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**Counter Radicalization Analysis in Efforts to Prevent the Spread of
Radical Ideology in Indonesia**

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Abstract

Terrorism is a product of the radicalization process, the massive effects of radicalization of IS ideology have resulted in an increase in the threat of terrorism in Indonesia. Factually, the increase in the threat of terrorism in Indonesia can be seen from the large number of victims who fell, namely as many as 35 police died and 67 police were injured in an effort to fight terrorism in the 2014 to 2015. From a total of 171 terrorism acts that have been successfully revealed. During 2000 to 2015, there were 1,064 suspected terrorists who had been arrested. Meanwhile, as many as 408 Indonesians are in Syria to join IS. Indonesia alone there were around 543 people identified as core groups, 246 identified as support groups, and 296 identified as IS sympathizers. The fact that after the establishment of National counterterrorism agency (BNPT) in 2010 which replaced the role of the Counter Terrorism Coordination Desk (DKPT) apparently there were various acts of terrorism and radical radicalization processes in Indonesia. Support and bai'at simultaneously and massively that occurred in various provinces in Indonesia seemed to successfully open our eyes that radicalization as a process is actually being and continues to happen to the people of Indonesia. And this indirectly creates a big question mark about the BNPT prevention program that has been done so far. Therefore, this study was made to find out and conduct an in-depth analysis of how the implementation of counter-radicalization programs carried out by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT in an effort to prevent the spread of radical ideology in Indonesia. The method in this paper is qualitative research by interview and observation with the stake holders related to counter-radicalization programs carried out by the BNPT and Detachment 88 AT the National Police. The fact finding that the implementation of the counter-radicalization program policy by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT is carried out with the suitability and compliance between policy direction and policy implementation in the form of offline or online strategy programs. The offline strategy by the BNPT Prevention Directorate was conducted by procuring programs for seminars, workshops and training activities for BNPT partners, both government agencies, NGOs, and community leaders who were members of the Counter Terrorism Coordination Forum (FKPT). And this is done by BNPT formally, and directly without undercover and third party intermediaries. The online strategy by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT is carried out by means of media literacy involving the Media Literacy Task Force, the Peace Media Center (PMD) as managers (coordinators, evaluators, analysts), content formulators, and implementing activities through website, social media, media electronics, and or print media. The content presented contains an image of the government's perspective through BNPT, but now there is a website that is managed by a third party in collaboration with PMD and the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT as an effective counter-narrative media. Even so, this program has just been implemented and certainly requires a process and time to get optimal results. The impact of counter-radicalization policies and programs from the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT is still not in accordance with the formulated vision that is "prevention of terrorism in a whole, protecting the dignity of the nation and free from violence". The indicator that marks the non-fulfillment of the vision of the Prevention Directorate is the fact that radical radicalization of offline ideology is still occurring both offline and online by radical terrorist groups in Indonesia, especially IS. In addition, acts of terror continue to occur in Indonesia until now.

Keywords: *contra radicalization, preventive, spread of radical ideology*

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Introduction

Terrorism is a product of the radicalization process, the massive effects of radicalization of IS ideology have resulted in an increase in the threat of terrorism in Indonesia.

The implementation of the de-radicalization strategy and the counter-radicalization strategy implemented by BNPT since 2010, must face the test of massive mobilization and radicalization flows in the form of narrative propaganda launched by phenomenal and terrible terrorist groups which are al-Qaeda, namely ad-Dawla al -Ilamiyyah fi al-Iraq wa as-Sham (Daesh, or "Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham," ISIS or "Islamic State," IS). This global terrorist group managed to take advantage of the Arab Spring situation, Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Syria, and the vulnerability of Iraq after the occupation of the Allied forces led by the United States as a stage and the reason for the rise of establishing the Islamic Khilafah in June 2014 and conducting propaganda so that Muslims throughout the world supports the Islamic State (IS) and commits Bai'a al-Baghdadi as caliph. In fact, this group ordered its followers to cancel bai'at against their respective state governments and fight all who disagreed with them in order to achieve the goal of establishing an IS branch in their respective areas of struggle.

Factually, the increase in the threat of terrorism in Indonesia can be seen from the large number of victims who fell, namely as many as 35 police died and 67 police were injured in an effort to fight

terrorism in the 2014 to 2015. From a total of 171 terrorism acts that have been successfully revealed. During 2000 to 2015, there were 1,064 suspected terrorists who had been arrested. Meanwhile, as many as 408 Indonesians are in Syria to join IS. Indonesia alone there were around 543 people identified as core groups, 246 identified as support groups, and 296 identified as IS sympathizers. The fact that after the establishment of National counterterrorism agency (BNPT) in 2010 which replaced the role of the Counter Terrorism Coordination Desk (DKPT) apparently there were various acts of terrorism and radical radicalization processes in Indonesia. Support and bai'at simultaneously and massively that occurred in various provinces in Indonesia seemed to successfully open our eyes that radicalization as a process is actually being and continues to happen to the people of Indonesia. And this indirectly creates a big question mark about the BNPT prevention program that has been done so far.

Problems

1. How is the implementation of the counter-radicalization program by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT in an effort to prevent the spread of radical ideology?
2. What is the impact of the implementation of the counter-radicalization program by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT in an effort to prevent the spread of radical ideology?

Terms of reference

Islamic state (IS)

Ustadz Dr. Ali Musri Semjan Putra, MA in As-Sunnah magazine about the heresy of IS ideology and the chronology of the formation of IS, it is known that the chronology of the formation of ad-Dawla al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq wa as-Sham (Daesh, or "Islamic State of Iraq and as - Sham, "ISIS or" Islamic State, "IS) was initiated by Jordan-born terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Ahmed Fadeel al Nazal Al Khalayeh). Zarqawi, a mujahidin who fought against the United States in Afghanistan, was a member of Al-Qaeda, which after returning from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2004, later changed the name of his group to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq. Zarqawi's involvement in three major attacks on the US military caused him to be killed in 2006 by US airstrikes. Before Zarqawi was killed, he announced through a recording of the formation of the "Majlis Syura Mujahidin" chaired by Abdullah Rasyid al-Baghdadi. Their goal is to form a "Majlis Syura Mujahidin" to anticipate the separation between various groups of fighters scattered in various parts of Iraq. After Zarqawi was killed, his position was replaced by an Al-Qaeda figure named Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir. Then, at the end of 2006, through the Majlis Sura Mujahidin, this group created a consensus to establish the Islamic State of Iraq or the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi

Radical Ideology & Radicalism

Ideology is an idea or an idea. The word ideology itself was created by Antoine

Dstutt de Tracy in the late 18th century to define ideas. Ideology can be considered as a comprehensive vision, about how to see things. Ideology in the Arabic perspective, is a term that can be translated as Mabda, which etymogogically mabda is mashdar mimi from the word bada'a (start), yabda'u (starting), bad'an (beginning), and mabda'an (starting point). In terms of terminology, ideology means fundamental thinking that is built on the branch of thought (Ahmad, 2004: 84).

While Radical comes from Latin, namely radix and or radicis, which means root. In the Big Indonesian Dictionary (1990), radical means very demanding change. While radicalism has the meaning as an understanding or flow or extreme attitude of a political school that wants social or political change or renewal in hard or drastic ways

McCaulley (2016:10) “... *we might wish to limit or control political radicalization and the violence that can emerge from radicalization. If we cannot understand why normal people turn to violence, to reduce it, or to immunize against it. If we cannot understand radicalization, we will have to live with its effects-including the extremes of terrorism.*”

Martha Crenshaw (Crenshaw: 4) “*Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but rather the direct activity of small groups, however authentically popular these groups may be: even if*

supported by a larger organization or political party, the number of active militants who engage in terrorism is small.”

Hoffman *“The unlawful use of –or threatened use of- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives”.*

Marc Sageman’s Four-Stages Process of radicalism

1. A sense of 'moral outrage' or a feeling of moral savagery, as can be sampled in the reaction to mass slaughter as the killing of Muslims in Bosnia and Cechnya, or insult to Muslims as happened in Iraq's Abu Grade prison and or Charryl Hebdo newspaper in France which is a bridge connecting global views (2007: 3))
2. A specific interpretation of the world (in short, where moral violence is considered a representation of "war against Islam" (2007: 3))
3. Resonance with personal experiences (is an interpretation of the west doing war against Islam that makes perception chaotic in everyday life, where there are social anti-Muslim feelings, political bias, economic bias, religious bias and

discrimination. This feeling is combined with unemployment and boredom, which is also controlled by participation from clandestine activities (2007: 3)), and

4. Mobilization through networks are forms of anger and frustration that are accumulated, often through internet forums and chat rooms, which interactively act to radicalize Muslim youth, reinforcing a sense of dissatisfaction (2007: 4).

Frameworks




Figure 1. Implementation as a Political and Administrative Process

Methodology

The method in this paper is qualitative research by interview and observation with the stake holders related to counter-radicalization programs carried out by the BNPT and Detachment 88 AT the National Police.

Facts Finding

Policy of the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT

- ⊙ *Agenda Setting*
- ⊙ *Policy Formulation*

- ⊙ *Policy Adoption*
- ⊙ *Policy Implementation*
- ⊙ *Policy Assessment*
- ⊙ *Content of Policies Affecting the Implementation of Counter Radicalization Programs*

Implementation of counter-radicalization programs by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT

- ⊙ *Supervision Sub-directorate*
- ⊙ *Counter-Propaganda Sub-Directorate*
- ⊙ *Sub-directorate for Community Empowerment*

Analysis of Implementation of the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT

The BNPT Directorate is seen in carrying out their flagship offline programs by means of seminars, workshops and training, more to formal ceremonial activities, carrying government symbols in them. For groups of people who have not been exposed, this may not be a problem. But for groups of people who have sympathized with radical terrorist ideologies that have the potential to become radical terrorist activists, of course this does not interest them

"Counter-radicalization carried out by BNPT is sometimes not right on target, because they do not understand the core ideology that we hold. The use of NU or Muhammadiyah ulamas will not be effective for us first, because they are considered to be pro-government and liberal scholars. Ulama should be used which is basically the same understanding as us, but more soft in the implementation of its teachings. These scholars can correct our wrong understanding with a correct understanding of the teachings of the great ulama Ibn. Taimiyah and or Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. "(Interview, 1 December 2018).

In addition to delivering counter-radicalization messages offline, the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT also conducts online programs in the form of media literacy carried out by PMD (Peace Media Center) through the website damailahindonesiaku.com, jalandamai.org, dutadamai.id, as well as advertisements / pamphlets in the informational form still uses the PMD and BNPT attributes that highlight the Government's invitation

BNPT only meets at least: (1) Availability of sufficient time and resources; (2) A combination of necessary resources is truly available; and (3) Those who have the authority can demand and get perfect compliance. However, other conditions such as: (1) External conditions faced by agencies / agencies will not cause serious disturbances / constraints; (2) Policies that will be implemented are based on reliable causality relationships; (3) The causality relationship is direct and is only the link link; (4) The relationship of interdependence must be small; (5) Deep understanding and agreement on goals; (6) The tasks are detailed and placed in the right order; and (7) Perfect communication and coordination, until

now it has not been optimally carried out by BNPT.

CONCLUSION

1. The implementation of the counter-radicalization program policy by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT is carried out with the suitability and compliance between policy direction and policy implementation in the form of offline or online strategy programs.
2. The offline strategy by the BNPT Prevention Directorate was conducted by procuring programs for seminars, workshops and training activities for BNPT partners, both government agencies, NGOs, and community leaders who were members of the Counter Terrorism Coordination Forum (FKPT). And this is done by BNPT formally, and directly without undercover and third party intermediaries
3. The online strategy by the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT is carried out by means of media literacy involving the Media Literacy Task Force, the Peace Media Center (PMD) as managers (coordinators, evaluators, analysts), content formulators, and implementing activities through

website, social media, media electronics, and or print media.

4. The content presented contains an image of the government's perspective through BNPT, but now there is a website that is managed by a third party in collaboration with PMD and the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT as an effective counter-narrative media. Even so, this program has just been implemented and certainly requires a process and time to get optimal results.
5. The impact of counter-radicalization policies and programs from the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT is still not in accordance with the formulated vision that is "prevention of terrorism in a whole, protecting the dignity of the nation and free from violence". The indicator that marks the non-fulfillment of the vision of the Prevention Directorate is the fact that radical radicalization of offline ideology is still occurring both offline and online by radical terrorist groups in Indonesia, especially IS. In addition, acts of terror continue to occur in Indonesia until now.

Suggestions

a) The BNPT must prioritize a religious approach by presenting the correct narrative of Islam through a third party, namely the Ulama who have credibility in the field of Religion Science and that would be heard by vulnerable groups (sympathizers). Da'wah is an optimal way to rectify understanding of deviating radical ideology of terrorism in Indonesia. When the doctrine of radical terrorist ideology has been shaken by counter-narratives carried out through da'wah (online-offline), at that time national propaganda to foster a sense of love for the country will be optimally implemented. In this case the understanding and mapping of the core radical ideology of terrorism in Indonesia must be carried out comprehensively and in depth, and needs to be supported by the formulation of the right content and delivery method as a counter-narrative effort.

b) BNPT must start using third parties in the implementation of the offline and online strategies they implement, and begin to slowly abandon the formal ceremonial tendencies that have been

implemented by the BNPT in the implementation of its programs.

c) BNPT must massively neutralize the counter narratives, and counter propaganda they formulate and pour into offline and online strategies.

d) Need the participation of the community and related government agencies to support the BNPT Prevention Directorate program. One example is optimizing the role of POLRI with the concept of Community Policing, as an effort to early detection and cooperation in the field of delivering counter-narrative and counter-propaganda messages together with the Counter Terrorism Coordination Forum (FKPT).

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