

6-15-2021

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### Recommended Citation

Bulgini, Moh. Iqbal (2021) "Kuwait's Foreign Policy in the 2017 Gulf Crisis between Saudi Arabia-Qatar," *Journal Of Middle East and Islamic Studies*: Vol. 8: No. 1, Article 3.

DOI: 10.7454/meis.v8i1.129

Available at: <https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol8/iss1/3>

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## Kuwait's Foreign Policy in the 2017 Gulf Crisis between Saudi Arabia-Qatar

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### Abstract

The Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt embargoes against Qatar on June 5, 2017 have harmed the Qatari side and have broken the stability of the GCC. The involvement of Iran and Turkey on the Qatari side has made GCC fragments unavoidable. This crisis was actually triggered by Saudi Arabia's perception that Qatar had supported a terrorist movement that made Saudi Arabia invite all GCC countries to blockade Qatar, but among the Gulf countries, Kuwait is the only country that rejects the embargo and chooses neutral, even mediating the crisis. The reasons for Kuwait's rejection of the Saudi Arabian embargo and Kuwait's interest in the crisis will be analyzed using the theory of neorealism and hedging concepts. This writing uses a qualitative approach with descriptive-analytical analysis. The neorealist, neutrality and mediation of Kuwait in the 2017 Gulf crisis because Kuwait wants to "survive" in the GCC and the region, given Iran's involvement on the Qatar side while Kuwait does not want to conflict with Iran. Based on the hedging strategy, Kuwait undertakes indirect balancing of Saudi Arabia such as rejecting a security pact GCC 1981, refused send troops to Bahrain 2011, and challenge the Saudis to develop economic zones on five islands involving Iran's presence. Kuwait also engaged Qatar with mediating the crisis in Qatar in 2014 and 2017.

Keywords: Gulf Crisis, Saudi-Qatar Rivalry, Kuwait, Regional stability.

### Abstrak

*Embargo Arab Saudi, Uni Emirat Arab, Bahrain, dan Mesir terhadap Qatar pada 5 Juni 2017 telah merugikan pihak Qatar dan memecah stabilitas GCC. Terlibatnya Iran dan Turki di sisi Qatar membuat perpecahan GCC tidak dapat dihindari. Krisis ini sejatinya dipicu oleh anggapan Arab Saudi bahwa Qatar telah mendukung gerakan teroris yang membuat Arab Saudi mengundang seluruh negara GCC untuk memblokade Qatar, namun diantara negara-negara Teluk, Kuwait adalah satu-satunya negara yang menolak embargo tersebut dan memilih netral, bahkan memediasi krisis. Alasan penolakan Kuwait atas embargo Arab Saudi dan kepentingan Kuwait atas krisis akan dianalisis menggunakan teori neorealisme dan konsep hedging. Penulisan ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan analisis deskriptif-analitis. Menurut neorealist, netralitas dan mediasi Kuwait dalam krisis Teluk 2017 karena Kuwait ingin "survive" di GCC dan kawasan, mengingat ketrelibatkan Iran di sisi Qatar sedangkan Kuwait tidak ingin berkonflik dengan Iran. Berdasarkan strategi hedging, Kuwait melakukan indirect balancing terhadap Arab Saudi seperti menolak pakta keamanan GCC 1981, menolak mengirim pasukan ke Bahrain 2011, dan menantang Saudi mengembangkan zona ekonomi di lima pulau yang melibatkan kehadiran Iran. Kuwait juga melakukan engagement terhadap Qatar dengan memediasi krisis di Qatar pada 2014 dan 2017.*

**Kata Kunci:** *Krisis Teluk, Rivalitas Saudi-Qatar, Kuwait, Stabilitas kawasan.*

## INTRODUCTION

The 2017 Gulf Crisis (Al-Azmah Al-Khalijiyah) is a crisis phenomenon in the Gulf region when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain (plus Egypt), which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), embargoed Qatar on June 5 2017 and demanded that Qatar fulfill thirteen demands within ten days. However, of the six GCC members, Kuwait and Oman chose neutrality and rejected the embargo from Saudi Arabia and the coalition.

The crisis was initially triggered by fake news in May 2017, when the Qatari news agency, Qatar News Agency (QNA), was hacked by UAE intelligence agents, and broadcast Qatar's Amir, Tamim al-Thani, praising Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. The fake news then spread and angered other countries, even though Qatar had basically clarified that their offices had been hacked (Kinninmont, 2019). Apart from that, the crisis was also influenced by the arrival of the President of the United States (US) Donald Trump at the Riyadh Summit on 21 May 2017 which discussed bilateral US-GCC and multilateral cooperation between the US and Muslim countries throughout the world. The arrival of the US is considered to be a strong motivation for Saudi Arabia to lead the

GCC coalition to embargo Qatar (KirkPatrick, 2017).

In contrast to all Gulf countries, Kuwait chose to remain neutral and mediate the crisis. Kuwait's neutral attitude towards Saudi Arabia's embargo on Qatar can be seen from the response of the Prime Minister of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, who said that "Kuwait has always been committed to the principles of respect for sovereignty and independence, and does not intervene in affairs of other countries" (mofa.gov.kw).

In neorealism theory as explained by Kenneth N. Waltz (Waltz, 1979), every country has the character of anarchy, a condition where war and threats between countries cannot be avoided. In this anarchic situation, neorealist theory demands that a state play its role at the structural level and unit level simultaneously. Countries must be flexible and careful in managing bipolar and multipolar systems to maintain stability, one way is by forming alliances. The strategy used must also please the country's potential allies in the alliance (Waltz, 1988). The country must pay attention to its position in the regional or international context (structure), therefore neorealism theory is also known as realism structural theory. The national interest of each

country in an anarchic international structure is "survive" (Waltz, 1979)

After the bipolar cold war, the terms large countries and small or developing countries often appeared; a term that indicates conditions where large and strong countries adopt a system of domination and hegemony while small or developing countries are forced to "follow" (bandgowing) the large country or balance it out (balancing). Hedging is not a strategy to follow or offset the influence of strong countries, but is a strategy to achieve balance which is carried out to maintain relations with strong countries that share influence, such as countries in the Asia Pacific that maintain closeness to the US-Japan or US- China to achieve balance (Goh, 2006).

On a practical level, Goh explains three important elements of the hedging concept: 1) Indirect balancing or also called soft balancing: a policy formula carried out to maintain closeness to a strong country by limiting the closeness between the two countries. 2) Engagement: a complex bond with another strong country so that the other strong country can be influenced by the small country to comply with international regulations. 3) Enmeshing: a strategy to unite major regional powers to create regional stability (Goh, 2005).

This research is intended to understand the crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and analyze Kuwait's role in mediating the crisis. Researchers use neo realism theory and the concept of hedging strategies to analyze Kuwait's position in the Saudi Arabia-Qatar conflict. Kuwait, as a country that borders Saudi Arabia to the west and Iran to the east, certainly must be alert to the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Accusations by Saudi Arabia and its coalition that Qatar has allied with Iran, on the other hand, the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry is still heated, is a major consideration for Kuwait in their foreign policy.

## **METHODS**

In analyzing Kuwait's policy in the 2017 Gulf crisis, the author uses descriptive-analytical writing. Descriptive in question is a picture obtained from findings that are arranged systematically and accurately, while analytical in question is an effort to analyze the findings obtained in the field in depth and analyze the dynamics of correlation between phenomena that occur (Husaini, 2003). The author has obtained findings regarding the picture of Kuwait's foreign policy towards the Gulf Crisis that occurred in Qatar with comprehensive and detailed findings. The author also uses a qualitative approach, according to Idrus, the characteristic of

qualitative writing is an in-depth description of the situation in the field, which is dynamic and developing (Idrus, 2009). The author obtained primary data through interviews with the Kuwait Embassy and the Qatar Embassy in Indonesia.

## **RESULT AND ANALYSIS**

### **Factors Causing the Saudi Arabia-Qatar Crisis**

Responding to the crisis phenomenon, the Amir of Qatar chose not to respond to the embargo. Qatar does not withdraw its citizens from the Gulf countries at all. Towards his citizens, the Amir of Qatar actually made the statement "don't blaspheme them (Saudi Arabia and the coalition), they are our brothers". The Amir of Qatar did not express any protest or condemnation of Saudi Arabia and the coalition, except for a request for negotiations. Qatar asked for unconditional negotiations with Saudi Arabia and the coalition, namely sitting together without any demands from both parties (mofa.gov.qa). However, this request was clearly rejected by Saudi Arabia when Kuwait tried to mediate the crisis in August 2017, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Adel Al-Jubair, said: "no negotiations with Qatar" (Bakeer, 2017).

If traced, the main reason Qatar was embargoed was actually due to three things: First: 1) the effect of the Muslim Brotherhood. Geneologically, the spread of IM influence in the Middle East can be traced to 1954. After attempting to assassinate President Gamal Abdul Nasser that year, the Egyptian government arrested all IM members in Egypt. This caused IM members to flee and spread throughout Arab countries, one of which was Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries (Grabowski, 2016).

At the beginning of its arrival in 1954, IM members fled Egypt and spread throughout Arab countries (Grabowski, 2016), IM was accepted in Saudi Arabia. The IM's presence in Arab countries is generally used as a "shield" to prevent the influence of Egyptian Nasserism. Tensions began to arise when Saudi Arabia received US troops to fight Saddam Hussein who would invade Kuwait in 1990. This was because for Al-Sahwa, Saddam was a hero figure who opposed the arrival of the US in Saudi Arabia which ultimately aimed to serve Zionist-Israel. Al-Sahwa, who initially accepted royal legitimacy, then criticized Wahhabi orthodoxy and called for changes in political reform towards democracy, one of which was by demanding that the prime minister not be from the Royal family. Al-Sahwa's

criticism of the Kingdom became sharper when this movement founded a political party called the Umma party in 2011 by frequently submitting petitions to the kingdom (Echague, 2013)

Second, Al Jazeera Media. The beginning of Al-Jazeera was marked by the collapse of the Qatar-based satellite channel ORBIT-BBC Arabic that same year. Saudi investors fire 150 BBC staff for broadcasting content about the Royal Family. This opportunity was used by the Amir of Qatar to open a new satellite channel, Al-Jazeera, by employing hundreds of fired staff with funds of \$ 140 million (Cherkaoui, 2014). In its development, Saudi Arabia has always tried to block Al-Jazeera's influence in the region by creating rival media, which is why in 2003 Saudi Arabia created the al-Arabiya TV station. Al-Jazeera's international controversy also occurred in the US when a number of influential US lawmakers urged the Trump administration to make Al Jazeera Plus (AJ+) registered as a "foreign agent". The US Member of Parliament said that Qatari-owned media companies are inherently involved in political activities and seek to influence public opinion in America (Gulfnews, 2019).

Third: closeness to Iran. In 2017, Qatar's closeness to Iran was marked by the arrival of the IRGC in Doha to secure joint

military exercises between the two countries. The Iranian navy and the Qatari navy are carrying out joint maritime security exercises in the Indian Ocean. Apart from the two countries, Russia and China will also take part in the military exercises (english.arabiya, 2017). The closeness of Qatar and Iran is not only demonstrated on a regional scale, but also internationally. This was when Qatar became the only non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to oppose Resolution 1696 which imposed sanctions on Iran's nuclear power. Apart from that, Qatar also formed an alliance called The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) by collaborating with Iran and Russia in 2001. In 2010, GECF also succeeded in making a symbolic security pact that legitimized Qatar's cooperation with Iran (Vakil, 2018).

These three factors then made Saudi Arabia angry and invited all countries in the GCC to embargo Qatar. However, of all the Gulf countries, Kuwait chose to be neutral and mediate the crisis. Kuwait of course also has its own reasons for the neutral stance it chose and the mediation it attempted to resolve the crisis.

## **Basis for Kuwait's Rejection of Saudi Arabia's Embargo against Qatar**

### **1. Kuwait Constitution**

In the Kuwaiti constitution which was passed in 1962 it is stated:

“Desiring to use the means of democratic rule for our dear Country; and, having faith in the role of this Country in furthering Arab nationalism and the promotion of world peace and human civilization; and, striving towards a better future in which the Country enjoys greater prosperity and higher international standing, and in which also the citizens are provided with more political freedom, equality, and social justice, a future which upholds the traditions inherent in the Arab nation by enhancing the dignity of the individual, safeguarding public interest, and applying consultative rule yet maintaining the unity and stability of the Country” (Kuwait Constitution, 1996).

In the introduction to the constitution, Amir stated that Kuwait's identity as an Arab nation would always be inherent in the Kuwaiti people. In addition, peace and human civilization are the goals in every foreign policy that Kuwait chooses. The words "Arab Nationalism" and "Promoting World Peace" that Amir uses can certainly be translated into Kuwait's actions and role in regional and global contexts. Kuwait's

mediation in conflicts and tensions occurring in the region is very large and has historical value. Since Kuwait joined the Arab League in 1961, Kuwait has contributed tremendously to peace in Arab countries. Apart from Kuwait's interest in reducing external threats, by distributing its oil wealth in the region and partnering with the West (Partrick, 2006). Kuwait's decision to choose neutrality and mediate the crisis was actually influenced by the Kuwaiti constitution.

### **2. Powers of the Kuwaiti Parliament**

According to Ghabra, Kuwait's foreign policy challenge is essentially the imbalance in the political system in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Constitution, which upholds freedom and gives freedom to parliament as a representation of the people, has in many ways become an obstacle to Kuwait's foreign policy. On the one hand, parliament has the right to evaluate the work of ministers and can veto the Amir's decisions, but on the other hand, the Amir also has the right to issue an 'Amir's decree', namely to dissolve parliament. This situation causes conflict between parliament and government to be very strong and occur repeatedly, such as the dissolution of parliament and resulting in new elections. Over the past few years, prominent members of the Sabah family in the government have regularly come under

pressure from the Kuwaiti parliament, such as a vote of no confidence from the parliament (Ghabra, 2014). This situation has caused a series of crises in the economy and politics in Kuwait. This is made worse by the fact that the composition of the opposition in parliament is comparable to that of the government:

**Table 1: Composition of the Kuwaiti parliament after the 2016 election**

Ideology	Affiliate	Chair 2016
Independent Sunnis	Pro-Government	20
Shia	Pro-Government	6
Perempuan	Pro-Government	1
Liberal	Opposition	8
Sunni Islamists	Opposition	16
Total pro-government:		27
Total opposition:		24

(Source taken from CongressionalResearchService, 2019)

Parliament's support for Kuwait's foreign policy in the 2017 Gulf crisis is very valuable for Kuwait considering that parliament has great power in maintaining political stability in Kuwait.

3. Kuwaiti pragmatism Avoids Conflict

Kuwait was a small tribal country under Ottoman rule. Power began to change when Sheikh Mubarak ascended the throne in 1896. Because of his diplomatic talents, Sheikh Mubarak managed to secretly invite Britain and make a 'secret agreement' in 1899 which stated that "the Sheikh of Kuwait promised to bind himself, and his heirs, to England and will not accept any representation in Kuwait." The arrival of the British weakened the Ottoman Empire in Kuwait (Khadduri, 1997).

History records that Kuwait has always tried to avoid war. In the border case, for example, Kuwait is involved in the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border disputes. When Saudi Arabia claimed and blockaded land on Kuwait's borders, including the border issue with Iraq, Kuwait actually tried to avoid war by inviting Britain to mediate tensions, at the Uqair conference in 1922 which was funded by Kuwait. The Uqair Conference resulted in an agreement to establish two neutral zones; namely the Kuwait-Saudi neutral zone and the Iraq-Saudi neutral zone (Guazzone, 1989).

4. Lessons from the invasion of Iraq

Kuwait once had the experience of Iraq invading its country, because Iraq considered Kuwait as part of its power based on the administration system of the



Ottoman Empire (Dijk, 2008). In essence, the invasion which was based on the claim that Kuwait was part of his country was just an excuse. This claim was refuted because in 1899, the Sheikh of Kuwait succeeded in secretly inviting England and entered into a 'secret agreement' which stated that "the Sheikh of Kuwait promised to bind himself, as well as his heirs, to England and would not accept any representation in Kuwait" (Khadduri, 1997). At the start of the invasion of Iraq, first aid for Kuwait actually came from the GCC coalition which was part of the Paninsula Shield Force (PSF), in the form of 10,000 combined troops from six Gulf countries which was formed in 1986. However, the PSF did not last long because it was unable to hold back Iraqi troops (Koh , 2010). A valuable lesson from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the importance of the solidity of GCC members for Kuwait's regional security.

#### 5. Kuwait Maintains Reputation as a Mediator

Responding to the Gulf crisis in Qatar, Sheikh Sabah delivered a speech at the Kuwait National Assembly meeting, as follows:

"Disputes between our brothers in the GCC countries actually weaken our capabilities and threaten our achievements." "Strengthening unity and solidity is our position, because

we are used to overcoming all differences at the Arab level and placing the highest interests of our nation (Arabs) above all considerations."

The Amir's statement "has weakened our capabilities and achievements" certainly refers to the achievements of Kuwait's policy which has overcome crises and tensions between countries, namely efforts. Kuwait's consistency in conducting mediation is very inherent and has become Kuwait's image in the eyes of other countries. The interest in mediating the crisis is getting stronger because Kuwait is staking its reputation in the international world, considering its role as the Asia Pacific representative as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Therefore, international recognition is clearly the key to Kuwait's mediation reputation, which is marked by Kuwait's efforts to garner international support. In fact, Kuwait's mediation received a good response from the international community. Support for Kuwait comes from the UN, EU, Russia and US. The International Community stated that it would maintain good relations with all groups (Majed M, 2018).

#### ANALYSIS

According to Waltz, forming alliances is one way to create "survive" in the region, but cooperation between

countries is something that is difficult to achieve because each country will certainly ensure the fulfillment of its own national interests (Waltz, 1979). In the context of foreign policy, Kuwait actually needs to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia as a country that borders it directly, but this is not an easy thing. Kuwait must also consider its geographical proximity to Iran. Apart from the fact that 30% of Kuwait's population is Shia, Kuwait is also indebted to Iran. The experience of the Iraq invasion has changed Kuwait's negative perception of Iran. According to Metz, Iraq's ambition to invade Kuwait in 1990-1991 had made Iraq its "sworn enemy" and "common enemy" in the region. This is because not only Saudi Arabia, even Iran also has hatred towards Iraq (Amiri, 2011). In fact, after Iraq declared Kuwait the 19th Iraqi province, Iran's foreign ministry condemned Iraq's annexation of Kuwait by issuing a declaration. In the condemnation, Iran stated that Iraq's actions were a violation of a people's right to determine their fate. Tehran has consistently demanded that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait (Amiri, 2011).

Kuwait does not want to clash with Iran. The assassination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait (1986) and the suicide bombing carried out by Islamic Jihad affiliated with Iran several times in Kuwait (1987) are

valuable lessons for Kuwait (Alenezi, 2018). On the other hand, Kuwait also has Iranian investment interests in the five islands that Kuwait is developing.

On the other hand, Kuwait also does not dare to be hostile to Saudi Arabia, by providing support and assistance to Qatar as Oman does, because Oman's assistance to Qatar has proven to have made Saudi Arabia distance itself from Oman as mentioned in the previous section. However, apart from the political aspect, Kuwait also actually depends on Saudi Arabia for the fate of its country's economy. Saudi Arabia's influence on neighboring Arab countries has proven to be very significant, namely in determining oil prices in OPEC (Amiri, 2011). By not providing assistance to Qatar, such as Kuwait's decision to stop importing natural gas from Qatar in the previous section, Kuwait gains political and economic benefits at the same time. The political advantage is that Kuwait is still considered capable of mediating the crisis because it is believed to be the only neutral Gulf country. The economic advantage is that Kuwait can still secure its position as the 6th largest oil provider in the world, with supplies of around 102 billion barrels, while also securing oil supplies of around 13 million barrels in the Kuwait-Saudi, Khafji

and Wafra "neutral zones" as in figure 4.4 (EIA, 2016, p. 3).

### **Indirect Balancing Kuwait against Saudi Arabia**

Based on the Hedging concept, as a country that is between two hostile countries, Kuwait must carry out indirect balancing against Saudi. This was done so that Kuwait would not be under Saudi influence or follow (bandwagoning).

Kuwait's first indirect balancing against Saudi Arabia is in terms of security. As a country that is vulnerable to regional tensions, such as the 2011 Arab Spring revolution and the country's position near three much larger powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq), Kuwait has secured its country's defense by establishing defense cooperation with the US. The presence of US troops in Kuwait is the largest in the Middle East, that there are 15,000 US troops in Kuwait, this is much larger compared to Qatar (10,000), Bahrain (7,000), UAE (5,000), and Oman (200) (McCarthy , 2017).

Another indirect balancing in terms of security carried out by Kuwait towards Saudi Arabia can also be seen in the tension between the two countries in fighting over land on their respective borders. Both countries claim ownership of the land. However, Kuwait did not want to get

involved in a war with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait invited Britain to mediate the crisis. So in 1922, the "Uqair conference" was held and it was determined that the Kuwait-Saudi border was a neutral zone (Ghanemy, 1966).

As for indirect balancing in economic terms, Kuwait also carried out indirect balancing against Saudi Arabia by developing the Silk City (Madinat al-Harir) megaproject and building an integrated economic zone on five uninhabited Kuwaiti islands, namely the islands of Boubyan, Warbah, Failaka, Maskan, and Aouha. Referring to Kuwait's vision 2035. This development has sparked tensions with Saudi Arabia because it clashes with Saudi Arabia's economic and foreign policy agenda on three levels: competition over investment; utilization of the Iraqi market; and engagement with Iran. For Saudi, involvement with Iran is a threat (Mogielnicki, 2018).

### **Engagement towards Qatar**

Referring to the hedging concept, apart from carrying out indirect balancing against Saudi, Kuwait must also engage with Qatar so that decisions taken by Kuwait receive Qatar's support. Kuwait's first engagement with Qatar was in political and economic terms. In essence, the Kuwaiti government is also disturbed by

the presence of Al-Jazeera in its country. The Parliamentary Opposition which was able to mobilize Kuwaiti society to protest during the 2011 Arab Spring in Kuwait was so strong that it was able to overthrow Prime Minister Kuwiat. Kuwait's objection to Al-Jazeera was none other than because the media supported the Kuwaiti opposition during the protests (Kinnimont, 2019). However, to maintain closeness with Qatar, Kuwait maintains political relations with Qatar by mediating every crisis experienced by Qatar, such as the diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia in 2014 and 2017.

Kuwait also engages with Qatar in economic matters. In fact, Kuwait from the start had tried to secure funding for a pipeline from Qatar to Kuwait in the early 2000s, but this was vetoed by Saudi Arabia, because it was worried about Qatar's influence in the region (Seznec, 2018). However, in its development, Kuwait continues to import natural gas from Qatar. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) has imported up to 7.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas over the last three years from British Petroleum, Shell and Qatargas. Meanwhile, import shipments from Qatar reached 80,000 tons per shipment. Gas imports have saved Kuwait's state treasury up to \$5 billion (Zawya, 2019).

### **Enmeshing Saudi Arabia-Qatar**

Kuwait's efforts to bring together (enmessing) the two great Saudi-Qatari powers can first be traced to the beginning of the founding of the GCC in 1981. At that time, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah was Kuwait's foreign minister who was most vocal about the prevailing local political conditions. in the Bay. Armed with Al-Sabah's experience in negotiating, Kuwait hosted the first meeting of the six Gulf countries in early 1981. According to Al-Sabah, maintaining regional stability has been its task since the founding of the GCC (Miler, 2019). In the context of the 2017 Gulf crisis, Kuwait tried to mediate the crisis between Saudi and Qatar.

### **CONCLUSION**

In reality, Kuwait's foreign policy of neutrality and mediation is in accordance with the Kuwaiti constitution which upholds the interests of the Arab nation and creates peace. Apart from that, Kuwait also has support from parliament, because the power of parliament is able to veto the decisions of the Amir of Kuwait if they conflict with the constitution. Kuwait is also trying to play its role at the regional structural level. First, learn from the history of Kuwait which has always been faced with threats to sovereignty, such as Wahhabi expansion into the country,

Turkey's return to control Kuwait, and Iraq's claim to Kuwait which led to the 1990-1991 invasion. Learning from this experience, Kuwait's foreign policy has always been pragmatic, avoiding war or conflict and always maintaining the integrity of the GCC as Kuwait's first defense in the region.

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