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**The Transmission of Global and Regional Extrimism in Indonesia**

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**Abstract**

Salafi Jihadi has been widely accused of being the actor behind terrorist acts in various parts of the world. In Indonesia, acts of terror are generally carried out by parties who have relations with the Salafi movement who have transmissions at the regional and global levels. The Salafi movement literature originating from the Middle East, accompanied by political dynamics and conflict in the Middle East, has become the light of the radical movement in Indonesia. This study uses qualitative methods with a literature study approach and in-depth interviews. Analysis of the transmission of extremism is carried out using transnational theory and social movements. The results show that the transmission of extremism that occurred in Indonesia was caused by the idea of Salafi Jihadi and the events of the conflict in the Middle East.

Keywords: Extremism, Transnational, Salafi Jihadi, Middle East

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## **Preface**

In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist bombings, Indonesia was faced with the problem of terrorism with all its implications. The existence of a transnational terror network and national terror network are the two causes of terror in Indonesia. These two factors are also the reason why extremism is so strong in Indonesia throughout 2001-2010. Terror transmission was also strengthened by conflicts occurring outside Indonesia such as the conflicts in the Philippines, South Thailand, Afghanistan, Iraq, and finally Syria.

Salafi Jihadi in many studies is the cause of terror events in various worlds. This ideological transmission not only occurs in Indonesia, but also occurs in almost all over the world. Indonesia historically had the roots of radical movements during the Padri War in West Sumatra. In the modern era, especially after the independence, Indonesia faced various threats from radical movements which began with the Darul Islam (DI) movement. This movement was then transformed in the post-Suharto era under the name Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) which is also the node of Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia. In its development, some ex-JI

groups pledged allegiance to ISIS officials (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).

The external transmission does not give motivation to terror act in Indonesia, but also give contribution to the deepening knowledge and skill to produce weapons and low, medium and high exposure bomb. Not only that, the transnational network also provides funding for acts of terror that occurred in Indonesia. Uniquely, radical movements in Indonesia are always wriggling when there is a warming of conflicts abroad. This suggests that one type of the transnational movement is always reactive to global dynamics.

## **Literature Review**

There are some researches which have been done related to the radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. Here are some foregone literatures that related to this research theme. Mona Abaza wrote about *The Discourse on Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia: A Critical Perspective* tells about explanation of fundamentalism in Southeast Asia and Middle East. Abaza mentions that there are similar ideas of purification of religious teachings and the view of there

is no difference between religion and state. The similarity is also mentioned because of the similarity of the literature used as a reference. (Mona Abaza, 1991: 229). Unfortunately this research does not specifically provide a form of network of organizations that have similarities between Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Angel M. Rabasa in *Radical Islamist Ideologies in South East Asia* discussed the development of radical groups in Southeast Asia, including in Indonesia. Rabasa said there were two patterns of the spread of radical ideas in Southeast Asia, namely through funding religious activities and religious education and funding of militant Islamic groups. Rabasa specifically mentioned that there was an Arabization effort in the Southeast Asia region. Rabasa also mentioned several organizations in Indonesia that have links with radical movements in Indonesia. (Angel M. Rabasa, 2005: 28)

Zachary Abuza mentions religious education as one of the causes of the ease with which Al Qaeda builds networks in Southeast Asia, as well as the increasing number of students who significantly contribute to Al Qaeda. In his research, Abuza also discussed Wahhabism and

Salafism in which Abuza explicitly explained that the Al Qaeda network in Southeast Asia was also caused by relations that were built during the Afghan conflict. Even Abuza called Southeast Asia a country of Convenience. (Zachary Abuza, 2002: 428)

In connection with the involvement of Indonesian citizens in the Al Qaeda network and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, David Leheny named Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar as two figures who played an important role in the radicalism movement in Indonesia especially in the establishment of Jamaah Islamiyah (David Leheny, 2005: 96). In the context of the transmission of radicalism movements in the Middle East, Leheny called one of the figures named Ramzi Yusuf, a Kuwaiti citizen, who had a role in several radical action plans in the Philippines. (David Leheny, 2005: 102)

In addition to Ramzi Yusuf, in the IPAC report entitled *The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia*, the name of Omar Bakri Muhammad was recorded. He is a Syrian citizen who has an important position in al Muhajiroun, namely the wing organization of Hizb ut-Tahrir which campaigns for khilafah and the

enforcement of Islamic law. In its development, it turned out that Omar Bakri Muhammad was known to have a relationship with Tuah Febriwansyah alias Muhammad Fachry, a member of ISIS (IPAC, 2014: 2)

With regard to Al Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz conducted research in London in 2002 focusing on the Al Muhajiroun group. Research is conducted to answer the question of why thousands of British teenagers are attracted to radical Islamic movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Supporters of the Shariah, Al Muhajiroun and Al Qaeda. He has the opinion that there is a social network influence on the formation of radical behavior. (Quitman Wiktorowicz, 2005).

There are also studies related to ideology that are the roots of radical movements in the world. One of them is research conducted by the European Union Parliament which details the salafi relations with radical movements. The study states that there is support for the Salafi movement, especially Salafi Jihadi, for armed violence in various countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Syria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt (European Union Parliament, 2013).

SETA Foundation, conducts the same research as the European Union. This study cites Bruce Riedel's findings in his writing *Al Qaeda Strike Back* where he mentioned that since 2007, more than 4500 internet sites supported radicalization and jihad and monolithic religious understanding (Tuncay Kardas, 2015: 15).

Furthermore, Noorhaidi Hasan conducted a study of *Laskar Jihad*. Noorhaidi discussed the relationship of this group to the Ambon and Maluku conflicts while historically reviewing the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Noorhaidi explained that the Salafi transformation process as a missionary movement becomes a militant group, where Salafi Jihadi is a form of its transformation (Noorhaidi Hasan, 2001).

Frazer Egerton in his *Jihad in The West: The Rise of Militant Salafism* is also related to Salafi Jihadism. Egerton's research was conducted on several individuals involved in terror attacks in various cities in the world such as Paris, London, Madrid. Frazer said that the perpetrators had followed the Salafi Jihadi doctrine before committing terror (Frazer Egerton, 2011).

Angela Rabasa and Cheryl Benard in *Eurojihad: patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe* present a pattern of radicalism in Europe today. Rabasa and Benard found two European Islamic constructs: Muslim Liberals, namely groups that harmonize western values and Islamic principles; and Salafi groups, groups that reject the value of western values and traditional values, and choose to carry out values that are claimed to be pure Islam. Some Salafi figures in several countries in Europe are known to have relations with Al Qaeda and call terrorists to have links with Salafi groups. (Angela Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, 2015). Carl Bjorkman in the work of *Salafi-Jihadi terrorism in Italy* calls the findings almost identical to Rabasa and Benard (Carl Bjorkman, 2010: 231-250).

Eman Ragab in his research on *Foreign Fighters ISIS from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain The Gulf Cooperation Council of countries and countering ISIS: threats, policies and challenges*, states that most FTF who go to Syria start from a false religious understanding of jihad (Eman Ragab , 2016: 577-595).

Henri Lauziere in *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* tried to see the

historical roots and salafi doctrines rooted in Ibn Taymiyah and Ahmad Ibn Hambal. Lauziere said there were two major conceptions of salafi, Puritan Salafi and Modern Salafi (Henri Lauziere, 2016, 135-142). According to Noorhaidi, the contemporary salafi movement is a form of reconstruction of Wahabi teachings. This group systemically formulated the classical thinking which was the reference of Wahhabi, Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad Abdul Wahab, and Ibn Qayyim Al Jawziyya. In the context of the modern era, the Salafi group refers to the thoughts of Abdul Aziz Abdullah Bin Baz and Muhammad Nasiruddin Al Albani (Noorhaidi Hasan, 2001: 25).

One book that discusses the issue of financial terrorism is a book edited by Jodi Vittori entitled *Terrorist Financing and Resourcing*. This book is about how terrorist organizations fund their activities, ranging from the Irish Republican Army, Al Qaeda, Liberation Tiger of Tamil Ealam to state-sponsored terrorism. However, this book does not discuss in detail how Al Qaeda funding to support the transmission of Middle Eastern extremism in Indonesia. This book only mentions Indonesia as one

country that has an Al Qaeda network (Jodi Vittori, 2011).

Those above researches reflect that Salafi Jihadi has tremendous potential in terms of network and funding to conduct terror operations around the world. Not only that, in terms of ideology, this group has become a motivation for many people to follow it. The difference between this study and previous research is how the transmission of Middle Eastern extremism occurs in Indonesia with various variants of its supporting factors.

### **Theoretical Framework**

In his book *The Politics of Collective Violence*, Charles Tilly said that one type of politics of violence was carried out in a coordinated manner. In this context, coordinated destruction is defined as: persons or organizations that specialize in the deployment of coercive means undertaking a program of damage to persons and / or objects; examples include war, collective self-immolation, some kinds of terrorism, genocide, and politicization of the programmed annihilation of a political category's members (Charles Tilly, 2003: 14). To answer why transnational extremism transmission has expanded significantly, all cross-border conceptions and

deteritorialised concerns the discussion of political, economic and cultural aspects (Thomas Faist and Rainer Baubock, 2010: 14)

Aspect of Religion is also being one reason for transnationalism (Steven Vertovec, 2009: 155). Kokot, Tölölyan, and Alfonso stated that *"In past decades, the meaning of the term "diaspora" has been extended from long established diaspora like the Jewish, Armenian or Greek experience, towards a host of new and more contested areas of reference. With this extension of meaning into the wider field of migration and transnationalism, questions of religion seem to have faded into the background"* (Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan, Carolin Alfonso, 2004: 6). In his article entitled *Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Political Islam: Hizbullah's Institutional Identity*, Mohanad Hage Ali implicitly explained how Hezbollah is a model of Islamic transnationalism (Mohanad Hage Ali, 2018: 221).

The transnationalism movement also has identity aspect and collective action. It is necessary to know that identity is an important part of collective action. According to Porta and Diani, *identity plays an important role in the explanation of collective action even for*

*those who see in collective action a peculiar form of rational behavior. Those who perceive in collective identity certain criteria for evaluating, in the medium and long terms, the costs and benefits of action, are numerous* (Donatelo Della Porta, Mario Diani, 2006: 113).

From the description above, it can be concluded that in order to unravel the transmission of Middle East radicalism movements in Indonesia, there are several theories that can be used, namely; coordinated destruction, cross-border mobility, identity and collective action, and the theory of transnationalism.

### **Discussion**

In this section, the author will try to unravel the Salafi Jihadi issue and the transmission of Middle Eastern extremism in Indonesia. With the coordinated destruction approach, Charles Tilly explained that people or organizations can use violence to achieve goals. The involvement of extremist groups in various acts of terror in various parts of the world was prepared by coordinating the terror movement. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Osama Bin Laden became the leader of Al Qaeda that was able to drive terrorist acts

in various parts of the world. Meanwhile, Muhammad Adnan and Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi as leaders of ISIS have also succeeded in mobilizing all their sympathizers in various countries who have been hit by terror attacks to carry out terrorism attacks.

There is involvement of Salafi Jihadi activists in several acts of violence in Indonesia that have relations with violent groups. In Indonesia, the ability to organize the forces of terror to carry out acts of terror can be seen from the involvement of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, an Indonesian of Yemeni descent, who is legally proven to be involved in several cases of criminal acts of terrorism. Ba'asyir received a prison sentence for his involvement in a training case in Jantho, Aceh.

The transmission of Middle Eastern extremism to Indonesia is strongly influenced by the conflict situation in the Middle East. The war on terrorism carried out by the US in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks turned out to be a significant influence in mobilizing Salafi Jihadi extremism groups in various worlds. Indonesia, in several important events in the Middle East region, has become one of the countries, with different geographical

regions, which are very active in responding to regional dynamics. The Iranian revolution which brought down Shah Reza Pahlevi, was quite resonant and received responses from several groups in Indonesia, and so the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The last dynamics that occur in the Middle East region are the ISIS declaration in which Indonesian citizens simply pay more attention to this issue. In fact, the Syrian and ISIS conflicts succeeded in mobilizing Indonesians to come and join ISIS.

Indonesian interest in the transnational movement is strengthened by the involvement of foreign nationals from the Middle East. This can be seen in the involvement of Khalid Sheikh and Muhammad Jabara in the Bali case (Schweitzer, Shay, 2001), and in the case of Umar Al Faruk who was involved in the action of forming a Vietnam camp to train the Al Qaeda network in Southeast Asia (Gunaratna, 2007: 423).

The similarity of culture and similarity of other identities also affect the transmission of the values adopted. This happens among Indonesians with other Asian citizens who join ISIS. Although the movement of Indonesians to Syria is based on the Salafi Jihadi ideology, it cannot be forgotten how cultural

similarities facilitate interaction between one network and another. In fact, ISIS sympathizers from Indonesia are more acceptable to ISIS from Central Asia, than Europe and the Middle East (Anonymous, 2016).

The second type of extremist group, both from Indonesia and from abroad, is that they generally have cross border mobility. Nasir Abbas, one of the former Southeast Asian Jamaah Islamiyah leaders, acknowledged that he often traveled in and out of Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-Philippines (Nasir Abbas, 2018). One of the JW Marriot bombers, Yusuf, also stated that in 2000 there were movements of Indonesians to the Philippines in preparation for bombing. According to him, this was done as a form of time I'dad before going to the real jihad field. While in Moro, he received training in guerrilla warfare, the use of weapons, and the ability to survive on the battlefield (Mahmudi Hariono, 2018).

Other cross-border movements were carried out by Indonesians who were students at a University in Solo, Central Java. The student previously asked about the flow into Turkey to one of the master's students in Istanbul in 2016. After the questions were not responded



well by students in Istanbul, the student from Solo was known to upload on social media already in Syria (Anonymous, 2016). Another with Wildan Mukhollad, a first-year student at Al Azhar University in Egypt who went to Syria to join ISIS. Previously Wildan had a lot of socializing in the Mansyuroh area, one of the areas with Salafi followers in Egypt, plus before leaving Wildan was one of the students of Al Islam Lamongan Islamic Boarding School, East Java (Niam, 2015).

Cross border mobility is also very visible in ISIS supporters. After the ISIS declaration in 2014, many citizens of the world (including Indonesia) traveled to Syria. Some terrorists in Istanbul, Belgium and Paris have the ability to move places. They use various methods and various modes of transportation across the country to avoid detection of security forces. Indonesian citizens traveling to Syria number around that number of 176 people have returned to Indonesia with various reasons (PSMP Handayani, 2018).

Cross border mobility extremist groups also use separate lines, in the context of the movement of Indonesian citizens who moved to Syria. ISIS sympathizers use different trips, ranging from Indonesia-

Istanbul, or the Indonesia-Singapore-Istanbul route, Indonesia-Malaysia-Istanbul, Indonesia-Qatar-Istanbul, Indonesia-Uni Emirate-Istanbul, or even Indonesia-Saudi Arabia-Istanbul (Anonymous, 2017). The same thing was done by Nur Shadrina, a young teenager who managed to persuade 25 family members to Syria. Nur's efforts to attract family members are done by sharing information about ISIS in the form of videos, blog articles, and conducting Q & A directly with ISIS sympathizers who are already in Syria. The trip to Syria was studied through social media until finally found a smuggler who facilitated the existence of members for several months in Turkey until finally arrested by Turkish security forces on the border of Turkey and Syria (Nurshadrina, 2018).

The next type is identity and collective action. The similarity of identity as part of an Islamic group that feels injustice by parties other than Islam has succeeded in moving some people to embrace extreme ideology. The desire for jihad and joining under the auspices of the Islamic Khilafah is able to produce a collective action that is manifested in various forms, from moving to another place to committing acts of violence against the local government.

Similarity of identity is also the motivation of the Salafi Jihadi movement which led to movement from the Middle East to Indonesia. One of the most interesting is the invitation to Osama Bin Laden's war pledge which is incorporated in the World Islamic Front, where the invitation to join was submitted directly to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in Afghanistan in 1998 (Solahuddin, 2011: 249). The distribution of identity distribution by the Jihadi Salafi circles in Indonesia can be seen from the reference references used by Abu Qotadah Al Falistini (Solahuddin, 2011: 250). This World Islamic Front then consolidates the jihad movement in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus region (Rohan Gunaratna, 2017: 421). In subsequent developments, Al Qaeda established a military training camp in several countries in Asia. The influence of thought transmitted from the Middle East also happened to the terrorists of the Serpong bomb who admired the thoughts of Abdullah Azzam (Ibrahim, 2017).

The ideological similarity of jihad in the Indonesian extremist movement rooted in the Darul Islam with the Middle East extremism movement, however, is connected with the Afghan conflict.

Generally, Indonesian citizens who came to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union had a background in kinship with Darul Islam. This Darul Islam transformation which is part of the jihad movement in Afghanistan is recognized by Farihin, one of the Afghan alumni who had studied war and weapons in the military academy. He stated that his departure for jihad was approved by his parents, even his father helped arrange passports. Farihin had a father from Sumbawa, a Darul Islam activist, and his mother was from Tasikmalaya, also a Darul Islam family. Farihin's grandfather from father and mother, is a person who has a close relationship with Kartosoewiryo. Farihin's father was involved in the Cikini action in November 1957 which was an attempt to assassinate Soekarno (Farihin, 2018).

The transmission of the Salafi Jihadi movement also succeeded in getting Indonesian citizens to join the ISIS movement in Syria and Iraq. This happened to the mother of Ghina Inas Fathina who invited all members to move to Syria. Ghina's mother's desire to join ISIS was based on the ideology adopted by her mother since high school, where at that time she joined spiritual activities and attended many recitations (Ghina

Inas Fathina, 2018). The desire of Indonesians like Ghina's mother is based on the view that the concept of a country like Indonesia is a thogut. They also believe that the Islamic State began from Syria with the form of the caliphate, not with monarchy or democracy. Some even believe that Shia is a part of the infidels, without having to be distinguished from the conception of the kafir harbi and the infidels of dhimmi (Anonymous, 2018).

The ideology of extremism that drives this network has a fundamental, radical, harsh, and tends to be takfiri style. This ideology also relates to the concept of hakimiyah where the adherents expressly divide the state into an Islamic state that uses laws made by God and non-Islamic countries that use man-made laws. Abu A'la Al-Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad bin Abd Wahhab until Abu Bakar Baghdadi agreed on hakimiyah. bcThey stated that: "The formalization of Islamic Shari'a as the basis of the state is an agreement that must be reached by Muslims, although there are some differences. Does the Islamic state have to be one and cover all of the world's Muslims or simply be represented by the nation state but with Islamic law? "

The establishment of an Islamic State has become an important doctrine

championed by terror groups. They aspire to a country that contains the teachings of Islam as the highest basis, where the Koran and hadith are used as the only legal references. Although different in understanding the aqidah and the Islamic style, their ultimate goal is the same, namely the realization of an Islamic State. In addition, another concept that they often doctrienate is the existence of Thogut, this concept emerged clearly when ISIS claimed to be the embodiment of the Islamic Caliphate. Other concepts are Hijrah, Al Wala and Al Bara, and so on. The legitimacy of this Islamic group always relies on the text of the Koran and hadith according to their own interpretation. Some of the arguments used are the traditions about Hijrah, Jihad, Ghuraba (foreigners), the Blessings of the Sham country, Islamic countries, Caliphate, Baiat Khalifah, leaders of Quraysh, Panji Hitam (Black Banners), 72 nymphs and others.

Transnationalism is the next part of the important factor of extreme movement transmission in Indonesia. If traced historically, the spread of Islam in Indonesia is indeed done by Transnational Islam with a variety of perspectives. The spread of this model seems to be imitated by the extremist

movement and proved to be very effective. The ability of Al Qaeda and ISIS in networking in the context of Southeast Asia, for example, is seen when several Afghan alumni are involved in forming the territory of Mantiqi.

The transmission of extremism that brings the value of jihadist ideology is moving with the media used by the Salafi Jihadi group. ISIS for example, uses media such as in Dabiq and Rumiya magazines. The content of the media is always displayed in persuasive language to fight thogut, hijrah, jihad, and enforce Islamic law. Dita Oeprianto, the Surabaya bomber (May 2018) is an arm of ISIS that seeks to practice Baghdadi's persuasion to attack "enemies" in their respective countries. He did this together with the spread of Baghdadi's voice record (Al-Baghdady, 2014), and in accordance with the 2nd edition of Rumiya's mission. Baghdadi's call is to kill infidels everywhere, even a flower seller at his kiosk. ISIS also believes that Muslims who disagree with ISIS are infidels so that their blood is lawful. Here they use the arguments of QS AT-Taubah 111 and Surah Al Baqoroh 191. ISIS propaganda and other terror groups are disseminated via social media so as to

attract the attention of many people. Many terrorism sympathizers eventually became lone wolf due to the massive distribution of videos and images spread by ISIS.

In addition to the jihad ideology, the Salafi Jihadi doctrine that supports the transnational movement is hijrah. In addition to the jihad ideology, the Salafi Jihadi doctrine that supports the transnational movement is hijrah. The conception of migrating in this group's perspective is the movement from one heathen region to the Islamic region. Hijrah in the teachings of Jamaah Islamiyah is an effort, activity, steps to mobilize members of the congregation to become Muhajir to Allah and Rasullullah. In order to prepare for the establishment of the Islamic Religion, Hijrah is preparation or *I'dad* for the establishment of the glory of Islam. The function of progress / development of hijrah are, to realize, to utilize and to secure the elements for progress / development of hijrah so as to support the preparation for Iqāmatud-Deen Daulah (General Guidelines for the Struggle of Jamaah Islamiyah, 1996).

According to Farihin, alumni of the military education academy in Afghanistan, the material taught related

to Hijrah and Jihad is very important. Because the highest level of obedience from the creature to the creator is jihad, and only those who are elected are able to do jihad, they are have been chosen by the God. (Farihin, 2018)

*"We are sure that this is God's choice. We must be sure, we must also have a comparison. Different from the departure of ISIS children. He was not because of God's choice, he forced himself. So that they do not understand what knowledge has been obtained from there ..., while ISIS people today depart because of the importance of the precedence of the Caliphate. So it has been promised to be good, it isn't big. If we don't. We learn jihad fi sabilillah. And those who strive for jihad are guaranteed by Allah. But the name jihad is difficult. "*

The concept of migrating from JI has similarities with DI/NII, but is slightly different from ISIS. The concept of a trip to Darul Islam must be passed with proper religious preparation and understanding, not instant. According to them, the people who make hijrah and jihad are the elect.

Conception of hijrah for ISIS followers was massively echoed immediately after this Daula declaration in 2014. ISIS invited Muslims all over the world to move to its territorial territory when Abu Bakar Baghdadi first appeared in public, namely when giving a sermon in Mosul. Since then there has been a massive wave of migration to the territory of ISIS. In Dabiq 3rd edition, the opinions of Jihad leaders before ISIS advocated hijrah, for example:

Abu Mus'ab Az-Zarqawi says:

*"Indeed I swear by the Essence that will return to Him the true jihad in Iraq will never be realized without the presence of the muhajirin, sons of generous people, who leave their tribes, who defend Allah and His Messenger (sallallāhu 'alayhi wasallam). So don't lose them, because their loss means the loss of your strength. Their loss means lost the blessings and delights of jihad. So really you cannot escape from them, just as they cannot be separated from you. "[I will not let this Dien gnaw, while I am still alive] (Dabiq edition 3).*

In addition to transmitting ideological identities, cross-border mobility, and transnationalism, the Middle East Salafi Jihadi transmission to Indonesia is also supported by enormous financial support.

Jamaah Islamiyah's affiliation with Al Qaeda greatly influences the funding support of this group. After the Bali Bombing I, Ali Imron said that there were a number of funds disbursed by Osama bin Laden, to help the Al Qaeda network, even though it was unclear where the funds were (Ali Imron, 2018). The role of the network in Al-Qaeda's terrorist acts has become a major component from 1988 to 2012 (Ramirez, Robbin: 2018). The existence of local organizations that function as networks and major components, establishes Al Qaeda as an organization that has a global perspective (Byman, 2014). The same thing is found in ISIS, although the existence of Al Qaeda is relatively different from ISIS which has a special territorial area with world-wide membership coverage.

In the context of extremist funding in Indonesia, the name Agus Dwikarna is known as the main liaison of Al Qaeda to Indonesia. This funding is done through the Al Haramain Indonesia Foundation where the Foundation is called the United Nations as one of the terror organizations in the world. In addition to the name Agus Dwikarna, there is the name Aris Munandar, who is the administrator of Kompak, an institution

founded in 1998 with the aim of providing humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict in Maluku. Aris Munandar is an Afghan Alumni who collected donations from funds from the Middle East.

The assistance of the Jamaah Salafiyah Muhtasibah movement carried out by Saudi Arabia has had a tremendous impact on the Salafi da'wah movement in various countries. Some groups such as Ahl Hadith in Pakistan and Ansar Sunnah Al Muhammadiyah in Egypt are known to receive funding from Saudi Arabia (Solahudin, 2011: 16). One of the things that should be observed after funding and mobilizing the extremist movement is how this narrative of extremism influences the pattern of the spread of extremism in the world. In this regard, Sandra Scham calls the narrative of influential extremism in the Middle East in ancient and modern times (Sandra Scham, 2018).

## **Conclusion**

Salafi Jihadi transmission and extremist activities from the Middle East to Indonesia are influenced by various factors. The ideological factors supported by Indonesians who have network relations with Salafi Jihadi in the Middle

East are the reason why extremism can spread to Indonesia. Political events in the Middle East are also the reason for extremist groups to engage in violent organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. Conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria are two examples of political events that show how the transformation of extremists such as the Darul Islam has the opportunity to show their identity.

The ability of the Salafi Jihadi group to spread the idea of extremism in Indonesia is also influenced by the mobility of this group moving from one location to another. The existence of a network of extremist groups in Indonesia facilitates the movement of members from one location to another. At the same time, the presence of international networks facilitates the mobility of Indonesian extremist groups to other countries. In addition, established funding makes extremist movements with a strong command network between one another and can operate and carry out acts of terror in Indonesia.

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### **Paper Presentation**

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### **Interview**

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