

Conflicts are inevitable when people and governments in a pluralistic country are unable to understand diversity. So, they cannot wisely deal with differences in the society. This shows that pluralism can backfire if the governments fail and are unresponsive to demands for more attention; or if there are social, economic, and political inequality experienced by different ethnic groups (Hikam, 2015)–as demonstrated in countries like Indonesia and the Philippines where plurality exists in their respective societies. As a result, both countries are prone to conflicts if the governments are unable to accommodate the interests of each ethnic group in their respective territories.

The conflict between Aceh and the central government of Indonesia began when Teungku Daud Beureueh declared a rebellion in 1953 under the banner of Darul Islam (DI/TII). The chief factor triggering the conflict was the dissolution of Aceh into the Province of North Sumatra and the unfulfilled promise of President Soekarno who swore to give freedom to Aceh to implement Islamic Sharia law. A more radical rebellion followed under the name of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement, which was marked by the declaration of the Aceh State by an Acehnese intellectual, Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, on Mount Halimon, Pidie in 1976. The purpose of this movement is to separate Aceh from Indonesia because of the unjust and unequal treatments by the central government towards developing regions. The Acehnese people felt betrayed by the central government, as Aceh had enormous supplies of natural resources, which could hardly be enjoyed by the Acehnese people themselves (Ismail, et.al., 2001). This revolt ended on 15 August 2005, with the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) through which the rebels should let Aceh submit to Indonesia and ignore their demand for independence.

The Bangsamoro conflict began in 1972, initiated by an academic named Nur Misuari under the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) movement. The conflict began due to clashes on religion and land patrols, shifting overtime to geographical and historical issues, driving an unsatisfied group to desire independence and form a separate country from the Philippines (Mardhiah, 2015). The MNLF itself was divided because there was a mission of struggle which cannot be accepted by all members, leading to the formation of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977, led by Hashim Salamat. The uprising in Bangsamoro resulted to many casualties, as more than 120,000 thousand people died within the four decades of rebellion (Jeffery, 2017).
To address the conflicts in Aceh and the southern Mindanao the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines ought to execute various measures. The armed conflicts in both countries were finally resolved at the negotiation table involving foreign institutions as third parties which gave birth to peace agreements.

There are some previous studies that have touched upon the Aceh and Bangsamoro conflicts. The first one is the study conducted by Schiff (2014), which focused on how an agreement was reached using the theory of readiness and building coalitions in the Aceh peace process. The aims of the study were to understand the factors leading to the resolution of the Aceh conflict and to offer a systematic examination of the preparedness theory assumptions which had been the subject of several case studies to date. The results showed that the analysis of the Helsinki MoU process in the Aceh conflict demonstrated that with readiness theory, one can identify and map many factors that influence the process that would bring parties to negotiate, including the important role of third parties.

In the case of Bangsamoro, a study conducted by Kapahi and Tañada (2018) focused on the struggle of Bangsamoro to identify basic laws in Bangsamoro as a path to peace. The results of this study showed that the Bangsamoro conflict was caused by unfair socio-cultural, economic, and political frameworks, which were deeply rooted under the rubric of identity and marginalisation. However, through dialogues, recognition, and legitimisation, conciliation between the Philippines government and the Bangsamoro people could be achieved. To do so, trust between both parties would be a pre-requisite. A harmonious relationship between the Muslim-Filipino and Christian-Filipino communities would be a cornerstone to tackle the unequal power structure which is associated with prejudice, ignorance, and hate.

The next study on Bangsamoro was Abubakar and Askandar (2012), which focused on defining the Bangsamoro’s right to gain self-determination in the MILF peace process. The study aimed to find out how Bangsamoro conceived the concept of development and the right to self-determination. The results of this study showed that reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development efforts in the conflict-affected areas were undertaken as part of a confidence-building measure during the peace process itself. Thus, development was introduced in the pre-peace phase before a peace agreement. The Bangsamoro, through the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), defined the Right to Self Determination according to its own process of development interventions in the name of the values of transformation training.
Another study on Bangsamoro and Aceh was performed by Sangsuwan (2014), in which he discussed ethnic conflict and peace process. Aceh and Bangsamoro were referred to as ethnic groups in this study, when at the moment Aceh gained its peace agreement, Bangsamoro was still engulfed in a turbulent conflict. The objectives of the study were to study the ethnic conflicts and the peace process, as well as to analyse why the conflict in Aceh had been successfully resolved and Mindanao had not. The results of this study showed that the successful resolution of the Aceh conflict was due to the political will of the Indonesian government, the unity of the rebel group, the third-party mediator, the special autonomy, and the tsunami in 2004 which severely damaged Aceh. The obstacles for conflict resolution in the southern Philippines were the lack of the political will from the central government in Manila, insurgency groups, weak mediators as the third parties, and traitors.

These previous studies on the Aceh and Bangsamoro cases have not yet explained the quality of peace achieved by the two conflict-affected areas. Therefore, we consider that it is imperative to compare both cases of conflict in Aceh and Bangsamoro as they share some similarities. Both were vertical conflicts and took place in the Southeast Asia region, involving two ethnic groups that were affiliated to Malay and Islamic values. Accordingly, we seek to investigate the qualities of peace that were generated in settlements between the government of Indonesia and GAM; and between MILF/MNLF and the government of the Philippines. To address this problem, the next section of the paper will analyse the conflict resolution for both the role of foreign parties in these peace processes and the consequential results that we call the quality of peace.

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

Conflict is an inevitable social event because humans have a variety of needs, interests, and points of view (Commonwealth Youth Programme, 2007). Conflict also represents how different values and demands are disputed to obtain certain status, power, and sources of wealth that are inadequate for the general public, in which the disputing parties not only want to control the goods they want, but also to corner or even harm the opponents they face (Veeger, 1990). Many conflicts originate from the unfulfillment of basic human needs; therefore, to solve them, it is pivotal to recognise that those needs are true and are not satisfied by conflict opponents who claim their rights (Kriesberg, 2013). Based on this acknowledgment, parties who are opponents in conflicts triggered
by prosecutors must be able to change their conditions and/or understanding of human needs for one another. These changes can then transform conflict positively.

To deal with conflicts, one approach that must be in place is the conflict resolution approach. According to Nurhasim (2008), conflict resolution constitutes an approach employed to remedy a conflict threatened by the possibility of disintegration. A conflict which has reached a severely intense stage, he said, urgently needs transformation through which the conditions that give rise to that conflict can be addressed, thus enabling the possibility to put an end to it. Wallensteen (2002) defines conflict resolution as a condition where the parties involved in a conflict enter into an agreement that resolves their central discrepancies, accepts the existence of each other as parties, and stops all acts of violence from each other. Another definition defines conflict resolution as an act of solving common problems (Coleman & Deutsch, 2006). In contrast, Fisher, et. al. (2001) contends that conflict resolution is an attempt to deal with the causes of conflict and try to build new relationships that can last a long time between hostile groups.

According to Widjajanto (2005), there are four stages of conflict resolution. The first stage is very much about military strategies that mostly seek to address armed violence in a conflict-affected area. The second stage has more to do with political orientation which aims to start the process of re-integration of the political elites of the warring groups. The third stage is more socially nuanced and seeks to apply a problem-solving approach. The last stage has a strong cultural nuance for it aims to reform the socio-cultural structure that can lead to the formation of a lasting peace in the community.

Furthermore, according to Killen, et al. (2000), conflict resolution is an act of finding solutions to resolve two differences or more by promoting social and moral development that requires skills and judgment to negotiate, compromise, and develop a sense of justice. Similarly, Waisová (2005) point out that conflict resolution is a social situation, where those who fight in armed conflict voluntarily choose to coexist peacefully or to solve the underlying causes of the mismatch of their interests so that violence can be stopped.

Of all the definitions presented above, we consider Wallensteen's definition of conflict resolution to be relevant with our study. Conflict resolution can be successfully achieved through an agreed agreement so that the fighting parties can put a halt to the dispute between them. Then, the agreement should be implemented in the peacebuilding
process to create a quality peace. Here, the quality of peace, as sketched in Wallensteen’s theory, constitutes the creation of postwar conditions that make the inhabitants of a society (be it in an area, a country, a region, a continent, or a planet) secure in life and dignity for now and for the foreseeable future (Wallensteen, 2015). The conceptualisation of the quality of peace is based on the thrust of successful peace processes that bring about social, political, and economic changes in post-accord society and sustain the existence of peace itself, not only by systematically addressing the commonly understood root causes of the armed conflict, but also by addressing the problems caused by the armed conflict, such as security issues and issues related to governance (Joshi & Wallensteen, 2018).

**RESEARCH METHOD**

This research is guided by qualitative approach to analyse the quality of post-conflict peace in Aceh and Bangsamoro. Secondary data elicited in this study consist of official agreement documents, legislations, or laws related to derivative agreements and articles from online and printed media. Data analysis techniques are conducted through several stages as suggested by Creswell (2012). First, we collect relevant secondary data that encompass official agreement documents, legislations, or laws related to derivative agreements. Additionally, we collect relevant articles from online and printed media which publication dates range from the year of 2000 to 2020.

The second stage is finding the intended meaning of data that has been obtained. Third, we group the data and classify them according to variables in the analytical framework. For this stage, we group them into three categories, namely peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Those categories are then converted into nodes according to the features in the NVivo application.

Fourth, the information that has been obtained should be re-explained to find out the pattern, so that it can be categorised into the fixed nodes. Lastly, we describe the relationship between the explanation on the findings with the analytical framework, so that all documents can be processed through the NVivo application, which, according to Bazeley and Jackson (2014), will help us to manage and analyse non-numerical or unstructured data. In addition, the NVivo application allows us to observe, analyse, and classify the information contained in selected documents and to state the relationship between the parts of information and among the problems that shape them (Woolf and Silver, 2018).
DISCUSSION
Conflict Resolution
The resolution needed in conflict must be loaded with measures aiming for betterment for it to be able to accommodate existing conflicts. That the implementation of conflict resolution only arrives at the stage of deferment or attempts to erase its escalation is far from adequate. Rather, it must be a realisation of a resolution that is beneficial to each party involved in the conflicts (Sudira, 2017). Conflicts that occur in Aceh and Bangsamoro were responsibilities that must be tackled by the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines. For this reason, the respective governments developed the stages of conflict resolution as a path to peace, in line with the theories put forward by conflict resolution experts such as Johan Galtung (2010) and Chadwick F. Alger (2014) who stated that the process of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding was included in the conflict resolution process. In this effort, the government also involves neutral foreign institutions to become mediators and facilitators as third parties. The mediation process in a conflict resolution carries an important role as it serves as a process in which the parties can work on their self-relation under the intervention from the mediator and within the horizon of thought of mediation discourses (Trödle, 2018). In this process, the intervention and techniques of the mediator ought to fit together with a certain setting and control.

Figure 1. Nodes and conflict actors’ connection.
Source: Authors, processed by Nvivo’s cross tab of group query feature
Aceh (GAM)

Based on the analysis of documents through the Nvivo 12 application, the indicators of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding stages that exist in the concept of conflict resolution have a balanced relationship with the empirical situation. It can be inferred that the Aceh conflict led by GAM and the Indonesian government’s efforts to resolve the conflict have carried out indicators of the stages of the conflict resolution process, such as agreements, especially those which have been mutually agreed, as demonstrated by the Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh 2000.

Under the leadership of President Abdurrahman Wahid (well-known as Gus Dur), initial efforts were commenced by the Indonesian government to choose dialogue as an approach, which was hoped to lead to resolution for the conflict. For the first time in the Gus Dur administration, an agreement was reached between the Indonesian government and GAM, which is dubbed as the Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, reached under the Henry Dunant Centre’s (HDC) mediation. This is in line with what was stated by Aspinall and Crouch (2003), in which the humanitarian aspect became the main consideration of the Gus Dur administration to ensure the safety of Aceh from conflicts, so that the government could provide services and protection for the people of Aceh. Although this agreement was signed by both parties, the situation in Aceh was still disrupted by acts of violence. That was why this agreement did not reach the peacebuilding stage (Tunçer-kılavuz, 2019).

This approach, however, was much better than what the Suharto-led New Order regime did in response to the Aceh conflict, as they preferred military instruments to suppress all movements considered as threats to Indonesia’s sovereignty. The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 resulted to B.J. Habibie’s leadership as the president of Indonesia. Under his authority, Habibie changed the approach that was carried out by the New Order by prioritising a welfare-oriented approach, targeting orphans and widows who fell victims to the conflict (Djumala, 2013).

Then, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), signed in 2002, emerged as the second peace agreement, which occurred in the era of President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s leadership. HDC’s position as a mediator remained irreplaceable in the resolution process. However, despite efforts to continue the dialogue in the Aceh conflict, the military approach was also re-used by the regime by declaring Aceh as a ‘daerah operasi militer (DOM)’, the Indonesian terminology for military operations.
area, which was aimed to pressure GAM to accept the concept of special autonomy offered by the central government (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). Yet, the conflict and violence in Aceh were not resolved and became even worse than before.

Finally, the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding served as the third peace agreement initiated by the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla by involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) as a third party. This stage became a new momentum for Aceh to resolve the Aceh conflict peacefully. Equally important was that this peace process received a lot of appreciation from the international community and was deemed as an example for other conflict resolutions in the world (Kingsbury, 2016).

Bangsamoro (MILF/MNLF)

In terms of the Bangsamoro conflict, the indicators of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in the concept of conflict resolution are also evident in the efforts taken by the conflicting actors in the Philippines. This means that the resolution of the conflict between the Filipino government on the Bangsamoro conflict did include indicators of conflict resolution. That was proven by a series of agreements that were reached, such as the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, the Jeddah Accord in 1987, the Interim Ceasefire Agreement (ICA) in 1993, the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) 1996, the Memorandum of Agreement on the Muslim Ancestral Domain (MoA-AD) in 2008, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012, and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. Owing to the failures of most of the agreements as they were not durable, the conflict in southern Mindanao repeatedly reemerged in worsened conditions than they were before.

The Tripoli Agreement in 1976 was the first attempt to negotiate peace and a ceasefire with MNLF, which was carried out by President Ferdinand Marcos under pressures from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in the mid-1970s. This was proven by the signing of the agreement between President Ferdinand Marcos and MNLF in Tripoli, Libya (Talib, 2019). This was a good start for the relationship between the Central Government of the Philippines and the Muslim separatist movement in Southern Mindanao. But the results of the Tripoli Agreement did not produce a long-lasting peace, because there were differences on the implementation process of the agreement, the partial control of Ferdinand Marcos without considering the interest of the rebelling party, and the internal dispute over ideologies and strategic
shifts inside the MNLF, which resulted in the formation of a breakaway fraction—MILF, led by Hashim Salamat (Bertrand, 2014; Levey, Shellman, & Young, 2013).

The *Jeddah Accord* 1987 was the second attempt by President Corazon Aquino to open a re-negotiation between the Filipino government and MNLF in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, after a meeting with Nur Miswari, MNLF leader, seeking for mediation assistance from OIC. Accordingly, MNLF agreed to make peace by accepting the concept of autonomy for Muslim Mindanao as a new clause that would be raised in the Philippines’ Constitution (Abubakar, 2019). However, this agreement failed and reached a deadlock at the Filipino Congress, pushing MNLF leaders to call on President Corazon Aquino to issue an executive decision to grant autonomy to Muslim Mindanao. The request was not heeded, resulting in the non-fulfillment of the agreement formulated in the *Jeddah Accord* (Plank, 2015).

None of the presidents after the departure of Corazon Aquino was able to resolve the conflict in Southern Mindanao, regardless of the formulation of agreements during the respective administrations. The agreements that were reached between the government and separatist movements in Mindanao, be it MNLF or MILF, fell short of expectation when it came to implementation. The commitment of both sides to maximise the implementation had also been slim (Hernandez, 2014). Later on, President Fidel Ramos, who re-established communication with MNLF, sought to enable joint conflict resolution to end this dispute, and the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was initially considered to be one-sided by separatist groups, was again discussed together. The pressure from the OIC on the government of the Philippines was very strong to re-discuss the commitments of both parties to implement the *Tripoli Agreement* in 1976 (Abubakar, 2019).

After appeasing MNLF in 1996, a year later, the Fidel Ramos-led government immediately moved to negotiate with MILF. Then, negotiations continued under the leadership of the next President, Joseph Estrada, who brought about some further good developments. MILF announced that they would accept the ARMM concept offered by the government (Indrawan, 2016).

Under the ARMM concept, the implementation offered by the government for conflict resolution remained an unsolved problem. ARMM became a vehicle for political protection and was not manifested into programs for effective governance and development in the ARMM region. On the other hand, the existence of ARMM was disrupted by poor fiscal capacity, subject to budget allocations from the central
government of the Philippines. The ARMM performance indicators continued to decline, as indicated by the high level of poverty, low level of access to education, and low scores achieved by indicators pertaining to the health sector (Abubakar, 2019). Thus, ARMM was deemed to be irresponsible to Bangsamoro's needs.

After the conflict with MNLF ended, the government of the Philippines attempted to establish communication with MILF to attain peace. The Filipino government decided to collaborate with Malaysia, a member of OIC, as a third party to facilitate several agreements with MILF as the representative of Bangsamoro, in the MoA-AD in 2012, as well as the FAB and CAB in 2014, which would later change the concept of ARMM to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The new concept granted more authority to Bangsamoro. It is worth noting that, at this stage, an intervention of a foreign country on behalf of OIC was rather blurred, although it was predominantly perceived as a third-party country, even though the country is a member of OIC. In this light, Malaysia’s involvement representing OIC only occurred at the peacemaking and peacekeeping stages, while the peacebuilding process, as the last stage, would follow after the referendum in January 2019.

**The Role of Foreign Parties in Conflict Resolution**

In the process of conflict resolution in both the Philippines and Indonesia, foreign institutions (third parties) partook as mediators and facilitators to find solutions to the Aceh and the Bangsamoro conflicts. Figure 2 shows the conflict resolution process and the actors involved in the Aceh and Bangsamoro conflicts.

![Figure 2. The conflict resolution process and involved actors in the Aceh and Bangsamoro conflicts](source: authors, processed by Nvivo 12)

After studying documents related to the raised problem, we processed the data through Nvivo 12 and found out the results as depicted in the chart above. In the Aceh
conflict, two foreign institutions served as mediators, namely HDC, based in Geneva, and the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), based in Helsinki. HDC contributed in two conflict resolution processes that led to joint agreements, namely the Joint Understanding of the Pause for Aceh and CoHA. With these two agreements, conflict resolution, which was reached as a means for peacemaking, reached a percentage of 8.79%, while in the indicator of peacekeeping, the percentage only amounts to 4.99%. Only about 0.28% of the agreements was reached for the indicator of peacebuilding; this is so due to the failure to reconcile the two conflicting parties. Therefore, efforts to implement the terms agreed upon in the agreements were far from optimal; hence the re-emergence of the conflict and violence in Aceh, and the situation turned worse than how it had been before.

When the mediation was controlled by CMI as a third party, the Aceh conflict resolution process achieved significant progress. Although the percentage reached for the peacemaking indicator only amounted to 6.41%, which is lower when HDC was involved, the next parameter depicted better results, as the percentages amounted to 7.31% for peacekeeping and 12.12% for peacebuilding. Therefore, as a whole, the Aceh conflict resolution process involving CMI yields the success of generating peace attempts at a percentage of 10.95%.

The Indonesian government’s efforts to involve CMI in the mediation process of the Aceh conflict was actualised after an enormous tsunami hit Aceh in 2004, as emphasised with the signing of the 2005 Helsinki MoU. The mediating role played by CMI as a third party did succeed in bringing about a peace that has lasted until now. Along with the government of Indonesia, GAM elites were also involved as actors who are involved in resolution and peace efforts. Besides, another factor worth mentioning in the process was the destructive tsunami which then put Aceh under the spotlight of international attention. The disaster forced GAM to announce a ceasefire, which was then soon followed by the peace deal (Aspinall, 2009). Shortly, based on the findings above, the influence and role of CMI are more dominant in the process of conflict resolution compared to that of HDC, which previously mediated the Aceh conflict.

In the context of the Bangsamoro conflict, the involvement of foreign parties in conflict resolution efforts was also initiated by the Filipino government. However, the foreign parties involved in the process were not Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), as seen in the Aceh conflict, but OIC, an organisation that consists nation-state members. OIC’s involvement in the conflict resolution process has resulted in several
agreements, namely the *Tripoli Agreement* in 1976, the *Jeddah Accord* in 1987, the *Interim Ceasefire Agreement* in 1993, and FPA in 1996. In each of these four peace agreements, it was MNLF that represented Bangsamoro. From the findings of the documents analysed in this study, OIC was involved, as well as the Filipino government and MNLF, with respect to the stages of peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in the Bangsamoro conflict.

After the 1996 FPA was agreed upon, a split arose within MNLF. Hashim Salamat, who was the second most important figure in MNLF after Nur Misuari, disagreed with MNLF's move to accept the concept of special autonomy, which was according to him not in line with the initial ideals of their struggle. Therefore, Hashim Salamat formed MILF as a new movement for people in Bangsamoro to fight the government.

Regarding the resolution of the Bangsamoro conflict, after the conflict with MNLF ended, the Filipino government attempted to communicate with MILF to establish peace. Manila worked together with Malaysia, which is also a member of OIC, as a third party to facilitate several agreements, as demonstrated through MoA-AD in 2008, FAB in 2012, and CAB in 2014. However, at this stage, involvements in the name of OIC was rather vague, but seemed more convincing as an involvement of a third-party country, despite the country’s membership in OIC. Then, Malaysia's involvement as an OIC member was only evident at the peacemaking and peacekeeping stages, while the stage of peacebuilding would be in the process after the referendum in January 2019.

In terms of the percentages shown in the figure above, the Bangsamoro conflict resolution process involving OIC produced stable results. Peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts reached percentages of 8.31% and 9.01%, respectively. More remarkable is that the percentage of the peacebuilding indicator reached 9.47%. Meanwhile, OIC’s overall involvement allowed for the conflict resolution process to reach a percentage of 9.32%. This was proven when OIC held talks with the Filipino officials to find out a solution for the peace of Bangsamoro and other talks separately with MNLF and MILF, as representatives of Bangsamoro, to assure them of the peace process ("Komitmen OKI Wujudkan Perdamaian di Filipina Selatan", 2016) The results of the discussion were reported when forty-three foreign ministers of OIC's members met in Uzbekistan on 18 to 19 October 2016. Ambassador Sayed Kassem Elmasry was OIC's special envoy for the peace process in the southern Philippines at that time
Ikhwan Rahmatika Latif, Dyah Mutiarin, and Achmad Nurmandi

("Komitmen OKI Wujudkan Perdamaian di Filipina Selatan", 2016). It was affirmed that OIC had indeed become a joint forum to terminate the war, as well as maintained peaceful struggles for Bangsamoro.

The Quality of Peace

Peacebuilding is in essence a large-scale extensive project. Any supporting institution need a lot of resources in order to guarantee its legitimacy after the conflict. It needs committed efforts beyond the promotion of democratic life, a primary one would be the drawing up of a strong state budget to be allocated for building infrastructures and conducting hard-task development projects that ensure welfare for the citizens (Kharisma, 2017). The quality of peace is a matter of hope and the ultimate goal of a peace that has been realised is ensuring that the achieved peace will be eternal. This is in line with what is articulated by Wallensteen (2015), in which he said that the quality of peace is the creation of post-war conditions that make the inhabitants of society safe in life and dignity, now and for the future. Worth noting is that ASEAN has a future project, as demonstrated by a conceptual lens to shape ASEAN as a ‘compartmentalised regionalism’ (Choiruzzad, 2017): in order for ASEAN’s development not to merely be seen as a widening and deepening process, but also how its two projects—economic integration and political-strategic issues—develop and are mutually integrated. Therefore, it is imperative to create a quality peace for Aceh and Bangsamoro (both in the ASEAN region), so that it will be sustainable as a basis to frameworks towards lasting peace.

For the quality of peace in Aceh and Bangsamoro, we can reflect upon the achievements of what have become mutual agreements of the conflicting parties. For the Aceh conflict, we largely emphasise the latest agreement, the 2005 Helsinki MoU and its translation into detailed terms, which were later stipulated in the Law No. 11/2006 on the Government of Aceh. Likewise, for Bangsamorom we also focus on the latest agreement, the 2014 CAB, and its derivative in the constitution, namely the Republic Act No. 11054 or the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL).
In the case of Aceh, the peace achieved by both conflicting parties has hitherto lasted for fourteen years. Because of that, we can assess the extent of the ongoing peacebuilding process, because if peacebuilding shows noticeable positive growth, the peace that has been gained can be said to have a high quality. But if the peacebuilding process shows no significant development, the quality of peace achieved is deemed as thin and it is very likely to be vulnerable to possible future conflicts between the previously fighting parties. As depicted in Table 1, post-conflict peacebuilding in Aceh reached 54.22%. Power-sharing shows a very prominent result, that is 36.83%, which is then followed by wealth-sharing at a percentage of 8.09%, and finally by territorial-sharing at 0.86%.

According to the Helsinki MoU document, Aceh has at least twenty-six asymmetric authorities, ten out of them have not been realised, namely: (1) determination of the name of Aceh and the title of elected senior official (power-sharing); (2) clarity of the Aceh border with the North Sumatra province, which must refer to the border decided on 1 July 1956 (territorial-sharing); (3) Aceh has the right to use regional symbols, including flags, symbols, and hymns, as symbols of privilege and specialty, in which out of the three, only the hymn has been realised, while the flag and
Ikhwan Rahmatika Latif, Dyah Mutiarin, and Achmad Nurmandi

emblem have not (power-sharing); (4) Aceh will obtain funds through foreign debt, and it will also has the right to set interest rates different from those determined by the Central Bank of Indonesia (power-sharing); (5) the central government of Indonesia and the provincial government of Aceh agreed on letting outside auditors to verify the collection and allocation of revenues between the central government and Aceh (wealth-sharing); (6) the establishment of an impartial and independent justice system, including a high court established in Aceh, within the judicial system of the Republic of Indonesia (power-sharing); (7) for all civilian crimes committed by military personnel in Aceh, they will be tried in civil court in Aceh (peacebuilding); (8) the central government will allocate adequate agricultural land and funds to the government of Aceh to be given to all former GAM combatants, all political prisoners who receive amnesty, and civilians who can show obvious losses due to conflict (wealth-sharing & peacebuilding); (9) the government of Aceh and the central government will establish a Joint Commission for Claim Settlement (Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi or KKR) to handle claims that are not realised (peacebuilding); (10) former GAM combatants will have the right to obtain employment as organic police and army in Aceh without discrimination and in accordance with national standards (power-sharing & peacebuilding).

Then, the derivative form of the Helsinki MoU is the Law No. 11/2006 on the Government of Aceh, better known as the Law of Governing of Aceh (LoGA), as a reference for the legality of the exercising of Aceh's authority. LoGA implementation has to subscribe to Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintahan or PP) and Presidential Decrees (Perpres) as guidelines. Of these, ten PPs and three Perpres are needed.

Regarding the PPs, there are four out of ten PPs that have not yet been formed: (1) PP regarding standards, norms, and procedures for guidance and supervision of Aceh / district/city civil servants, which should be based upon Article 124 Paragraph 2 of the LoGA (power-sharing); (2) PP regarding the name of Aceh and the official title of the government of Aceh, which legal basis is Article 251 Paragraph 3 of the LoGA (power-sharing); (3) PP concerning the delivery of infrastructure, funding, personals, and documents related to educations commenced in Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI, or an Islamic-oriented school at the elementary level) and Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs, or an Islamic-oriented school at the middle school level), the legal basis of which is Article 263 LoGA (power-sharing); (4) PP regarding the delivery of infrastructure, funding,
personnel, and documents related to the management of public ports and airports, which legal basis is Article 19 of the LoGA (power-sharing).

Meanwhile, regarding the _Perpres_, three out of four regulations have been ratified, except one—the Presidential Decree No. 23/2015 concerning the diffusion of regional offices of the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional or BPN) to their branches at district or city levels. This is a part of the power-sharing clause, in which an authority must be delegated from the central government to the Aceh government.

The quality of peace from the Aceh conflict still cannot be said to have been completely fulfilled, considering that Aceh still has terms in both the Helsinki MoU and LoGA that have yet to be fulfilled and realised as they should be. This is so because there were regulatory conflicts between the Aceh government and the Indonesian central authority. Another factor is that the mutual suspicion between the central government and the government of Aceh in the effort to implement the terms of the agreement. This hampers the authority of Aceh, which should have been completed.

In the case of Bangsamoro, the peace established after the Bangsamoro conflict is still very young and is in the process of transitioning to a new era. However, from the progress that has been going on, we seek to analyse what has been decided and the future planning that will be carried out by the Filipino Government to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.

Referring to Table 1, the achievement of Bangsamoro’s peace is the result of the latest agreement documents, namely the 2014 CAB and the Republic Act No. 9054. The effort of peacebuilding accounts for 54.41% out of all clauses in the documents, followed by power-sharing at 30.18%, wealth-sharing at 10.1%, and territorial-sharing which only reached 5.31%. With regards to clauses on power-sharing in particular, the Bangsamoro government should be granted wider authority than the previous agreement reached under the concept of ARMM. However, it is still merely stipulated as contents of the agreement or is still in the stage of peacemaking and peacekeeping because Bangsamoro has just finished the referendum process and at the moment it is in the transition period. The implementation (peacebuilding) stage has not yet been realised and is not yet enjoyed by the community and the autonomous Bangsamoro government.

The same thing happened to clauses on wealth-sharing, where the Bangsamoro government should have the right to manage its natural resources and obtain fiscal autonomy in running the Bangsamoro government. Bangsamoro should also get a
special autonomy fund as a peace compensation which will be granted to the Bangsamoro government for 10 years.

Likewise, territorial-sharing (to be included in clauses on self-government or autonomy) has also been determined through a plebiscite (referendum) for five provinces, namely Basilan (except Isabela City), Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, then followed by three cities, namely Cotabato City, Lamitan, and Marawi, which based on the results of the referendum become under the authority of BARMM.

CONCLUSION

The results of the quality of peace from the conflict resolution efforts undertaken by the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines are going well. However, at the final stage of the conflict resolution efforts, namely peacebuilding, there were still obstacles between the two parties, especially the Aceh conflict between GAM and the government of Indonesia. There are still terms on Aceh’s authority which are not actualised, although they had been included in the Helsinki MoU. Mutual suspicion is also a factor that makes the terms in the deal not completely realised. Then, in LoGA as its derivative, there are also conditions still not perfectly translated into actions because official regulation to enable the implementation of the Act has not been generated.

Furthermore, the peace between Bangsamoro and the Filipino government has reached the process of peacemaking and peacekeeping, so that it is now approaching the stage of peacebuilding. Unlike the previous concept of ARMM, the contents of the latest agreement between the two parties suggest that the concept of BARMM encapsulates a more serious posture and grants more authority for Bangsamoro. This is an effort to ensure the seriousness of the government of the Philippines in resolving conflicts in its territory. Additionally, considering the fact that President Rodrigo Duterte is also from the Bangsamoro area, it is a good momentum for conflict resolution during his reign.

Therefore, to create a good quality of peace, both parties ought to show seriousness, honesty, and sincerity in order to address the diversity in people’s perceptions. So that what has been agreed can be applied carefully without triggering mutual suspicion between each other.

Having said this, this research certainly still has a weakness: a linguistics hindrance to access sources, as sources available for the authors were mostly available
in Indonesian and English. Had the authors also access media sources written in languages spoken in Bangsamoro, the range of informative data would have been broader. In addition, for further studies, the authors suggest other researchers to conduct ethnographic researches on this case in order to figure out exhaustive answers out of more critical discussions. It is also recommended that a comparative research to be performed to compare peacebuilding steps taken by Aceh that have been completed with further peacebuilding that will be obtained by Bangsamoro.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We convey our gratitude to everyone who supported and were involved in the research process of this article. We would also like to express our appreciation to colleagues in the Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. Finally, we would also like to thank colleagues in the Darussalam Institute for Acèh Studies (DIAS).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
https://doi.org/10.2307/2672283


Jeffery, R. (2017). Amnesties and intractable conflicts: Managed impunity in the


https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v7i2.236

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315268569