Repositioning Indonesia in the Changing Maritime Landscape of the Indo-Pacific Region

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REPOSITIONING INDONESIA IN THE CHANGING MARITIME LANDSCAPE
OF THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

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Abstract
Indo-Pacific has been among the most contested regions in the past decade. After China demonstrated its ambitious goal in reviving maritime silk road with its military and economic presence, United States, India, Japan, and Australia formed a new coalition to counter this strategy. This paper aims to examine the position of Indonesia as a traditional regional maritime power in the context of this changing maritime landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, this paper develops the concept of “the three faces of maritime power” which distinguishes maritime power into hard, soft, and normative maritime power. The findings of this paper indicates that Indonesia demonstrates less of its hard and soft power, but it capitalizes on its normative power to demonstrate its presence in the new maritime landscape of the Indo Pacific.

Keywords:
Indonesia, maritime power, Indo Pacific, the three faces of maritime power
INTRODUCTION

Indo Pacific is a relatively new term in international relations. However, it draws much attention both within academic and decision-making circles given its centrality as the new front for big power rivalry amid China’s growing influence economically and militarily. The rise of China as the second biggest economy in the world requires China to safeguard the continuity of the supply of hydrocarbon resources as the engine of growth for its industry. Thus, not only that China needs to secure the resource itself, but it also has to secure the sea lanes transporting these resources to China (Malik, 2014). Two decades ago, China still focused mainly on the East Sea and the South China Sea or referred to as the Western Pacific. The last decade, however, has demonstrated China’s more salient presence far west to the Indian Ocean (Malik, 2014; Xinhua, 2015).

China’s growing presence in this Indian Ocean has unavoidably raised concerns among other states. The most overt response is perhaps from Japan and India as direct neighbours to China who at the same time also have historical animosity with China. Japan and India’s bilateral meeting in October 2006 resulted in an agreed perspective that the centre of gravity of maritime affairs has shifted from the Asia Pacific to the Indian and the Pacific Ocean as seen by the increasing trade activities in these two oceans which currently accounts for more than 60% of the total maritime trade (Malik, 2014). Thus, it is important to treat both areas as an integral region, the Indo-Pacific.

Since this emergence of the new geopolitical construct, there has been a new level of complexity in the maritime landscape in this region. With China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean, the US has also indicated its support with the new geopolitical construct. The US as an outside power often has limitation in influencing regional dynamics both in various disputes where China insists for no intervention and bilateral solutions and various regional mechanisms involving within-region states only. At this point, the US benefits from the new geopolitical construct as it is broader to include the “Pacific” where the US has been traditionally acknowledged as the Pacific power, and Japan has even made it clear that it includes the US and Australia (Aso, 2017). In fact, Australia was among the strongest supporter of the Indo Pacific because in the existing regional arrangement, Australia has been also excluded from various regional mechanisms. Interestingly, Japan, India, the US, and Australia then formed a new coalition under Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad. One could conclude therefore, that the new Indo-Pacific region is a very dynamic region where cooperation and competition among states are fluid and complex.
One interesting point arising from this changing maritime landscape in the region is then how to position Indonesia as the traditional maritime state in the region vis-à-vis these other powers. While Indo Pacific covers both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Southeast Asia, or Indonesia to be precise, is geographically at the heart of this region. Indonesia is the maritime state having three critical chokepoints as the gateway for any vessels passing Southeast Asian sea lanes to East Asia or the other way around. With 17,502 islands, Indonesia is also the largest archipelagic state in the world. Seen from Morgenthau’s natural elements of national power as consisting of geography, resources, and population, therefore, Indonesia is categorically a natural maritime power. Moreover, Indonesia has also demonstrated its active participation in shaping global maritime governance as apparent in its role in the UNCLOS processes and its active participation in regional maritime affairs (Djalal, 1979; Kusumaatmadja, 1978). Indonesia, in short, is not only a maritime state, but a significant maritime player in the region. However, with other powers coming to reshape the power relations as mentioned earlier, there is a big question on how to position Indonesia in this context.

This paper aims to contribute to this discussion as the existing literature on the Indo Pacific focuses mainly on the big power rivalry between China and the Quad. As a consequence, this approach has seen the Indo Pacific in a very narrow lens and it treats the region – Southeast Asia - as passive spectators of this rivalry. In this regard, the purpose of this paper is two folds. First, it aims to examine the power relations in the region more comprehensively to include regional states in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, and to demonstrate that regional states also have agency role in shaping regional dynamics. And secondly, it aims to better understand Indonesia’s maritime power in the middle of these changes. There is continuous discourse within Indonesian public to “revive” Indonesia’s maritime power rooted in the past glory of Srivijaya and Majapahit as maritime empires during their period (See for example Marsetio, 2018). However, little has been explored to understand Indonesia’s maritime power, such as whether Indonesia is indeed a maritime power, what kind of maritime power Indonesia is, and how it is compared to other.

Thus, as the current Indonesia’s government also envisions the country to be the Global Maritime Fulcrum, and there has been also international discussion on the rising profile of Indonesia in the international affairs (See Tamara, 2009; Reid, 2012; Pertiwi, 2014; Acharya, 2015), this paper aims to contribute to clarify the matter in the context of the changing Indo Pacific. The main problem in achieving all these purposes, however, is
that the concept of maritime power as the main subject of discussion, is also underdeveloped. Therefore, this paper will first delve into the existing concept of maritime power and proposed a reconceptualization of it before it examines the case of Indonesia.

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

The concept of maritime power is not only underdeveloped but also rooted in one dominant source of literature i.e. Alfred Tayer Mahan’s seminal work entitled “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1780” (Mahan, 1987). Written in 1899, this work proposed an argument on the importance of control over the sea to the power of a state. Mahan (1987, p.14) interestingly mentioned that what makes sea becomes political is that for some and other reasons, people “choose certain lines of travel rather than the other” or what we refer to as the trade route. In this context, control over the sea equals with control over the sea lanes. Given the nature of sea travel as long and vulnerable from various threats, it is important for states to control directly or indirectly, through cooperation with transit states, the strategic points along this sea lane (Mahan, 1987, p.15). Defined in this way, Mahan then made his second argument that control over the sea could be acquired through naval power.

Even when he proposed the six factors influencing the sea power, Mahan thought of these factors in relations to naval strategy. These factors are “geographical position”, “physical conformation”, “extent of territory”, “number of populations”, “character of the people”, and “character of the government” (Mahan, 1987, p.14-26). In relations to geographical position, for example, Mahan argued that there are several favourable geographical positions for maximizing its naval strategy. This position, however, could only be capitalised only if states has control over these areas. Similar cases also apply in relations to physical conformation. States with broader coastline and numerous ports to interact with the outside world have more advantage than others who do not. This, however, must be balanced with state’s ability to defend it. Other physical conformation that matter are natural production and climate, in which Mahan argues that poor natural production and unfriendly climate have surprisingly proven to be the push factors for states to develop its “spirit of exploration” at the sea (Mahan, 1987, p. 19). Finally, the last element of sea power is the extent of its territory which he defines as the extent of a state’s coastline. This natural factor, too, must be supported by sufficient number of seamen for its defence (Mahan, 1987, p.21).
But nature is only part of the equation for Mahan. Human factor is no less important even though again, it is still related to the ability to build a strong naval power. Mahan argued that the number of population is important to defend the extant territory as “staying power”. Yet, he emphasizes that the most important is those “readily available for employment on ship” (Mahan, 1987, p.23). Interestingly, Mahan also took into account the character of people and the character of the government as the last factor that must be counted. The government policies on ocean development is critical in supporting state’s vision as a sea power. But the character of the people, that is how the seamen seek benefits on sea must also be counted. This is an interesting point as Mahan focused on naval power but he also took into account the “morale” of its people as well as norms and regulations set by the government as an element of sea power.

Based on this explanation, there are several points from Mahan’s sea power concept that could be noted for the theoretical development of maritime power. First, Mahan has offered a definition of sea power as a state that has control over the sea lanes. This definition, even though interesting, is based on his observation during his period, which might be insufficient to the current context. During Mahan’s period, states could only claim three-mile territorial waters, thus control over the sea implied control “overseas”. In the current context, however, states have extended territorial waters of up to 12nm, Exclusive Economic Zone over 200nm, and continental shelf of up to 350nm. This implies that states must also demonstrate its control over these surrounding waters. Activities at the sea in this context is not only limited to trade but also include economic exploitation on these waters. The concept of sea power in the current context, therefore, could be redefined to include a state that has control not only over the sea lanes but also the surrounding waters.

The second important point is the six indicators of the sea power. These elements are comprehensive. However, they are given, implying that sea power is a matter of being and not becoming. States who do not have such natural and human quality will never be a sea power, and vice versa. Seen from a constructivist perspective, therefore, this paper cautiously adopts Mahan’s elements of sea power more as elements of potential maritime power that state could capitalize, yet, their actual maritime power will still depend on other elements. However, it is in this regards that this paper also departs from Mahan’s third argument that this other element refers to naval power. Naval power is undeniably important. However, it could be problematic if it is treated equal to maritime power. Mahan himself consistently treated naval power in defensive function of their territory.
Mahan clearly stated that control over the sea lanes could also be done indirectly through cooperation with other states. In this regard, Mahan opened the possibility for non-coercion approach to maritime power.

Finally, Mahan’s focus on naval power is based on his observation on states’ practice during his period when international law was not well established. This is different in the contemporary era where international law and norms have abolished territorial expansion and have regulated the use of force. Globalization with its highly economic interdependence has also made war costly. There is limitation, in short, of naval power to be the only element of maritime power in the contemporary era. There are various cases that illustrate this phenomenon. Indonesia after its independence protected its territorial integrity not by developing its naval power, but by promoting a new international norm of “archipelagic state” which treats waters between islands as an integral part of its territory. On the contrary, the South China disputes illustrate how big naval powers such as China cannot win its claim against its smaller neighbours and the United States as the biggest naval power in the world cannot effectively influence other states to follow international law as it is also not part of the UNCLOS. These examples demonstrate the importance of norms as new sources of power in maritime affairs.

Against this backdrop, there is an urgency to re-conceptualize maritime power to meet the contemporary challenges. Building upon Mahan’s work, Geoffrey Till (2009) developed the concept of sea power as to have two aspects, i.e. input and output. Sea power as an input consists of resources that could generate power in the maritime sphere which for Till is also mainly derived from the naval power. Yet, he argued that this naval power must be supported by six constituents which consist of population, society, and government; geography; technology; resources; maritime economy and other means. While some of these constituents are similar with Mahan’s six elements of power, it differs in that it gives importance to economic sources for naval development. The second aspect of sea power is as an output. Here it is defined as “the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea” (Till 2009, 21). It is at this point that Till departed from Mahan as he did not limit the main role of sea power only for the command of the sea, but also expeditionary operations, naval diplomacy, and maintaining good order at sea. In short, Till expanded maritime power to include both hard and soft power.

Building on this work, therefore, reconceptualizing maritime power might need to revisit the basic concept of power itself. Joseph Nye has developed the concept of
power consisting of the three faces of power (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011). The first face of power is the ability to make others do contrary to his initial preference. The second face of power is the ability to frame/limit others’ option in line with one’s preference. The third face of power is the ability to shape others’ initial preferences so that it is in line with one’s preference. Nye argues that both hard power and soft power could be employed in each face of power. Hard power refers to the use of coercion both in terms of rewards and punishment. In the context of maritime power, it includes the use of coercion at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour such as the use of naval power to take over sea lane, conquer territory, or exploit maritime resources. Meanwhile, soft power refers to the use of persuasion or attraction such as ideologies, culture, and economic advantages. Translated to the maritime context, following Till, it will include the use of persuasion/attraction at/from the sea to influence other. China’s attraction through its Belt and Road Initiative is one example of China’s soft power in influencing maritime development in other countries.

While this categorization is comprehensive, it is complex at the same time, as it has two levels of categorizations in terms of methods (divided into faces and into soft and hard power, in which both hard and soft power could be applied in each face). Secondly, it also based on the rational actor model. For constructivists, for example, international relations can also be regarded in terms of social relations, and thus states behave not only based on cost and benefit calculation but also social norms governing interstate relations. In this sense, those that have the ability to set the norms also have power to influence others, including in the maritime domain. Indonesia’s success through UNCLOS and US inability to influence China in the South China Sea are cases in point on the role of norm as a source of power. Norm as a source of power, or shortly named as normative power, is different from soft power. Soft power includes both tangible and non-tangible sources, but they are all attractive source for others, and it is because of this attraction or persuasion that others follow one’s want. Normative power solely relies on non-tangible source which might be or might not be attractive to others, but because it is the norms that is accepted by a group of states or states in general, other state feels to have moral obligation to follow the norms.

Reflecting on this limitation, this study develops its own version of the three faces of power to be applied in maritime domain. In principle, the three faces of maritime power consist of almost similar elements developed by Nye with only additional elements of normative power and it is much simplified as one face will be related to the dominant
type of power used in each face. Thus, the first face of power refers to the maritime hard power or the use of coercion at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour. The second face of power refers to the maritime soft power or the use of persuasion/attraction at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour. The third face of power refers to the maritime normative power or the use of norm on the sea to make other feel morally obliged to follow the norms which is in line with one’s norms.

The concept of normative power has never been developed systematically in studying maritime power. This concept was firstly introduced to describe the position of the European Union in the current international affairs as it is no longer the biggest military or economic power in the world (Manners, 2002). The concept of normative power was thus introduced to describe the role of the EU in international arena which puts more emphasis on promoting norms for other states that aims to cooperate or be part of the EU (Manners, 2002). While this concept has not been developed in the study of maritime power, it is not external to maritime power itself. From Mahan’s elements of sea power, Mahan included characters of the people and characters of government, meaning that a country’s norms and attitude toward the maritime domain are keys on the development of sea power. Till’s sea power output to include maintaining good order at sea also demonstrates the importance of norms on the sea to influence actors’ behaviour at the sea. The case of Indonesia and the US mentioned earlier also demonstrate the exercise and the importance of norms in the maritime domain.

One important thing about the maritime normative power is how it is exercised. Based on Finemore and Sikkink’s argument, norms spread through several stages before it is adopted by others, namely emergence, cascade, and internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Thus, state’s maritime normative power could be seen in each stage of norm cycle, that is from how state internationalises a new norm until it is internationally accepted, usually through the help of transnational advocacy network, and how state socialises this norm to put pressure on the other actors’ behaviour, usually through the process of emulation, praise, and ridicule or the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 902).
Table 1. The Three Faces of Maritime Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Hard Power</th>
<th>Soft Power</th>
<th>Normative Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The use of coercion at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour</td>
<td>The use of persuasion/attraction at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour</td>
<td>The use of norm on the sea to make others feel morally obliged to follow the norms which is in line with one’s norms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Coercion/force/command</th>
<th>Agenda setting/persuasion</th>
<th>Internationalizing/Socializing norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Sanction/punishment/rewards</td>
<td>Ideology, culture, economic advantage</td>
<td>Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td>Tangible/Non-tangible</td>
<td>Non-tangible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Naval forces to secure one’s interest in competing maritime claims</td>
<td>Infrastructure assistance to promote maritime cooperation</td>
<td>International norms to influence other in competing maritime claim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed from Nye (2004, 2011)

**RESEARCH METHOD**

In examining the position of Indonesia in the changing landscape of the Indo Pacific, this paper will then see which face(s) of maritime power that Indonesia mostly demonstrates in the Indo Pacific. As it is even still debatable whether Indonesia could be categorised as a maritime power, this paper will first look at Indonesia’s potential maritime power based on Mahan’s conception of maritime power. Primary data for this section are collected mostly from documents of the Indonesian government and analysed through qualitative method as there are many non-quantifiable elements in Mahan’s sea power concept. The second section will then examine the actual power that Indonesia has demonstrated in the changing Indo Pacific based on the faces of maritime power using observation data between 2014-2019. This period represents the revival of the concept of the Indo Pacific and Indonesia’s returning to the sea under Jokowi’s presidency. Thus, the section will in turn discuss Indonesia’s use of the first face of power, the second face of power, and the third face of power, based on various secondary literatures which will lead to the conclusion.
DISCUSSION

Indonesia’s Potential Maritime Power

As mentioned earlier, Mahan’s conception of sea power could be treated as the parameter to see states’ potential as a maritime power. Thus, this section will first examine Indonesia’s potential maritime power based on Mahan to clarify if Indonesia naturally could be categorised as a maritime power or if it has the potential to be one.

First of all, in the element of geographical position, Indonesia has an undeniably favourable geographical position as it is bordered by seas, meaning it has an advantage for escaping an attack compared to those bordered by land. Indonesia’s maritime domain, in this context, is three fourths of its total area and it is equal to more than three millions square kilometres of internal and territorial waters and almost another three millions square kilometres of EEZ and continental shelf (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). Indonesia’s 81,000 km coastline is the second longest in the world after Canada (Perwita, 2004; BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). In addition, Indonesia also fulfils the criterion of those states located closely to the highway. Indonesia is located in the confluence of the two oceans which are currently become one of the busiest in the world – the Indo Pacific. In fact, three important chokepoints in this maritime trade route are in the Indonesian waters. Indonesia is in short has the first element of maritime power suggested by Mahan.

In the second element – physical conformation, Indonesia has a mixed status. Indonesia has rich natural production and favourable climate which, according to Mahan, has pulling effect for people having incentive to go to the sea. The fact that Indonesia has retreated from the sea under the New Order era for 32 years might be partly explained by Mahan’s theory on the pulling effect of rich natural production and favourable climate to people’s incentive to explore the sea. However, if physical conformation is defined broadly to include the surrounding waters that a state could exploit to advance its sea power economically, Indonesia with its total 6,315 million km² of surrounding waters, has 27.2% of the world’s total flora and fauna species, 19% of the world mangrove forest, and 14% of the world’s coral reefs (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). Indonesia is also rich in fish product and hydrocarbon reserves. In terms of physical conformation, therefore, Indonesia’s natural production offers rich economic potential for its maritime power, however, at the same time makes the country more inward looking in its maritime orientation.

In relations to the third element – the extent of territory – defined as the length of the coastline, Indonesia with its 99,093 km coastline – the second longest in the world –
provides great opportunity for its people to interact with the outside world. However, if we include the second condition, that this extent of territory must be defended by proportional number of men at least living in the seaboard, Indonesia does not meet this criterion. Mahan mentioned that the number of sailors, seafaring people and population must be proportionate to the extent of the sea-coast (Mahan 1987, 22). However, Indonesia’s village located on the seaboard is only 15.61 percent for the total villages in Indonesia (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). It means not only that there is a lack of naval presence and seafaring people, but also only few of the total population safeguarding Indonesia’s water. Ports as access to seafront are also not proportional with the extent of territory. For the 99,093 km coastline, Indonesia only has one port for each 109 km (Kementerian Perhubungan, 2016). In contrast, Japan has one port for every 34 km coastline (Pertiwi, 2014; Tim Jalasena, 2012). If the extent of territory is also related to physical conformation in which Indonesia has the largest number of islands in the world, the problem is more complex. As Mahan argues, that a state is divided by sea could be a source of power, but it could also be a source of weakness if it is not well defended. In this context, that 1,148 of Indonesia’s islands have not been named and 67 of the outermost islands have no inhabitants demonstrate the lack of government’s attention in border areas which often become secure places for transnational crimes (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). In conclusion, nature has been favourable for Indonesia in terms of the extent of territory, but human factor as the safeguard is not yet sufficient.

This is more apparent if it is related to the fourth element – the number of population. Indonesia consists of 255 million people, meaning that Indonesia has a large number of staying power to defend its territory (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2014). However, the population density is 134 people/km meaning that this staying power is unevenly distributed across the country (BPS-Statistics, n.d.). This number is even smaller if we refer to those readily available to defend/to exploit the surrounding waters. For example, in the fishery sector, only 14.82% Indonesian people are working as fishermen across the 34 provinces (KKP, n.d.). Indonesia has also 395,500 active military personnel (IISS, 2016) to defend the total area of almost two million square kilometres (CIA, n.d.). This proportion is only above the United States, but still lagging compared to China and India. India has over four million military personnel (IISS, 2016) to defend its only three million square kilometres of territory (CIA, n.d.). Specifically related to the navy, the proportion of Indonesian navy to its water area is still lagging from that of Japan (IISS, 2016). The fourth element, therefore, echoes the preceding element that even
though Indonesia has significant number of population, those readily available for mobilization on sea remain limited.

As for the characters of the people, Mahan mentioned that it is counted if one based the definition of sea power on the peaceful and extensive sea commerce, and at this point, “aptitude for commercial pursuit” or the tendency to trade as seen in the productivity in relevant sectors could be the indicator, even though of course it is far from telling the qualities of the people in pursuing this commercial goal. Indonesia ranked 30th and 40th in the global merchandise and commercial service export respectively (WTO, 2017), and specifically in the maritime sector, Indonesia is among top producer and exporter of fish and fisheries in the world. In terms of maritime trade, Indonesia is among the top countries contributing to seafarer serving international commercial vessels and ranked 20th top ownership of world shipping fleet (UNCTAD, 2019, p. 98). This perhaps could be a starting point to trace Indonesia’s maritime power based on sea commerce which seems to play an important role, even though of course it doesn’t tell about the quality of the people in engaging maritime trade which is acknowledged as the limitation of this study. The quality of the people in terms of peaceful relations with other countries, however, could be seen in individual leaders and representatives in dealing with others in the maritime domain – thus linked to the character of the government.

The character of the government requires supporting government policies toward maritime development. In this context, Indonesia’s policy has shifted between administrations. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia’s policy was highly supportive of its maritime development. In fact, it was under his administration that Indonesia envisioned to be a global maritime power and proposed an archipelagic status to maintain the integrity of its separated territory (Kusumaatmadja, 1978). It was Indonesia’s diplomacy at the UNCLOS that reflected the successful use of normative power for the first time in the maritime domain. And it was due to this experience, that Indonesia was selected to lead the process of the establishment of the International Seabed Authority (ISBA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and held the first presidency of ISBA. However, Indonesia under Sukarno was also known for its confrontation policy against Malaysia which gave it negative reputation at the international arena. It was under the following administration that Indonesia rebuilt its image at the international level through its peaceful approach towards other states. Indonesia had actively participated and demonstrated its leadership role in various regional mechanisms, such as in the South China Sea where Indonesia played an honest
broker through its track two initiative and its shuttle diplomacy (BPPK KEMENLU - PSSAT UGM, 2015). This peaceful approach at the international level, however, was not matched by Suharto’s domestic approach which shifted away the focus from maritime to agriculture. Only recently under Jokowi’s administration that Indonesia began to return to the sea under the vision of “Global Maritime Fulcrum”. In relations to the last element, therefore, Indonesia’s approach to maritime development from the government had changed overtime depending on the domestic political change.

Finally, having discussed all the six elements of sea power according to Mahan in the case of Indonesia, it can be concluded that Indonesia has supportive natural and human elements to become a maritime power. Indonesia has favourable geographical position, extent of territory, number of population, and the character of the people. Only in relations to natural conformation and supporting human factor that Indonesia still has some works to be resolved.

Indonesia’s Actual Maritime Power
While Indonesia has great potentials to become a maritime power, its actual power – that is the power that it exercises or demonstrates to other – might not be similar. This part will begin to see Indonesia’s actual power in the Indo Pacific using the framework of the three faces of maritime power.

The First Face of Indonesia’s Maritime Power
The first face of maritime power is the use of coercion at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour. Hard power is traditionally identified with the threat or the use of military power, or in this context, the naval power, and thus the discussion will begin by examining the current stage of Indonesia’s naval power and its use during the period of 2014-2019.

Indonesia’s naval power is directed to meet the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) required to defend its territory. By 2024, Indonesia will be expected to have 274 naval vessels consisting of 110 striking vessels, 66 patrol vessels, and 98 supporting vessels, with an additional of 130 naval aviation (Supriyanto, 2012; Pertiwi, 2014). Judging from this force structure, Indonesia seems to lean toward developing a defensive rather than offensive capability. In fact, Indonesia has clearly stated that it targets itself to become a green water navy by the same year (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2014). Green water navy is the term to describe a state’s naval power that could well operate in its own jurisdiction of around 100 nm to the next significant land formation (Cole, 2002)
Its capability is clearly defensive compared to the blue water navy which has an ability to operate in the open sea without support from the home base. In relations to the first face of maritime power, therefore, Indonesia seems to not focus on using its hard power in its maritime affairs. Statistically, this is even more apparent if Indonesia’s naval power is compared with other maritime powers in the Indo Pacific region. Except Japan and Australia, most of these powers are blue water navies. Seen from Table 2, Indonesia’s overall military spending is the smallest among these maritime powers. While the number of its active naval personnel is slightly above India and Japan, Indonesia has much larger maritime territory than these two countries, and thus it is still lagging in terms of the proportion of personnel versus territory. Therefore, not only Indonesia’s naval power has not met the minimum required forces, but it is also still lagging compared to other maritime powers in the Indo Pacific.

Table 2. The Comparison of the First Face of Maritime Powers in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Naval Power</th>
<th>IDN</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>JPN</th>
<th>PRC</th>
<th>AUS</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Military Spending ($m)</td>
<td>7,385</td>
<td>56,638</td>
<td>46,471</td>
<td>216,031</td>
<td>26,383</td>
<td>600,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Personnel</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>58,350</td>
<td>45,500</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>13,550</td>
<td>323,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Force Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Principal Combatant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Frigates</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Air Craft Carrier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Destroyer</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Cruiser</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Patrol &amp; Coastal Combatant</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>199+</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Corvette</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mine Warfare</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Command Ship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Amphibious</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Logistics and support</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data for military spending (SIPRI, n.d.), data for personnel and force structure (IISS, 2016)
Historical records also reaffirm this tendency. Except Confrontation against Malaysia in 1963, Indonesia never uses its military to resolve interstate conflicts. Dispute with Malaysia over Ambalat indeed led to rising tension between the two militaries, but in the end, the countries always resort to diplomatic tools to resolve the problem. This trend continues during the observed period between 2014-2019 amid the rise of the Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia has firmly challenged the existing conception of the Indo-Pacific as a new front for power rivalry and instead proposed to establish the Indo-Pacific as a new arena for cooperation with ASEAN in its centrality and East Asian Summit as its main venue (KSP, 2018). Indonesia’s approach at this point is far from aggressive and militaristic.

Similar with the case of the South China Sea. Indonesia continues to play its role as an honest broker in the dispute meaning that it plays active role in facilitating dialogue among claimant countries but at the same also strengthened its military presence in the Natuna islands which are directly bordered by the South China Sea. During the observed period, the most significant development was the defensive measures taken against Chinese illegal fishing in 2016. This is, however, only minor compared to Indonesia’s overall strategy in the South China Sea and compared to those adopted by other powers. India, Japan, and the US conduct routine naval exercise annually both in the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean under the umbrella of MALABAR exercise. In addition, the US alone also has routine FONOPs or Freedom of Navigation Operations which have been conducted six times under Obama and another six times under Trump (Storey, 2018). Moreover, China as the claimant state who not only conducts routine patrol but has continuously built up artificial islands together with its military installation in the seven disputed features in the South China Sea. Seen from the practice during 2014-2019, therefore, Indonesia continues its traditional approach of avoiding the use of its hard power.

The Second Face of Maritime Power

Indonesia’s reluctance to use its hard power does not mean that it excels in its soft power. The maritime soft power is the use of persuasion/attraction at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour. This may include maritime economic attraction in the forms of maritime resources and maritime trade, maritime development assistance, maritime diplomacy, and naval diplomacy. Comparison between Indonesia, China, Japan, India, Australia and the United States in some aspects of these sectors can be seen in Table 3.
In terms of maritime economic attraction, Indonesia as described earlier has rich marine biodiversity, fisheries, and hydrocarbon. Compared to other countries, Indonesia ranks second after China in terms of fish production and third after China and the US in terms of fish trade. In the broader maritime trade, however, Indonesia shares the least merchandise trade and second least share of the world fleet ownership or only above Australia which because its rank below the world top 35 fleet ownership, the data is not available. Even so, it is also not clear if and how far Indonesia takes advantage of its maritime resource attraction to influence others in the Indo Pacific. Indonesia successfully led the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as a socio-economic cooperation among countries in the Indian Ocean Rim between 2015-2017 and in 2017, it also initiated the Archipelagic Island States (AIS) Forum, more as an environmental cooperation among archipelagic states. Yet, it is unclear how and how far Indonesia uses its maritime economic attraction and its maritime diplomacy to influence other in both organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marine Resource</th>
<th>IDN</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>JPN</th>
<th>PRC</th>
<th>AUS</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fish production</td>
<td>11492</td>
<td>10762</td>
<td>3872</td>
<td>66808</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>5364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish trade</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>7652</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Trade</th>
<th>IDN</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>JPN</th>
<th>PRC</th>
<th>AUS</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of world Fleet ownership (2019)</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>11.47</td>
<td>10.51</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of merchandise world trade (2018)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (UNCTAD, 2019; WTO, 2019; FAO, 2018)

Indonesia’s lack of maritime soft power is more apparent in the maritime development assistance. Indonesia still positions itself as a recipient rather than donor. This is different from China who is currently the biggest donor of maritime development assistance in the region through its Maritime Silk Road Initiatives (Panda, 2018). Responding to this, Japan also boosted its development assistance including for those areas prone to the breeding of sea pirates. In addition to the already established maritime security cooperation with ASEAN in anti-piracy measure, Japan also offers technical assistance for developing coastguard in individual ASEAN countries amid the growing
role of Chinese coastguard in the region (Honna, 2014). The United States also allocated $119 million assistance in 2015 for maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia (US Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, n.d.). Australia also continues to offer capacity building assistance with individual regional states or collectively, such as the capacity building through Exercise Kakadu. Meanwhile India demonstrates its presence through training, capacity building and investment in regional states’ infrastructure, including the deep-sea port in Indonesia and port infrastructure in Myanmar (Upadhyaya, 2018) (Chaudhury, 2019). These various kinds of foreign assistance are important tools through which major powers compete for their influence in the Indo Pacific. In fact, many accused that it was the dominant Chinese aid in Cambodia that led to Cambodia’s position of supporting China in ASEAN in 2012 when Cambodia rejected to include the South China Sea dispute in the joint communique and in 2016 when Cambodia rejected to mention the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration also in an ASEAN joint communique (Thayer, 2012; Pertiwi, 2016; The Japan Times, 2019).

Last but not least, it is also important to take a look at naval diplomacy as a source of maritime soft power. It must be noted that naval diplomacy can serve as a source of hard power if it emphasises the coercive function, soft power if it emphasises the image building, coalition building, and persuasion or attraction, and even normative power if it emphasises the socialisation of norms. Thus, as soft power, naval diplomacy influences the behaviour of others through the advantage that it offers in the programs, for example, training, capacity building and information sharing. In this sense, all countries under discussion have their own naval exercise programs. Australia has exercise Kakadu which also includes capacity building for the 27 participating countries in 2018 (Royal Australian Navy, n.d.). India has Milan which includes information sharing for its 16 participating countries in 2018 (Indian Navy, n.d.). Perhaps the most significant soft power competition could be seen between China and the United States who both conducted their own multilateral naval exercise with ASEAN countries in 2019. China conducted its naval exercise with six ASEAN countries in April 2019 while the US began its first ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise (AUMX) in September (Chan, 2019; Kapur, 2019). Interestingly, Indonesia also has its own naval diplomacy as mandated by Law No. 35, 2005 (Sirmareza, 2017) in the form of Exercise Komodo, and it had the biggest number of participating countries (34 countries) compared to the previously mentioned which perhaps could be explained by Indonesia’s successful image building as more neutral in the power rivalry in the Indo Pacific (Parameswaran, 2018).
The Third Face of Maritime Power

The last face of maritime power is the use of norm on the sea to make other feel morally obliged to follow the norms which is in line with one’s norms. This is perhaps the last aspect that many expect Indonesia to have comparative advantage compared to the others. After all, Indonesia’s past experiences have demonstrated its normative power at the UNCLOS process and other regional maritime arrangements. In the South China Sea, Indonesia has promoted ‘peaceful solution’ to the conflict as early as in the 1990 when it first initiated Track Two Diplomacy (later became Track 1.5) on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea which is still conducted regularly up to present (Luhulima, 2007; Kartika, 2019). The workshop itself led to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992 which then evolved into the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China (DoC) in 2002, and is currently in its final negotiation to become a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (CoC), which Indonesia actively participates in (Kusumasomantri, 2015, p.64). Indonesia’s promoted norm of ‘peaceful solution’ and ‘ASEAN unity’ to the dispute resonate well, consistent, and is accepted by all parties in the dispute. Indonesia has also demonstrated its effort in safeguarding this norm as apparent in its shuttle diplomacy when ASEAN was in danger of failing from issuing joint statement on the dispute and brought back all members on the same front for the dispute. In the recent negotiation with China on the Code of Conduct, Indonesia also took the initiative to ensure all ASEAN members had similar position on the matter and bridged ASEAN discussion with China (Kusumasomantri, 2015).

This is rather different from China’s promoted norm of ‘bilateralism’ which has been challenged overtly by other claimants and other regional actors such as Japan and the United States. Other claimants have consistently rejected dealing with China bilaterally. Also, when China still valued bilateralism more than international law in the form of the PCA rulings, ASEAN member states called for respect for the rulings. In this context, the US’s approach to the dispute is no more accepted than that offered by China. So far, the US has mainly promoted the norm of ‘freedom of navigation’ that must be respected in the dispute. However, while US allies such as Japan, Australia, and India, support this norm and no other countries have challenged this norm verbally, this norm is not well respected. China’s continuous island build up and its strong critics to the US as non-party to the UNCLOS talking freedom of navigation are only few among similar critics to the US. In this normative approach, therefore, Indonesia’s normative power is
more influential and accepted compared to others. In the 1.5 track diplomacy under the workshop of Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Indonesia even succeeded in bringing China and Taiwan in the same table and implementing the same project (BPPK KEMENLU - PSSAT UGM, 2015). Even though the workshop dealt with low political issues, it demonstrates others’ approval on Indonesia’s peaceful and cooperative approach to the dispute.

This is also the case with naval diplomacy mentioned earlier. Naval diplomacy can also be used as a normative power when it is used to promote certain norms or to pressure others to follow certain norms. The US and Australia’s naval exercises have this element, that is to support the norms of freedom of navigation. Australia’s Exercise Kakadu was also participated by China for the first time in 2018 and thus a useful tool to socialize this norm (Smith, 2018). Yet, China’s behaviour in the South China Sea shows that this norm has not yet well adopted by China. On the other hand, China has consistently participated in Indonesia’s Exercise Komodo which puts less emphasis on the freedom of navigation but more on humanitarian action which is more comfortable for China (China Military, 2018). Indonesia’s approach to invite many participants not only demonstrates its successful image building as a neutral party in the Indo Pacific but also a consistent promoter of the norm of open and inclusive Indo Pacific. In the discourse of the Indo Pacific, Indonesia has been leading in promoting ASEAN’s outlook on the Indo Pacific to be an open and inclusive region focusing on maritime, economic, connectivity, and SDGs cooperation (Kemlu, 2019). This normative role is important amid the heightened contestation in the region between China and the Quad as it helps demonstrating not only the existence but also the active role of ASEAN in managing its own region in this changing landscape. Indonesia’s vision, in this sense, is also more acceptable for the members of the region compared to the other visions of the newly Indo-Pacific.

**CONCLUSION**

The question of Indonesia’s position in comparison to other maritime powers in the changing landscape of the Indo Pacific is a simple question which requires complex analysis. Study must be conducted to redefine the currently underdeveloped concept of maritime power as the key concept used in this study. Even after the redefinition of the concept, the application of the concept requires broad analysis across the three faces of maritime power, both to examine Indonesia’s absolute maritime power and its relative
power compared to the other. Answers offered in this study serve more as the beginning for further analysis which is not feasibly conducted in this short essay. Provisional conclusion that could be drawn at this point from the selected cases and observation during 2014-2019 is that Indonesia has potential maritime power and has demonstrated its actual power during the observed period. However, Indonesia demonstrates more of its normative power, less on its soft power, and least on its hard power. Brought to the larger context, the case of Indonesia demonstrates that regional power is not only takers or spectators in the Indo Pacific region. They have agency role even though subtle as they make use of their normative – intangible power, rather than tangible sources such as military or economic power.

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